PROPOSED OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBA

Created: 3/11/1961

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Proposed Cuban Operation,arch

Revised Cuban Operation,arch

Propaganda3

Status of Political

6 March'5

Working Group Paper,erch6

Cuban Operation paper,pril

Resistance Elenents Active in

arl tine Operations..6

Zapata Svasrp RevclutlcmaJv^jPtory

Press Statement by RafBttic^ry

Memorandum to TaskjEce,pril

Menorandua topril

JMATEr,arch

Backgroundwjper on Cuban Operation 15

lor MrJBfcndy and President Kennedy,1

Theress Allegations Regarding

Operation

PaayT on Responsibility for 17

ffomCI, Sen. Capehart, 18

jtiBornmsnts on Drew Pearson's 19

jfi'Press Releases in Name of the Revolutionary Council... its Developmentmergence

ft! History of Radio 21

Twelve "Topica for 22

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PROPOSEDINST CUBA

1. Status of Preparatory Action:ear ago thc^BCncy was directed to set in motion: the organizationroadlv-bjIBife opposition to the Castro regime; ajor propaganda campaign- JBfpon lor both peaceful and violent resistance activities in Cuba; aAjFhe development of trained paramilitary ground and air ion es of Cubfifvolunteers.

A decision should shortly be made^avto thectivities and the employment or dUpositionAoassets that have been created. The status of the more importaoVsrciivities is as follows:

a. -Political: ertatfjtnear, the FRD (Frente Revolucioniarohichni created in the hope that it would'

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become the organisational embodimentnified opposition to Castro, has proved to be highly useful as^fcover and administrative mechanism but important political elements$sfused to join it.

yf* effort was undertaken three weeks ago tooreevolutionary council which would Include the FRD, and which could lffM to the setting uprovisional government. Considerable progress basveen made in negotiations with the principal

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Cuban leaders in which great effort! have been made to permit the Cubana to chart their own course. It ia expected that the desired result will be accomplished shortly. What is emerging from these negotiationsrovisional governmententer to left-of-center political orientation,olitical platform embodying moat of the originally stated goals of theuly movement. It is believed that this will command the supportery large majority of anti-Castro Cubans although it will not be altogether acceptable to the more conservative groups.

t b. Military: The following paramilitary forces have been recruited and trained and will shortly be in an advanced state of readiness.

reinforced battalionhich will be brought uphrough the addition of onecompany to be used primarily forandeserve.

briefly trained paramilitary force of

ntended to be usediversionary night landing to be undertaken in advance of commitment of the battalion.

n air force of6 light bombers,s and.

hippingontonCUsCVPa.

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A JCS team recently inspected the battalion and the air force at their bases in Guatemala. Their findings led them to conclude tbat these forces could be combat-readypril. Certain deficiencies were indicated

that are in progress of correction partly by further training and partly

by the recruitment of the additional infantry company referred to above.

c. Timing: It will be infeasible to hold all those forces together beyond early April. 'They are in large part volunteers, some of whom have been in hard training, quartered in austere facilities for aa much as six months. Their motivation for action is high but their morale cannot be maintained if their commitment to action is long delayed. The onset of the rainy season in Guatemala in April would greatly accentuate this problem and the Guatemalan Government is in any event unwilling to

havo them remain in the country beyond early April. The rainy season in Cuba would also make their landing on the ialand more difficult.

2. The Situation in Cuba: We estimate that time ii againat us. The

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castro regime ia steadily consolidating its control over cuba. in the absence of greatly increased external pressure or action, it will continue to do so regardless of declining popular support as the machinery of authoritarian control becomes increasingly effective.

regime le proceeding methodically to solidifyover all the major institutions of the society and to employthe communist pattern aa instruments of repression. thedirectly controls all radio, television, and the press. it hasdependable leadership in labor unions, student groups,organisations. it hae nationalized most productiveenterprises and isrogram of so-called land reformeffective control over the peasantry. it has destroyed allexcept the communist party. politically reliable andinternal security and military forces are being built up. '

is still much active opposition in cuba. itthat there are0 active guerrillas and anotherengaging in various acts of conspiracy and sabotage, thewhich has been rising in recent weeks. nevertheless, theshown considerable skill in espionage and counter-espionage. it is

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making good ase of the militia against guerrilla activities and the infiltration of people and hardware. The militia is relatively untrained and there la evidence that ita morale is low but the government.is able to use very large numbers against small groups of guerrillas and ie able to exercise surveillance of suspicious activities.throughout the island. Short of some shock that will disorganize or bring about the defection of significant parts of the militia, it must be anticipated that violent opposition of all kinds will gradually be suppressed.

1 c. At the present time the regular Cuban militaryespecially the Navy and Air Force, are of extremely low effectiveness Within the next few months, however, it is expected that Cuba will begin to take delivery of jet aircraft and will begin to have available trained and well indoctrinated Cuban pilots. During the same period the effectiveness of ground forces will be increasing and their knowledge of newly acquired Soviet weapons will improve. Therefore, after some date, probably no more than six months away it will probably become militarily infeasible to overthrow the Castro regime except through the commitment to combatore sizeable organized military force than can be recruited from among the Cuban exiles.

3. Possible Courses of Action: Four alternative courses of action

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involving the commitment of the paramilitary force described above are discussed in succeeding paragraphs. They are:

of the paramilitary forceannerminimise the appearance of an invasion of Cuba from the outside.

of the paramilitary force In awith tactical air support, the installation under its protectionsoil of the opposition government and either the rapid spreadrevolt or the continuation of large scale guerrilla action in terrain

suited for-that purpose.

