NUCLEAR TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS

Created: 4/13/1961

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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NUCLEAR TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS

Soviet delegation has continued to accept only those Western concessions whichto previous Sovietwhile criticizing other proposals as unacceptable. At the conference session onpril, Chief Soviet delegate Tsarapkln announced acceptance of the Western plan formember control commissionof four representatives from the West, four from the bloc, and three from neutral countries.

He divided the remaining Western proposals into those which were still unacceptable and those which showed only an appearance of "movement." Xn the latter category he placed the moratorium on underground testing and the number ofposts to be set up in the USSR. He claimed, however, that the Western plan would leadituation ln which control posts would bein the Soviet Union after two years, while the US would be free to conduct undergroundear later, when the moratorium expired.

Onpril heinsistence thatposts be installedUSSR during aratherroposed by the West. delegate also saidinspections could bethe end of thiskeyissues hethe

to advocateattitudes.

The Soviet representative has adopted the familiar tactic of pressing for immediatein principle on the points accepted by Moscow, despite

significant areas ofon details. The Soviet delegation urged the Western powers to indicate that general agreement has been reachedermanent ban of high-altitude testing, on internal inspection of nuclear devices used in the research program for improving detection methods and in the peaceful uses program, andeto over the total budget for the control system and the composition of the control

Onpril he claimed that recording agreement on these items would be of "enormous significance" and demonstrate that the conference was making progress. Soviet propaganda has used Western refusal to stress that the West bears the responsibility for leading the talks into an impasse.

The current Soviet tactic of picking certain points for agreement without offering new counterproposals on unresolved issues suggests that the Soviet leaders feel further Western concessions can be obtained. Press reportsa "high Communistsource" as stating thateek or ten days Moscow willenerally unfavorable reply to the over-all Western plan, persist ln its opposition ton-site Inspections each year in the USSR, and Insistripartite council for administering the control system.

Soviet diplomats have hinted privately, however, that amight be arranged. ompromise might take the form of an explicit Sovietthat the veto ln the proposed tripartite council would not apply to on-site

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inspections within the agreed quota, in exchange for Western agreement to scale down the number of inspections for the Soviet Union.

A member of the Soviet delegationesternthat the real sticking point was not theripartitecouncil but thequota. He claimed that the USSR had previously given

up veto rights over on-siteand that in return the US should give up something on the number of Inspections.

In an off-tho-recordwith CBS correspondent Schorrpril, Tsarapkiniberal interpretation of the Soviet tripartiteimplying there would be no Soviet veto over inspections. While asserting that the USSR would adhere to Its proposal, he claimed that this would not reduce the effectiveness of the control procedures,equest for inspection by any treaty member wouldraault in the dispatching of an on-site Inspection team. When the tripartite plan was originally introduced, Tsarapkin stated that decisions would have to be unanimous.

Tsarapkin also said Prench tests would "hamper" theand pointed out that he had chosen this wordrathertronger term which would imply ain the conference. The Czech foreign minister, in an

Interview with UPI, also used the same language to describe the effect of further French testing, which suggests that the bloc Is attempting to soften tbe Impact of Moscow's original charge at the conferencerench teat wouldreaty "pointless."

Tsarapkin's more moderate line in this conversationthat the USSR may bethat the conference will break down over Its tripartite proposal, and that the Soviet leaders are attempting to give the Western powers some assurance that the proposal Is subject to modification. At the same time, the Soviet leaders may beto convince the West that the next French testa will not be usedretextoviet walkout.

Soviet propagandaof tbe conference, however, continues to be highlyVice PrealdentJohnson and the|

delegations

Pravdapril as demanding acceptance of Western proposals in an extremely ultlmativewith the implication that the West will break off the talks if the Soviets do not agree. Pravda claimedampaign was developing in the West aimed at "wracking theenator Gore's message to the President was cited aa support for the contention.

Newsweek magazine was also

cited as disclosing that the basic task of the Westernwas how to end tbe talks

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WEEKLY REVIEW

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without giving the USSR the propaganda advantage. Izvestia on 10 April also emphasized these charges, while noting

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