Created: 4/28/1961

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Bo Kst Dcsfroy


(Reference Title: CAESAR




Thisorking paper. It traces chronologicallyoi aspects of Soviet policy toward colonialthe countries regarded by Moscow as having achieveddegrees of independence from "imperialism." TheStudies Group would welcome comment on thiswrote the paper, or to the

actlnc coordinator of the group, in9 *'M" Building




Moscow's preoccupation in theith the task of reconstructing the Soviet homeland, with theof Eastern Europe into the bloc, and within Westernmain focus of East-Westa decadeynamic policy in peripheral areas: non-Communist Asia, Africa, and Latin America. on numerous public occasions Lenin and Stalin hadgreat optimism over trends in colonial areas,agitation and Soviet action in theseWorld War II shattered the existing social structure in large sections of Asia and speeded up the tempo ofeconomic, and social changeorld-widehad been singularly unsuccessful.

The USSR's failure in5 toold program to capture or guide the anticolonialist movements which had matured during the war,reflected not only the Soviet Union's desire not to embitter relations with the West on secondary matters, but also uncertainty as to the reliability of non-Communist leaders and movements and the general lackoviet "presence." Stalin apparently evaluated the newas transitory, soon to give way before popularin an inevitable evolution of political power to the left. The worsening of Soviet relations with the West was accompaniedtiffening of Moscow's line in Asia. With the founding of the Cominform inoderation toward non-Communists was repudiatedwhich was reflected8 in the widespread outbreak of Communist-led strike violence, terrorism, and armednot only in remaining colonial areas but also In the newly independent states of Asia. The Kremlin apparently believed that nothing further could be gained by Communist restraint or conciliation, and this view was abetted bysuccesses in China andonsistent overvaluation of Communist party prospects elsewhere in Asia. Asianparties, following Moscow's lead, began freely toa "Chinese way" for the anticolonialist movement; in essence this meant the encouragement of peasant and workers' armeds well as intensified political struggle. The subsequent suppression of Communist-inspiredwith the notable exception ofheavy losses to Communist assetserious setback to Moscow's general line that the time was ripe for revolutionary upheavals in As

The world-wide crisis touched off in0 by the Soviet-sponsored invasion of South Korea prompted the USSR to mobilize world Communist and non-Communist "peace" forces in support of its Korean policy. Moscow, however, was slow in recognizing the extent to which antiwar sentiment and "neutralism" could be turned against the West; even after the war turnedilitary and political stalemate and the Soviet Union's general attitude toward Asiangovernments moderated, Stalin continued to rebuff neutralist efforts to bringompromise.

1 ECAFE meeting in Singapore, Soviet delegates, in an abrupt reversal of their previous tactics, offered to holp promote the economic development of Asian countries by exchanging Soviet machinery for local raw At the UN, the Soviet Union's consistent anti-Westernism now was combined with limited overtures to non-Western delegations, hange reflected also in Soviet world-wide diplomaticthat Moscow had upgradod the possibilities for expanding its influence through traditional government-to-government channels. The extensive buildup given the Moscow Economic Conference (sponsored by the World Peace Council) inhat Stalin also looked to increasedromising avenue for breaking out of the USSR's semi-isolation. The2 alsohift toward greater Soviet diplomatic and propaganda support for the Arabs against Israel, to the encouragement of Arab extremists.last major theoretical pronouncements pointedreater emphasis on exploiting divergencies of interestthe industrially developed Western powers and thedeveloped or undeveloped "capitalistut his continued rejectionettlement on Korea actedowerful brake on Soviet efforts toriendship campaign rolling.

Stalin's successors reaffirmed his goals but discarded his methods and attempted to bringimitedin relations with the non-Communist world. Theeffect of minor steps undertaken by Soviet leaders in the six months following Stalin's death made it apparentundamental reorientation of Soviet tactics towardcountries was in progress. For the first time the Soviet Union announced itsto contribute to the UN's technical assistance program, and

Soviet Premier Malcnkovgood neighbor" policy andew approach" on economic aid to Asian countries.

The USSR's subsequent economic overtures attempted to play on local popular and governmental concern over export markets and desires for rapid economic development. main attontlon in34 was to Asia,interest in the Arab world increased with the new tempo of political, economic, and social change in the area. The Soviet Union paid little heed to non-Arab Africa or to Latintacit admission that they were more or lessscaled off from its influence.

A Moscow-directed world "peace" campaign, under way0 in an attempt to exploit the universal fear of atomic warfare and generate pressures against military or political cooperation with the West, was intensifiedhe USSR extended diplomatic and propaganda support toinvolved in disputes with the West on territorialand other matters and stepped up its efforts to introduce detachments of Soviet specialists and technicians into Asian and Arab countries. The Soviet Union's tactical support for nationalist regimes such as those of Nehru, Sukarno, and Nasir was based on the expectation that their greater self-assurance and self-expression would have the net effect of reducing Wostern influence and,egree, discrediting Western leadership.

The USSR's Intention toloser working agreement with Asian and Arab nationalist regimes was made clear by its5 agreement to help finance and construct astool plant at Bhilai, India, and by the fervor of its efforts to identify Itself with the views and objectives of the neutralist-convened conferenco of Asian and Africanat Bandung in Moscow's attempts toits public posture to neutralist-nationalistwas underlined dramatically in connection with the June visit to the USSR of Indian Prime Minister Nehru; havingattackod him for his anti-Communist and "pro-imperialist" policies, Moscow now praised him for bis "spiritual" andleadership of Asia.

On the eve of5 Geneva summit conference, the USSR's "posture of peace" appeared to hold out the promise Of an improvement in East-West relationseneral

reduction of international tension, not just in Europe but throughout the world. Concurrent with conciliatory moves, however, the Soviet Union set inhain of secret arms negotiationsroup of Asian and Arab statesto offset pro-Western alliances in theactic surfaced with the announcement that September of Cairo's arms deal with the bloc.

The Bulganian-Khrushchev visit to Asia in November and5 was Moscow's first big chance to bid foramong Asian peoples. The two leaders dropped their Geneva smiles and attempted to give Asianore anti-Western slant by identifying the USSR with Asian neutral ist aims and "peace" and the West with "colonialism" and Agreements on increased trade, technical and cultural exchanges, and credits reached during the tour laid the groundworkonsiderable subsequent expansion of Soviet influence in the area.

Theh party congress in6 sought to create the impressionew era wasbright with prospects of Communist victories. new formulations of the congress were intended to add credibility to the Soviet Union's general line of "peaceful coexistence" and to facilitate long-term cooperation between the USSR and non-Communist countries. Khrushchev confirmed that aid to Asian, African, and Latin American countries for theirpolitical, and cultural development was an important plank in Soviet foreign policy, designed to provide "astumbling block" to imperialism.

Zn the series of crises touched off by the collapse in6 of Cairo's negotiations for Western economicto build an Aswan high dam and Nasir's swiftof the Suez Canal Company, Moscow encouraged Cairo to resist Western demands. The Soviet Union'sand propaganda footwork following the attack on Egypt was intended to halt the fighting and embarrass thecountries without committing the USSR to all-out support of Nasir. After the cease-fire, Communist propagandists feasted on this "evidence" of imperialist intervention and magnified the Soviet role as protector of Arab interests.

Moscow's efforts in7 to distract worldfrom bloc internal troubles centeredampaign to counter President Eisenhower's "Middleo frustrate the extension of pro-Western defense

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arrangements and to protect the newly won Soviet influence in some of the Arab countries. The Soviet Union's ownforeign economic program could point to increasedand economic contacts both in Asia and in the Arab states, to dozens of new trade agreements with non-Communist countries, andenerally enhanced impression that the USSRerious economic as well as political competitor with tho West. andful of countries, however, had agreed to extensive programs of Soviet economic and military aid or of economic aid alone.

Following the frustration in7 of efforts by the "anti-party" group to break bis control of the Soviet government and party, Khrushchev led the USSR into bolder foreign moves. acade of Soviet security interest in Syrian developments and in the context of intensepressures following Soviet tests of an intercontinental ballistic missile and claimsew world balance of power, Moscow set out to test Western reactions and Western resolution. After two months of efforts toand prolong world fears over Syria, the USSR's abrupt reversal reflected apparent disappointment that it was the Arabthan thebuckled under East-West pressures.

Theh anniversary celebrations and subsequent meetings of world Communist parties inn effort to make direct political and propaganda capital out of changes wrought domestically andin the years of Soviet rule. The essence of the new formal policy pronouncementsall for an intensified struggle by all anti-imperialist elements against Western influence, with top priority to peace forcesrive against the manufacture, test, or use of nuclear weapons. The practical effect of the party discussions on Sovietwas slight, with the USSR continuing to professto enter into reasonable agreements with the West and to assist politically and economically in the development of countries seeking to break away from dependence on the West.

Moscow8 riding the wave of optimism engendered by World-wide reaction to its military and space achievements, and it appeared to count on the cumulative effect over aof years of the bloc's political, economic, and military aidwith people-to-people contacts, intensive

propaganda, and growing localrowing number of the underdeveloped countries materially dependent on the bloc and politically tractable. However, Nasir's procipltous moveerger of Egypt and Syria pointed up the Soviet problem of maintaining good statewith nationalist governments while supporting the spread of Communist agitation and organization. The Soviet: Union ended by grudgingly accepting the formation of theits disastrous effects on the Syrian Communistturned its attention to heading off any rapprochement between Nasir and the Wost, on the one hand by increasing itsand military support to Cairo and on the other byto fan anti-Western sentiment among tho Arab populace.

The USSR's vigorous reaction to the Iraqi revolt on8 and the subsequent American and British landings in Lebanon and Jordan reflected Soviet concern that these movesreludeeneral Western counteroffensive against Soviet and UAR interests in the lliddle East. As in the earlier Syrian crisB, Moscow attempted to intensify the air of crisis, to discredit Western moves, and to force an immediate big-power conference to bringetente. The Soviet Union moved rapidly to develop close relations with the new Iraqi regime, evidently viewing it as an effective instrument for promoting anti-Western sentiment among Arabs. Anti-leftist coups in the fall8 in Pakistan, Burma, and Thailand prompted Moscow to urge on the peoples andof the underdevelopedore resolute stand against reactionary influences, both domestic and

Att party congress in9 Khrushchevspotlighted ideological and political differences which had arlson in Moscow's political, economic, andsupport of solected non-Communistbased principally on parallel anti-Western interests rather than on compatible ideologies or common long-term goals. Khrushchev implied Soviet demands in the future for moresupport of Soviet foreign policy in exchange forfavors. The congress' endorsementore active line in underdeveloped countries was reflected In signs of aand deepening of Soviet attention to African affairs and of attempts to step up economic, diplomatic, and cultural contacts with Latin American countries. The general strategy outlined at the congress reflected the USSR's apparent belief

that the stalemate in East-West relations facilitated rather than hampered lis policy ofedge botweon theand neutralist camps; support for the latter wason tho basis that the conduct of the neutralists showed them to be supporters of peace and "well-disposed" toward the bloc.

Innder the exigencies of its drive for detente with the West and in reaction to unfavorable developments key underdeveloped countries, the Soviet Union temporarily set aside its activist line in favor of overtures forfriendly govornment-to-government relations. Moscowhoped that Khrushchev's trip to the United States would help build Irresistible popular pressure for an oarly summit meeting and pave the way for Western concessions.disarmament initiative at the General Assemblyin New York, which included the promise of vastlyeconomic assistance to Asia, Africa, and Latin America from both the bloc and the West once the arms raco was over,ransparent bid for support for immediate talks on.

ifferent vain, Mikoyan's9 visit to Mexico pointed up the new stage in Soviet efforts to exploit the economic difficulties of Latin American countries in the direction of expanded trade and other ties with the bloc; Mikoyan's visit to Cuba in0 reinforced this tactic; at the same time it called attention to Moscow'sthat Castro's anti-Americanism opened an unprecedented opportunity for expanding Soviet influence throughout Latin America. Khrushchev's own highly publicized Asian trip in February and0 probably was intended to bait tho erosion of Soviet influence and popularity, which had suffered particularlyesult of friction between Peiping andFar Eastern capitals, and generally to shore up Sovietand prostige.

Khrushchev's disruption of the Paris talks in0 apparently in reaction toncident and the dimming of prospects for Western concessions on any of the majorInternational issues,ajor effort by Soviet spokesmen to absolve the USSR of any blame and totho world public that the United States alone was ncident was usedretext for ato frighten America's allies into restricting the use,

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and pressing for the evacuation, of American bases from their territory under the threatoviet strike in the event of their use by any future invader of Soviet air space. Released at least temporarily from inhibitions deriving from thefor negotiations with the US, the Soviet Governmentold line on Cuba which went well beyond any previous Soviet move in Latin America, althoughuly threat to use rockets against the US in the event of "Pentagon" intervention in Cuba wasluff to impressLatin America with the might and daring of the Soviet Union. The stronger line was also evident in Moscow'sof thencident and its breaking off disarmament talks.

Moscow seized on the crisis in the Congo following its achievement of independence onuneindfall tothe West not only in the Congo but throughout Africa and tooviet presence through heavy support to Lumumba-controlled elements in the Leopoldville government. Khrushchev's pledge of unilateral aid wasashion to 'undermine the UN program, which came under heavy Soviet attack for "improperly" supportinginterests. Mobutu'september order expelling all bloc diplomats and technicians brought the USSR's Congoto an abrupt halt and forced the Soviet Union to fall back on diplomatic and propaganda exploitation of the continuing political, economic, and military chaos.

Khrushchev's performance ath General Assembly session in New York in September andhichto keep the ideaummit meeting at the forefront of world public opinicn at the same time that Moscow continued to play up situations making an early meeting of Soviet and American leaders seem imperative, was an effort to influence the countries of non-bloc Asia, Africa, and Latinsingly and ina heightened assault on colonialism. Khrushchev's official and unofficial conduct, and Soviet maneuvers generally, added upajor effort to impress on the leaders of these countries that in theears since World War II there hadundamental change in the world balance offact which had not yet been reflected proportionately either in the policies of their individual governments or in the structure and operations of the UN.

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In sum, the assumption underlying Moscow's policy toward the underdevelopedwhich it has clung despite heavy pressures from both inside and outside thethat the world is passing through an interim period ofbut fairly short duration,ecade, during which political, economic, and ideological forces now in motion will bringasically new world situation: the predominance of "socialism." Changes within Asian,and Latin American countries will reflect theof world forces, resultingradual elimination of political, economic, and ideological tics with the Vest. In this period, growing bloc economic and political support to underdeveloped countries will help their governmentsa neutrality increasingly friendly to the bloc andopposed to Western policies and interests.


Moscow's preoccupation in the immediate postwar years with the massive task of reconstructing the Soviet homeland, with the incorporation of Eastern Europe into the bloc, and with crucial developments in Westernprincipal focus of East-Westa dynamic policy in peripheral areas: non-Communist Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Nevertheless, the extreme fluidity of the Asian political scene aroused Moscow's revolutionary optimism and called for an updating and clarification of its views onworld prospects. Although Stalin at every partysince the earlyLenin had beforeofficial optimism over developments in "the colonialommunist agitation and Soviet meddling in the affairs of non-Communist Asia, Africa, and Latin America had in fact been singularly unsuccessful. World War II, by shattering the existing social structure in large areas of Asia and speeding up the tempo of political, economic, and social changemost of the world,-opened new vistas for the expansion of Soviet influence.

Moscow's failure at the end of the war to steplear-cut strategy to guide or capture anti-colonial, anti-Western movements, reflected the USSR's desire not to embitter relations with the West on matters which it considered secondary to the overriding necessity ofuitable settlement in Europe. It turned also onin top Soviet circles whether to cooperate with non-Communist leaders andon whattolocal Communists to attempt to seize power. Theof solid information, the lackovietecord studded with overenthusiastic appraisals of anti-colonial developments all counseled caution. Although Lenin's vaunted thesis that the capitalist chain could be broken at its weakestareas under "imperialistand Stalin's formula for overcoming imperialism byits colonial "rear" were considered still valid, neither servedractical guide for Soviet policy in this period of widespread revolutionary change.

Whatever Soviet intentions concerning exploitation of the chaotic and near-chaotic conditions in South and Southeast Asia, Moscow was stymied by the fact that relations between local

Communist and non-Communist independenceif ever,been embittered in most areas over the

issue of wartime support for the Allies. nd subsequent concentration on Popular Front tactics inviewed fascismore pressing danger thancontributed to the estrangement offrom incipient nationalist movements by committing Moscow to collaboration with the Western colonial powers. Stalin's pact with Hitler removed these inhibitions, butGermany's attack on the Soviet Union inhe virulent anticolonial campaign was suddenly moderated by the requirements of the wartime alliance. With the Japanesethe two-front struggle of Communists and nationalists against the colonialoacha new peak of intensity.

Moscow, in no position to influence local developments by effective material or political aid,teady stream of charges against British, French, and Dutch military actions undertaken in an effort to maintain their colonial positions, but its attitude toward non-Communist movements coming to power in the new Asian states vacillated. Moscow was publicly cool toward their leaders, and Soviet spokesmen questioned the "genuineness" of their anticolonialism, in light of the compromises which had made early independence pos sible. Well into the postwar period, Moscow continued toAsian developments in terms of ever-deterioratingand economic conditions and openly predicted thatgovernments and their programs would soon give way before the inevitable evolution of political power to the left. Stalin not only minimized the immediate prospects of Asian nationalist movements, but he apparently also entertained hopes that different views on colonialism, combined witheconomic self-interests, would leaderious rift between the United States and its Western colleagues. onsequence of these views, Soviet propaganda downplayed the American role in attempting to stabilize areas recently freed from Japanese occupation, concentrating its attacks on other Western powers active in Asia.

Moscow's unsure diplomatic hand was reflected in disagree ment in top Soviet academic circles as to the meaning of the changes brought about in the colonial world by war. Unanimous only in their appraisals that "tremendous" and "revolutionary" developments had taken and were taking place, Soviet scholars

and publicists, in the absence of firm guidance from the top, arrived at no consensus which would fit the needs of Soviet policy.

Their considerable differences were underlined by the controversy which sprang up over thef Changes in the Economy of Capitalism Resulting From the Second World War by Moscow's leading politico-economic theoretician, Academician Eugene S. Varga. Varga's monumental survey of the war's effects on world capitalism, including an attempt to assess the "far-reaching changes in thebetween the colonies and the motheroncluded that on the basis of industrial development and lesseneddependence, the war years irrevocably had reduced the economic dependence of the majority of the colonies on their metropolises. Varga, in company with other Soviet analysts, cited the growth of an industrial proletariathole series of colonies and the supply of arms to colonial peoples during thepart of which they were able to retain and use for the creation of revolutionaryfactors facilitating the development of Communist influence.

Although Varga's views found considerable support, the implications of his favorable appraisal of economicin the capitalist world were increasingly unacceptable as cold war tensions mounted. Public rebuttal of Varga's views was considered necessary. Published discussionsoint conference of Economics Institute and Moscow University theoreticians in7 reflected Soviet hostility toward both the Western powers and the Asian nationalist movements. Varga's findings on the degree of economic independenceby certain colonies and "semi-colonies" (imperialist "dependencies" such as the Latin American countries) were challenged, and it was deniedasis had been laid in some colonies for independent economic development. Although the regime-sponsored counterattack on Varga served notice that the area for individual interpretation of world events had narrowed considerably, both Varga supporters and Vargadisplayed uncertainty toward developments in Asia, finding as much to condemn as to praise in the current scene.

The founding of the Cominform in7 marked the conclusive repudiation of moderationine to betoward non-Communists. Zhdanov's keynote speechthe extent to which Moscow was to commit itself to the


doctrine of two antagonistic world systems, completelythe possibilityhird, or neutralist, position. Zhdanov's speech and the early Cominform propaganda had little to say about Asia and served to underline the fact that Moscow primary concern remained withavorable,settlement of European issues. Asian Communist partieshort time began to reflect this harsher line and toore vigorous assault on remaining Western colonial interests and on non-Communist Asian nationalist parties. The8 was markedidespread outbreak of Communist-led strike violence, terrorism, and armed rebellions not only in thecolonies, but also in the newly independent states. Moscow's encouragement of such tactics apparently stemmed from the belief that nothing further could be gained by Coamunist restraint toward the West nor from additional attempts tonon-Communist Asianiew abetted by Communist successes in China and by consistent overevaluation of Communist party prospects elsewhere in Asia.

An obvious effort was made to exploit Chinese prestige which ballooned in Asia on the heels of8 military Asian Communist parties, following Moscow's lead,freely toChinese way" as properstrategy for Asia. The content of this "Chinese way" was not spelled out, but in essence it meant the encouragement of armed revolts by peasants and workers, as well aspolitical struggle to draw additional elements of the national bourgeoisie into the "anti-imperialist" struggle. The foundering of thisevidenced by the general sup pression of the Communist-inspired revolts with heavy and in some places catastrophic losses to local Communist assets, with the notable exception ofa serious setback to Moscow's general line that the time was ripe for revolution ary upheavals in Asia.

Post mortems on failures of the resort to openthe editorial in the9 issue of Problems ofthe degree of cooperation "exposed" between area governments and the "colonialists" and freelyeneral deterioration of the Asian political situation which would give Communist parties another chance under morecircumstances. Soviet scholars were charged withtheir efforts on the support of Soviet andgoals in Asia by greater attention to present-dayand to combatting the false theses of non-Communists.

Inhree-day meeting of Pacific and Orientalspecialists was held in Moscow to improve the content of Soviet propaganda on Asian developments and in June thereoint conference of the Pacific and Economics Institutes. The principal roport at both meetings was delivered by the director of the Pacific Institute, Acadomlcian Eugene M. Zhukov,op spokesman on Soviet Asian policy.

Tho proceedings of the two conferences point up thedoctrinal backing and filling which was going on in the Communist movement at this time. Having just sufferedat tho hands of the bourgeoisio In many of the new Asian states, Moscow was in no mood to examine dispassionatelyopportunities for playing up existing differences betweon the new statos and the West, and instead increased itsfrom Asian nationalist movements by heaping abuse on their leaders and ideologies. Zhukov, howover, made it clear that Moscow even then was less concerned with the social role of various capitalist elements in tho new Asian states than with the "main question":

the progrcssiveness of one social movement or another, the revolutionary nature or reactionary nature of one party or another, etermined by their relations with the Soviet Union, with the camp of democracy and socialism.

The conferees' exposition of an Asian strategy welding anti-imperial 1st intellectuals, petit-bourgeois, and middle-bourgeois olomontsilitant proletariat and peasantry largely ignored recent defeats of Communist-led insurrections and, becauso of "fundamental changes" caused by the war and the "new alignment of political forces" in Asia resulting from the Communist sweep of the Chinese mainland, consideredchances in Asia bright enough for the continued advocacy of violence. The general line continued that authoritatively set by Zhdanov at the founding of tho Cominform in SeptemberCommunist leadership of anti-imperialist coalitions and across-the-board attack on all evidence ofinfluence. Area Communist parties were slow in coming around to the Moscow-charted course; loss caught up inissues, they preferred to attack local class enemies. The Communist party of India, the most important inAsia following the suicidal uprising of the Indonesian partyas split into factions over the question whether

to continue peasant guerrilla warfare, which had failed in Telengana, or to retreat to more peaceful forms ofagitation in an attempt to win over dissatisfied elements in the Congress party. Cominform efforts to bring Asian Communist parties into line were pointed up by an editorial in its0 journal attacking those Indianparty leaders who continued to question the directof the "Chineso experience" to their ownfor power, and the Japanese Communist party for"peaceful revolution" for Asia.

On tho occasion ofh birthday, Professor I. I. Potekhin, rincipal spokesman on African affairs, summarized the Stalinist position on "Colonial Revolution and the National-Liberation Movement:"

Comrade Stalin warned, and the last quarterentury fully confirmed, that the complete and final victory of the colonial revolution isonly under the leadership of the proletariat. Petit-bourgeois nationalist organizations and parties have already proven their incapacity to accomplish national liberation. They limitto constitutional reforms and thoof formal, bourgeois democracy which do not and cannotomplete break from tho system of imperialism.

In Stalin's name, Potekhin went on to recordof the independence movement not only by the Chinese bourgeoisie, but also by the big bourgeoisie of India, the Philippines, and Kgypt.

The Moscow-created crisis touched off by the invasion of South Korea inhich quicklyolitical confrontation of the major powers,ew focus for Soviet Asian policy and pro-orapted attention from the other areas. Stalin's Korean gambit showed him at least temporarily willing to use Communist armed forces, at the veryriskeneral war, to achieve his political The move obviously stemmedonumentalof the Western mood.

