LETTER TO ROBERT KOMER FROM CHESTER L. COOPER RE RELATIONSHIP OF MAINLANDERS ON

Created: 4/10/1961

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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Mr.coer

Senior Staff Assistant

The National Security Council

The shits House

. C.

Dear Bob,

You ask aoout. such matters as the aorale andtion of the aairilar.ders on Taiwan and their relation with The Taiwanese. >wj have wrestled with thene questions time and tine ai;aln In our estimates, alwaysarling of inadequacy because of the difficulty of cosing to prlps arith oroblene of attitudesituation where, on the one hand, an officially imoosed myth lias sustained national purpose within Mainlander elite rroups, while on the other hand, the role of the bulk of the population, the Taiwanese, has been

largely one of passive resignation, rther ccinnounding

the diffioulty of discerning political meUvations has been the steady "mprovement of economic life on Taiwana

worthy developmenthas been largely

treated as Incidental by the iifiC leadership.

'lien we talk of the Mainland ar*ir aporaach toward Ch'na, Taiwan, and their own personalwe first sust ask,t valnlanders are ve lalkinf.Vidrossing ourselves first to the top echelon of the GRC {the Gjjno, his coterie, tho high-ranking military officers, sow* oflegislators, andJrTroi'o numbering not ranch morehousand, ife nay rind that the answers to these Questions lie more in thesychiatry !han In politics. 'Ihisespite the passage of time and constant frustrations andstill appear to regard its residence on Taiwan ss temporary. Although in their heart of hearts some of them may feel (as George Teh is reported to have aaid) that "they will live oat thfir days onroap, they aist oa.int.ain Ihe hope and mystique or Heturn. So lone as the awful moment of truth does not confront thwrn, they tTSto grasp and magnify any indication of dissldence on the Ma inlandl*yi of pro-Ch.'ang sentlawait and aJbr everything they have done and all the sacrifices

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they have made, over the part decode. Thef truth will take piece if and when thetakes action, either congominp the ITS or the offshore islands, which the GflC would interpret as unequivocal IK> Supportwo-China arrangement, oat will happen when these people first face the shambles of their hope? and Jispiratlons is,ave said, probably asroblem for the psychiatrists as it is for the political analyst. That the GRC will goeriod of trauma is eortaini how lone this will last and what its aftermath will be is store difficult to predict. ew things cansaid with snaerc will no larredefections on the part of this fT-oup to theany of them, Jf they have the wherewithall and have had the foresight, might leave Taiwan for mich places as Westchester County or Qeneva; those that remain will. In time, (depending largely on the extent andof Americanguarantees and proHises of additional economic supjort) will workersonal and croup modus vivendi on Taiwan, Substantial, firm guarantees and additional 'JS commitments would have to be given, and proaptly. 3ut as wsj have estimated all along, thef hope for Return weld noty and automaticallyimple fold-up of non-Communist rule on Taiwan.

What of the middlenese Natienalirt society? (the lower ranking military types, theand civil servants, the professional class, the intellectuals, the business-nen). It irrrild appear that thlfile going along ont of necessity, or expediency, (perhapsertain amount of self-delision as well) with theiryatloue, has, over the past -evmrsl years,sy.-holnglcal, economic, and social adjustment to life on Taiwan. There are important variants, of course: theive faredworse than the businessmen (it's been the same In rrrany of tie civil servants are underemployed and therefore restless. While this group would noto stay on Taiwan If they could ret-.tm to the Mainland under favorable circumstances, most of then orobanly rr-alize thathoice is not ooen to them. If facedore realistic choice, remaining on Taiwan or returningheat substantial r'sk of life and treasure, nost of them, would probabX*'" prefer to remain where they were, recognising that the probability of their hv'r.r. able to lead secure and comfortable lives rm the Mainland wop not sufficiently high to compensate for the sacrifices 'nvolved in patting there. arge

'ority of this grw> tflere mightreat sense of reliefhoice weref they could shed once

and *or all the schizophrenic apnroach to their future and establish permanent rootslace which, although was not their ancestral none, was nonetheless not alien to them.

Finally, there is the fcrcup on the lower end of theand social scale (the soldiers and the assorted coolies servants, and camp followers who found themselves caught up in the evacuation of the Mainland). o not know thetions of thisoubt that anyone does. 'V far the largest number had no wiah to le; ve the lia inland and had no etroriS political convictions at the tine of their evacuation (nor do they probably have now), ould guess that the relatively favorable economic ciroims*anceo of the civilian elment in this group and the stories they hear of theand austere life on the mainland would probably stake them disposed to remain on the island. Although most o' them left their families behind, some have carried Taiwanese and, with the passage of tiae, might establish substantial roots. Airy morale would depend pretty much on their antl-Sommun^ot orientation, on the level of discipline, and the avallaoillty of amenities. These factors need not necessarily he affected if the Army's mission was entirely ftreated toward the doferse of Taiwan. It is worth noting in this connection, that nore thanercent of the enliatod strength of the GRC forces is no* Taiwanese.

' ns! pa oetween tea inlander: ami the Taiwanese are cool rather thon intimate. Tna Taiwanese, of course, have their share of Thereesidue of hoe till left frcwi the early harsh andya whan the nationalists had pretty muchover the island as an occupying power, eventhe Taiwanese ruite clearly do not have their share of good jobs, ilaees in tbe university, or influence in the governcent. This is not to say that many of then haven't irproved their lot in the post ten years. SSoi'ldtionaJistB look inward toward Taiwan rather Ihun outward toward the Hetaland, the concentration of the country'i resources and foreign assiftance on lenc-run de-elocmewit and the undivided attention of the government on the problems of Taiwan itself mitfit leadloser cooperation between the two segments of tue community. On the othert is conceivable 'hat the Taiwanese are presently tolerating the ^Inlanders tn tha hope that their reticence is merely tennorary and that in due course the Taiwan- se will De their own mastere.

Too nek importance can re attached toriction brtweennlanders and the Taiwanese, One

ahcild not. ferfet that the Chines* generally ere closely bound to their ancestral areas andantonese has always (prebablv still does) regarded someone from another part of the country with suspicion and even hostility. The Taiwanese are looked upon pretty much as people from another province of China rather than an alien people and, in tiae, especially with Increasinghe feeling of apartness may be dissipated. In the list analysis, the rViinlanders (because of their political power, control of the security apoaratus, and wealth) probably will continue to have the lending role in the political andife of Taiwan. Tha extent to wiiich This con'rol 's maintainedpirit of cooperation rather 'nan oy force,pry much depend on the attitude of the ioiinlacdrrs themselves.

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