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! c. Commitment of the paramilitary force in two successive operations: First, the landing of one company without air supportemote area in which it could sustain itself for some days (hopefullynd second, the landing of the main force forty-eight hours lateridely different location in the'same manner as in. above.

d. Commitment of the whole force in an inaccessible region

where It would be expected to keep controleachheadong

period of time to permit installation and recognitionrovisional

governmentradual build-up of military strength,

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4. Covert Landing of the Paramilitary Forces: Careful study has been given to the possibility of infiltrating the paramilitary forcesight amphibious landing, using man-portable equipment and weapons and taking ashore only such supplies as can be carried by the troops. The force would move immediately in-land to the mountains and commence operationsowerful guerrilla force relying entirely upon continuing air logistical support. Shipping would retire from the coast before dawn and no tactical air operations would be conducted. Unfortunately, it is

believed that such an operation would Involve unacceptable military risks.

a. The paramilitary force would run the risk of becoming

completely disorganised and scatteredight landing. (Suchis very difficult for even highly trained forcesamphibious.

b. The force would not have motor transport, heavy mortar,m recoiling rifles, heavy machine guns, nor tanks. Initial

ammunition and food supplies would be limited.and it would be wholly

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dependent on air logistical support. If tbe rainy season commencesovercast conditions could prevent effective support. not be

C. Since tactical aircraft would not participate, the objective area could not be isolated; enemy forces could move againit the beachhead unimpeded. The Castro Air Force would be left intact.

5. anding in Full Force: This operation would involve an amphibious/airborne assault with concurrent (but no prior) tactical air

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support, toeachhead contiguous to terrain suitable for guerrilla operations. The provisional government would land as soon as the beachhead had been secured. If initial military operations were successful and

especially if there were'evidence of spreading disaffection against the Castro

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regime,/the provisional government could be recognizedegal basis

provided for at least non-governmental logistic aupport.

a. The military plan contemplates the holdingerimeter

around the beachhead area. It ia believed that initial attacks by the Caatro

militia, even if conducted in considerable force, could be repulsed with

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substantial loss to the attacking forces. The scale of the operation and the display of professional competence and of determination on the part of the assault force would, it is hoped, demoralize the militia and induce defectlona therefrom, impair the morale of the Castro regime, and induce widespread rebellion. If the initial actions proved to be unsuccessful in

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thusajor revolt, the assault force would retreat to the

contiguous mountain area and continue operationsowerful guerrilla force.

b. this course of actionetter chance than any other of leading to the prompt overthr'ow of the castro regime because it holds the possibility ofemoralising shock.

c. if this operation were not successful in setting offrevolt, freedom of action of the u. s. would be preserved because there is an alternative outcome which would neitherorerious defeat;uerrilla action could be continuedizeable scale in favorable terrain. this wouldeans of emrting continuing pressure on the regime.

6. iversionary landing: ariant of the above plan, it would be feasible toiversionary landingorce ofen in an inaccessible areareludeanding of the main assault force. the initial operation would be conducted at night without tactical air support. atart of the provisional government would go in with

the diversionary landing and presumably the establishment of the provisional

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government on cuban soil would thereupon be announced. the subsequent landing of the main assault force would be carried out as outlined inreceding.

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coune of action might have certain politicalthat the initial action in the campaign would beharacter thathave been carried out by thewith little outside help.

wouldilitary advantage in that thewould distract attention and possibly divide some enemy forces

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from the objective area for the main assault. If reports had reached the Castro government that troops trained in Guatemala were on the move, the diversionary landing might well be taken to be the main attack, 'thus enhancing the element of surprise for the main assault force. These advantages would be counterbalanced by the diversion of troops otherwise supporting the main unit.

7. Landing and Slow Build-up: Under this fourth alternative the whole paramilitary force could carryanding andeachhead ln the most remote and inaccessible terrain on the island with intent to hold indefinitely an area thus protected by geography against prompt or well-aupported attacks from the land. This would permit the Installation there of the provisional government, its recognition by the U. S.scent interval, and (ifong period of build-up during which

additional volunteers and military supplies would be moved Into the beach-.

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major political advantage of thii course of action would

be that the Initial assault might be conducted inay as to involve

less display of relatively advanced weaponry and of professional military

organisation than the landing in force discussed above, especially so as

there is every likelihood that the initial landing would be virtually by

unopposedA Recognition coulduitable political and legal basisrotracted buildup after the initial assault,

an operation would, however, require tactical air

support sufficient to destroy or neutralise the Castro Air Force. If this were not provided concurrently with the landing, it would be needed soon thereafter in order to permit ships to operate into the beachhead and the planned build-up to go forward. If the initial landing could include aeizure of an air strip, the necessary air support could fairly soon be provided from within the territory controlled by friendly forces. Chere ia, however, no location which bothseable airstrip and is so difficult of access by land aa to permit protectionlow build-up.

type of operation by the very fact of beingnature and remote geographically would have far less initial impact

politically and militarily than courses two or three.

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8. Conclusions:

*. The Castro regime will not fall of its own weight. In the absence of external action against it, the gradual weakening of

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internal Cuban opposition must be expected.

b. atter of months the capabilities of Caatro's

military forces will probably increaae toegree that theof his regime, from within or without the country, by the Cuban opposition will be moat unlikely.

e. The Cuban paramilitary force if effectively used has a

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good chance of overthrowing Castro, or ofamaging civil war, without the necessity for the United States to commit itself to-overt action against Cuba.

d. Among the alternative courac of action here reviewed, an assault in force precedediversionary landing offers the bast chance of achieving the desired result.