Tho war made academic further discussions within theworld over hard or soft tactics to be followed in the anticolonial struggle. What counted now was the success of


local supporters in mobilizing Communist and non-Communist "ponce" forces in support of official positions. Tin? war also marked the final step in tho evolution of Communist propaganda toward singling out the United States as the principaloncmy, not only of Communist interests butof those of the independence movements as well' the attack on South Korea was initiatedesult of Moscow's estimateilitary shock bringing down one of the weak Western-oriented states in Asia wouldhain reaction of revolts elsewhere. By the summer1 it had become obvious that the fighting would continue deadlockedone side or the other was willing to take much greater risks.

With the drawinglose of the military phase of the war, Moscow began to back away from its previous line. The clasli of Korean policies had exposed considerable Asianfrom the West. Statements by Indian and Arabin particular, and voting records in the United Nations not hostile to bloc positions, pointed up the considerablewhich had dcvelopod between the "peace" policiesumber of Asian governments and those of the principal Western powers. In retrospect, Moscow, which had actedto organize world-wide condemnation of the UK effort in Korea, was slow in recognizing the extent to which antiwar sentiment and "neutralist" foreign policies of Asiangovernments could be turned against tho West, To tho end, Stalin rebuffed neutralist efforts to bring about aonroblem in which he was too personally and emotionally involved to permit even the tacit admission of error.

The transitionore peaceful stage in Communist and Soviet relations with the former colonies of Asia was gradual and uneven. The1 was markedonsiderableoff of Communist-led guerrilla wars inforrenewed emphasis on political agitation by tho local parties, but the changeover in tactics was notby unmistakable public signs such as those on their adoption in Bolshevik in1 commentedon the newly adopted program of the Indian Communist party which turned its back On further encouragement of peasantand set the party's primary purpose as the creationevolutionary bloc comprised not only of the working class and the peanantry. but also progressive elements of the

intelligentsia and of the Indian bourgeoisie. India hasbeen treatedpecial problem by Soviet If Moscow intended its endorsement of the Indianparty's shiftignal to Asian Communist parties generally, the message was slow in taking effect, for it was late2 before the last parties fell in line.

At the1 ECAFE meeting in Singapore thedelegates, in an abrupt reversal from their previous har-rassmcnt of participating Asian governments, offered tothe economic development of their countries by theof Soviet industrial machinery for local rawove which had all the earmarksropaganda gambit ratherolicy shift. Better evidence that Stalin'scircle of advisers had concluded there was littleof an early Communist victory in general Asian revolution, thus callingajor change in strategy, is presonted in the roporta of discussionsday conference in1 of Soviet Asian specialists of the Institute of Oriental Studies and of the party Central Committee's Academy of Social


Zhukov again fulfilled the role of regime spokesman. The burden of his argumentation was that Asian parties could not count on cooing to power everywhere through "revolutionarynd that tho main significance of the Chinesefor other Asian countries was its blending ofand anti-feudal elementsingle anti-lmperial1st front struggling toward independence. Resort to armsolitical tactic was not specifically disavowed, although it was considerably downgraded by the conference majority. With the pendulum now swinging in the direction of intensified political agitation, tho conforeoistruggled to give morecontent to the conceptoncapital1st path offor Asian countries, reopening the debates of thever the possibilities ofsocialist" order out of semi-feudal, semi-capitalist societies.

A desire toew stage in Soviet relations with non-Communist Asia was apparent in Moscow's behavior in the United Nations, where consistent anti-Westernism was combined with limited overtures to the small-countryapparent reflectionorldwide upgrading of possibilities forCommunist Influence by manipulating traditional methods of diplomacy. Greater Soviet attention to international and

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domestic developments having no immediate bearing on Soviet security or on the main arenas of East-West conflict wasin the appearanceymposium prepared by theof Economics on The Peoples of Latin America in the StrucKle Against Amor lean _Impe rial ism", the first significant monograph devoted to this subject in the postwar period. No tour do force such as6 work, this book inthe task at hand as the "unmasking of the economic,military, and ideological expansion of American impcrlal-sim" is typical of Soviet scholarship of the period: theof quotations from the classics of Marx-Lenin.-Stalin for original analysis and heavy dependence on second-handin the local Communist press. The2 Lenin anniversary speech of party theoretician Petr N. Pospelov, surveying the current "crisis of the entire colonial system of imperialism" in optimistic terms, claimed to see "hundreds of millions of formerly backward and suppressed people" now beginning to play an active political role, in fulfillmentnin's predictions.

That Stalin looked to increased economic contacts as one of tho promising avenues for breaking out of thetho USSR sufferedesult of its role in Korea is suggested by the Soviet buildup for the2 World Peace Council- sponsored Moscow .Economic Conference. Communist,and peace council groups throughout the world attemptod to drum up invitees, individual businessmen who might servo as future trade contacts or might serve as focuses for local agitation against Western trade controls. Moscow sought to stimulate interest in increased trade with the Soviet Unionew highly selective trade offers, overtures to establish comprehensive economic rolations, and 1lmitod offers ofassistance. Although infrequent offers to exchangeindustrial equipment and capital goods for raw materials and foodstuffs produced in the formor colonial areas had been made previously, they had met with general skepticism in view of Moscow's general hostility to non-Communist governments.

In seeking to expand trade and technical contacts, Moscow was acting from manifestly economic as well as political Tho USSR's desire to break the West's trade restrictions and open up Asia and Africa, if not Latin America as well, as sources of materials vital for Soviet strategic reserves and to facilitate its breakneck industrial expansion werecontributing factors. Despite heavy propaganda attention


controls, assorting that the Soviet Union no longereed for imports but could compote with the West on the basis of its own resources. Stalin heir-apparent Malonkov's report toh party congress which followed in2 cited the general povorty of the peoples of "colonial and dependent" areas anderiod of continuod decline in*the economy of the underdeveloped countries which, in combinationeneral shrinking of world markets for Western manufactured goods, would "drag down the economy of the capitalist worldead weight." Stalin's short concluding speech to thewas devoted exclusively to problems of the worldmovement, to exhorting more intense effort, and forthe faithful that greater successes were In the offing. Stalin and Halenkov's statements, in combination with Moscow's stepped-up political and economic overtures to the Asian and Arab states, suggested that the period of relativecome to an end. For obvious reasons, Moscow did not spell out its role in the intensifying troubles forecast for the capitalist world, but by implication, Communists would step up efforts to exploit political and economic differences whenever and wherever they appeared. In the2 General Assembly session,-Moscow moderated its previous stand on several minor measuresnited Nations economic assistance role. Stalin,hristmas "interview" with James Reston, declared himself in favor of Increasing economic and political relations, particularly with tho smaller Stalin's continued rejection of Indian efforts to bring about an East-West compromise on Korea, however, metedowerful brake to Soviet efforts to get its friendship campaign rolling. With the3 discovery of the "doctors'oscow's foreign countenance, mirroring Its domestic one, abruptly became more hostile.

Particularly during his last years, Stalin appeareda "dead hand" on Soviet policy with his inherentof all forces which were not under hischanges in Moscow's line, as also post-Koreamade in the face of radically changed Asiantook place with little or no influence fromStalin undertook with



Stalin's sudden demise shook the whole of Soviet society. Since Stalin dominated all aspects of Soviet policy--making and implementation, and since he had taken only rudimentary steps to prepare for an orderly succession, his abrupt departure left his successors as stunned as was the ordinarytiaon .and on the_defensive. . The unsteady coalition which now assumed command turned firsteduction ofwith the West in order toreathing spell for consolidating their collective authority as well as theirpositions.

First of all, tho new leaders sought to dispel the black clouds, domestic as well as international, generated during the dictator's final two months of rule, and to revitalize the moves made the preceding yearimited improvement in relations with the non-Communist, world. Molotov's funeral oration attempted to affirm the new regime's dedication to carryingStalinist peace-loving foreignhich he interpretedesire for the development of "cooperation" and "business ties" with all countries. Malenkov's speech to the Supreme Soviet onarchten days afterto reassure the Soviet people andhis Intent to pursue peace. By the end of March, Moscow haderies of minor moves and token, steps intended to clear the air of the hostility engendered earlier in the year and to support the genuineness of its professed desire for Improved relations with the West. umber of Sovietculminating in Bulganin's May Day speech emphasized the neededuction in the risk of war and called on the West to respond to Soviet peace overtures by abandoning the arms race and dismantling Western military bases close to Soviet territory.

As the new leadership became more confident of itsthe tempo of reform and improvisation in its foreign relations increased. In succession Moscow succeeded inrelations with Greece, Israel, and Canada. claims against Turkey were abandoned, and new efforts were made to increase diplomatic and trade contacts, especially with Asian and Arab states. The Soviet peace offensive brought diplomacy and propaganda to bearombination unknown in Stalin's day. In their handling of various international issues,

the new leadersonsiderable flexibilityarked Increase in sophistication as they sought by the very number and variety of their moves, many of which were merely the reversal of Stalin's gratuitous manifestations of ill will, to create the impressionajor shift of Soviet, policy in the direction of detente. Soviet diplomats abroadidespread demonstration of good fellowship for theircolleagues. The new leaders in Moscow, who stopped short of openly rejecting Stalin's methods in reaffirming his goals, dared privately to deplore "excesses" which had crept into Soviet foreign relationsesult of Stalin's personalof day-to-day diplomacy. The new more conciliatory features of Soviet foreign policy were Interpreted for the home audience as testimony of the Soviet Union's growingand strength. This synthetic official optimism was not accompanied by any appreciable let-up in Jonestichostile to the West, however.

In addition to the peace offensive, which occupied Moscow's primary attention, the regime stepped out in the direction of increased economic contacts with the whole capitalist world. At the Geneva meeting on East-West trade, Soviet officials toned down their propaganda role andarked business-llko approach to the discussions. 3 Kommunlst review of the major lines of Soviet economic policy placed Moscow squarely on the side of "widening economic cooperation andtrade relations with all countries" and for an over-all increase in International trade. At the same time, the author, A.eading Soviet economist, reiterated thelines of Moscow's attack on Western trade policies, which he held to be responsible for holding down the volume of trade, and on Western strategic commodity controls, which he wanted dropped In favor of the "re-establishmentinglemarket." Stepped-up efforts through diplomaticshowed that Moscow was looking toward an expanding exchange of goods with the major capitalist countries as well as with the Independent countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.


In July it became apparent that the new regime was pre>-pared to carry its overtures to the underdeveloped capitalist countries well beyond the limits Implied in earlier overtures. At theuly meeting of the UN Economic and Social Council, Soviet delegate Arutyunyan announced Moscow's willingness for the first time to contribute to the UN's technical assistance program. While attacking the Western approach to technical

assistance and repeating the standard Soviet position that elimination of Western trade restrictions Imposed on the weaker capitalist countries and the development of "normal trade" with all countries would do more to facilitate their economic development than any likely UN program, Axutyunyan nevertheless announced that the Soviet Union bad set aside four millionlater by token amounts from the Ukraine andthe UN's technical assistance program.* The impact of Moscow's offer was reduced by Arut-yunyan's grudgingis better to let them trade normally with other countries and get the money they need that way that to render them so-calledby the gradual realization that the "contribution" in effect could be spent only within the USSR or for services of Sovietabroad and did not conform to-the requirements of the UN program. The initial four million rubles,esult, went unused. The statement issued onn theofh Anniversary of Bolshevism, reflected the considerable degree to which the, regime was willing to link belief in the possibilityasting coexistence with the capitalist worldrive for increased economic ties with all countries.

The "good neighbor" policy which Malenkov advanced in3 speech to the Supreme Soviet,

The Soviet Union has no territorial claims against any state Differences in the social and economicannot serve as an obstacle to the strengthening of friendly

was intended to follow up Moscow's earlieras its well-publicized surrender of nuisance claims against Turkey andto pave the wayolder across-the-board approach to the newly independent states of Asia and Africa. Malenkov's remarks were keyedoassertlon of Soviet strength, which within two weeks were buttressed by public claims toof the hydrogen bomb, as part of an effort to reinvigor-ato the Communist movement, which had become somewhat lethargic

'Always constrained to show its policies as continuous and unchanging, Moscow laterNLtteupted to cover up its years of opposition to this program Dy falsely dating the inception of this program, insteadnd alleged the participation of the USSR, the Ukraine, and Belorussia from the beginning.



in tho absence of strong one-man leadership and under the debilitating influence of the concerted effort to play down outstanding differences between the two world power blocs.

The drive by Stalin's successors for "reducingtension" had helped reduce the diploaatic-seral-isolation Moscow had sufferedesult of the Koreanand had succeeded in part in reducing pressure onpositions both in Europe and in the Far East, but it had failed to attract Western concessions. Moreover, the peace offensive wasuitable vehicle for helping to create the impressionSSR rapidly growing inprestige andimpression which Communist leaders from the early days of the revolution had recognized as vitally necessary both to Moscow and to the worldmovement. The new foreign policy course indicated by Malenkov represented not soreak with Stalinistas itejection of Stalinist tactics and the recognition that improved government-to-government relations would place the USSRetter position totrong global policy. The cumulative effect of the minor movesby Moscow over the preceding five months madeundamental reorientation of Soviet tacticsthe underdeveloped countries had been decided on.

The3 appearance of academician Eugene Varga's Basic Problems of the Economics and Politics of Imperialism After the Second World War, which according to the author was preparedonn light of Stalin's Problems of Socialism andh party congress discussions,authoritative summary of the world views inherited by the regime. Varga's analysis harped on the coming disintegration of Western Imperialism through failure to overcome Internal and external "contradictions" andno great role to built-in antagonism between newlyAsian-African states and the West. Instead, he dwelled on rivalries among imperialist powers for influence and markets in colonial and formerly colonial areas andthat the principal goal of American foreign policy was the economic and territorial redistribution of colonialof the world to its ownprocess hewell under way. Varga also repeated the standard charge that "rotten compromises" between local bourgeoisand Western imperialist states had postponed theconclusion of the "national-liberation" struggle over much

of Asia. Varga's work did not reflect the evolution which had begunreat accommodation of Moscow's policies toward prevailing moods in the underdeveloped countries norationale for the new tack. It did, however,ocusimited re-evaluation of Moscow's views on "colonial" developments in the guise of scholarly criticism of-Varga's book carried out over the succeeding six months.

Following the3 plenum of the centralwhich confirmed Khrushchev as party first secretary and set off the offensive on the agricultural front, the decision to step up the foreign economic program was endorsed publicly in unmistakably official tones. Following up Moscow's grant of one billion rubles for North Korean rehabilitation. Premier Malenkov oneptember called forew approach to solve the question of constructive and effective aid" to Asianby "manymplying Soviet willingness to assist the economic development of friendly non-Communist Asian Malenkov's cautious step was followed by diplomatic efforts to spark mutually reinforcing drives for increased trade and for the "exchange" of technical information and

Although the principal reason for Moscow's trade drive probably was the need for greater imports of consumer goods entailed in Malenkov's "new course" promises to raiselevels in the USSR, Moscowajor effort to exploit its Interest in increased trade as proof of its good will andemonstration of Soviet economic progress. Newlydesires to import consumer goods were usedeg for further allegations of the ridiculousness of Westernon trading with the bloc. Mikoyan'sew program on retail trade and production ofgoods underlined Moscow's Interest in increased imports. At the same time, Mikoyan's statement was especially noteworthy for the lengths to which he went in attempting to justify the newwell as to bid for added internationalby referring to the USSR's postwar strides in economicand industrial development. Moscowrowing list of new and revised trade agreements as proof of the fruits of its new program.

Conclusion3ive-year tradewith India pointed up the rapid rapprochement which had been developing between tho two countries, speeded by the


moderation of Moscow's Korean stand following the death of Stalin. Tho agreement, looking toward increased exchangeide range of goods, contained inague clause concerning future Soviet technical aid. At about this time, Moscow apparently made overtures to extend technicalto Egypt and pressed similar negotiationsandful of Soviet technicians had been sent to Kabul the preceding April in connection with planning for theof grain storage facilities,rewar tactic which had led Stalin to enter into contracts for theof several industrial establishments in Turkey and Iran and to "lend" technicians to friendly Afghanistan. Theonecember of the appointment of five new deputy chairmen of the USSR Council ofPorvukhln, Tevosyan, Malyshev, anda broad increase in foreign as well as domestic economic activities. Malenkov, in replying onecember to questions submitted by Kingsbury Smith, renowed bids for expanded East-West trade aseans of expressing and of promoting peace and international cooperation.

Moscow's economicttempted to play on local popular and governmental concern over export markets and the problems of rapid economic development, accompanied bypropaganda efforts to discredit Western economic and political Influence and to exacerbate commercial as woll as political friction between the little developed Asian, African, and Latin American countries and tho major Western powers. Soviet spokesmen continued to reject the possibility of any compromise with capitalist methods of economic dovelopment and repeated standard allegations of the Inevitable failure of bourgeois efforts to industrialize the "East." The.first serious post-Stalin study of tho problems of economic growth in the former colonies appeared in tho3 Problems of Economics. The author, L.pecialist in nonbloc economic developments, contlnuod Moscow's attacks on Western-oriented economic policies but veered away from past Soviet condemnation of foreign economic assistance per se, conceding without elaborating the point that the extension of economic aid under proper conditions "promotes" international ecember review of the prospects of international trade in the same journal asserted the "great possibilities" bloc countries now had of developing trade "with all capitalist countries desiring to do so under mutually advantageousnd linked the Soviet trade drive with Moscow's continuing "peace" offensive and with moves to "aid the economicof backward countries."


In response to the needhoroughgoing reassessment of Soviet views on developments in the formerly colonial areas and to explore the processes of economic changepecial conference of economists and orientalists of theof Sciences and of tho party central committee's Academy of Social Sciences was held instensibly tothe theses of Varga's Basic The conference proceedings and lengthy critiques of the' book in both Kommunist and Problems of Economics were intended to present andate summary oT Moscow's current interpretation of such basic problems as the short-run prospects of world capitalism and of relations between the Western powers and their political and economic "dependencies." Untenable, as undermining the very bases of Communist evaluation of capitalist-worldwere Varga's views "minimizing" tho extent and theof tho "crisis" in world capitalism. Soviet economists seized on signseneral economic decline3 as proof that the standard thesis was not overdrawn. Reluctant to giveheme vital to their proselyting effort, they encouraged the expectation that the troubles of the big powers would lead to economic disaster In the underdeveloped areas.

At the same time, Varga was criticized forthe strengthening of the position of "young capitalism" in the former colonial areas, which was looked on as adevelopment because it increased economic and political antagonisms within world capitalism. oncurrent review of world capitalist developments3 published in Kommunist predicted that3 economic downturn would lead the West to step up its efforts to balance its shaky economies bytho exploitation of backward countries anduying raw materials in these countries at lower prices and selling them Industrial products at more exhorbitantand foresaw only further reductions in the standards of living of the peoples in the underdeveloped countries most affected.

Party Secretary and theoretician Pospelov's4 Lenin Anniversaryhis remarks on the same occasion two yearsout Asia as the "most vulnerable part of imperialism" and Justified optimism among his listeners by citing the continued growth of the "popular resistance" movement throughout that continent. Althoughattentions to tho Arab world bad increased over the past nine months, thisonsiderable degreeeasure of tho increasing tempo of political, economic, and social change


there as the Soviet leaders continued to be suspicious of the revolutionary regime in Egypt. Moscow hailed Naslr's struggle for "Immediate withdrawal" of English forcos as an essential element in attaining "trueut attacked the" policies of Egypt's "ruling circles" for their repression of Communists and otheror using force and meager land reform to quiet peasant unrest, and for theirinclinations. The slight attention laid to non-Arab Africa -and Latin Americaacit admission that these areas, part of the "colonial reserve" of Imperialism, were more or less effectively sealed off from Soviet Influence.

Tho conclusion on40 credit and technical assistance agreement with Afghanistan set off an unprecedented propaganda campaign to convlnco underdeveloped countries of the genuineness of Soviet overtures to initiate trade and broad economic relationsutually advantageous, apolitical nature. Ath ECAFE meeting in Colombo,delegates again pressed Asian delegates for commercial ties, for initiation of exchanges, and for acceptance ofassistance. Moscow's numerous specific offers, public and private, were Intended to whet local interest whichwould find themselves unable to resist. In March trade agreements were negotiated with both

The increase in economic overtures was more than equaled by the increase in political and propaganda attention toefforts to form Asian countries into an anti-Soviet The decision toearmed Germany into thealliance and to extend the anti-Communist defense structure throughout Asiairect challenge to Moscow's year-long effortotonte on its own terms. Moscow's publicto real or rumored negotiations between Westernand Asian states on defense pacts and possible military aid reflected great sensitivity over these developments which raised the prospect of transforming areas close to the USSR's southern border into centers of pressure on that extended flank. The USSR's series of diplomatic demarches backed up by propaganda pyrotechnics proved ineffective in heading off the projected alliances in the main, but it did succeed in polarizing Asian and Arab government and popular sentiment around this Issue and making it the crucial test of Asian and Arab government relations with one another and with both East and West.


First of all, Soviet political counterneasures featured efforts to draw Indiatrongly anti-Western, anti-American position. Moscow has always accorded India great interest and predicted Indian developments wouldital role In the struggle against "Imperialism" in the East. The sheer volume of material devoted to India in Sovietover the years has been impressive. Both the firstof the "Bolshaya" encyclopedia, publishednd the second edition, publishedaveages to India, much of it highly propagandists. If developments flowing out of the Korean war had awakened Moscowriendly Indian neutrality, these views wereby Indian attitudes toward Indochina and concern lest the conflict there become an even more sensitive focus of East-West rivalry and engulf greater areas, possibly all of South and Southeast Asia, In the hot war. Moscow's concern was to encourage India and Nehru into an ever-stronger stand in favor of the bloc's "peace" program. Kommunist in4 could now hail

he important role of modern India in the world arena, the positive contribution of tho Indianin the matter of peaceful settlement ofinternational problems, and India's attempts to convert the United Nationsenuine forum for all the peoples of the world.

The principal factor working for Soviet-Indian rapprochement, however, was the deep-seated antipathy between India andwhich prompted New Delhi's violently adverse reaction to the gradual unfolding of an impending American military aid program for Pakistan. olidof approval for the course of Indian foreign policy, Moscow welcomed thedisplayed by the Indian leaders in connection withof forces of aggression In Asia."

The unmistakable build-up of Bast-West tension as theof developments in both Western Europe and Asia prompted an intense policy debate In top Soviet circles revolving around how far Moscow could go in antagonizing the West. Malenkov's4 "election speech" warning that atomic war might mean the "destruction of worldthan just capitalistthe high point in his efforts to convince his colleagues of the necessity for an accomodation with the West. His retreat the following month to the old


formulation reflected his failure to carry the majority of Soviet leaders along with him on thiswith it the defeat of Malenkov's efforts to dominate the rulingt the same time, Soviet propaganda reflected concern that public statements of Western intentions in relation toof the fighting in Indochina gave rise to thethat the USSR and the United States might be drawn into atomic war without either side really intending it.

Speeches by both Malenkov and Khrushchev at the4 session of the Supreme Soviet tied bidseduction of international tension and "coexistence" with assertions of growing strength, implying no weakening of Soviet opposition to the West nor any concession on its part. Moscow'sand propaganda support to countries involved in disputes with the West intensified. At the United Nations, Moscow heightened its support for Syrian complaints growing out of border clashes with Israel and over Israeli plans to divert Jordan River water,lay for general Arab favor by demanding thattaken against Israel. At the Geneva Conference, Holotov's attempt to championstruggling for independence" was directed toward tying Western hands in Asia. In asserting the "full right of Asian peoples to settle their affairs themselves" and adopting the stand that developments in colonial and formerly colonial areas are "first and foremost their ownolotov sought to build up pressure for big-power agreementands-off policy which would protect recent gains in Indochina. Moscow used the Chou-Nehru talks to further the picture of close Indian collaboration with the bloc and extracted the "Five Principles of"Panchin the preamble to the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet signedprilharter for Asian-African neutralism, themes given heavy support at the World Peace Council meeting In Berlin In Hay.

'Because of the demoralizing effect ofhesis on Communists at home and abroad, Moscow could not publiclythis line even if Soviet leaders themselves believed It. Thus Malenkov's aberrationandy club in the hands of his rivals to help oust him, one year later, from the premiership.


