Created: 5/9/1961

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible


Attached la an excerpt dPfre tranecrlptIA briefing of the HouseSubcomrnlttee oa This glJwthe comment* made on the Cuban operation.

Allen W. Dullei Director






Members of House Armed SenaTces Committee

Paul J.hairman

Charles E.lorida) George Huddlcsfafi. Jr.labama) Melvln Pj#beUdoIs) James E. VsVZandtennsylvania) Bob JTflsonalifornia)Osmers, Jr.ew Jersey) Leslie CjfjKrcndsx officio member Robert Smart, Chief Counsel Central Intelligence Agency Allen W. Dulles. Director leneral C. P. Cabell, USAF, Deputy Director Robert Arnorv, Jr. Richard Helms John S. Warner I. M. Peterson, Rec ordlng Secretary




MR. DULLES: Onuba, first of all. lio Is very classified, althoughertain amount of it^Rs gotten to the press, but not its attribution. Beginning just abowj^ year ago now the decision was made in the high political level ton Cuba had passed the point of noat itajffnated aociety, that there una no reason to believe that they were gomf to change, that their stock in trade waaf snd attempt to degnfn the United States in every possible way, and that the objectives of Cuba-^fcre far beyond the confines of Cuba ltaelf, that they were trying to cjBlnd their Communist revolution to neighboring countries, partlcupTrly ln the Caribbean area, and therefore we were asked to start to daj/elop, workingorce ln being of Cubansolitical ounnlzation of Cubansropaganda attack on Communism in Cubahree-pronged attack: one was military, one was the politicals snd the third was the propaganda.


To start the last first, we developed the radio equipment on Swan Island, wh/ch you hovereat deal about. That has been going on now for sbSut six months and is, we thiok, very effective. That reaches practically all of Cuba. And we arc working on the program very carefully with the Cubans, and we have the very best Cuban refugees working on

that program.


and we havearrage ot broadcasts to Cuba now, attacking

ihe Communist regime. We have also availed ourselves c: the .hsTt that

most it the able Cuban writers have come either to this coi Venezuela, or neighboring countries.

We have been working very hard to try to bring the Cuban leaders together In somei organization. We have organized what w* call The Frente underJl/erona. During tbe laat lew weeks we haveo: that and we hope to haveopefully, thisave Q tronger group more representative of all the Cuban resistance parties. It's terribly difficult to get these people together Thereeparate, different Cuban groupi. ail of which aaoire to leadership. There are at least eople that think they ought to be the neret President of Cuba. We have beenertain amount of funds to this operation, andreally feel now there is some ground for hope.


This hsi been followed very closely in the papers. The Baltimoaj^un has hsd some pretty good stories about this. You can't keep^vout of the press. We do not appear openly In this. We are workipjpRnder pseudonyms,o that is not attributed to the United States, alrfough they must suspect the funds come from some official or offifally controlled sources.

No* the third facet, and probably the natBt important of all, is the preparationuban force,ill %mk General Cabell, who has been working very particularly on tbat, to cMcrlbe tbat.

GENERAL CABELL: Mr. Chfirman, that Involves all three elements,aval, and air, becausefwe have to have those capabilities. the size of our grouad force Is roughly In the neighborhoodhousand Cubans, already Recruited, organised, and in training in Guatemalaase there. Andave by this timeery high degree of proficiency, underZ-atin stsndards, aad our judgment is that It's probably the best force to ever develop In Latin America aa far*as Its firepower and its^rnsneuverabillty and all is concerned. In connection with that we have developed an Air Force. It too is based in Guatemala and under training recruited from Cuban pilots, both commercial and military crews. As far as flying aircraft Is concerned they areairly high degree of training, but we run fnto, particularly there, the normal Latin characteristics of lack of precision and determination and all, and their ability to get throughiven mission and to do the things that they


ave the necessary seacxaft assembled to transport the ground

to Cuba If, as, and when we get the order to proceed with such ajTopcration.

At the present time this is al

0. MB. Chairman, la aId our acti-

vities being played by the Church in Cuha, or not?