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REVISED CUBAN OPERATION

1, Political Requirements: The planuban operation and the variants thereof presented onarch were considered to be politically objectionable on the ground that the contemplated operation would not have the appearance of an infiltration of guerrillas in support of an internal revolution but rather thatmall-scale World War II type of amphibious assault. In undewtaking to develop alternative plans and to judge their political acceptability! it has been necessary to infer from the comments made on the earlier plan the characteristicsew plan should possess in order to be politically acceptable. They, would appear to be the following:

a. An Unspectacular Landing: The initial landing should be as unspectacular as possible and should have neither immediately prior nor concurrent tactical air support. It should conform as closely as possible to the typical pattern of the landings of small groups intended to establish themselves or to join others in terrain suited for guerrilla operations. In the absence of air support and in order to fit the pattern, it should probably be at night.

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Base for Tactical Air Operations: It wai emphasizedflucceaa of the operation will require tactical airto the establishment of the control of the air over Cuba. to fit the pattern of revolution, these operations shouldfrom an air base within territory held by oppositionit is impracticable to undertake construction of an air baserainy season and before any air support is available, thein the original landing must include an air strip thattactical operations.

Tempo: The operation should be so designedcould be an appreciable period of build up after the initialmajor offensive action was undertaken. This would allow for

a minimum decent interval between the establishment and the recognition by.rovisional government and*would fit more closely the patternypical revolution.

Warfare Alternative: Ideally, the terrainonly be protected by geography against prompt orfrom land but also suitable for guerrilla warfare in thean organized perimeter could not be held.

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Areas: Five different areas, three of them onof Cuba and two on islands off the coast, were studied carefullywhether they would permit an operation fitting the aboveof the areas appears to be eminently suited for the operation. Allhad to be rejected either because of unfavorable geographyabsenceuitable air strip) or heavy concentrations of enemyboth. The area selected is located at the headell protectedestuary on the south cbast of Cuba. It is almost surrounded byto infantry in any numbers and entirely impenetrable toalong two narrow and easily defended approaches. Althoughby theee terrain features, the area is near the center ofthe island

and the presence of an opposition force there will soon become known to the entire population of Cuba anderious threat to the regime. The beachhead area contains one and possibly two air strips adequate tos. There are several good landing beaches. It is of interest

that this area has been the scene of resistance activities and of outright

guerrilla warfare forundred years,

ofthe Operation:

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a. The operation will beginight landing. There are no known enemy forces (even police) in the objective area and it is anticipated that the landing can be carried out with few if any casualties

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and with no serious combat. Aa many supplies aa possible will be unloaded over the beaches but the ships will put to sea in time to be well offshore by dawn. Tha whole beachhead area including the air strips will be immediately occupied and approach routes defended. No tanks will be brought ashore in the initial landing. It ia believed that this operation can be accomplished quite unobtrusively and that the Castro regime will have little idea of the else of the force involved.

i b. The second phase, preferably commencing at dawn

following the landing, will involve the movement into the beachhead

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of tactical aircraft and their prompt commitment for strikes against the Castro Air Force. s will move in with gas in drums, minimal maintenance equipment, and maintenance personnel. Aa rapidly as possible, the whole tactical afr operation will be based In the beachhead but initially only enough aircraft will be based there plausibly to account for all observable activity over the island.

c. In the third phase, as soon as there ie adequate protection for shipping from enemy air attack, ships will move back into tha beach to discharge supplies and equipment {including tardea). It must be

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presumed that counter attack* against the beachhead will be undertaken withinoours of the landing but the perimeter can easily be held against attacks along the roost direct approach routes. The terrain may well prevent any sizeable attacks (providing the enemy air force has been rendered ineffective) until the opposition force is ready to attempt to break out of the

d. The timing and direction of such offensive action will ^depend upon the course of events in the island. At least three directions of break out are possible. Because of the canalization of the approaches to the beachhead from thereak out will require close support by tactical air to be successful unless enemy forces are thoroughly disorganized. The opposition force will have the option, however, of undertaking an amphibious assault with tactical air supportifferent objective area if it should seem desirable.

4. Political Action: The beachhead area proposed to be occupied is both large enough and safe enough so that it should be entirely feasible to install the provisional government there as soon as aircraft can land safely. Once installed, the tempo of the operation will permit the U. S. Government

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extend recognitionecent interval and thus to prepare the way for

more open and more extensive logistical support if this should be necessary.

5. Military Advantages:

afer military operation than the daylightforce originally proposed. The landing itself ia more likelyunopposed or very lightly opposed and the beachheadbs more easily held.

are no known communications facilities intarget area. This circumstance, coupled with the plan

ight landing, increases the chance of achieving surprise.

comparison with any of the known inaccessiblethe Orients Province tha objective area is closer to rearair and sea logistical support.

plan has the disadvantage that the build up*ofbe only gradual since there ia virtually no local populationto recruit additional troops and volunteers from other partewill be able to infiltrate into the area only gradually.