Tho USSR's reaction to tho4 overthrow ofleftist president Jacobo Arbenz, which it alleged to be the result of "intervention organized by US monopolies from Nlcaraguanas loud and bitter and attempted to appeal to world sentiment hostile to outsideoviet propaganda, besides reflecting Moscow's anger at the turn of events and its impotence to reverse them, sought to cover the Soviet Union's own role with this "living proof" of Its charges concerning the nature of American Imperialism. Appointment of an ambassador to Indonesia in Julyeriod of intense Soviet Interest In developments in that country arising out of Djakarta's unstable domestic political and economic situation and, evon more, Indonesia's complextroubles with the Netherlands and the united States. Heavy propaganda support was afforded Indonesian anti-Western moves, and the first order of business for the newly arrived Soviet staff appeared to be to press Indonesia to accept Soviet industrial equipment on easy-payment terms. Moscow's attitude toward Burma also had become noticeably more friendly. If events in Asia favored rapprochement with India, Indonesia, and Burma, Soviet overtures for stepped-up economic contacts, political demarches,uccession of Increasingly sharp propaganda warnings to other AsianTurkey, Pakistan, andnegotiations on area mutual defense pacts proved to little avail.

Moscow pushed two logically contradictory butcomplementary courses. On the one hand, its"peace" campaign was intended to exploit the universal fear of atomic warfare by generating pressures against military It seized upon the Geneva Conference results as confirmation of the correctness of its line that peace could be achieved only through negotiations respecting the Interests of "both sides." On the otheroscow-produced orclimate of groat East-West tension was essential to its policies toward the underdeveloped countries. Moscow aimed at persuading people that Western policies had brought thekept itbrink of devastating war, and played on apprehensions arising out of the security pactwhich allegedly put Asia-Africa on the "front line" In any future conflict. The Ineffectiveness of Moscow'sto turn its sporadic diplomatic and propaganda supportodest expansion of economic relations to directadvantage was pointed up in October by Naslr'sdespite months of fervent Soviet efforts to dissuade

an agreement with Britain concerning the evacuation of troops from the Suez Canal zone on terms permitting their return in the eventthird power" attack on the Middle East.

On the economic front, Moscow stepped up its efforts to capitalize on local desire for rapid economic development to introduce pioneering detachments of Soviet specialists and technicians under UN auspices and through direct bilateral agreements. By ostensibly participating In UN-sponsoredwhich enjoyed considerable popularity and esteea in the underdeveloped countries, Moscow sought to broaden the Impact of its own as yet aodest efforts and to Introduce Sovietand scientists into countries and fields otherwise closed to It. Further, this contributed to the Soviet effort to play up the growing stature of the USSR as an advancedpower and opened the way for undercuttingand especiallyassistance programs on yet another front. Moscow cited the lack of political stipulations onid and the "wllllngnoss of dozens of countries to go along with the UNut alleged the United States alone holds aloof for Its own political and military motives. Soviet publicists, still obliged to present developments In theworld in terms of an imminent general economic crisis, stressed increasingly more unfavorable terms of trade for the underdeveloped countries. Varga, writing In the first ssue of the new semi-scholarly monthly journalAffairs (Internationalointed to two years of depressed prices for raw materials and food exports and to repercussions of impending American economic crisis asreasons why underdeveloped as well as Western European countries should turn to expanded trade with the blocolution to pressing economic problems.

The long-awaited Soviet textbook Political Economy, the productroup of writers including leading ideologists Dmitry Shepllov and Pavel Tudin, signed to the press on followed Stalin'sapproach to theof world developments. The authors crudelyeconomic relations of the Western powers *lth the former colonies, alleging that foreign trade was "one of the sources of economic enslavement of backward countries bybourgeois countries and (that It) widened tho sphere of capitalist countries." Political Economy claimed advances for the "national-liberation movements" in Indonesia and India but spoke in terms of greater political roles allegedly being


played by the "proletariat" and Communist parties, and the "national bourgeoisie" continued to be attacked as "weak andin the struggle against imperialism. Tho hostility shown to nationalist "conciliatory" policies marked even independent Indiaourgeois entity and thus an onomy. In this and other formulations, the authors showed-themselves hesitant to amend fundamental Communist theses to bring them in line with tactics Moscow currently followed in its relationsumber of Asian governments.

In the fall, important works were published on the two areas of the world which to date had been generally beyond the scope of Soviet Influence and at best on the periphery ofInterest. An imposing Institute of Ethnography symposium, The Peoples of Africa, under tho Joint editorship ofD. A. Olderogge and ethnographer-political scientist I. I. Potekhinhorough analysis of African cultural achievements and political and economic developments area by area. Their general thesis, and that of Soviet Afrlcanlsts generally, was that racial discrimination and economicare the twin bases of fostern policy and views on Africa. To combat the West's views and to champion African peoples, Soviet Afrlcanlsts advanced an Interpretation of Africanbasedlong and original path of historicast golden age which was destroyed by Westernand economic intrusion, and In general attributing to Western Influence all negative features of African life. Potekhin's summary views on the progress of "nationalacknowledged the absence of Communist activity in most of Africa, cited trade unions as tho centers of antl-lmperi-allst agitation where there are no Communist parties, and payed tribute to growing African participation In world "peace" and other fronts. ess substantial survey of" the Institute of Economics by M. Grechev, The Imporlal1st Expansion of tho US In Latin America After World War Il| was devoted principally To attacking postwar US Latin American policies and toa strategy for local Communist parties based onall antlforeign elements around "the working class and its ally thenited front on Communist terms to

put an end to the yoke of foreign monopolies, to give land to the peasants, to facilitate Industrial development, to Improve living conditions of all workers, and to carry Latin American countries on tho broad road of progress and Independence.


By the closehe "good neighbor" policy vhich the Malenkov regime hadat timeswas no great success. The increase in Moscow's influence among extremist nationalist elements had been in directto the prevalence of virulent anti-Western sentiment arising out of unresolved territorial and other politicalwith the West andesser extent to localover the failure of political independence to solvepolitical, economic, and social problems overnight. attitudes toward nationalist movements and their leadersexample, Nehru, Sukarno,tep in the direction of tactical cooperation. Moscow'swas that as nationalists these leaders had to be praised to the extent they were "anti-imperialist" but as bourgeois they had to be attacked for their commitment to capitalist methods and ideology and for their opposition or suppression of "progressive" elements. By' the end4 Moscow had come to the point of supporting nationalist governmentsnot in the Western, camp, in the expectation that their greater self-assurance and self-expression would have the net effect of reducing Western influence and,egree,Western leadership. Any further concessions would have ledeterioration of the morale of local Communist part ies.

Moscow scored an impressive propaganda breakthrough with the signingfter five months ofof the agreement to help finance andajor steel plant at Bhilai, India. This announcementoviet economic assistance program of new dimensions andeasure of concreteness to the Image of two worldsystems in competition for influence and favor inareas.




The demotion of Malenkov in5 promptedto step outolder policy both in regard to the Western powers and the politically uncommitted, economically underdeveloped countries. This was done in part to shore up domestic confidence, following the personnel shake-up, with harsher assertions of an increased international authority. Molotov's speechebruary to the Supreme Sovietrelations with the West wholly in cold war terms andan unusually clear rationale for Soviet cooperation with Asian and African governments. Acknowledging that the newly independent governments of Asia and Africa were still economically dependent on the West, the Soviet foreignneverthelessasis for optimism in the fact that in questions of International relations, "they show concern for the maintenance of peace and the reduction oftension" and so were worthy of Soviet support. As had other Soviet leaders over the past year, Molotov singled out for particular praise the "international authority" of India. The Supreme Soviet resolution on foreign policy, which set forth the principal guide lines of the subsequent Bulganin-Khrushchev period, also called for the exchangeactic Moscow had introduced the previous year by hosting several semiofficial parliamentary groups.

The acceleration of Soviet moves in Asia and the Middle Eastecognition of the Increased international status of Asian and African states and of the likelihood that their international role would continue to increase In At the same time, it was intendedartial answer to Western Initiatives building up military andpolitical pressures along the USSR's southern borders. The regime's efforts to underscore Soviet military andmight furthered the impression that the new leaders were less disposed than Malenkov to seek accommodation with the West; in any event, the West's firmness in Europe held out the prospect that any Soviet probing there might leaduclear war.

Moscow's intention toloser working agreement with Asian and Arab countries was made clear in its diplomatic and propaganda reaction to Middle East developments and in the fervor of its efforts to identify itself with the views and

objectives of the conference ofsian and Africanincluding Communist China but not the Sovietat Bandung, Indonesia. tatement by the Soviet Foreign Ministry on5 presented detailed charges ofdeterioration" of the Middle East situation,that this was the direct result of Western efforts to form anti-Communist military blocs there, and offered, in terms more specific than ever before, official Sovietto area governments opposing Western policies. At the same time, Soviet propaganda hailed the prospects of Asian-African cooperation, and Pravda threw Soviet support behind any agreement which might be reached by the Bandung powers in the directionommon effort against "pressure and threat" from outside powers or in implementing Individually or collectively the Chou-Nehru declaration on the "fiveof coexistence." Moscow's current appraisal apparently stemmed from optimism that "parallel" short-term interests of Asian-African states and the USSR, in combination with the inherently weak political and economic positions of areaopened tho wayapid increase in Soviet influence.

Further indicationsundamental reorientation of tactics was involved was the initiationholesale shake-up of Soviet Interpretation of developments in non-Soviet Asia and Africa. In late5 there appeared the first issue of Soviet Oriental Studies, the functions and responsibilities of which were to tie research and Marxist-Leninistto the immediate needs of Soviet diplomacy and propaganda. Kommunist In May kickedampaign to bring ideological formulations more in line with the Soviet posture oftoward the non-Communist countries represented at Bandung. Kommunist admitted that erroneous interpretations had crept into past Soviet assessments of anticolonlal movements, and it criticized Soviet scholars, and by implication Stalin and those responsible for Moscow's foreign policy in the early post-Stalin period, for underevaluating the antl-imperialist significance of the nationalist movements. Foreshadowed in these programatic statements were stepped-up efforts tothe present and even the fairly remote past in anti-Western terms and to dissociate the current Soviet regime in the minds of the peoples of the neutralist countries from those past Soviet words or deeds which impeded closer Without providing clear new guide lines, Kommunist nevertheless indicatedore optimistic appraisal of Asian-African developments was in order and that prosaic.

mechanical applications of Communist theorems wcro to give waylexibility which owed more to cold war requirements than to the Communist classics.

Moscow's new accommodation to neutralist-nationalistwas underlined dramatically in connection with the5 visit to the USSR of Indian Prime Minister Nehru. Nehru, who had been described by Stalin's Asian spokesman Zhukov asunning servant of Britain and the united Statesloody stranglcr of progressive forces inow wason all counts for his spiritual and political leadership of Asia and for championing progressive views on such major issues as Korea, Indochina, military blocs, and tho banning of atomic weapons. ussian translation of Nehru's Discovery of India was published in connection with thepassages scathingly attacking Communist tactics inlong "reviews" of the book in Kommunist and Soviet Oriental Studies used itoint of departure in setting forth the new Soviet line on Asian and African developments. Apparently encouraged by the prospects of this Initial venturo into the realm of "personalvisit having beenpubliclybrilliant manifestation" of growing friendly relations between the twoextended invitations to the Shah of Iran and to Nasir. Efforts were initiated on an unprecedented scale to flatter neutralistthe cultures of friendly countries, and Asian-African self-importance. Synthetic Soviet commemorations of Asian andnational holidaysrominent feature of the new program. Pravdaartywas sent to Egypt in connection with Cairo's Liberation Day celebrationsersonal emissary of Moscow's top leadership to impress on Nasir the potentials of closer Soviet-Egyptian cooperation.

Moscow's moves to exploit the "Bandung spirit" asoordinated Asian-African opposition to the Vest was accompaniederies of diplomatic and economic stepsappropriate propagandato buildposture of peace" to improve its prospects at thesummit conference. Moscow's attitude appeared to hold out the promiseajor improvement in East-Vest relationseneral reduction of international tension, not Just inbut throughout the world. The Soviet people themselves were encouraged by the regime's propaganda tousinesslike atmosphere" In international relations.

ugust report on the Geneva talkspecial session of the Supreme Soviet balanced "Genevaessening of tension, increase in "mutualnd the initiation of personal contact amongundown of major substantive international problems outstanding.

Concurrent with Moscow's pre-Geneva conciliatory posture to the West and Bulganin's sober appraisal of the results of the conference, the Soviet Union set inhain ofnegotiations designed not to further the possibility of any mutual "hands off" policy in Asia-Africa, but to offset the consolidating pro-Western coalitionsroup of Arab states under its influence. Although Molotov's5 foreign policy survey had been pessimistic on the Middle East,

We cannot say that the national-liberation movement in the countries of the Arab East has attained the strength and momentum which this movement achievedumber of other Asian

intensified Soviet overtures to Syria and Egypt in the months followingore hopeful view. Reports of various credibility that Moscow had made offers to sell arms to Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, India, and Afghanistan were confirmed in essence by Nasir'september announcement of his arms deal witha dodgeirect agreement between Moscow and Cairo.


The supply of armson-Communist governmentharp departure in Soviet practice andhallenge to Western influenceore intense and immediate nature than Soviet economic overtures. Discussions with Nasir were well advanced by the time of the Geneva talks, suggesting thatearly had hedged its betonciliatory posture and such reasonableness as agreeing to the Austrian state treaty would encourage significant Western concessions. Moscow's immediate reaction to the surfacing of Nasir's agreement to purchase bloc arms was predictably defensive, attributing tho Western uproaralse interpretation of developments based on the West's own "exploitative practices." It went on,to assert the "legitimate right" of all states to buy weapons for their defense without outside interference. public and private follow-up was subdued, although the "Geneva spirit" in its relations with the West had already

largely dissipated. Kaganovich's October Revolution speech, concurront with the visit of Burmeseu to Moscowefinite coolness at the foreign ministers' meeting in Geneva, omitted any referenceajor shift in Sovietimplicit in the offers and deliveries of trade andeconomic, and now military assistance to Asian and Arab countries.

Moscow continued tho process of reappraising world devol-ments in terms justifying the development of closer governmcnt-to-govornment relations with Asian and Arab August hadioneering attempt to citeconsequences" of policies In the direction of peace,of international tension, and oppositionasis for singlingategory of politicallythough economically dependent states which were worthy of support. Kommunist author Mlkbeyev's effort topropositions raised by Soviet leaders early in tho year did not fully account for the scope and variety of Moscow's tactics, as economic and political blandishments were being offered not only to friendly neutrals but also to countries clearly non-neutral, such as Turkey. The new line on Asia and Africa was reflected in the fall5 with the appearance of the second edition of the textbook Political Economy, which contained drastic revisions of passages offensive to India and other uncommitted countries. Byeutral foreignin effect the sole criterion of Sovlot support, Moscowa strategy for local Communist parties which wasandonsiderable degree demoralizing. ourse Moscow tacitly admitted the relativeof the nationalist governments, and in offering these governments many-sided support without extracting anyin protection of local Communist elements, Moscow indowngraded the latter and left them to shift on their own meager resources.

Moscow's first big chance to bid for Asian popularwas the Bulganln-Khrushchev "visit of friendship" to India, Burma, and Afghanistan from mid-November tohe two Soviet leaders dropped their Geneva smiles andto give Asianore anti-Western slant bythe USSR with Asian nationalist alms andnd they attempted to equate tho West with "colonialism" and Using local sonsitivity to the colonial pastoint of departure, tho



bitter attacks on tho West and sought to focus Asian and world attention on Soviet economic, political, and cultural Khrushchev and Bulganin, by adopting brazon stands on the Asian Intramural disputes over Kashmir anderved notice that Moscow Intended to step up its diplomatic and propaganda support for friendly neutrals and to increase pressure on pro-Western area governments.

The touring Soviet leaders dramatized to millions of Asian neutralists and to the world in general the USSR's apparent readiness to offer political and material support to new states attempting to establish or secure political and economic Agreements reached on the tour for the extension of Soviet technical assistance, for increased trade, and for greater technical and cultural exchanges laid tho groundworkonsiderable subsequent expansion of Soviet Influence in the area. Khrushchev's announcement in India that

If you wantnd you ask us for it, we shall give it. If you want to develop your technology and ask us to help you, we shall help you. If you want to train technicians, send them to

appeared to raise Moscow's budding economic aid offensive to newimpression made more concrete by thein Kabul0 credit to Afghanistan.

The reports of both Bulganin and Khrushchev to the Supreme Soviet onecember as to the results of their trip served to underline Moscow's optimism over its new thrusts for favor in Asia. For the home audience, Khrushchev made the sameattack on Western economic activities in thecountries as he had in Asia, and he implied that one of the alms of the Soviet foreign economic program was to force Western concessions to the underdeveloped countries. Riding the crest of optimism raised by the tour, KhrushchevSoviet offers of economic and technical help as signs of "our honorablend, although he cited "mutual advantages" in the program, he nevertheless was encouraged totopian note, "We consider it our duty to share with our friends and to help them as brothers." Especially since this South Asian tour, Khrushchev has taken great pains to be identified publicly with Moscow's friendship overtures, with the Soviet economic aid program, and with the necessity to increase "person-to-person" contacts,ital factor in each.


Further steps wort? taken in Soviet publications in late

bring Soviet versions of certain standardformulations nore in harmony with currentsuch reappraisal, on the vital and touchy quest-ion ofof the "national bourgeoisie" in the struggle forwas undertaken slowly and cautiously. ewin Soviet Oriental Studies, which has servedas an outlet for official views rather than as afor scholarly papers,reater role toin bringing about the anticolonial revolutions In view of the complexity and sensitivity of thoof postwar developments and the need tobe convincing to Asian-Africanintellectuals, to leave undisturbed the dynamicthe international Communist movement, and to maintainof the immutability of Communist doctrine, for

remained for the Soviet leadership tocreative" interpretation of Leninism in light of the now situation.

Theh party congress in February

a supreme effort by the regime to turn worldand non-Communist attention away from thefrom any need to account for or explain away elementsStalinist heritago which now were to bethe impression that with theew era,with prospects of new Communist victories, wasmajor part of the congress' effort was dovoted toshore up the theoretical bases for the regime'spolicy, to justify coexistence with the Vest, andverisimilitude to Soviet overturos to Asian-African All who spoke at the congress attempted tothe aura of optimism, of unprecedented assurancephysical and ideological challenges of theand of unanimity.

Khrushchev reserved to himself the starring role, but Suslov, Mlkoyan, and Kuusinen contributed to the publicof Soviet attitudes to non-Communist governments. Khrushchev'sebruary keynote speechew global view characterized as the "breaking out" of socialism from the boundsingle stateorld systemcapitalism in scope and power. His abandonment of the thesis of the "fatalistic" inevitability of war betweenand socialist campsecessary, and tardy, step

to add credibility to its "poacoful coexistence" line and to facilitate long-terra cooperation between the USSR and non-Communist countries. Ehrushchov's admission, under pressure to improve relations with Tito, that there are many possible forms of transition from capitalism tono single pattorn would be applicable "to Denmark in the same way as to Brazil; to-Sweden in the same way as toopened up tho whole delicate and complex problem of intra-bloc relations. Moreover, by appearing to support social development according to "concrete circumstances" in each country, Khrushchev made an extraordinary concession to the nationalist governments. Khrushchev's third majorat the congress, that the changeover from capitalism to "socialism" need not be violent but could be attained through "the winningtable parliamentaryad special significance for neutralist countries such as India andwhich had large Communist parties.

At the congress, Mikoyan, as always closely associated with Soviet trade policies, launched Moscow's strongest plea to date for the development of economic relations with non-Communist countrieseans for both reducing international tension and obtaining economic advantages. Malenkov, who had initiated many of the lines of Moscow's revised policy toward the former colonies, was now reducedole of seconding currently accepted formulations. Be Justified the regime's policy toward Asia and tho Middle East as "substantiallyWestern potentialities for attacking the bloc. Molotov acknowledged that in Stalin's days the USSR had underestimated the importance of the colonial struggle against the Wost and admitted the correctness of party contral committee criticism or" his Foreign Ministry rfor "underestimating the new

Khrushchev's survey of Moscow's developing foreignoffensive left llttlo doubt that this program was toigh priority. The6 credit to Belgrade oftop of the theatrical offero Kabul In Decemberremoved any doubts about the vigor with which Moscow Intended to push this program. Khrushchev's revelation that tho USSR had granted long-term credits within the bloc totalingillion rubles wa3to contribute to the prestige of the Soviet Unionorld economic power, and possibly to sidetrack blocof Soviet offers to nonbloc countries. Promising aid

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in tho economic, political, and cultural development of non-Communist Asia, Africa, and Latin America,

in order to create an independent national economyigher standard of living for theirithout making it necessary for them to bow down to their former overlords,

Khrushchev left little doubt as to the political character of this program, or that his intent was to impair their relations with tho West, to placeajor stumbling block" in the way of colonial policy.

A mouth prior to the congress, Bulganin6 January "interview" published inews magazine circulated in Latin America, for the first time extended to Latingovernments the same type of diplomatic and tradethat Moscow had been making regularly to friendly and not so friendly Asian countries. It was reported that Soviet party leaders at the congress sought out representatives of the Latin American Communist parties present in an effort to improve their morale and to stimulate their activities especial ly in the direction of attracting broader segments of the population into the front organizations. Party organizational tactics outlined at the congress by Suslov and Kuusinensharply increased emphasis on united action with -non-Communists, but the Stalinist debate touched off by Khrushchev' secret speech destroyed some of the ldoalizod notions about Communism and tho USSR held by party members and sympathizers abroad. umber of months the controversy over de-Stalin-lzation nullified any gains for the world Communist movement which Moscow may have expected from its moderate formulations ath congress.

The congresslood of publications to reflect the new views and to attempt to apply them currently andin support of Soviet policy. Mikoyan at thehadtrong goadhorough-going shake-up in tho field of Soviet oriental studies, charging that

while the whole East has awakened in our timo, the Oriental Institute happily dozesime when our rolatlons with the East are growing In scope and strength, when, With the extonsion of economic, political, and cultural relations with Eastern

- 34

countries, the interest of the Soviet public has grown to such an extent, as has the need for people who know the languages, economy, and culture of the Eastern countries.

An unsigned lead article of the journal Soviet Oriental Studies which appeared immediately following the congress admitted"to organizational and theoretical shortcomings in Soviet studies of the non-Communist East and attempted to translate congress thesesrogram of action for Soviet scholars and Past evaluations were attacked for having failed to give proper attention to the new correlation-of social forces in Asia and Africa, and Soviet historians were criticized for approaching their problems from too rigid and dogmatic a ow version of the contradictions betweenmovements and the West admitted that at the present stage of the "anti-imperialisthe interests of thebourgeoisie "basically correspond with the interests of the majority of the ^people." The revised theorem was in-tended to reduce ideological tension between Moscow andelements, and was not accompanied by acknowledgement of the role played by bourgeois leaders in winning independence for their countries*

Other public discussion of developments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America following the congress reflected Moscow's concession that considerable economic development was possibleleast in the neutralexisting political, economic, anil GoClfcT frameworks. roblems of Economics ar-

ticle by V.pecialist in free world economictrends, applied tho congress1 views to economic development of the former colonies and showed Moscow willing to go tolengths to court favor with government parties, support for efforts to protect local capitalists from the pressures of "foreign monopolistic" capital. Kollontay reiterated the position that economic development is,roblem of mobilization and correct organization of domestic resources, and he played up to strong non-Communist sympathies in the aroa for state planning and regulationation's economic life. "Industrialization" was presented as the only sure path to economic independence, and the securing offreedom and economic relations with the bloc were offered as the means for bringing it about. Past ridicule of national attempts to solve pressing economic problems and to bringise in living standards was shunted aside in favor of efforts

to stimulate new and expanded political and economic relations withozenor at least temporarily cool to theterritorially from Indonesia to Egypt and economically from primitive Yemen to India, where capitalist development admittedly was "well under way."