MB. DULLES: Yes, the Church haa takensTvery stout attitude, and it has been very helpful. They have been rudaw repressed by the government. They areery difficult pollsitlon. 'A question as to how tar theof the Church goes down took and file of the people. It's very influential ln the middle ranks of the^peoplereat many of those are anti-Castro. Our problem is whajQbe great rank and file of the people feel. We are very disturbed at the geaVral trenda. In that they haveery largebout ZOOjfaousand In Cuba. We think that moat of that militiaighting forcebut that they are building up hard0 tohousand in that Militia which probably has pretty good fighting qualities.

Q. MR. OSMEftS: What is the food situation there, Mr. Dulles

of the average


MR. DULLES: The average man isn't suffering yet. Food comes cheap and easy in Cuba. They are getting in the sugar crop, oot aa well as usual but It's not going toatastrophe. They are not going to get anything


like the money out of their sugarecause they are not selllnaJK to usigh price. They will have to sell at world pricesi may have some difficulty in disposing of it, although the Soviet Bl(#isery large part of the crop. Now hou- much cash they'resffoing to give themecause they bave givenrr^n; of armsthousands of tons of arms have gone into Cuba by ahijK and wc believe they have all the small arms and trucks and small tarjhfc', and sond some largerhat type ofhat they neef^ We don't rate very highly their ability to use it, but we are afraidc goes on the Communist hold will get stronger and stronger. AndiJK question that General Cabellery difficult question, mti that isolitical question and beyond us. We have tried to caajw out our particular side of the mandate we were given, but recognize the wireme difficulty in effect on Latin America,ut we feel at tjk'present time the resistance inside Cuba is not strong enough of itself fl&Tlse up against this militia force that they have created, and that if thace is any hope of having it rise it will have to be sparked. In some wayjjf other you have to light the fuse and do it fairly dramatically. Then thatftrvolves the possible use of these forces.

Q. MB. KlLDATfiV What portion of the militia is armed?

MS. DULLES: $ell, they could have armed practically all of it in some way or other With the arms they have from the Soviet Union.


MR. KILDAY: Are the irms-ln the hand* of the militia?

MR. DULLES: Very largely, yea. a MR. KILDAY: With ammunition? MR. DULLES: Yea.

Q. MR. KILDAY: The militia actually have their arms? MR. DULLES: In most cases, according to our informaj^n. Now whether thehousand do oron't know.


been concerned with They have assembled rrplete with ammunition.

GENERAL CABELL: When they have occasion to dafloy the militia

then they issue the ammunition. For example, they dissident movements ln the Escambrayarge militia force, and those have been Uae,

in the normal training they don'turn over the ammunition. G. MR. KILDAY: But they do havehe arms? GENERAL CABELL: Yes.

C. MR. SMART: What is the rationale about the site of the force in Guatemala underhousand troops against the size of the Cuban Army plus the militiasm. considered to be adequate? or Is that all we can get? or what Is the rJseOnale back of that?

GENERAL CABELL: It'tfif' combinationize that you con really

retain any semblance of non-aatxibutebllity. We could recruit more Cubans


but we would have totandards as to what we consider to be the individual reliability of tho&e' men, and motivation. The thousand that we

have have been well screened, and we believe that their motivationahigh, and that theyelatively high class of Cubfrnsare not just street

Q. MB. SMABT: Is it considered they would fond* the nucleus of the leadership?

GENEBALoth leadership, outran particular they would form the nucleus, for example, of an emphibRus operation inortion of Cuban real estate, and that enajpave then would beheof it, the knowledge of It, and the>presence of it wouldallying point both visible to Cubans toresistance in other parts of the island, because they would bave this ejfcample in front of them, and an actual, physical enclave people could join, jff

C MR. OSMERSj/fto you feelorce of one thousand, however well trained, would bjiCable to holdconsidering normal attrition, would they be able toizeable enough piece of Cuban real estate to permit that? dmit ai&ousandhousand times better than none

GENERaX CABELL: Our judgment Is affirmative on that.

LSON: Castro started

MH7 DULLES: We haveery careful assessment of this secretly by MghiriiUtary authority in thiswe had their help, because we don't ebnslder ourselves competent military authority in the United States, so we have sought the very highest and effective support of that kind.

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic: