NUCLEAR TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS

Created: 3/30/1961

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Soviet delegationvirtual silenceGeneva conference butthat Moscow willa conprehenslve replynew Western proposals. discussionsarch, chief SovietTsarapkln urgedto be patient and awaitresponse titer the

development or their proposals. He told the ambassador that be would continue to listen to the American plans withand that the USSR was anxious to bring about aconclusion to the negotiations.

In the conference session onarch, Tsarapklnthe Soviet delegation's intention to wait until the end of thepresentation bexore commenting

ln detail. He claimed that since the US position appeared topackage" proposal, an analysis and evaluation of individual points could not be given until conclusion of the Western explanations.

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rivatewith theelegate onarch, isarapai avoided any comment on tbe Western proposals but repeated his familiar line that tbe

USSR had made all the He claimed that the Soviet proposals would be adequate toest ban; hean as

a measure of "extremely limitedtating that any treaty would be anin international control, and should therefore begin withinimum of control

irapkln agreed with the [suggestion that the layarget date forreaty, but only if the Soviet terms were accepted. He made only brief mention of the Soviet proposalripartite administrative

council to supervise thesystem, and madeto Frenchthe

inpresuiuD OR CM Soviet delegation was prepared to continue negotiations through the summer,

The only substantive point raised by Tsarapkln at theconcerned freedom of action of the three powers to resume small underground tests when the voluntary moratorium on these tests expired. the probable line of attack on this issue, be asked whetbor the American proposals admitted the possibility ofunderground testa at that time. The USSR hasinsisted that the three powers should not be automatically free to do so.

A member of the Soviet delegation has also indicated privately that it will insist that there be onlyontrol posts for the USSR, rather than theroposed by the West, and will hold out for Soviet representation on the Inspection teams. He stated that the Soviet delegation regarded the new American proposals as bargaining counters.

Outside the conference, Tsarapkln has continued his sharp criticism of the new American1 s.

In anCBS

correspondent onarch, he stated that the Westerncontained little new and showed that the USto hold an unacceptable position on such questions as the number of on-site inspections, the staffing of control posts and on-site inspection teams, and the scientific criteria for determining which detected seismic events qualified for on-site inspection. He applied the same term to the USon the number of control posts ln the USSR, theof the moratorium on small underground tests,num-of other questions."

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Tsarapkinimilar line in an intervieworrespondent of the Italian Communist newspaper L'Unita onarch. In an interviewepresentative of the Polish press service onarch, he subdivided the American plan into three parts: uestions on which the US takes the same attitude as in the past;ertain issues on which the West bashort step forward, andhose points on which the West approached the Soviet compromise proposals, without spelling out theissues, Tsarapkin declared that even the rare concession seemed "illusory" and qualified by numerous conditions and reservations.

Communist sources inhave also echoed Tsarapkin's pessimism. An Izyestlatold an Americanthat tbe Soviet Union would have to put the whole test ban negotiations into tbe framework of complete anddisarmament "if tbefailed to produce some other useful ideas." AItalian Communist reported tbat Tsarapkin,rivate conversation, belittled the Western concessions and stated that things looked bad for the success of the conference.

Tsarapkin has also used press interviews to repeat his warning on the "negative effect" of continued French testing and to underscore the importance of tbe Soviet proposalsripartite administrator for the control system. In the Polish press service interview he repeated his statement, given at the opening session, on tbe "negative influence" of French testing on the Tsarapkin stated that continued testing by France "would render questionable the efficacy of an agreement." He told CBS that French tests threatened to nullify theofreaty. In privateember of

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the Soviet delegation pointed out, however, that thesedid not pose anyfor further negotiations.

On the questionhree-member administrative council, Taarapkln termed it aproblem" and "of paramount Importance." Ambassador Thompson believes that the Soviet planhree-member secretariat to replace the UN Secretariat has become basic Soviet policy and that Moscow, therefore, will probably maintain its position on the three-member council toest ban even to the pointreakdown in tbe talks at Geneva.

The volume of Sovietcommentary on thelast week was higher than for any week since thebegan ln the fall Peiping has remainedon the negotiations. The revised Western proposals were broadly characterized by Soviet propagandists as "nothingidely broadcast comment claimed they were intended as "psychological preparation for torpedoing" the talks. Moscow's commentators have also reported, however, tbat the Sovietmust await the explanation of tbe Western plan before appraising the individual Wide publicity bas been given to the Soviet proposalripartite administrator and to Tsarapkln's warnings against further French testing.

Although there is nothreatoviet testnor any demand tbat France join theroadcast to France onarch claimed that an "effective"agreement is "hardly possible" so long as "one of tbe European great powers" continues testing. TASS onarchthe Soviet delegation had pointed out that French testing complicates not only the Geneva talks but the whole disarmament problem.

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