6. Political Acceptability: The proposal here outlined fits the three conditions stated inbove for the political acceptabilityaramilitary operation. The landing is unspectacular; no tactical air support will be provided until an air base of sorts ia active within the beachhead area;

7. Conclusion: The operation here outlined, despite theconcept to mee't'tne political^requirements stated above, will afill'haveccejtT The study/over the past several month.sopers^ons'makes perfectly clear, however, that it isintroduce into/Cuba and commit to action military resources that willgood chance^of setting in motion the overthrow of the regimeprice'in terms of accusations^by the Communists andby others. It is beheved that the plan here outlined goes as^farin the directiop/of minimizing the politicaPcost withoutjrnpsoundneas and onance of successiliary operations/Theappear.rc^be the demobilization of^nCparamilitary^force and theits roernbers to the Unitedof course^well understood that

this .course of action too involves certain risks.

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le an elaborate propaganda plan drawn which It to

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effect in support of any landing which may occur and the

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period. It will be primarily radio and leaflets. Tbe details of

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plan are In writing se tbat they will net be included here.

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radio effort will Include short-wave transmitters with the

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troops and the useumber of short-wave transmitters already in Cuba. In addition it should be possible aa soon as Cuban air Is removed tohip-borne medium-wave transmitter close to shore. In

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additionfollowing transmissions will support the landing and tbe

provisional'

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a. Short Wave

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Swan Radio WilUL

b. Medium Wave

Radio Swan

wUGS (Miami)

Vi'MIE (Miami)

WKWF (Key West)

Ship (mentioned para. 2(

Ths total time at presentpproximatelyoeek.

USIA broadcasts short wave oaeayew Jersey site. Tfaie,

of course, can pick up and retransmit much of tbe material sent on the

foregoing stations.

nother important publicity assetonnection with UPI through which news car. be quickly disseminated to ths entire Latin American area. Our connection belps lo speed of transmission since news which might be delayed for confirmation caa be released aa the basisuick confirmation by as. This channel mast, of course, be limited to actual news.

STATUS OF POLITICAL EFFORT 1. Varona has formally enlarged tha FRD Executive Committee by adding ten new membere. The preaent merabsrshlp ia: (original five are underlined).

LEFT

OF CENTER

Fernandez

(Labor for

Coznex Carlos He via Gear Meatre

ov)

Mlro Cardona

Travleao

(Student for

*

DUi Sergio Carbo Pepin Boach

probable reaaona for this move by Varona arci

strengthen his hand in negotiation* in the Committee ofwith Ray.

all-back group in ease the Committee of Six

is blockeday veto. Moreover, tha existence of this fall-back position will tend to discourage blocking tactic* by Bay.

take advantage of the present anti-Ray swing takingthe Cuban exiles.

2. Carr met two days ago with Varona and yesterday with Ray. Varona complained that the Committee of Six wae composed of individuals unfavorable to him, Ray, on the other hand, was pretty reasonable.

U-nyhajy, theruby canflrruiug Varwi*'* view*. Itolill felt ill be able to agreerovisional president, wLo iav dither Uiro Cardona or Felipewho i*n. liu uJJv at the loonaent letm to favor Miro CardonaIf eluci^J

e wholly acceptable as far as we arc concerned, a'be

ui Six meets tbii>errow afternoon with Carr for tha purpose ofcurtain procedural details. It la notit will

.a.

a provisional president at this meeting. uk, Lowcvcr, luat wa can

statu With ertainty thatcan produce a/

urea&seuteek. He will thanis cabinet andecondary officials.

S. It is iit>(iuaslblc prior to the selectionue exactly what inOi vidua lb will initiallyi uaconsiderable certainly,mi

ptrvfcraLlysenior officials will da Bu, CKVdwdt iuy ble to be transported too oooa but would be able to bu lutk*aUaccO us soon as any territory became reasonably secure.

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OUTLINE

1. Two operations have been proposed:

"T" operation would involve an require use of paratroops and concurrentsupport, would have to be in daylight, would

"Z" operation would be unopposed, no

tactical air until air strip seised, greater

, likelihood of surprise, generally unspectacular.

concern appears to be with later phases of theseon two assumptions.

phase unsuccessful despiteis annihilation

phase successful-.how isull victory?

of initial failure.

a. In the caseanding at "T" the force retires into the mountains, hopefully well equipped and with Dependent on air resupply. No possibility of extrication.

b. In the caseanding atnitial failure takes the formtalemate; little chance of beachhead being overwhelmed. This posture can be maintained almost

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indefinitely. If all chance of ultimate success abandoned, force can be extricated as it was landed without uae of U. S. resources.

of initial success.

a. After landing atoncept is for rapid build up of force with local volunteers and cutting of island in two.

. After landing atoncept is for slow build up of force mainly through infiltration of additional personnel, and equipment, ultimate breakout and drive directly on Havana.

of exploitation phase (either location).

recruitment and training of additional man force for reinforcement.

of revolts by known groups withcontact and communication established.

short of revolt, by sabotage and

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6. Balance of advantage.

peration has higher likelihood ofbut highern landingn earlyagainst beachhead. The "Z" operation lower risk;effect and therefore less chance of quick success;of ultimate success.

"T" operation absolutely requires tactical air

support and does not require air base.

strongly favors

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Intelligence agency OFFICIALI

is the Working Croup's paper which Mr. Dulles "il TlTtgsfflFWtr for last night. The Working Croup consisted o'ssaaasaa^ssssass),

J.ir.tate) and General Gray (Defcns. ,'The paper has been given the absolute minimum distributionaster list of all those who have seen or who have access to it. When you are through with it upould appreci it if It could be returned to me. Many than's.