Post-congress Soviet overtures were mainly in theof further expansion of economic and political ties with Egypt, Syria, and India andeneral increase in the USSR's voice in Middle East affairs. teady stream of arms deliveries to Egypt and heavy diplomatic and propaganda attention to area developments, Moscow issued onith the arrival of Bulganin and Khrushchev inForeign Ministry statement which attempted to pass off Soviet area policy as concerned primarily with protecting Soviet and friendly Arab Interestsasis could be found for top-level East-West talks on Middle East problems. In

. _ Jpublicly expressingto talk about halting arms deliveries to the area ifconcerned all Middle East countries and not merely the Arab states, the two Soviet leaders attempted to play up the. moderation of their position In order to facilitateand to gain atacit admission of "legitimate" Soviet interests in Middle East affairs.

une replacement of Molotov as foreign minister- by party secretary Shepilov, whose visit to Cairo the previous summer had paved the way for the conclusion of the arms deal with Nasir, augured for an even more daring Soviet foreign policy. Shepilov's trip in June to Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Greece, however, wasropaganda tour de force, with Shepilov publicly and privately attempting to exploit"friendship" and "sympathy" for localbuild np hopes of extensive economic aid at the same time as he dodged detailed discussion of political questions and avoided all Arab attempts to firm up Soviet commitments on the questions of Israel and Algeria. The USSR onune voted for Security Council consideration of the Algerian question over Frenchbut Moscow's subdued propaganda tended to confirm reports that Shepilov hadgo slow" policy toward the Arabs. Visits to the USSR that month by the Shah of Iran and Yemeni Crown Prince Badr pointed up the expanding territorial scope of Soviet initiatives.



Tho series of crises touched off by the collapse of Cairo's negotiations for Western economic assistance to build an Aswan high dam and Nasir's angry nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on6ajor test both of Soviet intentions in the Middle East and of Bast-West Shepilov's second trip to the Middle East in June had left the impression that friendly states could expectunlimltod economic aid from Moscow on gonerous terms. Nasir apparently had been all but assured that large-scaleaid for his pet project would be forthcoming immediately if negotiations with the West broke down. Moscow's strong propaganda support for Nasir's move was temperod by Khrushchev onuly on his returnwo-week swing through the "virgin land" areas. At that time he minimized theand called on the West for moderation.

Shepilov's subsequent tactics involved an attempt to keep negotiations going, as he was apparently convinced of ansettlement largoly on Egypt's terms. Moscow's strong diplomatic support for Nasir'sby such tangibles as the rcleaso of bloc canal pilots for duty atstopped short of any commitment of Soviet military support in the event of an attack on Egypt. Soviet propaganda attempted to protray tho crisisivid illustration of "Imperialist" reaction to nationalist efforts to remove the vestiges ofrule. Khrushchev'sugust statoment at the Rumanian Embassybloc volunteers, including his own son, might be sent to aid Egypt in the event of anMoscow's propaganda footwork in tho November crisis.

Preoccupation with Suez developments was not so complete, however, as to rulo out efforts to extend tho Soviet diplomatic and economic offensive elsewhere along now woll-established lines. Moscow's year-long effort to woo Indonesia's Sukarno ledell-exploited two-week visit to the USSR in6 and was capped by the announcement in Djakarta oneptember that agreement had been reachedredit for industrial development. In August the USSR set up the Institute of World Economics and Internationaland in September Moscow announced that the Oriental Institute, of the USSR Academy of Sciences, would beand expanded in an effort to bring its product more in line with the needs of Soviet policy. "Doctor of HistoricalB. G. Gafurov, long-time Tadzbik party secretaryoviet party central committee member who was assigned in

May to direct the shake-up said the priority tasks of theIncluded the political and economic formation andof tho new states of the East and especially of their experience and problems in relation to the general .crisis and disintegration of the colonial system in Asia and Africa.

A landmark of the new school in oriental studies was the publication In two Issues of the foreign affairs weekly New Times of an article onon-Capitalist Path for Underdevel-oped Countries" by Modeste Rubinstein, chiof of the US section of the Instituto of World Economics and International Relations, which wholeheartedly supported state planning and theof state-capitalist enterprises in India, Burma, Indonesia, Egypt, and elsowhore as the only way for underdevelopedto industrialize. Further, Rubinstein elicited theof local Communists and Communist-influenced cloments for the successful fulfillment of these state plans as long as the benefits "go to promote the welfare of the people."

The second stage of Soviet diplomacy In the Suez crisis was touched off by the London Conference of the "Suez Canal Users' Association." The Soviet Foreign Ministry statement ofeptember, Issued on the eve of the conference, for the first time linked the USSR's security to current Middle East developments andeneral call for UN action, though It did not specify what this action should be. Moscow kept up its strong diplomatic and propaganda support of Cairo'sto any form of International control over the canal and encouraged Nasir to keep talks goingeans to forestall action by the Wost. By mid-October, Moscow apparently felt that the likelihoodestern military response had lessened and indicated informally its willingness to participate innegotiations toay out of tho diplomatic impasso.

Moscow's immediate reaction to news of the attackovernment statemont condemning the action and calling for the Security Council to "take immediate steps" to halt theand to force withdrawal of the attacking forces. Soviet efforts to get, and to keep, the issue before tho Security Council were Intended to embarrass the attacking powers and givehance to foment pro-Naslr sentiment while it decidedouotorstrategy. Over the past months Sovietinformally had left the impression of thorough amounting almost to protection, for Cairo; the attack.


however, exposed the ambiguity of the USSR's position. Only after the Soviet leaders became convinced of the serious split between the attacking powers and tho United States did Moscow tako tho initiative, firstetter to President Elsenhower proposing Joint military action undor UN authority against thend then in blistering notes to Britain, Franco, andin the Sovietgave the impression that the USSR would take unilateral action against these powers unless thoy called off their assault on Egypt.

Four days afterovember cease-fire, Moscowhinly veiled threat of "Soviet citizenthreat which, in conjunction with iemoostratlons before tho British, French, and Israeli embasslos In Moscow and "angry protest meetings" throughout the USSR, was intended to build uppressure against tho West. Before settling on this gambit, however, Bulganinovember sent letters to Nehru and Sukarno proposing that theyecond conference of Asian-African countries to condemn the attack on Egypt and to promote common action against the Vest.

This first major test of the genuineness of Sovietto be the "protector" of the peoples of the Eastualified victory for Moscow's activist policies. Communist propagandists feasted on the "evidence" that imperialism had not changed its willingness to use armed force to keep orkey colonial positions, and Moscow's role In bringing about tho military cease-fire was magnified after the fact to contribute to the image of the Soviet Union asajor voice in Middle East developments. At the same time, Moscow was constrained to keep alive world fears that continuedin the area might lead to further fighting bothadditional Western moves against pro-Soviet Arabs and to draw world attention away from the recent Soviet military intervention In Hungary and its aftermath.

Moscow's disappointment over the failure of Asian neutrals to respond to its callolid front against "Imperialism" was reflected in diplomatic channels. Eoanunist in December lectured both party and nonparty elements for underestimating the seriousness of the obstacles remaining in the path of the anticolonial struggle and the "desperate energy" with which imperialists would continue to defend their positions,

a whole series of sharpultitude of battles on all economic and political problems between the newly arising states of the East and the

A6 conference of Soviet Asian specialists on "the economic and political positions of the nationalin the countries of the East" cited India, Indonesia, Burma, and Egypt for fulfilling "progressive" functions and attempted to quiet doubters ofh congress line for "ignoring facts" and "failing to notice new phenomena." The discussions showed Moscow now willing to endorse nationalin whatever formprogressive historical phenomenon in colonial and underdeveloped countries" and denying that its support was based on temporarily parallel interests. The papers as publishedonsiderable disparity of Views, but they indicated that those reflecting the orthodox suspicion tocommitments to non-Communist, governments now were out of favor.

Although political questions entangled with Suezshifted the spotlight off Moscow's foreign economicby the end6 Moscow could point to increasedand economic contacts in Asia and Africa, dozens of new trade agroements with non-Communistgreat many of which either provided for or looked toward the exchange Of technicala generally enhanced impression that the USSR was an economic as well as political competitor for influence in the underdeveloped countries. Shepilov boasted at the United Nations onovember that since the war the USSR had granted more thanillion rubles in foreign credits; he failed to mention that these loans were principally intra-bloc. However, the momentum of Moscow'swed more to promises of aid and prospective economic benefits than it did to solid performance. Furthermore, developments within the bloc inspecially the Hungarian uprising, and the sharp rise in East-West tensions flowing from both Middle East and Central European crises Interrupted the course ofpolicy, domestically as well as internationally. The6 Soviet party central committee plenum wasby the most extensive reshuffling of top governmental posts since Stalin's death, by extensive changes in Moscow-satellite economic relations, and by upward revisions ofhousing and consumer goods goals. There is somethat higher political priorities of economic aid to the

to Yugoslavialowdown in new commitments for aid to non-Communist countries andthose In the Soviet leadership opposed to thisto challenge Khrushchev on tho issue.* lowing up of the tempo of Moscow's economic program was.suggested by long drawn-out negotiations with India0 credit. Completed in November, the agreement, despite India's critical need for immediate help, carried the restriction that it not be drawn upon

*0ur best evidence of this split is Saburov's "statement" att congress charging that the antiparty group, blinded by "ultranationalist narrow-mindedness" had opposed both trade expansion and economic aid to bloc countries as well as to non-Communist underdeveloped countries. The upsurge in Sovietfollowing the7 dismissal of the antiparty group tends to confirm this.

At tho beginning Moscow was concernedwith distracting world attention from intrabloc troubles and with forestalling further Western moves in the Middle East and elsewhere while bloc unity was being restored and The series of bloc government and partyigh priority was being given to workingew program for intrabloc cooperation and to restoring the public image of Communist "solidarity." Domestically, the lessons of Hungary and Suez were exploited toigilance campaigneans for enlisting greater enthusiasm for official programs and for diverting popular dissatisfaction over the slowness of domestic economic gains.

A continued high level of diplomatic activity,by appropriately strident propaganda, attempted to keep alive the allegation that Hungary and Suez were merely the prelude to concerted Western efforts designed to re-establish their former world position in all key areas, especially the Middle East. Presidentanuary "Middle East proposals" were immediately made the center of Soviet attempts to split the Arab world into pro-Western and anti-Western fac-tlons. TASS onanuaryoint-by-point rebuttal of the "proposals" leading up to the assertion that although the program was formulated in terms of opposing Soviet andpretensions in the area, its primary purpose was to halt and reverse the course of the Arab movement toward The ominous, if ambiguous,communique ofanuary pledged that the bloc would "continue rendering the necessary support to the peoples of the Near and Middle East in order to prevent aggression and Interference" by the Western powers in the affairs of area governments.

Moscow welcomedanuary discussions In Cairo by Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian, and Saudi Arabian leaders as evidence of closer cooperation among the anti-Western Arab faction and of strengthening the hand of pro-Nasir Arabsto accept closer diplomatic and economic ties with the bloc. Acceptance or rejection of American economic aid under the new Middle East program was seized upon by Moscow as the chief criterion of genuine independence.

Soviet moves in the Middle East appeared motivated both by fears that Western moves in the area impinged on the USSR's security and by concern that its newly won influence in the Arab world would erode under combined Western diplomatic,and economic pressures. ASS statement onanuary alleging that the United States intended to establish atomic bases In Turkey and Iran touched off direct propaganda charges that the "Eisenhower-Dulles" Middle East doctrine was intended to prepare the way for aggression against the Soviet Union. Moscow's generally hostile tone toward the West was backed up by veiled boasts concerning new Soviet scientific-military developments. Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Zhukov, touring India as part of the increasing stream of top-level Soviet visitors to South and Southeast Asia,ard anti-imperialist line and focused Asian and world attention onmore optimistic Soviet public affirmations of comparative military strengthis the West, claiming an ability tocrushing blow" against targets anywhere on earth.

Soviet notes to the United States, Britain, and France onebruary callingultilateral big-power approach to Middle East problems, over the heads of localharp departure from the USSR's efforts to build up Soviet influence in the area through offers and deliveries of both political and material support to Arab anti-Western extremists. Although the notes were framed along lines long used to court thesein the internalof Middle East countries, rejection of military blocs, withdrawal of foreign troops, and the encouragement of economicdirection of the overture of partial detente to the West, backed by the suggestionutual ban on arms shipments to the area, showed the Soviet Union at this time willing to jeopardize Arab good will in the interest of atartial settlement with the West. Subsequently,has not been able completely to put to rest Arab suspicion that overriding cold war Interests may lead the Soviet Union to agreementsettlement with the West which would be detrimental to Arab interests or aspirations. Moscow may have had inig power conference on the Middle East similar to4 Geneva Conference on Indochina. Its Immediatewas to stall the implementation of the hew US Middle East program.

Foreign Minister Shepilov's survey of internationalIn an address to the Supreme Soviet onebruary, on

the eve of his return to the party secretariat and hisby foreign affairs "professional" Andrey Gromyko, went to considerable lengths to defend Moscow's policy of "coexistence" with the West as the "cornerstone" of Soviet foreign policy ratherolitical maneuver or tactic of the moment. Shepilov promised that the USSR would continue to follow the "greatest self-control, patience, and persistence" inolution with the West through negotiations. econd round of notes to the Western powers onpril, in an interview With New York Times editor Catledge onay, pointed up the analogy of the Geneva settlement on Indochina and said, "It would be wise if the leaders of the great countries met more often." At the same time Moscow sought to limit the negative effects of this tack by attempting to reassure the Arabs that itsebruary andpril proposals were designed to strengthen Arab security and promote the rapid economic development of the area.

The general outlines of Soviet views on developments in the Arab world were presented in two monographs, released in late April and early May, by scholars of the Institutes of Law and Oriental Studies respectively. In The State Structure of the Countries of the Arab Bast, I. Levin and V. Marapyev of the Institute of Law surveyed economic and social forces at work in the area and offered an explanation for Soviet support. An even more impressive attempt to interpret recent areainay as to justify current Soviet support for Arab anti-Western movementsymposium, Arabs in the Struggle for Independence, prepared by the Middle"East experts of the Institute of Oriental Studies, under the editorship of Egyptian specialist L. N. Vatoiina and Ye. A. Belyayev. The two works devoted little space to Arab history or political claims, although Egypt's2 revolution was hailed for its successful measures against imperialism and for its start in the direction of antifeudal, democratic reforms. Theauthors, citing the predominantly rural character of all Arab states, held out little hope of real economic development until the agrarian problem had been solved along "progressive" lines and large-scale irrigation, electrification, improved transport, and extensive Industrialization had boen carried out. The subject of joint development of the area was avoided in favor of individual Arab agreements with bloc countries. Making no disavowal of area Communists, admitting that in most Arab countries weak Communist elements are forced to workthe symposium stated that Moscow's aim is not the

dictatorship of the Arab proletariat, but the "strengthenlng of national independence through democracy, land reform, and the building of socialism in line with the nationalof the Arab countries.1* lueprint"of Soviet intentions, the two works! essential points presented solid testimony to Moscow's offorts to woo Arab leaders andand to accommodate its major propaganda lines to their interests.

The victory of tho Communist party in general elections in the Indian state of Korala pointed up tho contradictions inherent in Moscow's attempts toolicy of official good will and exploit an ostensible community ofinterests with neutralist countries, while at the samo time remaining committed ideologically to assisting the inevitable and historical communization of the world. pril of the Communlst-lod ministry in Kerala, the first concrete proof ofh partyon the possibility of the parliamentary path to powor by Communist parties, was greeted as testimony to the popularity of Communist ideas In India, but, out of an obvious desire to maintain good relations with the Indian Government and with Nehru, little comment was devoted to Korala. Considering the magnitude of the victory, the volume of straight publicity was small, although tourist accounts on Korala subsequentlyeature in Soviet publications. Commontators scrupulously avoided the subject of Indian internal affairs, and until8 there was no indication of Moscow's wlllingnoss totho Korala ministry.

In the continuing searchtronger rationalo for its policy toward Asian and African neutralist states, Sovietturned to Lenin's works to cull out applicable views. In this Instance the "return to Leninism" represented an effort to legitimize the new.course and glvo It the stamp of greater authority as well as to inject some of the early revolutionary enthusiasm into the new Communist theses. Lenin was cltod particularly to justify the temporary alliance with bourgeois-controlled Asian national movements; however, his stipulation that cooperation with non-Communist groups was possible only if Communists were left free to organize and agitate was not cited, in view of the domestic anti-Communist policies of some of the Asian and Arab governments which Moscow was nowto overlook. Moscow's modernized version of Leninismdown ideological differences in favor of bringing about the


unity of all national elementsoint struggle forindependence, which in turn was identified with anforeign

The USSR's initial impact on Asian-African neutralism had come about through direct contacts with nationalist leaders such as Nehru, Sukarno, and Nasir. Now, Moscow sought toits influence with the general public throughand broadening the appealhe traditional labor, women' student, and other Communist-front groups and by multiplying direct contacts of Asian and African peoples with the bloc. Special attention was given to the trade union movement in an attempt to exploit the historically close emotionalbetween the labor and nationalist movements. Moscow's greatest initiative along this line was directed towarda "Bandunghich it interpreted as general Asian-African neutralist endorsement of bloc policies andto expand to include not only the Bandung Conference discussions and their aftermath but also the parallel "Afro-Asian Solidarity" movement which had been developing along nongovernmental lines since Moscow recognized the potentialovement based on popular enthusiasm for Asian and African cooperationountain of anti-Westernas wellonvenient mechanism for collaborating with and influencing Asian-African nationalist-neutralists.

The participation of Soviet officials in leadingroles both in cooperation with and in competition with Egyptian and Indian elements was intended to bring the "Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement" as close as possible to the bloc's peace movement and to further the image of the USSR as an Asian nation. Overtures to Asians and Africans, however, were but parteneral Soviet effort to expand contacts with foreign groups and individuals, in line with theonaytate Committee for Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries, under the USSR Council of Ministers. Tactical flexibility in dealing with non-Communists, intO-person contacts MO'?tess than" In "government-torelations, was to be the order of the day.

The First All-Union Conference of Orientalists, convened in Tashkentoune, brought together specialists from all over the bloc in an effort to back up current Soviet foreign policy lines with more skillful and convincingof area developments and to strengthen the appeal

to Asian-African intellectuals. B. G.adzhik who sinceh party congress had authored the principalstatements on the new line for Asia-Africa, chaired tho conference and shared the spotlight with another Asian, N. A. Mukhitdlnov, then first secretary in Uzbekistan and candidate member of the Soviet party presidium. The locus of the conference {the heart ;of Soviet Centralhe content of the major speeches, and the leading role of Soviet Asians underlined the shift to efforts to utilize to the maximum the experiences of Soviet rule in the Central Asian republicsattern for the economic development of non-Soviet countries. Gafurov cited the "marvelous experienco" of the peoples of these republics,

which with the active assistance of the Russian people and of other peoples of the USSR, in the shortestperiod, overcame their former backwardness andighly developed Industry and agriculture.

Uukhitdlnov, now tabbedeading regime spokesman on national movements, likewise emphasized the political, economic, and cultural achievements of the peoples of the Soviet East in the years of Communist ruleromising vehicle for making more vivid and concrete the Communist program for Asia and In the year following this meeting, Soviet scholarstheir output of analyses of the social and economic development of Central Asia as the pathoncapitalist path of development from feudalism to socialism. The state universities at Tashkent and Frunze were developed as centers of scholarly and cultural contact with non-Soviet ASla.

The practical applications of these viefws to pressingEast problems showed Moscow engagedareful assessment of areas of conflicting Interests in which Soviet theoretical prejudicesimited role. Raving scored its advanced in the Middle East on the basis first of giving all-outfor Arab governments against Israel and second ofArab estrangement from the Vest, Moscow revised somewhat its earlier views on the shape of the dangers to its position and that of its Arab allies. Months after the fact Moscowits version of the Suez crisis to admit that the attack on Egypt came without prior agreement with the United States. At the same time, while tacitly admitting considerablesuccesses In shoring up the economic and military strength of area countries opposed to the extension of Soviet influence.


Moscow appeared loss concerned that major Americanwas Imminent and turned its principal attontion tothe anti-Western stand of Egypt and Syria and to winning broader Arab popular support. In the face of the ouster of the Nabulsl government of Jordan in April and the signature of Saudi-US agreements, Moscow blamed reactionary loaders rather than the two kings for these pro-Western moves,feeling that in timo these governments would be forced by lntra-Arab pressures to follow the load of Cairo and.

Moscow continued its offers of economic assistance toall area countries and speeded the re-equipplng of the Egyptian Army to replace its losses of material. Arms also flowed to Syria at cut-rate prices in exchange for Syrianof cotton and wheat, necessitating the diversion to the bloc of an Important part of Syria's traditional agricultural exports to West European markets and resultingramatic increase In the bloc's share of Syrian foreign trade. Despite Moscow's blanket offers of Increased trade, of economicloans, and technical assistance, byandful ofIndia, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Egypt, andagreed to extensive programs of economic or economic and military aid. Burma, Cambodia, Nepal, Ceylon, and Yemen had agreed to terms with Moscow,.but African (other than Egypt) and Latin American countries failed to respond to tentative Soviet overtures.

Moscow's intentions to follow an activist line inore objectiveof concrete developments on the one band and intensified ideological-propaganda attacks on Western policies on the other-were reflected in Important publication moves at mid-year. In early June, Moscow issuedeference handbook ofages entitled Foreign Countries. The publication, whichun-down of major developments since World War II for all countries except the USSR, prosent-ed short goographic and economic survoys, descriptions ofof state power, leading political parties, the press, etc. An aid to Soviet educators and propagandists, it was notable for its dissimilarity to an agitator's notebook.

Of more lasting impact, Moscow brought to lifeecade Varga'sew World Economics andRelations, the stated purpose of which was to examinedevelopments both in the developed and underdeveloped


capitalist countries and relations among and between thorn. The renowned economist was listed as an editor and hasrequent contributor, but the selection of Ya. head ofnd former chief of the foreign .section of Prayda, as chlof editor pointed up the unmistakable political bent of the journal. econd new journal, The Contemporary East, introduced at the same time was intended to serveopular voice of the Institute of Oriental Studies both at home and abroad. To date it has not lived up to its Initial promise to appear "soon" in the major languages of Asia and Africa, but under Gafurov's editorship it has been used to disseminate official views on pressing international problems especially touching on the interests of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, to publish the parallel views of neutralist leaders, and to point up the significance ofcontacts, exchanges, friendship societies, and front groups In bringing together non-Communist and avowedactivities in these areas..

The step-by step disclosure in early July of the "anti-party" group conspiracyad comeead the previous monthew era in Soviet relations with the uncommit-ted-aprld, as Khrushchev used this opportunity to attribute to the group: policies which were unpopular or had failed and to associate himself personally with those Initiatives which haduccess or were now to be undertaken. The dismissal of Shepilov, the Soviet leader most closely associated with Moscow's strong pro-Nasir stand, obliged the regime to explain to the Arabs that no change in Soviet Middle East policy was in prospect. The indictment of Molotov, probably correctly, for broad opposition to many of Khrushchev's foreign policy moves cleared the wayurely Khrushchevian style inaffairs. Accusing the whole antiparty group with having opposed such features of current Soviet foreign policy as moves in the direction of peace and coexistence with the West and

in authoring Important articles onrelations in his own and such other Sovietas International Affairs and Life Abroad, has used the literary pseudonym M. Marinin.

"personal diplomacy" were apparently intended to underline these features' sanctity and the importance with whichcontinued to viewong-range accomodation with the West. No mention was made at this timeby at least part of the ousted presidium members to Khrushchev's policies for Intrabloc as well as foreign aid.

The first test of the regime's intentions following the purge was provided almost immediatelyesult of theintimacy of Soviet-Syrian relations and Moscow's general embroilment in Middle East developments. oint Soviet-Syrian communique issued on the conclusionisit to Moscowigh-ranking delegation of Syrian political and military figures pledged the USSR to furthor extensive economic and technical assistance for Syria and sought to strengthen the anti-Wostern hand of the Syrian Government. Following the allegedeek later of an American plot, the Syrian regime ousted the last dissontors to its pro-Soviet policies and set off an area-wide alarm over the spread of overt Communist activities in the Middle East and on the possibilities of pro-Western intervention in Syria. Soviet propaganda seized on the Syrian charges and subsequent Arab alarms not only to Intensify the air of crisis In order topressures on pro-Western Arab governments, but also, as indicatedhird round of notes to Britain, France, and the United Stateseptember, to bring about big power negotiations on tho Middle East on the same terms as proposed in its notos ofebruary and

acade of exaggerated Interest in Soviet security in the Middle East, and in the context of intense political-psychological pressures, Moscow set out to tost Wosternand Western resolution over Syrian developments. TASS'ugust announcement of the successful testing of anballistic missile touchedampaign by Moscow to exploit claimsew balance of power and therebya stronger international authority for itself. Thiswas made more explicit by the publicationeptember in Pravdaong "interview" with bead of the Soviet air force. Air Marshal Vershinin, depicting overwhelming Soviet military superiorityis the West. Theeptemberby Moscow that two warships from the Baltic Fleet which wereood-will visit to Albania and Yugoslavia would alsoen-day visit to Syria dramatized the USSR's self-appointed rolo as "protector" of the Arubs at the same

time us it was intended to servooncrete reminder ofKiddle East interests. arty brochure published oneptember, The Soviet Union and the Countries of the Near and Mlddlo East', by Kh. N. Grigoryan, claimed that

tens of millions of people in the Near and Middle East see in the face of tho Sovietrue friend and supporter of the peace and independence of

In explaining to wide domestic circles Soviet diplomaticfor Syria and Egypt, the brochure did not Intimate that Moscow's backing would be other than diplomatic and economic. Khrushchev's attempts to build up the impression abroad of irresistible Soviet power woro intended to inhibit Western moves in the area and to encourage Arab governments totronger line against the West, secure in the belief that Soviet arms would protect them from any Western militaryand that bloc economic ties would foil attemptedretalllation.