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Ate

FOLD HEWC TO_WETUBW

.fWOM:C^

'DDP/A

CONKIDKNTIAL

em no. 'io-7

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of State

Secretary of Defense

Director of Central Intelligence Agency

Para-Military Plan, Cuba

Working Group assigned to work out the detailed tasks forand conduct of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba, andentral Office for the operation, has agreed uponto be accomplished by the representatives of yourand agency. The tasks are set forth foray anday Phase until Recognition;

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and Post-Recognition Phase.

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The tasks for theay phase are set forth inereto.

Th* tasks foray anday Phase until Recognition

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are set forth inereto.

The tasks for the Post-Recognition Phase are set forth inereto.

The proposed time schedule for theay Phase is attached asereto.

Department of State Representative

Atts:s stated

of Defense Representative

COPY NO/C

ENCLOSURE A

AY PHASE

I. Department of State representatives will:

White Paper for Presidential approval.

assistance to Mr. Schlesinger In preparation ofPresidential statements.

Working Group with Policy Statement as to what

action, if any, to be taken regarding disclosures.

.a

other.

United Kingdom *

policy guidance for all aspects of the development of theGovernment.

f> Prepare plans for overt moral and other possible non-military support prior to recognition of the Free Cuba Government of the objectives of the Cuban Volunteer Force and of the Revolutionary Council, including possible action in the United Nations or in the Organization of American States.

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plani (or overt moral and other possibleof the objectives of the Free Cuba Government when established.

policy guidance too support this plan.

plans foray actions.

of Defense representatives will:

to provide training and logistic support to theForce as requested by CIA.

logistics plans for arms, ammunition, andbeyond the capabilities of the initial CIA logistics support.

plans for provision of support from operationalrequired.

letter of instruction to tbe Services, CINCLANTfor support of this operation.

CINCLANT planners informed.

representatives will:

a Central Office from which Executive Departmentrepresentatives will coordinate planning and conduct operations.

to supply guerrilla forces in Cuba as feasible and Assist in the organizationree Cuba Government,

d. Conduct an interrogation of two or three members of the Cuban

Volunteer Force to determine full extent of their knowledge of actual

facta and provide information to the President as soon as possible.

ENCLOSURE A

detailed plana for the employment of the VolunteerCuba and follow up plans. Execute these plans on order.

to recruit, train and equip the Cuban Volunteer Force.

detailed plans for establishing contact with theestablishing such control, coordination and support ofaa may be desirable and feasible.

effort to arrange defection of key CubanThe defection of the military commander of the Isle of'Pinea,least officers who could control the Isle, would be particularly

desirable. J

i. Continue detailed intelligence collection on Castro activities.

throughout Latin America particularly his efforts to export revolution.

j. Support the preparation'hite Paper to be issued by the Free Cuba Government.

k. Review cover plans.

1. Coordinate with DOD representatives logistic follow-up support

requirements.

m. Review anday psychological warfare plan.

n. Review Psychological Warfare Planay anday

Phase.

o. Intensify UW activities in Cuba.

B

D-DAY ANDAY PHASE UNTIL RECOGNITION

of State representatives will:

such steps as may be feasible for the protectionuba.

plans for support of tbe Revolutionary Council or Freein the United Nations or Organization of American States andcommunist and/or Castro charges in the United Nations orof American States, as appropriate.

support to the objectives and actions of the Cuban Volunteerthe Free Cuba Government.

plans as necessary for support of the Free Cuba Recognize Free Cuba Government as appropriate.

of Defense representatives will;

follow-up logistic support as requested by CIA and/orwith logistics plan.

support from operational forces aa directed.

detailed plans to support. aid plan for theGovernment for implementation when overt support is given.

support by DOD agencies and commands.

representatives will:

a. Execute and support over-all para-military plan.

f b. Inform DOD representatives of logistics requirements.

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C

POST RECOGNITION PHASE

The Departments and the Agency will prepare, coordinate and execute, as appropriate, such contingency planB as may be required and will, moreover, plan for the resumption of their regularly assigned functions

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in relation to the new Cuban government.

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a. DOD Representatives:

(I) Complete letter of ina true Hon to the Services, CINCLANT and CONAD for support of this operation.

of State Representatives:

Provide Working Group with Policy Statement aa to what "recognition" really means.

Hava approved policy position regarding action, if any, to be taken regarding disclosures to foreign countries.

omplete plana for overt moral and other possible non-militar support prior to recognition of the Free Cuba Government of the objectives of the Cuban Volunteer Force and of the Revolutionary

Council, etc.

(4) Complete plans foray actions.

Representatives:

logistics plans for DOD follow-up support.*

Representatives:

inalize detailed plans for the employment of the Cuban Volunteer Force.

Complete detailed plans for establishing contact with the internal opposition and for establishing such control, coordination and support of this opposition as may be desirable and feasible.

Initiate effort to arrange defection of key Cuban personnel.

Complete review anday psychological Warfare Planay anday phase.

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b. CIA Representatives:

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. (I) Complete detailed intelligence collection on Castro activities throughout Latin America.

10.

a. DOD Representatives:

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(l) Complete plans lor provision of support from operational forces as required.

b. CIA Representatives: -

(tj Present final briefing on entire operation (if not given

prior to this date).