Moscow's handling of the second phase of the crisis was more clearly directed over Arab heads at the West. Moscow'septemberatomic and hydrogen weapons of various kinds had been exploded Inwith military training exercisesrelude to the recapitulation of Soviet military, scientific, and economic advances which followedctober launching of Sputnik I. Moscow kept the spotlight on military technology withctober that on the preceding day it hada "powerful hydrogen devlco of new design." Then Khrushchev personally took the lead in magnifying the war scare over Syria with his statement to New York Times correspondent James Reston that Turkey would not lastingle day"iddle East war. Again on the evening of the 7th the premier hit at Turkish and Western Intentions regarding Syria, adding that it would be too late to reconsider policies when "cannons begin to shoot and rockets to fly." The subsequent transfer of Marshal Rokossovsky to command of the Transcaucasus Military District bordering on Turkey and Iran, followed by anpress statement that military exercises had been carried out thero under simulated atomic warfare conditions, wasto convince both the Arabs and thethetensions were so great as to require an immediate settlement.

Although both public and private statements of Soviet willingness to undertake, if necessary, military action in support of Syria fell short of committing the USSR toaction, they served to cloak Soviet intentions and to maintain for Moscow as wide an area as possible forexploitation and political maneuver. When even the Naslr-oriented Arab states moved in the direction of detente, Khrushchev,eception onctober in theheatrical, self-styled "gesture of peace" and attempted to resume the pose of peacemaker. Perhaps inthat the very crudeness of its tactics had boomer-anged among some of the Arabs and had failed to shake the West, Moscow lateralfhearted attempt to blame the military pressures to the "adventurism" of then Defense Minister Marshal Zhukov. Zhukov may have favored such tactics and contributed to the atmosphere of crisis by repeating the harsher tones of the Moscow press In his speeches in Albania at the height of the tension, but in view of his three-week absence andearlier personal identification with thasrprbbe, he was an unsuitable scapegoat.

Moscow's subsequent attempts to depict its efforts toprolong, and manipulate tensions between Syria and its neighbors as another major trial of its role as protector of the Arabs have centered around the undisputed fact that no intervention took place. Although at the time the central press reflected disappointment that the Arab states provedin the face of East-West pressures, Soviet historians have prefered to skim over the diplomatic and politicalwhich led to the Impasse, toaricature of the crisis based on the Western plot thesis, to repeat the "we saved Syria" allegation without specifying the Sovietpressures employed. Although paled by the recentsupport for Syria, the signature onctoberong-term development assistance credit' emphasized the close cooperation between the two governments at the same time as it underlined the interplay of Soviet economic aid with both broad and immediate policy aims. Concurrent with the Syrianajor review of tho politics of economic aid to the underdeveloped countries by Modeste Rubinsteinthe indirect "financial-economic and military-political" methods used by colonialists in enforcing their will onindependent states and asserted that Moscow's unselfish aid "truly threatens colonialist policies" in opening the way for the underdeveloped countries to choose freely the course and pace of their economic development.


or the first time, economic aid was included as one of the Theses for tho October Revolution Anniversary;

Havingighty Industrial power, thestate not only extends to the countries of Asia and Africa moral and political support in theirfor attaining, preserving, and strengthening their independence, but also helps them in the creation of the economic basis of independence in building upand in developing agriculture.

h anniversaryonvenient peglood of Soviet publications to attempt to influence the peoples of the former colonics. The effort was keyed to the interpretation of recent world history in termsevolutionary struggle against imperialism in which all of these peoples hadin one degree or another and was couched in localized terms in order to increase its plausibility. Symptomatic of Moscow's more optimistic appraisal of prospects for still greater influence in Asia and Africa was the publication in the Journal Soviet Oriental Studies of an article on the First Congress of the Peoples of the East, held in0 at Baku, which ong discarded program ofstruggle of all peasants and workers of the world.

One of the frankest evaluations of East-West rivalry for the tactical allegiance of tho underdeveloped and neutralist countries was given by Eugene Varga on the eve of tho November celebration. Writing in "his" Journal World Economics and Internationalcited as WEIB--the noted Soviet economist singled out "the three mighty pillars" of colonial rule: monopoly on the supply of industrial equipment and machinery, monopoly on the sources of international credit, and monopoly on the supply of arms. Varga claimed all three were crumblingonsequence of Soviet policies. He brag--ged that the economic achievements of the USSR and the bloc permitted them to furnish whole Industrial combines tocountries and that sound Soviet finances permitted the USSR to make loans on more advantageous terms than those offered by either the United States or Britain. In one ofraro references to its nonbloc military assistanceVarga cited the high stago of bloc industrialas making possible the sale of arms to former colonies and dependent countries threatened by imperialist aggression, thus eliminating the West's third and last "monopoly" standing



in the way of complete political and economic independence. The near-term implication was that Moscow's call for peaceful competition with the West would feature greatly expandedefforts along all three of these lines. As for theMoscow was urging on the underdeveloped countries, the most importantro-Soviet, or at least neutral, foreign policy, plus domestic measures combining

land reforms and the elimination of feudal holdovers; the liquidation of the economic positions ofin industry, finance, and trade; the creationowerful state economy on the basis of an Increase of the relative weight and directive rolo of the state sector in the country's economy; the introduction of elements of state planning of the economy;efinite control over the activity of private capital; and the nationalization of foreign property. (From the unsigned lead article in Soviet Oriental Studies, Mo.igned to the pressovember.)

h anniversary celebration in Moscow, led andby Khrushchev, was keyed to efforts to make directand propaganda capital out of the changes wroughtduring theears of Communist rule. Khrushchev'sspeechist of recent domestic and internationaloff by recent ICBM claims and world-wide acclaim ofnd, on the eve of the holiday/,Sputnikgive the impression^that the successes of the past year were but tho prelude for further Communist advances, and he reiterated standard claims for the ideological and cultural superiority of Communismorld system. Bis remarks on the disintegration of colonialism were brief and notable only for the optimistic formulation that the "twilight of imperial rule in the East hass distinct from the usual equivocation as to timing. Khrushchev's speech did not even imply that up until less than two weeks previously the Middle East, specifically Syria, had been the locusajor East-West crisis. The following day, however, newly named Minister of Defense Marshal Malinovsky kept alive the Soviet charge that Western "adventures" such as Syria threatened mankind with the calamities of nuclear warfare.

The meetings and discussions of Communist party leaders who wore in Moscow ostensibly to help celebrate the anniversary


ajor effort to resolve intrabloc differences and toreater semblance of doctrinal andunity to the world Communist movement. Theissued atovember conference of bloc partiesdocument Yugoslavia refused to sign--apparently wasby its formulatorsort of bloc charter, and was so treated by Soviet propaganda forear following the meeting. The "Declaration" reaffirmed the theses of the Sovieth party congress and in effect validated Sovietof the world Communist movement in the interim period. At the same time, however, provisos were added which justified harder lines in both the ideological and political struggle with the class enemy (capitalism) and the bloc enemy (thehe meeting fromoovember ofommunist parties, claiming more0 members, was concerned withand invigorating Communist tactics and, in particular, enlivening the languishing "peace" movement. party "Peace Manifesto" called for an intensified struggle by all ant1-imperialist elements against Western influence andand directed peace organizations toassionate drive against the manufacture, testing, and use of nuclear weapons.

The party conferences and the two programmatic documents were Intended to close the gap between the correct line being followed by Moscow in governraent-to-governmentaccepted differences In social: and economic institutions as secondary to thetanceis thethe ideological priorities in local party programs. urvey, The Pisintcgration of the Colonial System by V. Ya. Avarln, which appeared in7 under the auspices of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, reflected Moscow's willingness totep toward reclaiming class struggle and agitation as motivating forces for progressive worldpoints left unsettled by theh party congress formulations. Avarin cited the position of theclass as "usually the basis and point of departure of the anti-imperial1st and antifeudal movement" and hailed the role of labor unrest and strife as an "integral part" of theliberation movement. Subsequent to the November meetings, Soviet commentators were more cautious in their appraisal of nationalist parties and governments than they had been theyear. The principal impact of the party get-togethers, however, was not on Soviet policies, nor even on Soviet public attitudes, but on bringing the tactics of local Communistinto line: to focus the resentment and hatred of allelements on the capitalist and foreign enemy, principally the United States.


The party discussions had little If any immodiate effect on the course of Soviet foreign policy. Moscow's publiccontinued to bo comprisedrofessed willingness to enter into reasonable agreements with the West and of an extensive commitment to assist those countries wishing to break free of dependence on the West, politically and economically.fter drawn-out negotiations,0 credit to aid India inomestic heavy machine-building Industry. Later in the month, following discussions in Moscow with Nasir's top aide Marshal Amir, the Soviet Union announced Its willingness to extend long-term credits to Cairo for projects under Egypt's economic development plan. Concurrently, efforts were made to Increase trade not only with the underdeveloped countries, but with the Western great powors as"promotestold visiting American newspaper magnato Hearst onovember. One sign that the Kremlin had not forgotten theof Western defense moves and Arab developments onstrategic and political interests in tho Mlddlo East was Moscow's continuation of its serious warnings and generalpressure on Turkey. In December, Moscowirst callew program for bringingummit conference which could leadeneral settlement of outstanding East-West issuesessening of international tension.

Khrushchev personally took the lead in extending Moscow's economic assistance and friendship campaign to Latin America, still relatively unaffected by post-Stalin changes in Soviet policy. In an interview with two Brazilian journalists onublished subsequently in Internatlonal Affairs, Khrushchevew stage of Soviet efforts to break down the resistance of Latin American government and businessto increased contacts with the bloc. Calling his visitors "the first swallowsew era in Soviet-Brazilianhrushchev pitched his discussion to theof ro-establlshing diplomaticabsence of which allegedly was depriving Brazil and other Latincountries of the advantages of economic and culturalwithto Soviet willingness to expandtransactions, extend industrial assistance, and Increase cultural contacts. According to local Communist pross accounts.



Soviet leaders had met separately with Latin Americanat the November meetings inf theatin American Communist parties, many illegal, had representatives at the Moscowworked out with them regionaland tactics.

Two articles in the December issue of Internationalattempted to apply to Latin American conditions the lessons ofh party congress and the developments up to and including the November Moscow meetings. It was asserted that the main purpose of the national liberation movement in Latin America was the attainment of genuine economicand national economic development in which the national bourgeoisie would be "almost as interested in economic progress and economic Independence as the working class." Moscow's transparent intention in seeking friendly contacts with Latin American businessmen and government figures was to lay the groundwork for long-term political gains similar to thoseearlier with similar groups in Asia and the Arab countries by exploiting their current economicox-change, export market, and Investment capitalthe direction of reduced economic and thus political dependence on ttoe united-States and increased political-'/ economic',ultural relations with the bloc.


its'"of the


Although Moscow often promoted increased economic contacts between the underdeveloped countries and theeven between the major capitalist countries and thea means Of reducing international tension and as an antidote for war psychosis, itrogram of undermining Western economic -influence la Asia,-'Africa, and-Latin America in unmistakably cold-war terms. At the same time as the Soviet economicprogram was Still restricted primarilyalf-dozen countries of considerable political and'strategic importance ln the East-West rivalry, Moscow carriedystematicidespread-campaign to counter Western and particularlyaid programs. pecial conference on "Americantoringing^ together leading,

e^hc1ais:tu" ^aics^and

Relations, and.:other establishments, was .held in December.-condensedtatemsnts


developed world. Also reflected was the desire to center local attention on political and military "strings" allegedlyto all Western aid so as to undermine the psychological and political impact of aid programs, with the further effect of diverting public attention in the underdeveloped areas-onsideration of concrete economic measures to political and propaganda side Issues which could be manipulated by Moscow and local anti-Western elements to discredit all relations with "imperialists." The core of the argument was not new: Western "assistance" is in fact partomplex scbemo to assure the continued political-economic domination of Western countries oVer the former colonies. The Implication of the conference was that there would be an intensification ofand Communist efforts not only to barrass Western economic programs in these areas, but to step up efforts to disrupt all forms of intercourse between the developed and underdeveloped parts of the capitalist world.

The first ImproBSlvo public exercise of Communist strategy toward the underdeveloped countries and of tactics to be used to intensify area frictions with the West was the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference held in Cairo from7 Although billeduccessor to the Bandung Conference, only the Chinese and Soviet delegations,ew Arab participants, were officially sanctioned byumber of thepeoples'fromountries were expatriates or exiles of the countries represented.. Moscow's impressive team was headed -by Sh. R. Rashidov, "President" of the Uzbek Republic, andxzumanyan, director of tho Institute or World EconomyInternational Relations. At the conference Arzumanyanald assault on Western economic positions in the assault framed In tensirect- challenge to established positions as well as to shifting economiclonshlps. -Simply-Arznmanyan's thesis was thatrder to safeguard their political independence and to secureIndependence asnderdeveloped'-conntrios- mutft develop their own heavy as well as light manufacturing To get the capital necessary for industrialization these countries should nnthe property ofain control for nut ional purposes of their own resources and of the profits which Westerners had been sending out of'the country. Underdeveloped countries would then find it possible to mobilize all Internal resources and plan their utilization. Increased commercial trade with the


bXoc and bloc technical and development assistance extended on favorable terms could supplement domestic resources with no limiting political conditions. Although this wasew concept, the fact that Moscowybrid conference at Cairo to spotlight not only its willingness to extend credits to friendly governments but also Its ideological antagonism to one of the pillars of the area's economy,investment, pointed up one of the purposes of Soviet political and economic support to nationalistthe encouragoment of political and economic forays against Western positions.

Besides the forum for attacks on the Wost, Moscow valued the Cairo conference and the "solidarity" movement behind itromising mechanism for maintaining liaison with andneutralist and nationalist sentiment in nonbloc Asia, the Arab countries, and also Black Africa. Having originated principally in Indian and Egyptian neutralist circles, the Afro-Asian solidarity movement, though Soviet influenced,espectability and home-grown flavor Moscow could not claim in Asia and Africa for its peace movement. Although Moscow vies withon occasion also with New Delhi andorganizational and ideological influence in this covenent, the resolution:: adopted at Cairo reflected the bond of anti-imperialismemanding immediate independenceolonial territories, and generally paralleled lines of Soviet foreign policy. The permanent organizational structure which emerged from the conference also provided Moscow with anew channel for direct contacts..with African nationalist groups Of many hues.

Soviet interests in African events had7 with Soviet representation at the independence celebrations of Ghana' and Tunisia,roadening andof attempts to initiate diplomatic and tradewith the independent. African,ovietn Africa, still primarily the responsibility of theof Ethnography,ointed at winning the confidence of politically conscious African elements by asserting aInterest In their coming of political age, and byon all countss past resent role In Afri-a, Ip ^Moscow'she; exchangediplomaticions and the establishment of regular economic and culturalong-time- Soviet Africaoist Professor I. I. Potekhinioneering role as scholar, semiofficialnd proto-dlplomat.

Moscow8 still riding the wavo of optimismby world-wide reaction to its sputnik launchings,doubts concerning Moscow's extravagant claims to world scientific and technical leadership began to bo more prevalent in non-Communist circles andapid decline In the political mileage Moscow could expect in this direction. expressions of Soviet leaders and Moscow commentary gave the appearanco that the Soviet Union was confident that changos taking place in non-Communist Asla, Africa, and Latin America, both In the field of international relations and in theirsocial and economic developments, were favorable to the increase of Communist Influence and moreover were irreversible. Moscow gave every indication that it was counting on theeffecteriod of years of bloc political,and, though more restricted, military aidwithcontacts, intensive propaganda, and growing local Communistmake at least anumber of the underdeveloped countries materially dependent and politically tractable.

The lines developed publicly at the November partyand of the CairoSolidarity Conferenceup and extended in Soviet publications over Pravda onanuary published an articleCommunist party leader Lombardo Tolodano, whoprestige throughout left-wing circles In In which Tolodano indicated that the principalLatin American Communists was to discredit theand its "colonialist" policies. More detailedof revised local strategy and of organisational andtactics were carried in local party organs followingof party leaders fromvisited Peiplng The report of the head of the Uruguayan CommunistArismendl, to his party congress was reprinted inagitprop organ Party Affairs inindicationwas considered both exemplary and programmatic. Thethe new strategy as outlined by Arismendl was toparties and organizations which favorededuction of ties with the West, and tothe Initiation of increase of diplomatic, economicrelations1 with bloc:countries* localpartiea-wero- to- play down classand attacks on capitalism per se in favor ofnational programs of "economic progress and economic

The establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Ghana on8 marked anextension of Soviet contacts with Afrlcao nationaland was balled by Moscow as acceptance by the Black African community of Soviet support and respectability. primary concern, however, continued to bo that ofWestern ties with African territories and frustrating Western plans toew framework of political andmutual relations. Besides spotlighting andracial discrimination in Africa and the United States as evidence of innate Western hostility to Africans, Moscow sought to fan fears of colonialist cooperation under Americanto extend the network of Western military basesAfrica and to tie African territories permanently in aeconomic and political roleariety of schemes andEurafrica*" onograph entitledPooples, released under the auspices of the Institute of Ethnography in Fobruary, A. S. Orlova attempted to apply the lessons of the Bandung and Cairo conferences to Africa and claimed progressive forces and their post-Bandung slogan of "Independence in this generation!" as part of the globalfor peace and democracy. Moscow's support for thestruggle for independence was more theoretical than real, however. The April conference of independent African states atby the UAB, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, the Sudan, Tunisia, and Ghana plus representatives of several African resistancesolely an African affairs', though Moscow sent messages of support and reported favorably on the results of the conference; conference documents were reprinted in International Affairs.

Although Soviet and Egyptian delegates had worked closely at the Cairo Conferenceeneral antl-imperialist line for Asia and Africa, Nasir's precipitous response toederation of Egypt and Syriaeriousto the bases of Moscow's support for non-Communistgovernments. Moscow supported the view as long as the talk was still ofut when the outlines of Nasir's planned merger became clearer, Moscow's praise ceased. Not only had Damascusore pliant ally, but diplomatic, economic, and military aid which had built-up excellentrelations had fostered the rise of left-wing Arab, elements which threatened to be the first victims of the union. More than point up the deficiencies of Moscow's simpleof attempting to evaluate political, economic, and social

changes in Arab and other underdeveloped countries in terms of pro- or anti-imperiallsa, the move toward mergertho differences in long-term aims between Cairo and Moscow and between Naslr-led Arab nationalists and Middle East Communists.

Moscow's pro-forma acceptance of tho accomplished fact did not conceal its lack of enthusiasm. Its first cautious appraisal of the new Arab state, prosontod by R. Ivanov in International Affairs,rudging adjustment to the now circumstances but did not refrain from restrained criticism, citing problems and differences in Syria "which cannot be surmounted at once by decreo or governmentubsequently Moscow was more openly critical of the antlpro-gressive prospects of tho extension to Syria of Nasir'son labor and political organizations. Although he conceded that the merger played an anticolonial role in strengthening Nasir's band, Soviet commentator I. Belyayov, writing in Contemporary East, expressed reservations as to the domestic effects of the union,

Moscow's dilemma in facing up to .the" implications of Nasir's move without surrendering completely Its Communist assets in Syria to the demands of continued good stato relations with Nasir was pointed up by tho fate of tho Syrian Communist party. Ehalld Bakdash, top Syrian Communist leader, refused totho Syrian party, publicly denounced Nasir's mergorandebruary fled with hla family and other Syrian Communist leaders to tho bloc. ariety of bloc forums, Bakdash kept alive tho thread of an uncompromising Communist program for the eventual communication of the Middle East, in marked contrast to Moscow's official policy of good relations with anti-Western Arab governments.* Both Moscow and Cairohowdown on Ideological issues, but the undertones of the Soviet reaction was thatetreat ratherurrender.

Naslr's acceptanceenewed invitation to visit the Sovietscheduled for6 butbecause of the crisis overannumber of high-level Soviet-UAH exchanges, featuring the parade to Cairo of Soviet Binistors to negotiate or Implement economic, agricultural, and cultural agreements. For reasons of their own, both Moscow and Cairo sought to limit the areas of their political disagreement so as not to dlstuiib tactical cooperation, which had brought major gains to both parties at tho expense of the West. Naslr's arrival in Moscow on8 touchedajor Soviet propaganda effort to portray USSR-UAH political views as identical. Naslr's speeches and his conduct during an extensive tour of tho USSR indicated that dosplto continued Soviet economic and military assistance, he intended to proceed with his recently announced policy ofimprovod rolations with the West. Do avoided seconding Moscow's anti-Western attacks at the same time as he accepted closer Soviet-UAR economic ties.

Moscow attempted to identify itself In the minds of the Arab peoples with purely Arab goals, but it would not formally endorse Nasir as spokesman for all Arabs, nor was Nasir able totronger Soviet stand on the Arab's war of liberation In Algeria. For their part, Soviet leaders seemed intent on heading off any rapprochement of Nasir with the West bytheir economic and military backing of Cairo andto fan anti-Western sentiment among the Arab people.

At the same time, the Soviet economic assistance program, as an Integral part of Moscow's relations with all thecountries, was undergoing continued re-examlnatlon and In turn was being diffused into Soviet analyses of the dynamics of social growth in these areas. pecialonebruary sponsored by the journal International Affairs, bringing together propagandists such as Ilyichev, tho military strategist-theoretician Talensky,andful of acadoralclans, discussed the latest achievements of Soviet science and technology and their significance for andon international relations. The abbreviated version of tho proceedings, as published in tho Journal, reflecteddetermination to push forward an interpretationizing enhanced Soviet prestige, to put new vigor behind its perennial "wave of the future" propaganda line, but also to claim greater International authorityesult ofchanges in the balance of forces between socialism and



capitalism." Propaganda to the underdeveloped countries, in order to keep alive intcrost in Soviet developments and to pave the way for closer government-to-government relations, featured the sputniks and other "peaceful" embodiments ofscientific advances.

Moscow's general economic aid offensive was pointed up early in March by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Flryubin at the ECAFE conference in Kuala Lumpur. At the same time, G. Ye. Skorov, one of the editors of WEIR,oint-by-point justification of Soviet economic assistance togovernments within tho goneral framework of He claimed for blocstabilizing" andinfluence on the oconoray" of the underdeveloped countries, with the implication that they stood with Moscow on important international issues and so should be strengthened. He also reiterated current Soviet support for development of the "state sector" but in stronger terms, asserting that

under certain conditions, the state sector of the economy may become the material-technical basiseaceful transition to socialism.

Skorov's most important contribution, however, was an attempt to shore up the Ideological basis for Moscow's economicwith the admission that although the immediate effect of Soviet aid often was to aid capitalist development, the state independence of the underdeveloped countries 'Involved them In the world struggle against the West and on the long term opened the prospect of social change. Then, In more traditional terms, he asserted,

Despite the fact that the majority of the nationally independent statesart of the capitalist system, the dialectics of world social growth are such that their movement forward along the path of Independent political and economic development does not strengthen, but, on the other hand, weakens world capitalism, depriving it of its most important reserve.

Mikoyan'sarch Yerevan "election" speech, whicha brief attack on "economist comrades" for taking an Incorrect position on certain foreign economic matters, left vague the focus of their opposition. It is not clear whether the erring "economist comrades" were opposed on Ideological


or political grounds, or whether they differed on economic interest andprogram appeared vulnerableumber of accounts. Whatever the case, Mikoyan's defense was along political rather than economic lines:

In this connection, we must not overlook such an important factor in international life as the role of countries that are liberated from colonialand have earned political independence and which are proceeding on the path ofeconomic independence.

On the occasion of his visit to Hungary inhrushchev gave considerable personal attention to justifying the present Soviet economic program, with emphasis on long-range objectives. At Tatabanyapril he emphasized the role of the working class in each country, the "Inspirational example" of economic developments within the bloc, andlimiting it. to thethe "only correct route to victory is the growth of productive forces in all possible ways." At the Hungarian Academy of Sciences theday, Khrushchev reiterated the thesis central to the program, relying on the example of Soviet economic advances: "We attack capitalism on its flanks from economic positions, from positions of the superiority of our system," Expressing Soviet intentions shortly to overtake and surpass the West, and particularly the United States, in per capita production of socially necessary goods, Khrushchev boasted:

Then the ideas of Communism will be understood by many people, not only by means of the studybut also by the force ofeople who today cannot utter the word 'communism' without irony will then also be with us. They will take our road without their being aware of It.

The flexibility of the Soviet approach and Moscow'sto adapt and modify its tactics to appeal not only to political extremists but also to moderates in thecountries was exemplifiedine introduced in March which implied that Moscow might be induced to competethe West for influence in the economic development of the former colonies rather than to keeptruggle to exclude Western interests. In an intervieworrespondent of Le Figaro onarch, Khrushchev pickedroposal advanced

by the French at the Geneva Sumit Conference ina real easing of International tension and disarmament "would make it possible to deduct sufficient sums to render real and tangible aid" to tho underdeveloped countries. Then4 March Interview with an Italian newsman, Khrushchev agreed there was merit in Italian Foreign Minister Pella's suggestionoint WesternSSR fund to aid Middle Eastprovidedund should be sot up not by agrouping" of countries, but by all European countries, the satellites.

Moscow's "six principles" for Middle East peace, set forth in its February and7 notos to tho Wostern powers, had tied vague "promotion" of area economic development to an arms embargo but had not been followed up. Soviet willingness to participate In regional aid now reappeared inaysetting forth agenda items for the expected summit

The necessity arises of also considering theof economic cooperation with the countries of the Near and Middle East, particularly in respect to assistance in creating their own nationalithout laying down any political, military, or other conditions Incompatible with the principles of their Independence and sovereignty.

Without committing itself in any way, not even to calling off or toning down its propaganda harassment of Western economic positions in the area, Moscow apparently wanted to put itself on the right side of an issue of much interest to thocountries.*

In his travels to the United States in the summer9 and to France inhrushchev tied prospectsajor increase in economic assistance to progress on disarmament, implying, though carefully not stating, that programs to be paid for by funds .releasededuction of military expenditures could be used forcarried on jointly with the West.

Soviet emphasis during the period, however, wason the side of undercutting Western economic activity in the underdeveloped areas. G. Hartysheva, writing in the semipopular monthly Contemporary East, echoed Arzumanyan's Cairo thrust for the nationalization of Western-ownedin the underdeveloped countries:

The task of liquidating ages-old backwardnessbe decided without seizing the positions held by foreign capital In theIs an integral part of the national liberation struggle; its realization will shrink the sphere of imperialist exploitation in the underdevelopedand will allow the governments of theseto turn the profits from nationalizedto the needs of economic construction, and above all to industrialization.

Nationalization, however, was only the logical conclusionimple assertion that private capital investment wasrather than assistance toward economic development, and that in effect it is not the countries exporting capital which finance economic development, but underdevelopedwhich provide excessive profits for Westernraction of which returns to the same or anothercountry, where the same chain of investment-exploitation takes place. The aithor also used an artificebalance sheet" purporting to demonstrate that profits American concerns have received from their postwar operations exceed by several times all American capital investments in the underdeveloped countries; this strategem was repeated with ingeniousby Soviet economists.

Tho failure of Khrushchev's ideological concessions and continued political and economic overtures to halt Yugoslavia's drift away from the bloc, leading to the secondcrisis,eassessment of Soviet views onprocesses and the relations of bloc countries to non-Communist countries as well as to Communist but revisionist In the lead article of Problems of Philosophy, G. M. Gak, leading upefutationought to establish the essential difference between Communist programs of revolutionary reform and the various stages of the bourgeois-democratic revolution which Moscow for governmental reasons supported in non-Communist Asia. He made it clear that

support for the national bourgeoisie in its struggle against imperialism should not lead to the conclusion that theare capable or interested in carrying the struggleto Communism. Citing the increasing numbers andof Communist parties in India and Indonesia, the author re-emphasized the importance of independent Communistand struggle:

In these countries the Communist parties,general democratic activity for which thebourgeoisie is capable, at the same timetruggle for the extension of its influence for the increase in the role of the working class and the strengthening of its ties with all popular masses in order to carry the country along the path of the construction of

A two-volume roundup of bloc and nonbloc Communist partyentitled The Great October Revolution and the World Libera-tion Movement, attacked revisionist versions ofand underlined the importance of tho party's role at the present stage. This work, signed to the press onay for wide publicpress run ofattuned toh Anniversary celebrations.

In the vehemence of their attacks on Tito and in thegiven for cancelling Soviet-Yugoslav aid agreements, Soviet leaders revealed more than was politic about theirthat political gains should follow economic aid. Khrushchev's assertionune to the Bulgarian partyeveryone knows that the Imperialists never give money to anyone for no purpose, just for having beautifuldirected at both the Yugoslavs and the Asian-African nations who showed an Interest in accpptlng American aid. In the hastily improvised justifications for unilaterallycredits to Yugoslavia, Khrushchevumber.of points about the Soviet aid program which hitherto had been hidden or denied but which probably had been theof discussion and disagreement among top Communist Onuly,peechoviet-Czech friendshipin Moscow, Khrushchev admitted that

speaking In general, from the commercial viewpoint, our economic and technical aid to the underdeveloped countries Is unprofitable for us. However, we consider

that aid to the underdeveloped countries is amatter from the viewpoint of humanity andhuman

This belied past protestations by the Soviets that theiraid program was based on mutual economic self-interest. Khrushchev's follow-up definition of the special "profit" to Moscow was straightforward:

by rendering economic, technical, and other aid, we by these means create in these countries conditions so that they, having been freed from colonial slavery, do not enter into any one-sided deal with colonizers, do not go begging to them, do not subordinate their economy to them, and in this way we make it possible for them to oppose attempts to bind,them in oldrelationships, however changed in form.

Moscow's vigorous reaction to theuly revolt in Iraq and the subsequent American and British landings in Lebanon and Jordan reflected Soviet concern that these movesreludeeneral Western counteroffensive against Soviet and UAR interests in the Middle East. Naslr's hurried flight to Moscow suggested that the UAR leader shared these views and sought reassurances as to the nature and extent of Soviet support. Soviet intervention was confined principallyirulent propaganda campaign directed primarily against the United States and secondarily against Britain and pro-Western states of the eastern Mediterranean and to immediate diplomatic and propaganda support for the new Iraqi regime. Contending that the United States and Britain had committed aggression, andilitary conflict was in progress which the West planned to extend to Iraq and possibly the UAR as well, Moscow attempted to apply many of the same psychological pressures which it had brought to bear during the crisis over Syria the preceding summer and fall, including the announcement ofmaneuvers in areas adjacent to the Middle East. Soviet efforts to use the crisis to force an Immediate conference of the major powers, plus India and the UN Secretary General,onsiderable public concern for Arab sensitivities over the possibility of East-West agreement on the Middle East to tho detriment of Arab prestige and interests, but subsequent exchanges, in which Khrushchevummit meeting under UN auspices and then backed away in the face of pressures from Peiplng, indicated the Soviet Union's apprehensions had quickly

faded. As in the earlier Suez aud Syrian crises, after the peak of tension had passed, Moscow continued its concerted propaganda and diplomatic effort to claim that only Soviet protection hadamaging blow to Arab interests.

The Soviet Union's rapid strides in developing friendly relations with Qasira, the flowering of pro-Communist forces in Iraq following the coup, and Qasim's strenuous andefforts to keep from being drawn under Nasir's control greatly complicated the lines of Soviet Middle East policy. Hitherto Moscow had relied on its economic and arms aid to Nasir to reinforce the anti-Western, anti-Zionist emotional core of the pan-Arab movement and speed the erosion ofInfluence. At an early date Moscow apparently realized the advantagesecond, more radical, anti-Western Arab centerheck on Nasir andore effective instrument for the furtherance of its long-range goals of ensuring the anti-Western orientation of Arab governments and ofthe political, economic, and social structure of the area.

Comtemporary East in early July hadengthyAll Yafa^ head of the Communist party* ofwhich was one of the strongest efforts to justify, in terms of an ascending scale of unities of Interests betweenand nationalist forces, Communist support forbloc government-to-government relations with Cairo and Communist acqulscence in Nasir's efforts to be the soleof the anti-Imperialist Arabs. In sharp contrast, the first issue of the new bloc Journal Problems of Peace and Socialism (the English edition of which appears under the title World Marxisteleased in lateeassertion by Syrian,Communist exile Khalid Bakdash of the need for an independent role for the Communist party in the Arab struggle for Independence and unity. Bakdash's articleummary of views he had expressed at several bloc meetings since his February flight from Damascus: of Arab governments.willing to carry on friendlyrelations with the West; scorn for the willingness or ability of the Arab national bourgeoisie to carry outdomestic reforms; and flat rejection of Nasir'sfor the liquidation of Arab Communist parties.

The visit to Cairo in September of N. Mukhitdinov, Soviet party presidium and secretariat member charged with Middle East and Asian affairs, was apparently intended by Moscow to smooth

out tho wholo range of political differences which had become more acute in the two months since the Khrushchev-Naslron Lebanon. Mukhltdinov, whose government post isof the Foreign Affairs Committee of the OSSR Soviet ofale shadow of his party responsibilities, reportedlypirited defense of Moscow's support for Qasim and against Iraqi amalgamation with the UAR, and in support of Middle East Communists as the most rellabloforce. urther point of contention was the extent of Soviet support for the Algerian war. With Naslr'san "Algerian Republic" was proclaimed in Cairo oneptember. Although Mukhitdinov's meeting with representatives of the government-in-exlle was publicized In the Moscow press and New Times hailed the step asogical and natural sequel to the Algerians' long years of liberationheUniontronger line.

For tactical roasons, Moscow apparently felt impelled to attempt to buy off Naslr's displeasure over Soviet policy and over Arab Communist opposition to his pretensions to all-Arab leadership. Having kept Nasir dangling for more than three years after tho withdrawal of Western pledges Of economicfor his pet project, the Aswan Highhrushchev onctober,remlin banquet for Marshal Amir, Naslr's top aide, pledged Soviet support andoviet credit0 toward the construction costs of the dam's first stage. Moscow previously had been reluctant to become so deeply Involved in Naslr's industrialization program while keeping alive Egyptian hopes for more Soviet credits. Aof tho USSR's economic assistance to Arab countries in the July issue of International Affairs had concludedefensive note,

he positive results of Soviet-Arab relations In recent years and increasing economic andcooperation, as well as the existing cultural exchanges between the USSR and the Arab countries, cannot as yet fill all the needs of strengthening tbe economic independence of the Arabemphasis added).

A reported disagreement among Soviet leaders as to lntrabloc and nonbloc economic programs and priorities led to the ouster in August of Minister of Foreign Trade Kabanov andoputy foreign minister, N. S. Patollchev. Apparently

a decision was madeonsiderable increase in Moscow's economic investment in support of long-term foreign policy objectives. atter of .days after Khrushchev's Aswan Dam commitment, Moscow agreed to0 credit to Argentina for the development of its petroleum industry and concluded Its first major economic agreement with Iraq.

Moscow's efforts tolausible explanation for its policies and to find patterns in the growing complexity of its relations with the underdeveloped countries, as well as tocurrent moves, were reflected In the growing volume of Soviet commentary on developments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America directed at all levels of sophistication and foras well as foreign audiences. Atymposium, Africa South of the Sahara, prepared by the new generation of Soviet AfricanTsts, attempted to update Soviet documentation on the decline of Western Influence in British, French, and Belgian Africa. Their mentor, I. I. Potekhin, admitted in an introduction to the work that Soviet Afrlcanlsts were still ill-equipped to explain specific peculiarities of Westernpolicies in Africa or to interpret many of the phenomena of contemporary African life. road study entitled The Colonial System of Imperialism and Its Decay, S. Tyulpanov, Vice rector of Leningrad University, criticized those whoto explain the rise of nationalism and the successes Of the Independence movements in Asia and Africa in termsorsening of economic conditions there in the postwar period; he asserted instead the importancewide circle" ofquestions in determining the speed and direction of their development.

Inonograph On the Historical.Experience ofSocialism in Formerly Backwardy M. S. OzKunusov, head of the philosophy department of the Klrgiz State University, attempted on the basis of the experience of the Soviet Central Asian Republics, China and Mongolia to explain how far social laws are universal and to what extent special historical,and socio-political circumstances determined steps in theirthis in the direction of offeringto non-Communist former colonies. Dzhunusov emphasized political struggles which go on within national liberationover the direction of their course of future development, and in admitting that social revolution may take many forms, he also cited the basic Leninist formulation that "there are not and there cannot be 'purely' peaceful and purely 'forceful'

forms of socialpoint considerably soft-pedaled by Moscow followingh party congress.

The major task of interpreting developments In-theareas In the face of changingimperialist assaults" and tho Insidious influence Boriseadingwho was head of the party central committee sectionwith nonbloc parties. Ponomarev's long review of "TheMovementew Stage" in Kommunist. releasedeve ofst Anniversary,'. admitted recent losses in Pakistan, Burma, and Thailandesult of "imporlalist-backodpnomarov attempted to overbalance these reverses with general claims of successes, phlch he said included the Iraqi coup, the independence of Ghana and Guinea, and the general development of the progressive struggle in Africa and Latin America. Ponomarev's status report at least implicitlya more unyielding line for local Communist parties. It alleged therehanging ideological content of theliberationrowing recognition by nationalist leaders that "it is Impossible to stop halfr to re-travel tho tortuous path which capitalist countriesurther, it contained an obvious slap at Nehru, defending the Communist government of Kerala against the "desperate attempts of reactionary forces" to discredit the "Communistollow-up survey of the International movement by oldKuuslnen in Pravda forovember, on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Moscow "Charter ofas, like the Ponomarev article directed against revisionistagainst going too far in conciliating non-Communist elements in the common struggle against the Vest. In the facerowing estrangement between key Asian-African leaders and Moscow, Kuuslnen, as had Ponomarev,ong list of Communist parties which he claimed had increased In power and influence, and he urged "ideological-political unanimity" among Communists.

Ponomarev's attack onfirst seriousbacking for the Kerala ministry since it took office in Aprilfollowed up in the December Issue of the new bloc journal by Paveleading Soviet Ideologist who at that time was ambassador to China. Yudinpage rejoinderebru article criticizing Communistof class conflict and the use of violence against opposition elements. The critical" tone of Yudin's article



was tempered onlyontinuation of the personal flattery Moscow long had lavished on Nehru. Soviet leaders previously had made no move to take issue with Nehru, despite the Indian leader's frequent public statements at variance with. Moscow's international 1ine.

Public and private rebuffs at the hands of its principal Asian-African "neutralist"the Afro-Asian Economic Conference held in Cairo in December the head of the Indonesian delegation challenged Moscow's right to be present, and Arab and Asian delegations combinod to limit Moscow's attempt to turn the conference into an anti-Western circus and kept the USSR off the organizingSoviet spokesmen togreater attention to African and Latin Americanin an effort to maintain an aura of optimism around the nationalliberation movement. It both Africa and Latin America, however, Soviet investment in terms of political, economic, and cultural overtures bad so far. been insignificant inwith its support for such Asian nationalists as Nehru and Sukarno, or of Arab leaders Nasir and Qasim.

Moscow's prompt political, economic, and culturalto the new state of Guinea, following the rupture of that state's political and economic relations with France, were an open encouragement to other members of the French Africanto press for more rapid economic and political The USSR also was quick to recognize that much of Africa was looking to Accra rather than to Cairo for leadership, and it accordingly lavished great attention on theAll-African People's Conference, held in Accra concurrent with the Cairo Economic Conference. Moscow's advice to the conferees atthe Soviet had heavy "observer" and press representation at an African conference for the firstrepeatedew Times editorial which was simplicityach country fighting theand unity of action of all African countries.'* propaganda sought to depict this conference as the direct outcome of Bandung, Cairo, and the Accra Conference ofAfrican States, intentionally blurring distinctions between governmental and nongovernmental conclaves in line with the USSR's efforts-to upgrade the force and validity offront and similar Communist-influenced or -sponsored popular meetings.


Moscow also probably valued Accra's ties with dissident and exiled nationalist leaders in.the remaining colonies. Red Starecember praised the Independence movementsumber of theNigeria, Kenya, Uganda,the Cameroons, Mauretania, and the. Belgianacknowledged the struggle as havingide diversity of form, and admitted "varied" success to date. For the moment, Moscow ignored tho controversy which surfaced at the conference over the use or repudiation of violence in order to attaingoals.

It remained for the upcoming Soviet party congress to forrau-lato more precisely the limits within which Moscow's attitude toward developments in the nonblocould evolve. Just prior to the congress,oint conference ostensibly of the "Editorial Boards" of the Soviet journal International Affairs and its Chinese counterpart on

the main tendencies of the progressiveof the colonial system of Imperialism and on the special features and perspectives of themovement of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America

summarized prevailing views. Leading SovietEugene Zhukov and Professors A. A. Guber and V. Ya.reflected Moscow's less optimistic appraisal of trends in non-bloc Asia and Arab states and greater emphasis on the clash of progressive and reactionary social forces within Individual countriesore resolute stand against imperialist influences, whatever form they might take. As summarizedin International Affairs, any serious exchange of views at the conference was subordinatede-emphasis of common interestnity of purpose and program.


pril itilliO

t congress of the CPSU, convened in late January and early February in "irregular" or special session toa Seven-Year Plan for the Soviet economy,ocus for Moscow's efforts to use the growing economic andprimarilyof the "SSR for an across-the-board assault on Western positionsthe world. Second only to the Khrushchev-led strategy of attempting to exploit recent and prospective economic gains for immediate political advantage, especially in the underdeveloped countries, Soviet leaders at the congressthe process of public re-examination and re-evalua-tion of Soviet economic and political support for neutralist governments.

The major political thesis of thein the competition of two world systems the relative decline of the West would soon result in the shift of economic superiority to the bloc, proving not only the greater efficiency ofsociety but also greatly magnifying the Communist voice in worldunderlined by the simpleof treating medium- and long-range goalsar with actual achievements. The political aspect of the economic doctrine unfolded by Khrushchev at the congress was tied to two predictions: first, that by the end of the seven-year period more than one half of the world's industrial output would come from the bloc; and second, that within anfive years the USSR would "occupy first place in the world both in over-all and per capita" production. Both Khrushchev and his principal lieutenants tied theeconomic development of the USSR with an expansion oforeign economic activities. Khrushchev reiterated thecommitment to aid the rapid economic development oi Asian, African, and Latin American countries on dding the defense "we are not engaged in benevolence." Old Bolshevik Kuusinen, however, relying more heavily on the prospects of the Scven-Year Plan,ore liberal formulation harking back in spirit to the Utopian internationalism of the early revolutionary period,

It is true that in the history of socialism thereime when with all good intentions there



simply was nothing to divide. Now this time is past. Having become richer, wc have not become In seven years we will become even richer. This means that not only we ourselves will live better, but our friends too will be-better off.

Khrushchev himself spotlighted the difficulties that had arisen in Moscow's political, economic, and military support to selected neutral countries on the basisarallelism in certain short-rangethan of long-range objectives, by unprecedented public criticism of Nasir, in whose government Moscow had made its greatest material and psychological investment. Taking issue with Nasir's recent jailing of Egyptian and Syrian Communists and with the UAR leader's condemnation of Communist policies In the Middle East as anti-Arab, Khrushchev not only refused to repudiate Arab Communist agitation but avowed Moscow'ssupport for "progressive*elements." The Sovietopen challenge to, Nasir was continued and developed by Mukhitdlnov, now well established as Khrushchev's top aide on relations with Asian and Arab countries, and by Arableaders Khalid Bakdash and All Yata,tviews reflected Moscow's turn away from Nasir. on Nasir not to let differences of "ideological views" interfere with friendly relations, Khrushchev reasserted the primacy of the "common struggle againstraising Nasir's arch-foe Qasim in the same breath as the UAR leader for their "triumphs over imperialism."

The implication of the Soviet premier's stand was that local Communists were to be encouraged to adopt more dynamic programs, in part to prod nationalist movements intoradical or at least bolder reforms and sharpening public opposition to Western economic, political, and cultural At the congress, party secretary and topSuslov specifically admonished Communists on the need to raise the ideological level of the national-liberation struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. On the other hand, neither Khrushchev nor any other Soviet leader showed any disposition to continue the'polemics with Nehru which were initiated tho preceding fall, but on the contrary resumed their studied efforts to win his tactical support, glossing over or denying differences of view. At the same time, the Soviet leaders prepared the way for new

toward the bloc and supporters of peace. Tho congressspecifically endorsed increased trade and "contacts" with the underdeveloped countries, but it was silent on futureor economic investment in neutralist governments.

Developments in the Middle East concurrent with andsubsequent to the congress helped to dispel anyworld Communist leaders might have had that political gains would flow all but automatically from their exaggerated claims of economic and scientific accomplishment. Virulent Arab reaction to Khrushchev's blunt criticism of Nasirexceeded Soviet expectations, and an effort was made to persuado Nasir that the attack was "only" political and not porsonal.

A sharper setback to Moscow's Middle East pretensions camo from Tehran. Encouraged by signshanged attitude on tho part of the Shah, Moscow increased its economic and political overtures to him and in late January and early February apparently had high hopes of prying Iran at least part way out of the anti-Soviet coalition In the Middle East. The sudden collapse of the negotiations in Tehran and the empty-handed return home onebruary of the USSR's special mission touched off pained and bitter Soviet publicrayda "Obsorvor" article onebruary and Khrushchev7 Fobruary speech at Tula slashed at the Shah's sudden reversal. Khrushchev's further attacks on tho "faithlessness" of the Shah and the Iranian Government4 February "electioneering" speech to the voters of tho Kalinin District in Moscow carried the polemics with the Shah to extremes, making it obvious that Moscow had given up any near prospects of improving relations with Tehran.

The apparent lesson of this episodo was that Moscow's psychological-political pressures on pro-Western states could bo switched off, given the prospectactical opening or intensified In frustration. In the violence of its new attacks on the Shah, on his regime, and on thobases of tho Iranian Government, Moscow pointed up the shallowness and tenuousness of the ideological roots of its tactical cooperation with non-Communist governments.

The content and tone of Soviet publications of the period tend to confirm reportsariety of sources that at private meetings with Asian, African, and Latin American party

representatives, Soviet leaders urged upon local Communistharper line toward nationalist elements than Khrushchev chose to adopt publicly at the congress. claimed to see the countries of Asia and Africa asew stage, in which progress depended on the "alignment of Internal forces" and on the character and direction of domestic programs. ummation of the congress' views on Communist strategy in the underdeveloped areas was presented by party theorist Boris Ponomarevarch in Pravda. Ponomarev presented essentially an activist line hewing closely to Communist orthodoxy, emphasizing that it is incorrect to think that social changes are going to occur automatically in the underdeveloped countrieslass struggle and stressing that in this struggle an ever-greator role is marked out for local Communist parties. Stressing the point advanced by top Soviet spokesman six monthsthe young governments of Asia andwereistoricadvised local parties that in the current processes of economic, political, and social change new party and class interests had arisen, and that shifts in class and party strengths withinmovements were taking place which called for aligningCommunist support for those local elements adoptingdomestic and foreign programs, namely

full liquidation of the remains of colonialism, growth of national industry, elimination of feudalism, the carrying out of wide-scale agrarian reform, the growth ofeace-loving foreign policy, and an active struggle against imperialist blocs.

None of these ideas is new, but the current emphasis onsupport for progressive elements rather than the"anti-imperialist" forcesurther cooling of Moscow's attitude toward non-Communist movementsarked departure from the synthetic friendliness ofh party congress.

Khrushchev's airing of his differences with Nasir att party congress had resulted In an intensification of press and radio polemics, but it was the revoltarchro-Nasir Iraqi Army Colonel at Mosul which broughtead political and Ideological differences between Moscow and Cairo. Nasir took the lead in public speeches onndarch

denouncing Communists in the Middle East as agentsoreign power and as enemies of Arab nationalism. This was toohallenge for Moscow to ignore. Khrushchev onarch,eceptionisiting Iraqi economic delegation, surveyed the whole field of Soviet relations with the UAR and with Iraq and the Cairo-Baghdad rivalry, throwing his wholeheartedbehind Qasim. Moscow apparently was confident that its considerable economic and military aid to Nasir would work to keep the dispute from seriously harming state-to-stateit probably reflected in addition an appraisal that over the past year Nasir's position in the Arab world hadas the result of the rise of Baghdad and Qasimival center of Arab nationalism, of increasing troubles in Syria, and of setbacks in Tunisia and Sudan to Nasir'sto dominate Arab affairs.