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CUBAN OPERATION

I. Orientation and Concept: The present concept of thebeing mounted to overthrow Caatrohat Lf^should harerowing and increasingly effective internal reeletance, helped by the activities of defected Cuban aircraft and by the infiltrationeriod of time and at several places) of weapons and small groups of men. External, support should appear to be organized and controlled by tbe Revolutionary Council under Mlro Cardooa bs the euccessorumber of separate groups. To support this picture and to minimise emphasis oa Invasion, the following steps bave been taken:

Tbe public statements of Cardona have emphasised that the overthrew of Caatro waa the responsibility of the Cubans, that It rrroat be performed mainly by the Cubans Ln Cuba rather than from outside, and that he and bis colleagues are organising this external support free of control by or official help from tbe U. S. Government.

b. Tbe plans for air opsrationa bave been modified to provide for operationsimited scalend againay itself Instead of placing reliancearger strike coordinated with the landingsay.

He vill stato that he defected with two6 pilots and aircraft and that they strafed aircraft on the ground before departing.

d.reliminary diversionary landing of true guerrilla type will ba made tn Orients Province. Theay landings will be made by three groops atpaced some dlinance apart on the coast. These will be followed about on* week laterarther guerrillaanding ln Pinar del Rio (at the western end of the island).

e, Ships carrying the main forces leave the staging

base at etaggered times. (Tbe first one sailed on Tuesdayhey will follow independent coursesendezvous for the final run-in. Until nearly duekhey would appear to air observation to be pursuing unrelated courses so there will be no appearanceonvoy.

L All the landings will be at night. At least In the first

ours, supply activity ever the beaches will be at night. There will be no obtrusive "beachhead" to be seen by aircraft. Most troops will be deployed promptly to positions inland.

2. Tha Tim* Table of lha plan la aa follows:

staging maintaging

completed night.

vessel sella from stagingaet

vessel depaxte early.

D-.6 defectionimited air strlkaa.

landing In Orlenteo

landing!oimited air

' strikes. nd liaison plane landair atrip.

D toreturn nighto complete

discharge of supplies.

landing ln Plaar del Bio.

3. Plysrslon or Cancellation: It would new be lnfeaslble to halt

the etaglng and emberVation of the troops. In tba eventecision

to modify the ope rational plan or to cancel tha operation, ships will

ba diverted at sea, either to Vieques Island or to porta In tha u. S. If

cancellation ls directed, the troops and ships' officers will be told

that the reason for tbe diversion Is that all details of the operation.

Including time and place of Intended landings, had been blown to the

Castro regime and that under these circumstances the landings would

be suicidal. This explanation would be adhered to after tha demobilisation

of the force In the U. S. The U. S. Government could take the position

lhat thiiNrptlW had bean undertaken by tha Cabana. Governmental support, that It had failed bacanaa of their poor security, and that tha U. S. could not rafaa* to grant asylum te the Cuban volnalee) If by reason of either new Intelligence or policy conalderatlona It la neceeaary toajor change In thaational plan. It will be accessary to divert to Vieques Island so that offteere ef the brigade and ships* captains can be assembled and briefed oa the new plan. (The advantages ef this location ara its security together with the opportunity for the troops to be ashore briefly after soma daya onboard ship.)

Naval Protection:' Tbs ships carrying the main force will receive unobtrusive Naval protection up to tbe time they enter Cohan territorial watera. if they ara attached they will be protected by U. S. Naval vessels bat following each an Interventloa they would be assorted. port aad the force would be demobilised.

Defections: Every effort la being made to Induce the defection of Individuals of military and political significance. At the present time contact has bean established by and through Cuban agents and anil-Castro Cuban groups with some thirty-one specific military

There axe, of course, In addition many others ramorad to ba disaffected but to whom co channel of approach is available. The objective ofefforts Is not to induce Immediate defections but to prepare the individuals for appropriate action ln placeay.

6. internal Resistance Mo-re meats; On the latest estimate tb* re are nearlynsurgents responsive to some degree of control through agents with whom communications ara currently

active. f these axe to Havana Its elf,n Oriente,

.. -

n Las Villas la central Cuba. For the moat part, the individual

I *

't

groups axe small and vary Inadequately armed. Air drops ara currently suspended because available aircraft axe tied up ln the movement ef troops from their training area to the staging base. ay when it is hoped that the effectiveness of the Castro air force will be greatly reduced. It ia planned to supply thaaa groups by daytime air drops. Every effort

will be made to coordinate their operations with those of the landing

l

parties. Efforts will ba mads also to sabotage or destroy by air attack

the microwave links on whichommunication system depends.

The objective la of course toevolutionary situation. Initially

perhaps In Oriente and Las Villas Provinces, and then spreading to all

parte of the Island.

7. Propaganda andComrrmnlcatidns: Currently medium endwave broadcasting in opposition to Castro le being carried onea station* la addition to Radio Swan. Antennas modification* of the latter have Increased It* effective power in Cube and it ie believed that there i* now good medium wave reception of Swan everywhere *xc*pt ln Havana itself where It can still be effectively Jammed. The number of hours of broadcasting per day will be lncreaaad beginning Immediately from abouto almostoonay. The combination of multiple long and short wave stations which will then be In use, supplemented by thrae.boats which carry broaden*ting equipment (two short wav* and on* medium wave) will assure heavy coverage of ell perts of th* Island virtually at all times. Radio program* will avoid any reference to an Invasion but will call for up-rising and will of course announce defections and carry news of all revolutionary action. Soonmall radio transmitter will be put ln operation on Cuban

*. Tb* Political Leadership: As of tb* present moment, the elx members of Card ona's Revolutionary Council, notably Including Ray, have reaffirmed theirlthough no specific portfolios bave been confirmed, th* following possibilities ar* currently under discussion: Verona.Ray, Cobarnacionarrilllo, Finance;

lOPSECSETi.

H*via, State! Macao, Public Health, Tbe political leaders have not yet been briefed on tbe military plan bat they will be informed mt each phase of military operations. Advance consultation with the political leaders Is considered unacceptably dangerous on security groundslthough last minute briefings will be resented, it la believed that the political leaders will want to take credit for end assume control aa quickly as possible over these major operations against Caatro. The-present plana is that on* of them (Artime) will go into Cuba with the main force, others will follow aa aoon a* possibleay and they will announce the establishmentrovisional Government on Cuban soli.

9. Commandi Military command will bea the nam* of th* Revolutionary Council and later ef the Provisional Government. In fact, however, th* CIA staff constitutes the general staff of th*^operation and the Agency controls both logistic* support and comccordingly, la the early stages at least, tbe taction*eneral baad-cfoartars will be exercised from the Agency with the Cuban brigadexercising field command over tba naita that landay.

age*

Resistance Elements Active ln Cuba

1. It la our estimate that there areersons engaged ln active resistance againstregime. Some twelve hundred are activethe remainder ere participating In sabotagefigures do not Include the thousands ofsupport the resistance with food, medicine, andor the many who engage ln sabotage on a

2. In the provinces guerrilla fighters are distributed as follows:

SO under the leadership oficoM In

the Sierra da JParial north ofed byFonsece in the area betweenn the Sierra de Crlotal;number ln tho vicinity of De lie las, wherestation was attacked recently, and Elnear El Cobre are led by Captain Octavio

n the Escambray area under the.leadership of Evelio Duque, Osvaldo Ramirez, Captain Merejo, end Lt. Cartn the Taguajay vicinity under Armando de Ortega and (fnu)n the Correllllo area under Benito Marti Ceapoe. Las Villas Is the principal center of resistance. Cuban Government forces have had clashes with guerrillas at someifferent points

c. Cama^Hoy. An undetermined number of guerrillas have been reported in the Los Negroes area. An air drop haa been made to another group on the South coast.

tangag. Guerrilla attacks have been reported froo Cascajal, Pedro Kayabori^ and San Jose da los Ramos.

; ECRET;-.

InJaguey Grande area thereroup ofed by Herellu Fena and Ramon Gonzales.

Havana. There are ann the Havana area engagedbo tage end support of insurgent groups* -

plnario. Anuerrillas- arts in the Sierra del Kosarlo. The resistance potential Is high, but unfavorable terrain restricts activelan to seize the Le re-San Julian area with the cooperation of Army and Navy officers haa been reported, *

Isle of fines'. No active resistance reported. There areolitical prisoners held here who '. wouldesistance force were it possible fox them to secure their release.

AIR

AIR AND MARITIME OPERATIONS

A total ofir missions have been flown as follow*:

re*

Escambray Pinar del Rio Matam -Oriente

Las Villas

/

South'Camaguey

Number of Missions

4

Number of Drops 7

1

total rigged weigbt dropped0 Ibe or approximatelyone nc

consisting of arms, ammunition, explosives and food.

On our most conservative estimate, two and one-half tons of tbe total

I

reached the reception parties. In addition, three bodies were dropped safely. MARITIME

A total ofaritime operations were run as follows: (Total includes

Successful or partially successful

aborts)

In addition to the aboveuccessful missions, there may haveore in which deliveries were ultimately recovered. Over forty tona of arms, ammunition and explosives have reached resistance elements by these maritime operations.

*

/

The Zapata Swamp In Revolutionary History

The paramilitary advantages of the- Cienega de Zapata are well known in Cuba, as the swamp was used extensively bothaven for refugees andase of operations during the insurrections ofs ands. Lessiles from Havana, Zapata, an areaquare miles, offers manyesistance element. Although it iswamp,f the area is dry land. Those familiar with the trails in the area can move fairly freely, while those who ore not find movement virtually impossible.

Cuban patriots as early2 sent agents to. to determine whether Cuba would be admitted to the Union if it freed itself of Spanish rule. . gave no encouragement at that time, though5 on there were. attempts to purchase Cuba from Spain. (The Ostend Manifesto3 urged. to offer0 for the island, and, if the offer was refused, to take Cuba by force).

The Zapata areaignificant place of refuge during the Ten Years' War that began This struggle, which was begun at Yara (Oriente Province) by Carlos Manuel de Cespedes and Francisco Vicente Aguilar, had as one of its aims the freeing of the slaves. Thousands of the latter fled to the Swamp (some of their descendents are the charcoal burners of the region today) and rallied to the banner of the "Cubangnacio Agramonte. (Agramontc was killed during the war and leadership of the revolution passed to Maximo Gomez). Although the war was ended by the Pact of Zanjonighting continued under the insurgent leader, Calixto Garcia. Garcia conducted for twolittle war" (guerra chica) against the Spanish. His ability to survive for that time was due in part to his skillful use of advantageous terrain, including the Cienega de Zapata.

SEGRET

War for Cuban Independence beganolitical leadership of Jose Marti and Tomas Estradathe military leadership of Maximo Gomez and Antoniowent to Cuba and was killed in fighting in Oriente.