Onarchoscow press conference, Khrushchevthe belief that Moscow could continue to have good relations with both the UAR and Iraq, patronizingly referring to Nasir as inexperienced and "hot-headed" and urging Nasir to have patience and end UAR interference in Iraqi affairs. Nasir struck back onarch in Damascus with,the assertion that in6 attack on Egypt, his country had fought alone against Israel, Britain, and France without "any sign of assistance from any foreign state, including the Soviet Union." Pravda "Observer" attempted to refute this claim, and Khrushchevetter to Nasir in April suggested that both sides should tone down their public recriminations. The basic points at issue were left unresolved,including the vital question of Soviet and Communistfor faster "social progress" In Iraq and the UAR. appeared content to leave any further move towardup to Cairo, and Khrushchevay told theand editor of Indian leftist weekly Blitz, whotalked with Nasir, that "it is up to them toshall live through it somehow."

The endorsement att congressore active line in the underdeveloped countries was reflected also in signsroadening and deepening of Soviet attention to African affairs. The signature onebruary in Conakryoviet-Gulnean trade and payments agreement pointed up the new stage of broad government-to-government relations with individual independent African states, following the general pattern of Soviet overtures to neutralist Asia in the

immediate post-Bandung ora. The March issue of the Institute of Oriental Studies' scmipopular journal Contemporary East was devoted almost entirely to African developments, with coverage running the gamut from the cultural accomplishments of African peoples and the mutual advantages of greaterbetween Africans and tho bloc to an appraisal of the African movements for Immediate independence by top Soviet Africanlst I. I. Potckhln. Potokhin's survey broughtlose the period of Soviet public ambiguity on tacticsfor the African nationalists, attacking those African leaders who would limit tho struggle to seeking

gradual constitutional reform within the framework and on the basis of the laws created by thethe path of negotiations, and agreements with the imperialists.

and asserted that African experience had proved the necessity of the use of violence against "imperialists." In March there also appeared in important Institute of Oriental StudiesA. Yu. Shpirt's Africa in tho Second World War, which emphasized World War IIgood political scnooT^for giving character and drive to the struggle of the Africanfor political and economic independence. A greatlycoverage of African developments in Soviet journals and the press reflected Soviet aims to harass Western economic relations with Africa, to dony tho West military basesAfrica and squeeze out those already established, and to build up neutralist, pro-Soviet, and intenselysentiment among the African peoples.

Soviet views wore not so sanguine on Latin Americanwhich sinco tho Soviet-Argentine economicwere signed had failed to dovolop in the direction of increased diplomatic, economic, and cultural contacts with the bloc. Despite heavy propaganda attention to theoflch it Interpreted as popularof US policy in the aroa, Moscowautioustoward the Castro government, while hailing thefor freeing democratic forces making possible the rapid transformation of the country along progressive linos. Following Castro's visit to the United States in April, Moscow seemed reassured of tho anti-US position of the Cubanand the intensity of Castro's antipathy to Americanand political interests. id-year survey of liberation

forces in Latin America cited substantial achievements in Venezuela and Chile as well as in Cuba and considored"despite all the barriers and difficulties,"also in Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Bolivia. the claim had been advanced before, there nowmore substance to Moscow's assertion that Latin America wasew stage of its development as an important sector of the world national-liberation struggle.

Moscow-led discussion of Communist strategy in theworld continued with the special conference, held in East Germany inf bloc theoreticians on the subject of "the national bourgeoisie and the liberation movement". Asajor portion of the speakers'as presented in the bloc journal, represented aattempt to stress the advantages of aid to-national bourgeoisie in the struggle against imperialism and theof political and economic ties of the underdeveloped countries with the West. At the same time, emphasis on the instability and indecisiveness of non-Communist leadership and on the divisions of altos and interests of elementsthe anti-imperialist front suggested greater local Communist attention to the limits of such tacticaland to independent political activity so as not to lose influence over the popular masses and to preserve and Improve the chances for its own leadership of the liberation struggle.

A similar view on the prospects of Communism in thecountries and of the role of Communists inmovements was reflected in the long-awaitedHistory of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which appeared the Tatter part of June, Prepared collectivelyroup of top-level historians headed by Ponomarev, the new party history devoted considerable attention to theof Communist organization and agitation under conditionsapitalist society. The general thesis deducible from the treatment of the Soviet past and of Lenin's classical formulations was on constant struggle which combines legal, semi-legal, and illegal activity and makes use of even the "most reactionary" elements in exploiting nationalistfor self-rule. In summarizing the textbook's import for the Communist world in the bloc journal, Ponomarevjoint action with non-Communists:

though their understanding of the ways and methods

of struggle differs from that ofhe overwhelming majority stand solidly for poaco and social progress.

He called for greater vigilance and stepped-up efforts because, as he put it, never before had the forces of reaction waged such an intense and varied struggle against Marxian-Leninism and against Communism.

However, despite the Intimations of the fallft party congress and Its follow-up, that Communist movements In Asia, Africa, and Latin America might withdraw their support for "bourgeois nationalist" movements and moveewdrive for Communist control against those nationalists who refused Moscow's lead as well as against pro-imperialist and pro-feudalinnder tho exigencies of the drive for detente with the West and of unfavorable crosscurrents within the underdeveloped world, again sacrificed an activist line in favor offriendly government-to-government relations. Events in Iraq touched off by Communist-led riots in Klrkuk and other Iraqi cities in connection with tho celebration of the first anniversary of the Iraqi revolution brought about stern coun-termeasures by Qasim and resultedharp decrease in Iraqi Communist influence both In the government and among the masses. Iraqi Communists, who had been engageditter lntraparty debate on bow far to press Qasimtrong Communist presence in the cabinet and influence in domestic and foreign affairs, found Moscow after the facttheir party's minority, which favored continuedwith Qasim, and taking to task the militant wing of the party for "irresponsibility."

Friction between the Indian Government and the Communist government of tho State of Keralaeak in June and July and posed another serious test of Communist intentions. Although the Communist party of India attempted to rallyfor the Kerala government against "acts of hooliganism and violence" inspired by the Congress party and threatened to meet violence in kind, Moscow kept itself apart. When Nehru's central government onuly dissolved the Communist ministry and legislature of Kerala on the grounds that it had proven itself unable to maintain public order, Moscowpassive. In backing away from any stand in support of the Kerala Communist government, Moscow made it obvious that

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it valued tho friendship aud good will of the Indianand of Nehru more than It did the prospects of either the Kerala government or the Communist party of India. sought to minimize the dispiriting effect of suchon other Communist parties throughout the world bysilence on tbo question.

Moscow's greater Interest in preparing for high-level nogotiations to bringelaxation of East-West tensions reinforced the trend toward downgrading party militancy, and Soviet leadors moderatod the tones if not the substance of their political and ideological hostility to the West. In singling out Berlin, West German rearmament, disarmament, and detente with the United States as the pressing problems of the day, Moscow did not intend in any way to detract from its long-torm program of undermining Western strength andin Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but theresult was to reinforce the impression that over the short run Moscow was willing to limit the scope of itson Western interests in the hope of gains at thetable. orld-wide survey of Soviet International relations for the first half9 prepared by six junior editors of the journal WEIR reflected an unusually realistic view of developments at the same time as it toned down the political arrogance and antl-Westernlsm of Moscow'soint. This and othor public commentary in preparation for "another, moro realistic Genevawhich Moscow hoped would come out of the exchange of visits with the President, centered on purported changes in tho correlation of world forces which had broughteed to review outstanding international questions inwith the new situation.

Assessing current trendseasonably detachedthe authors acknowledged setbacks in Moscow'swith Arab states and differences within the Arabmovement. Continued Soviet economic and political support for key Asian states was pledged In order to help them maintain their friendly political neutrality and to stiffen their opposition to the West's anti-Soviet,"penetration" in South and Southeast Asia. Thereflected on Latin America was that Increased trade and improved economic relations with the bloc offered tho most promising road to the erosion of American influence in the area. On Africa, the impression was that Moscow viewed

sub-Saharan developments as subject to unpredictablebut that the general struggle for political and economic independence would multiply the more or lesstrouble spots for the West and bog down Westernand prestige. Implicit in this evaluationon long-term political, economic, and social processes in the underdeveloped countries at least as much as on an expanded bloc economic, political, and ideological programs for determining the future course of their governments and peoples. Its picture is thatong drawn-Outbetween two social systems forin which many complex and countervailing influences would be at play, with no simple solution to be expected.

Moscow's considerable tactical flexibility and its ability to seize openings presented was reflected in its cultivation of Ethiopia and its Emperor. 0 Soviet loan "for development of industry and agriculture" announced at the close of the Emperor's visit in July was an Investment In Soviet respectability and was accompanied by the usual assertions of disinterested motives. Moscow's intention to press on with its economic aid program was pointed up by increased public discussion of the scope and implications of Sovietn article in International Affairs giving the first comprehensive listing of major So-v'iet credits to eightillion rubles.

Soviet propaganda and diplomatic preparation fortrip to the United States, epitomized in his article in the American journal Foreign Affairs, prepared forcoincident with his arrival, reflected an optimism and an ill-concealed expectation of concessions from the West. The visit took place amid signs that, in spite of Soviet reaffirmations of opposition to Imperialism and colonialism, some pro-Moscow neutrals were concerned that Khrushchev would enter Into discussions with the US which might prejudice their interests. Khrushchev's disarmament initiative at the General Assembly was designed to build fires under the alleged Western unwillingness to negotiate seriously on the Soviet proposals. The promise, howeverof the release of vastly greater resources by both the bloc and the West for economic assistance to Asia,and Latin America once the arms race is haltedransparent bid for the support by the governments and peoples


of all underdeveloped countries for immediate talks andon disarmament. Although at the previous session of the Generalthe fall ofhad had little success with its proposals for immediate cuts Off arms expenditures, with part of the savings7'to be used to step up aid to the underdeveloped countries,apparently counted on the prevailing mood for East-West detente, personal emphasis, and the world spotlight he commanded In New York to give great impact-to his Declaration of General and Complete Disarmament. The point as .to whether Moscow envisaged parallel or Joint aid programs was purposely left obscure In an effort to curry support in the broadest possible circles. Kommunist's follow-up of Khrushchev's New York proposal asserted that the Soviet Union "stood and stands for broad International cooperation in the matter ofaid to the underdeveloped countries" and held the door open for cooperation, particularly through the UN.

Khrushchev's interim report ofeptember to thepeople on the results of his US trip was little moreolksy account and reassurance as to its success. his trip to Peiping for Communist China's tenthcelebrations, Khrushchev, in speeches at Vladivostok and Novosibirskndctober respectively, emphasized his commitment toigh-level settlement with the West at the same time as he showed concern that tactics used to facilitate the negotiations mighteleteriouson Communist elan. At Vladivostok he attempted to make clear that he was searchingommon ground withonly on the questionirm and lasting peace, and that as far as other questions were concerned, "We do not find common language with American businessmen." At Novosibirsk he again sought to emphasize that he had not gone soft on capitalism and, in terms reminiscent of Shepilov's speech ofefined peaceful coexistence as "economic, political, andnot

Khrushchev's report onctober to the Supreme Soviet, in addition to being an authoritative review of thesituation, was intended to justify the various moves taken in preparation for' and anticipation of an East-Westmeeting and to reassure comrades that he had in mind no concessions to the West on matters of principle. Inthe wisdom of tho course adopted, he emphasized that both sides had taken stepsradical improvement in relations

between the USSR and the US". Although ho cautioned against overoptimism and cited the continued influence of reactionary elements, he conceded that the West bad given proof of its conciliatory intentions. His central thesis wasloser attention to changes which have been brought about not only by the growing might and international influence of the Soviet Union and of the bloc, but also by the greater role now played by former colonies, bygovernments everywhere which are vitally concerned with the preservation of peace and the prevention of war, and by peace-loving forces within the major capitalist countries themselves who want the cold war liquidated and opposeleading upew war.

At the same time, Khrushchev's speech reflected Moscow's marked willingness to moderate its tactics In tho struggle with the West for Influence in the underdeveloped world in order to promote great power settlement. Soviet Interest in not ruffling the surface calm in East-West"new international atmosphere" claimedesult ofAmericanreflected in his deliberately playing down the problem of Laos, which had attracted heavy and vitriolic Soviet comment since Communist-led elements in that country had reverted to guerrilla warfare in mid-Julyearalf of legal political action. that the fault was SEATO's and thatise approach and observance of International agreements" would lead to the normalization of the situation, he concluded that more noise had been raised In tho world about Laos than the situation Justified.

Khrushchev's overriding concern with an early-East-West summit meeting was pointed up even more clearly in hisof tho Soviet line on Algeria. ublicto independence for Algeria, regular and occasionally intense propaganda support for the Algerian rebels, and token material aid for Algerian refugees andto mention sporadic clandestine shipments of arms by East EuropeanAlgerian policy long had toughened or softened in line with prospects of closer relations with Paris. Soviet efforts to exploit public differences between President de Gaulle and other Western leaders on NATO policy and on such other top issues as disarmament and theof top-lovel talks with Moscowigher priority for direct East-West issues than for intensifying


the anticolonial struggle Citing the "close historic tics between France andhrushchev, drawing the French Communist party along behind him, asserted that de Gaulle's proposals ofeptemberlebiscite on tho future status of Algeria, if followed up, offered the possibility of ending hostilities thoro,

Kommunisteature article in November took up the matter of defining the limits of peaceful coexistence for the benefit of. world parties. Asserting that no mattor how vital Intergovernmental relations are, they do not exhaust tho field, the article restricted compromisearrow diplomatic field. In defending the permanence andlty of Communist doctrine, Koamun1st also reiterated the position that no middle ground exists or can exist between bourgeois and proletarian world outlooks.

The newly released textbook The Foundations of Marxism-Leninism, preparedroup of party theorists Headed by presidium member Kuusinen, was being discussed in tho Soviet press and party study groups. oo, reflected Moscow's persistent problem of harnessing revolutionary ontbuslasm to the current requirements of Soviet foreign policy. 's December review of this new guidebook emphasized-the complexity and variability of contemporary circumstances leadingecessary flexibility in Communist tactics and stated that

the task of the revolutionary proletariat and Its Marxist parties consists in mastering all forms and means of struggle and knowing how to apply them correctly, in accord with the concrete

Moscow's efforts to press forwardrogram of large-scale economic assistance to selected countrios was polntod up by the announcement In July of its willingness to extend an additional credit0 toinhelp finance New Delhi's Third Flvo-Yoar Plan. This commitment moved India well ahead of the UAR as the principal recipient of Soviet aid and was Intended to protect Moscow's political and economic interest and investmentriendly neutralist India, to keep New Delhiesult of its desperate requirement for large-scale economic assistance, and to dissociate itself from Chlnose


attacks on the Indian Government. Moscow's offer in Augustong-term, low-interest economic development credit to Guinea indicated the USSR's intention to follow up the flood of economic and cultural contacts It had Initiated with Conakry following the latter's8 independence with economic aid out of all proportion to Guinea's size but In line with its new Importanceocus of extremist anti-Western African nationalist sentiment. The lavish reception Moscow gave visiting Guincan Prosident Toure In Novembertho Soviet Union's lntorest In making Sovlot-Gulneanodel for the newly arising African states.

omewhat different voin, the visit of FirstMikoyan to Mexico City in November in connectionopening of the Soviet Industrial exhibitionnew stago in Soviet efforts to exploit Latin Americandifficulties in the Interest of expanding tradeties with the bloc. Although Mikoyan badMoscow's top trade expert, hisCl " '

in Mexico wore directed as much against political as economic aspects ofinfluence in Latin America. His attacks on tho policies and activities of the United States and of US firms in Latin America were combined with theof Soviet Interest in increased trade and willingness tocredits to Mexico and other Latin American countries.

Although Mikoyan's visit had little apparent effect on Mexico's economic policies and his attempts to interestgovernment and business circles In Soviet development credits wore turned aside, he nevertheless succcedod inLatin American attention on Increased economic relations with the blocay out of the Latin American economic Impasse andicit moans of reducing the predominant role of US oconomic interests. ore positive response to Soviet overtures was the visit to the USSRrazilian tradewhich Moscow had been angling for two yoars-Vwhich resulted in the signingecemberrade agreement, the first between the two countries, calling fortepped-up exchanges of goods.

Moscow's changing line on Latin America was rofloctod in an outburst of publications appearing In the latter part Tho general line presented by V. Levin in Inter-natlonal Affairs wasow stago arising in Latin Araorica's



liberation struggle as the result of the overthrow oflb, Cuba, Colombia, and Venezuela and of proletarian-led antifeudal and anti-imperialist agitation in other emlpopular treatment of the Cuban revolution by .K. M. Obydenpress runopies indicated that it was intendedide Sovietnot only claimed an important role for Cubanin the overthrow of Batista but also warmly supported the domestic and international program of Castro's government and hailed his revolt as the first in Latin America to drive the "capitalist classes, allied with the Unitedrom power. Soviet historian N. N. Bolbhovitioov presented, under the pretextcholarly study of the Monroe Doctrine for the Institute of International Relations, an attack on US policies past and present in Latin America.

The most impressive survey of Latin American political and economic developments in the post-Stalin period appeared in early December in the formymposium, The Problems of Contemporary Latin America^ under the auspices of theof World-Economics and International Relations. The gist of the argument was that the immediate goal of the Latin American independence movement was the attainment of economic Independence from USbe achieved through the development of national industry, the nationalization of local holdings of USegislation protecting local industry from deleterious practices of foreign capitalist trading companies, the development of trade with the bloc, and radical and thorough-going land reform to eliminate the last vestiges of feudalism. At the same time, Latin American efforts at economic and political cooperation were derided. Communist parties were urged to work for these goals through common action with non-Communist groups and particularly through labor agitation. Although it was admitted that the Independence struggle in Latin America was at varying stages In the different countries and that it was being carried outariety of forms, the conclusion was drawn that Latin America had entered the "final period" in its long struggle for full and complete independence,

Hikoyan's visit to Cuba inp6inted up- Moscow's optimistic appraisal of Castro's anti-Americanism (allied with the growing strength of local Communists)eans forSoviet influence throughout Latin America. oviet loan announced onebruary and the associated


Onebruary, justonference in Moscow of the eight Warsaw Pact powers had approved his stewardship of bloc interests and endorsed in advance his position in thesummit conference with Western leaders Khrushchevhreo-week tour of India, Burma, Indonesia, and Afghanistan. This visit, on the heels of high Soviet officials, suggests that he felt that the weight of his own personal diplomacy was necessary, in the "Leninist stylo Inhimself to broad popular masses in othern order to offset the sharp decline in bloc and local Communist popularity resulting from the Tibetan troubles, Slno-Indlan border friction, Pelplng's attacks on measures taken by the Indonesian Government against resident Chinese, and theenthusiasm for the US made evident on President Eisenhower' recent visit to India and Afghanistan. Khrushchev's less than triumphal toureavy stress on bloc economic competition with the West in aiding Asian nations along the path to economic Independence. Offering Soviet material and moral support, which he backed upundown of Sovietalready rendered Asian governments, he kepteavyhanded attack on Western motives and Western economic practices in dealing with the peoples of the area. peech to the Indian Parliament onebruary, Khrushchev cited "UN experts" as having calculated the annual investment needs of the underdeveloped countriesillion and

concern lest it be identified publicly with Castro's blatant anti-Americanism may have slowed Moscow's overtures to Havana. The review of International relations for the socond halfreparodroup of editors of the Journal WHIR,ection on Latintropicalboth tho preceding and subsequent semiannual roundups contained lengthy section.extremely critical of Western, and especially US, policy in these areas.

assorted that if full and gcnoral disarmament were achlovod, it would bo an easy matter for the great powers to sot aside

fifteen and oven twenty billion dollars from tho hundred billion dollars saved in order to solve tho universal historic task of preserving hundreds of millions of people from hunger and poverty.

In Calcutta onebruary he reiterated Soviet reluctance to participate jointly with the West in economic assistanceInsisting that "if aid is to be rendered, we will render it ourselves." No new Soviet economic aid was*announced during the Indian portion of the trip, although announcement was made of agroemont specifying the uses to which India would put part of0 credit for its Third Five-Yoar Plan announced some months earlier.

Tho principal economic highlight of the Khrushchev Junket was Indonesia's acceptance0 loan forpurposes which apparently Included provision forarms and equipment for the Indonesian armed forces. Khrushchev's heavy homage to Sukarno followed along tho lines of Soviet commentary, which not only supported hisInternational and domestic measures but also ostentatiously supported the"guided democracy." Strong public support for Djakarta's military struggle against rebel forces on Sumatra and Celebes and continued backing forclaims to West Irian moro than offset any lossesmay have sufferedesult of Indonesia's quarrel with Communist China over restrictions Djakarta Imposed on the Chinese business community In Indonesia. Khrushchev'sebruary announcement that Moscow had decided toPeoples' Friendship University" was Intended to Impress on Asians the importance with which Moscow vlewod cultural and technical exchanges, and it foreshadowed greatly stepped-up efforts to expand people-to-peoplc contacts. Khrushchov's repeated assertion that China, India, and Indonesia should take part in future great power conferencesoary Soviet tactic which neverthelesseavy favorable response In Asia. His reiteration at Kabul of Sovietfor Afghanistan's claims toike his earlior backing of Indonesia's claims to West Irian, openly encouraged parochial Asian nationalist sentiment.



Khrushchev's own summary of the significance of his trip again centered on the growing importance of the new countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Ho emphasized that it was in the Soviet interest to help these countries become stronger both politically and economically, not only by the continued and increased extension of credits to friendlybut also by limited grants of material and technical aid, as announced on his visit to Burma and Afghanistan. Khrushchev made it cloar that what he had In mind was political and economic assistance to friendly underdeveloped countries so ae to stiffen thoir resistance to Wosterncolonialism "however disguised." Although Khrushchev again lauded Nehru and Moscow's official line continued to avoid criticism of neutralist leaders andublic lecture onarch in Moscow, attendedestern observer, was more candid in general disapproval of all bourgeoisleaders with the signal exception of Guinea's Sckou Toure. Moscow's endorsement of Guinea's policies was made clear in the publicity it directed at tho Second Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference hold in Conakry fromorayda editorialApril cited Guineabrilliant example"odel for the peoples of Africa in how to attain and use their independence.

Khrushchev's trip to France fromarchpril took placere-summlt atmosphere, with the Sovietremarks attuned to the suggestion that cooperationthe Soviet Union and France was possible on terms which would rosultreatly enhanced French role In European affairs. Khrushchev's remarks at the Diplomatic Pressluncheon onarch that Moscow stood wholeheartedly behind de Gaulle's proposals fornot overwhelmingly reflected in the Soviet press over tho preceding his efforts toarmony of Soviet and French interests. ressonarch, Khrushchev refused to discuss the question of Algeria. He also was noncommittal concerning an arms ban to Africa and joint economic aid to the underdeveloped countries known to bo favored by do Gaulle. He asserted Soviet willingness to cooporate in rendering economicbut be linkedosibility to "agreement onand rejected the suggestion that all such aid should be undor UN auspices, alleging thatestriction would inflict great harm to those countries needinghero was no mention of Soviet-French agreement on events in


the underdeveloped areas in the communique issued at the close of the visit, in Khrushchev's speech on his return to Moscow, or inpril Pravda editorial summing up the results of the "historic vlsiTT1 On the other hand, points of openwere carefully skirted,

Unlike Khrushchev's^ visit to France, Mikoyan's visit to Iraq in April waskeyed to more modestof Qasim and of the prospects of Moscow's heavy political and economic investment in the Iraqi regime. Mikoyan'spril press conference statement that Moscow's failure to recognize the Algerian government-in-exile was done in the latter's Interest pointed up the Soviet Union's predicament in attempting tooderate standParis and at the same time assure the Arabs, and Asian-Africans in general, of the genuineness of -itst* support for" the most active of the current national liberation struggles. The visit also called attention to growing coolness between Soviet officials and Qasim and Baghdad's increasingly hostile attitude toward Iraqi Communists, No communique was issued at the conclusion of Mikoyan's "unofficial" visit, and both country's press accounts were merely polite. Shortlyhowever, it was announced that Iraq hadew Soviet credit for modernization of the Basra-Baghdad

The USSR's further investment inthe face of signsimited rapprochement of Qasim with the Vest and of stiffer measures by the Baghdad Government against localup Moscow's apparent belief that close economic relations with the new Asian and Africanespecially in the case of Iraq, the UAR,elect few othercombination with its considerableassistance program would prove decisive over the long term in determining the direction of their policies. The January announcement that the UAR hadong-term Soviet credit for completing the Aswan High Dam, for which construction had just begun, can be viewedajortriumph for Moscow.

illingness to tone down Its general hostility to the West, as demonstrated on Khrushchev's American tour and in Moscow's assertion of the importance of tho "spirit of Camphe Soviet Union's version of "peacefulcoexistence" with Western economic interests in the


underdeveloped countriesillingness to employ harsher tactics on an official level. Mikoyan's speeches in Mexico, Cuba, and Iraq exemplified the tenor of Moscow's attacks on "foreign" capitalist influences, as did histhat Latinin an address to Mexicanforeign holdings without compensationeans of recovering some of the value looted from their economy by foreign "monopolies." In his speech to the Supreme Soviet, onanuary, Khrushchev also asserted that the West had an obligation to repay to the colonies and formerart of the riches stolen from them; he repeated this line in hisanuary message to thePeople's Conference at Tunis. Similarly, Mikoyan's Cuban and Iraqi speeches featured sharp attacks on Western trade and investment policy in the underdeveloped countries.

By this time it hadtandard feature for Moscow to emphasize in general terms the magnitude of Soviet foreign assistance and its rolerime motive force inrelations. Soviet First Deputy Premier Kosygin, in hisctober report to the Supreme Soviet on the stateplanad stated that in the coming year Moscow would render technicalin somendustrial projects in blocandn underdeveloped countries. idely circulated survey of Soviet foreign economic operations and theirsignificance, The Competition of the Two Systems and the Underdeveloped Countries by A. ST KcdachenEo, signed To'tEe-press on 29 February, emphasized the broad dimensions of aid in unusually concrete terms. illion ruble credit to India for financing the Third Five Year Plan was highlighted as the largest credit ever extended by the Soviet Uniononbloc country, and the influential role ofassistance in certain of the underdeveloped countries was pointed up by the assertion that Soviet financialto the UAR coveredercent of total UAR expenditures for development projects and by the allegation that Soviet credits to Afghanistan comprisedercent of that country's total foreign developmental assistance.

Konununist's pre-summit surveys of developments in the non-Soviets well as the flood of publications on Leninrophet on oriental developments in connection withh anniversary celebrations, gave heavy emphasis on the scope and Intensity of political and social ferment

in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and to the direction of their future development. Soviet publicist K. Ivanov,the zigzag nature of events in these areas and characterizing the current path of the liberation struggle as "an extremely complex and confusedvaluated developments.,as effectively anticapitallst, thoughnot socialist. Kommun 1st editor in chief F. Konstantlnov minimized the importance of the "will and desires of the various peoples and governments".of the underdevelopedin determining their future, asserting as moretandard reference to objective economic laws and "the course of the competition of the two worldinterplay of Soviet and Western policies and programs', in theollection of articles on Lenin as the precursor of Moscow's currentand the East, edited by Gafurov andIn mid-April under'The joint auspices of the Institutes of Oriental Studies and ofattuned to theof Asian peoples to avoid the burdensome path ofevolution and to proceed more directly toocial order with the advice and assistance of the Soviet Union. The interim and transitional nature of the present political and social structures of the Asian, African, and Latin American states depicted in Soviet literature was not, however, reflected by any diminution in Moscow's willingness to commit Itself to short- and medium-term cooperation with existing non-Communist governments, given the current stage in relations between the two camps.


Khrushchev's disruption of the Paris talks, apparently iniicident tandran ing" o'Cqprospects forn any "d? ttheraa'Jor outstandingissues,ajor effort by Soviet spokes-men to absolve the USSR of any blame and to convince the world public that the United States alone was responsible. that the talks failed because aggressive militarists in the West feared the consequences of serious Bast-West talks, Moscow alleged that while the Soviet Union had prepared for the conference by adopting concrete measures to improve the international atmosphere and by working out "importantfor presentation at Paris, the United States had taken steps intended to make negotiations Impossible. Moscow's vociferous attacks onverflights as "outrageous"behavior were designed in part to minimize adverse world reaction to Khrushchev's tactics at Paris and to divert attention from the collapse of its pre-Paris line. Despite the publicized vituperation over, Soviet officials

3asserted that if the West did notin furtheroscow would do nothing to disturb the International situation. Nevertheless, with East-West talks not expected soon, Moscow's international posture noticeably stiffened.



The USSR's initial utilization ofncident to press the US* allies to remove American bases from their territories was unsubtle and violent, in the apparent belief that now as never before the allies were vulnerable toneutralist sentiment. Khrushchev warned that "we shall hit at those bases" from which any future flight comes. This warning was repeated In less precise language in the Soviet protest notes ofay to Norway, Pakistan, andthreatening "proper retaliatory measures" in the'eventuture intrusion of Soviet air space. Moscow's month-long effort to scare peoples in the affected countries to demand that their governments take measures to prevent future flights and that American troops be withdrawneak with Marshal Malinovsky's statement onay of his order to the commander of Soviet rocket forces that in the eventuture violation of bloc air space, he should strike at the base from which the intruder came; further Khrushchev

assertedress conferenceune that Halinovsky's warning should be understood "literally." In tho absence of any apparent success, this campaign was allowed to taper off but was later revived briefly. etter to British Prime Mlnlstor Macmillan in early August, Khrushchevthe validity of Halinovsky's instructions, but by this time the gambit had takenro forma aspect.

Onay,abor conference in Moscow Khrushchev reported on the summit breakdown. He assured tho assembled "leading workors" from all ovor the Soviet Union thatpolicy, as before, would bo directed toward reaching an accommodation with ;the West. At the same time, however, he predicted that 'more surprises were in store forimperialists" in colonial and formerly colonial areas. The mission of Soviet First Deputy Premier Kosygin to Buenos Aires in late May in connection withth anniversary of Argentina's "May Revolution" attempted to duplicate Mikoyan's anti-US feats, in Mexico and Cuba. Kosyginhad less success, as tho Frondizi government was cool toward his delegation. rotocoltho uses Argentina could make of the Soviet-Argentine economic agreement of Octoberfor petroleumsigned at this time.

Soviet publicistsampaign to acclaim0 Argentine revolution and subsequent Latin American revolutions as part of the world national-liberation The Journal Modern and Contemporary History featured articles on these "progressive forces"ears ago, "the direct antecedents of today'sndomprehensive bibliography of Soviet monographs, pamphlets, and articles on Latin America published in the Soviet Union sincescanttems, including translations and essays published in Soviet provincial journals ovoryear period. While these developments Impliedroader Soviet interest, Khrushchev'say acclaim of Fidel Castrofiery patriot" was the public signalewlyphase of Soviet-Cuban relations.

Since Mikoyan's visit to Havana inhe Castro government had shown Itself willing to expand economic relations with Moscow and the blochole and, Ifappoared to be forcing the pace of closer economic and political cooperation. With the breakdown of the Paris

talks, Moscow apparently docldod that the advantagesoscow-oriented Cuba in intensifying the anti-US lino through out Latin America were worth considerable political and economic risks. Released, at leasthort period, from inhibitions stemming from its efforts to prepare the way for negotiations with the US, Moscow adopted an .'unproccdentednd activist. Utnel/.iiWitntl. respoctatin American country. In taking this step, Moscow apparontly was encouraged both by tho steady drift to the loft In Castro's domestic andpolicies and by tho increase in influence and respectability of the Cuban Communist party. Increasing-operation between the two countries was refloctod in theIn Moscow onuno by Nunez Jimenez, director of the Cuban Institute of Agrarian Reform, that oil-sugar exchanges were being stepped up "at the request of tho Cuban Government" and that Khrushchev had agreed to an earlyof visits with Castro. Moscow's unannounced decisionmade In lateaccede Jto Havana's request to purchase arms no longer available to it from Westorn sources sealed the rapprochement. Moscow and Havana tested US reaction firstommercial transactionandful of helicopters and then, apid series of steps, concluded an agreement for and began the implementationajor program of Soviet military aid and training.

peecheachers' conference in Moscowuly, Khrushchev threatened to uso rockets against the US if the "Pentagon" intervened in Cuba. Thisrude and synthotlc attempt to create for himself the rolo ofof the Cuban revolution. It also went well beyond the bounds of Moscow's standard tactical exploitation of roady-mado opportunities to widen the breach between the US and governments of the underdeveloped countries and, as it wasluff, roflocted the USSR's conviction that there was little likelihood of US intervention. Moscow's diplomatic and propaganda follow-up was in much less direct terms, suggesting that the principal purpose of the gambit was to impress on the non-Communist Latin American public the daring and might of the USSR without committing theGovernment to any particular line of action In dofonse of Castro. Khrushchevs press conference statement ofuly supporting Havanaapid transition back topolitical and economic support and away from his rocket threat, although ho maintained his activist role with

a thinly veiled suggestion that the Cuban peoplemuster enough courage" to ask return of the

Khrushchev's denial that Communists controlled the Castro government or the Cuban revolution and his assertion that if they had, "the Cuban revolution would havedifferently" in no way detracted from the public Image of close harmony between the two governments. Subsequent heavy Soviet attention to Cuba centered on allegations of US economic and political aggrosslon not only against Cuba but throughout Latin America. Tho Joint communlquo marking Raul Castro's visit to Moscow in mid-July not only publicly affirmed but also gave an added solemn note to the nowof tho two governments.

Elements of aJstronger.itOfle^BiSov^el.pplio'ycwatecalso present In East-Vestharsh lino inup the disarmament conference and its treatment of then its exploitation of the Congo The Kromlln's early exploitation of the Congopointed up the heavy propaganda attention and more restrained official exploitation of antlcolonlalIsm which had becomo standard Soviet practice. Moscow bad followed the progross of Belgian-Congolese independence talks from their beginning and endorsed the upsurge of agitation and sentiment for freedom. Moscow's general views on tho Congo as it approached independence were summarizedonograph by V. A. Martynov, one of tho younger generation of Soviet experts on Africa..In The Congo Under the Yoke of Imperialism', signed to the press onnd in an autbori-tative ossay by senior Soviet African 1st I. I. Potekhln, "Characteristic Features of the Disintegration of the Colonial System of Imperialism Inublished In Problems of Oriental Studies in The gist of their analyses was that the transition of tho African peoples to political independence would be fairly rapid, though not uniform. Furthor, varied transitional political and social forms would appear which, although differing from those Moscow wouldif its voice were decisive, would nevertheless lead to the rapid disintegration of Western political, economic, and ideological influence, and so should be encouraged. hree-man Soviet delegation arrived in Leopoldville for the Congolese Independence festivities onune and negotiated agreements leading to the establishment of diplomatic and cultural reatlons. Such promptness bad long since becomo routine.


Moscow quickly seized on the riots and mutinies and the Belgian reaction they precipitatedindfall which could bo exploited against tho major Western powers not only In the Congo but throughout all Africa. Khrushchev's charge,ress conference onuly, that the NATO powers were using the "pretext of alleged disorder" to relmposo their colonialcharge secondedtrongly worded government statement on theany-sided propaganda campaign to harass Western Interests and intensify tensions between Africans and the West. Onuly Khrushchev pledged, in responseessage from Kasavubu and Lumumba, to support the Congolese leaders and hinted at unilateral Soviet aid. romise of "resolute measures to suppress the aggression" was put into action within aof daysramatic shipment of relief supplies and technicians was airlifted to the Congo. At the same time, Moscow encouraged the Congo Government to appeal to the UN and voted in favor of the resolution calling for theof Belgian troops and the authorizationN force for the Congo. As the crisis worsened, Moscow's attitude toward the UN stiffened, and Soviet spokesmen moved from criticism of UN officers for not moving more promptly toBelgian and Katangan compliance with the Security Council resolution ofuly to open attacks on the UN for having improperly gone over to support of the colonialists.

A third feature of Soviet exploitation of the crisis was its effort to establish its own presence in the Congo through political and economic support of theelements in the Congolese Government. Takingof the political isolation and lack of finances and of the administrative chaos in the LeopoldvilleSoviet officialsreewheeling effort to build up pro-Moscow sentiment in government and public circles by rushing in relief supplies, technicians, and advisers, and promising almost unlimited economic aid. The unrestrained efforts of the newly arrived Soviet diplomatic mission to discredit the UN's role in the crisis and encourage the Leopoldville government to open resistance to the UN'swere typical of Moscow's unsubtle tactics. orceful- role of the Soviet ambassador, Mikhail Yakovlev, was Confirmed by documents released by the Congoleseafter the fall of Lumumba. This phase of Moscow's attempt to implant its Influence came to an abrupt end oneptember when Mobutu ordered all Soviet and blocand technicians out of the Congo.

Soviet spokesmen failed to comment on the collapse of tho USSR's Congo gambit on the heels of the decline ofinfluonce. Moscow found that It had insufficientto go it alone, and anti-Western African governments, respecting the considerable strength and prestige of the UN, provod not as resolute in following Moscow's lead as the Soviet Union might have wished. Among other things, Moscow's aborted experiment showed up its poor understanding and lack of skill in dealing with African sensibilities.

Parallel to the development of Moscow's anti-imperialism campaign in Cuba and the Congo, greater attention was de-votod after the breakup of the Paris summit meeting to the question of the correct Communist attitude toward efforts by underdeveloped capitalist countries to solve political and economic problems and of tactics and Ideological lines to follow in winning over their governments and peoples to close cooperation with the bloc. (Communist strategythe underdeveloped countries hasocus of Mos-cow-Polping rivalry, thus takingew urgency. As this aspect is aiscudsedri.ihx.detail in current ESAUtudios, tho present paper makes no attempt to relate Soviet policies and attitudes and guidance to local Communist parties to the Slno-Sovlet polemics.) Although Moscowarsher line against Western governments and against It took pains to reassure Western powers that the way to negotiation was still opon on its former terms. its guide lines for Communist parties in thecountries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as they can be approximated, emphasized that there should bo no relaxation of efforts to cooperate locally with ub many non-Communist elements as possibleeneral effort to reduce Western influenco and to reinforce tendencies toward parochial nationalism.

Moscow's post-summit attitude wasong article in Sovetskaya Rossiya onune reviewing the expanding rolo of local Communist parties In the underdeveloped countries. The survey specifically warned against "rushing ahead, putting forward premature slogans of Socialist reforms where conditions are not ripe." It emphasized the "instructive example" for parties of "the East and Latin America" of the Iraqi party's seriousinhen its demands for participation in the Qasim government ledplit with Qasim's nationalist

Arab forces and to repressive measures against the party by the government. Moscow apparently was concerned over signs of dissatisfaction in some parties with its subordination of tbe struggle against class enemies to the tactical dictates of carryingorld-wide anti-imperial1st policy, and by the possibility that under urging from Pelplng, some local parties would again resort to their Inherent propensity for heating up the attack on class enemies, thus interfering with the delicate skein of Soviet diplomacy. Evon those Communists not drawn into the intra- and inter-party polemics could not fail to be impressed by Moscow's unequivocal reiteration of its position onugust,ravda article by partyBoris Ponomarev, and onugust by the dean ofspecialists on national-liberation movements, Academician Eugene Zhukov. Other Soviet programmatic statementsspotlighted tho cold war aspects of these movements. African specialists S. Datlin, writing in Kommunist in August, hailed the struggle between colonialism and the na-tional-liberation movement in Africa asreat historicalhich has far transcended the boundaries of tho African continent, with now almost the entire world taking part In It either directly or indirectly."

Moscow's "peace" line was eclipsed in May by the first phase of its strident attacks on the West for making thetalks Impossible and its allegations that Westernundermined the very basis of International With the new Soviet disarmament proposalsune, Moscowew campaign to enlist support In thecountries forttodisaiimamentji.i' - gain Moscow linked disarmament to prospects of vastlyoutside aid for economic development In Asia, Africa, and Latin America; in the authoritative Journal International Affairs, A. Kodachenkotentative" figureear which,

it can confidently be said, general and complete disarmament /would release/ for financing theprogress of the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The figure mentioned by Kodachenko does not bear upbut it is interestingeflection of the lengths to which Moscow has gone to build illusory and unrealistic expectations of rapid economic development, to assert that

not economic but political factors stand In the wayive-fold Increase in foreign assistance, and to point to sources of addedelimination of militaryon the part of underdeveloped countries, "the use of current foreign military aid for peaceful constructive purposes, greater trade receipts, and profitsillionKodachenko alleges flow out of theaddition to increased foreignmade possible by disarmament of the major powers. Soviet propagandists also used the line thateapon ofiting spurious figures of Soviet economist A. A. Santalov as evidence that colonies and former colonies lose approximatelyear from "unequivalent"'terms ofwith Western powers.

Moscow did not rely on these suspicious statisticsoint session of the editors of International Affairs and the "Scientificf the party's Academy of Social Sciences which was devoted to "The Two Socio-Economlc Systems in the World Arena" emphasized Soviet and bloc production achievements in the race toopvertake the US economically as having the greatest significance for determining the course of world affairs. With his usual flare, Khrushchev asserted in Bucharest1 June that bloc economic advances,ultistage rocket, will certainly lead the people of the whole world into the orbit of communism."

The eight-day XXVth International Congress ofheld in Moscow in August, brought togetherelegateshe conspicuous absenceingle delegate from China, although the Soviet press some months earlier hadhinese delegation in the hundreds. This meetingrime example ofespected, scholarly, international organization to support its current policies and to discredit the Westeconomically, and Ideologically In the underdeveloped "East." Soviet First Deputy Premier Hikoyan's officialto the congress, and the opening and closing speeches of Moscow's top orientalist-administrator",ed" Moscow's dedication to liquidating "as soon as possible" the remains of colonialism. Moscow's "unselfish" economic and moral support and the "priceless" Soviet experience in developing its Central AsianAsian andpartlclpantsNwere escorted through these areas after


theemphasized in support of efforts to impress visitors from the underdeveloped countries with the validity of Marxist-Leninist interpretation of current developments and with the practical aim of Soviethelp backward pcoplos become politically, economically, and ideologically free from Western influence. Although the congress revealed no new tack in Soviet policy in Asia and Africa, itMoscow's preoccupation with increasing the political and psychological gap between the Western powers and their colonies and former colonies, as well as the scope of Soviet Interest and the resources behind Moscow's anticolonial campaign.

Khrushchev's performance ath General Assembly session in New York, whore he gained for himself anaudfence of world leaders and held the worldfor weeks, wasreat extent pointed towardon the worldthe peoples andof the underdevelopedhigh priority of the task of putting an end to colonialism. Whilemanaged to keep the ideaummit meeting at the forefront of world public opinion, and while Soviet policy continued to create conditions making an early meetingSoviet and American leaders cBnoBu imperative, the weight of the Soviet premier's official and personalwas in the direction of influencing the countries of non-bloc Asia, Africa, and Latin America, singly and in concert,eightened assault- on colonialism. demands for an immediate end to the remainingof imperial rule over alien peoplestand long implicit in Moscow's foreign relations and, of course, explicit In world Communist agitation. He managed to give the appeal to popular opinion an unusual degree of vividness and of urgency, reinforcing it by gestures of personal and political friendship to neutralist and nationalist leaders.

Radiating from Khrushchev's official and unofficialand the Soviet delegation's maneuvers at the assemblyundamental effort to impress on the leaders of the governments of Asia, Africa, and Latin America that In theears since the end of the war there hadajor change in the balance of world power which bad not yet been reflected proportionately In either the policies of these governments themselves nor in internationalspecifically the ON. This Involvedestatement of

Moscow's long-standard claim to have risenosition of parity with the United States and the assertion that tiie disintegrationhe colonial system, which hadin the creation of dozens of new states, freed those states from having to submit to political and economic domination, either domestically or internationally, and thus opened the way for the former colonies toew and decisive international role. Khrushchev's bizarrebehavior and characteristic mingling of friendly and belligerent postures may have stemmed in partesire to .emphasize that Soviet strength and confidence was such that he could ignore Western norms and sensitivities.

Khrushchev's initiative inundamentalof the UN which would reflect his views on the current ccorelation of forces was Intended to stimulate Asian and African demandsreater voice in UN affairs, as well as to lay the groundwork for future major changes in the UN structure and staffing which would assure Moscow that the UN could no longer be used effectively to oppose Soviet policy anywhere in the world. His demand for the immediate abolition of all military bases on foreigndemand he linked with the move for immediate liberation of all areas still under colonialthat he recognized that this was another issue capable of arousing the masses and thatartial victory where Western bases were most vulnerable to popular pressures would be an important gain for Moscow.

Khrushchev's report onctober to the Soviet people on the results of his New York stay, which he defended as not only worthwhile but necessary, gave prime emphasis to his proposals for reorganizing the structure of the UN to reflect three major blocs, andeiteration of Moscow's disarmament position rather than to Its more aggressive anticolonial line. Khrushchev did, however, confirmstronger stand on Algeria whenctober in New York he embraced Algerian Deputy Premier Krim Belkacem and saiduncheonctober that recent Soviet-Algerian contacts meant in effect de facto recognition of theAlgerian government. Khrushchev's, assertion onctober that "we have rendered and will continue to render them all the assistance weby an increase of material aid to Algerian refugees by Soviet "publicthe view that, at least for the time

being, Moscow had given up hope of wooing France and French President do Gaulle away from close cooperation with NATO, West Germany, and the United States in particular.

The assumption underlying Moscow's policy toward the underdeveloped countries, an assumption to which the Soviet Union has clung despite hoavy pressures from both inside and outsido tho bloc, is that the world is passing through an interimuncertain but shortWhich forces now in motion will bringasically now world situation. Changes within the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin Amorlca willhift in the correlation of forces of the two world power blocs. This in turn,on the successful completion of Moscow's short- and medium-range economic plans, achievements which willconvince everyone of Communistbyalsoover the West in terms which will mako Moscow's international voice decisive. Within this framework, Soviet leaders continue to display an Interest in keeping crucial issues with tho West, such as Berlin andfrom coming to an early showdown, and the new forms and novel lines followed in the Soviet Union'sand intensified foreign aotlvities, "to answer fully contemporaryave been directed toward making this interim period as short and as politically profitable as possible.

Moscow's "modernized Marxist-Leninist" approach has been designed to bringapid transition of the political and economic policies of tho underdeveloped countries toward Joint or parallel opposition to thevoting with the bloc in the UN, acceptance of close economic ties and cultural relations with Communist countries, and. In the guise of "solidarity" and common interest of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, closer alignment of these countries behind the leadership of anti-Western extremist leaders. More and more, Moscow has committed its prestigemall but growing number of focuses of anti-Westernsuch as Indonesia, Guinea, Cuba. reater number of the new states, Soviet policy is based on the diplomatic and economic encouragement of narrow nationalistic sentiment, in tbe expectation that tensions between anti-Westernandelements for leadership of these governments will leadradual elimination of political, economic, and ideological ties with the West. In this respect,

rr r

Moscow's political and economic support for non-Communist neutralist and nationalistic governments of Asia, Africa, and Latin America has noture gain for localwhose major role, as the most dedicatedelement, has been reduced to propagandizing Moscow's current international line. Flexibility of tactics, with traditional big-power politicsore serious role than classical Marxian formulas,enerally pragmatic diplomacy since the advent of Khrushchev to top Sovietby an element ofwill last as long as Khrushchev has the decisive voice. The increasingly daring note in Moscow's post-Paris policy toward "imperialism" apparentlyonviction that world public opinion, backed by the vaunted might of tho "socialistan be manipulated to deter effective Western counteraction.

The world-wide expansion of Soviet political andactivity, which has ledoviet "presence" in the remotest areas of the world and made the Sovietargaining factor, either directly or indirectl y, in every political and economic transaction of an underdeveloped country with the outside world, has yielded political and economic gains of no mean order. Moscow's selective use of its resources to achieve maximum effect ononsequent relatively modest drain on its ownnot suggest that economic criteria will force any curtailment of this program, even allowing for aintensification of domestic demandsigher standard of living and real or anticipated intrabloc Grattdd the overriding influence of the temperature of East-West relations on thenot theSoviet policy, the prospects are overwhelmingly on the side of an even greater Soviet effort to Influence the course of developments in the underdeveloped areas.

Original document.

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