The revolutionary force traversed the island One column made use of the security offered by the Zapata Swamp byine of march from Aguada de Pasajeros across the swamp south of Jaguey Grande and thence northwest to Alacranes. Zapata again played its rolo of safe haven for fugitives sought by the Spanish authorities.

Castro's rise to power, Zapata was not athe Castro forces did not in fact have to fightehemy (most of the great Castro victorieswholesale hand over of posts and garrisons byto die forhere was no need forprotective cover. Today the foes of Castro havearea for their main active effort against him,mountains of Las Villas Province. Zapata, itnoted, lies to the west of the Escambrays and ispart of the same province. Las Villas. in Zapata today appears to be centered onof several recreation areas, particularly at

Playa Giron, the Laguna del Tesoro, and at the head of

fiahia Cochinos. There have been several reports of mysterious

construction activity in the area (rocket launchers, helicopter

pads,ut none have been confirmed. Until there is

up-to-date photography of the region, the facts will not be

known.

SECBtf

PRESS STATEMENT BT HEW ANTI-CASTRO "REVOLUTICWAPY COUNCIL"

The following document,inimum platfona of action and

political concept, vaa passed to the press on1 during a

conference In New York City heldroup of Cubans announcing the

unification of forces against Fidel

"Beforear, theknow what they villvbere It will lead them,vill comeHart?

OBJECTIVES

To overthrow the Communist tyranny which enslaves the people of Cuba and to re-astablish moral peace and harmony scene all Cubans.

ropose to the Cubans the ideal of notional reconstructionommon task forhe government and theowards tho eatabliabmont of the besis of the New Republic and to direct the course of the Nation on the pathoncrete and high historical destiny.

A STATE OF LAW.

To guarantee tbe immediate establishmenttate of Law and Order which will impede the excesses or those who would pretend tosocial chaos under the pretext of applying Justice, according to individual or group opinion- To reaffirm the Independence of tbe Judiciary Power and tbe respect to its decisions.

To repudiate tbe policy of an Open Constituent Power, and ln order to guarantee Juridicalasistate ofo re-establish tbe Constitution ofwith the exclusive exception of the following precepts:

Those relating to its organic rules vnose compliance are in conflict vith the very naturerovisional government.

That referring to the cash payment of expropriations Ln reference to the application of thb Agrarian Be fora ae formulated ln these basis. can be made in bonds.

Those referring to the Millionth portion of the national budget payable to teachers, and the contribution of the government to the University of Havana, vhich in practice has proved to be Impossible to comply with. Adequate remuneration for teachers and due endowment for tbe Universities vill be guaranteed by Lav.

Those relating to tbe Tribunal of Accounts, with tbe object of

/

obtaining greater efficiency in the control of public funds.

relating to the system of election of congressmen,be elected by electoral districts if the lav should bo determine.

To hold general elections vithin the undeferable term of eighteen months following tbe overthrew of the Communist tyranny. The Provisional President cannotandidate to any elective post in these elections.

To establish an efficient public administration. No officials, employees, or vorkers vill be1 appointed, nor will any budget payrolls be used, in any manner to satisfy sectarian political ends or as recompense for revolutionary sacrifices.

III. POLICY OF RSCONSTFUCTXCM AND ECONOMIC DgVELOrMOrT*

1. To promote an active policy of reconstruction of our economy as veil as industrial, agricultural, mining and tourist development vhich vill increase the national income, provide vork for the unemployed and raise the living standard of the people.

2. To stimulate investment of private Capitol, national and foreign, to-give ample guarantees to free enterprise and initiative and the rights of private ownership inlts broadest sense of social function.

To revise tho tax system violated by the .tyranny, returning to the

general system of tbe Lav of- Tributaryo. wflth tbe

1

necessary adaptations to meet existing realities of the national economy

and the demands of

k. To abolish tbe so-called Urban Reform Lav, freezing rentals In force on Octobernd offering ample' facilities for the construction of low-priced workers' dwellings.

s

17. AGRAffEAN POLICY

o establish an agrarian regime which will adequately solve the

existing situations created by the Cceznuniet government which .vill facilitate

acquisition by the farmer occupying the small parcels of land, giving him.

full ownership through payment to the former owner of the land in bonds duly

guaranteed, and which can be liquidated before maturity for financing industrial

projects of national

adopt measures necessary to proscribe latifundia, anddetermine the minimum yield of farmsixed area, andand terns ln vhlch they should be sold to other owners whenland does not produce the minimum yield.

dictate regulations which offer tbe farmer adequate financing,

*

long term credits and low interest rates, technical advice, transportation facilities, storage and effective measures forinimum price for bis crops, as well ae markets for his agricultural produce.

k. To propitiate and stimulate the creation of fane cooperatives, based on the free decision of Its ambers, offering thea technical aasl stance and tbe resources which tbe Government might assign for Its more effective functioning

adopt measures that will assure tbeigh leveleducation, hygiene and better living conditions.

arge scale plan for the construction of rural homes.

PRCCMM ..

To restore to the working classes all .social rights recognized and acquired under the Constitution.

To abolish the laws which have annulled free unions and to suppress the so-called volunteer contributions.

To abolish tbe State control of labor.

U. To encourage the participation of workers ln the earnings of tba companies or enterprises.

5. To guarantee equal opportunities of study, apprenticeship and employment for youth.

6*. To promulgate the Labor Code regulating the relatione between Capital and Labor and to establish Labor Courts.

reviae and strengthen the Social Security Institutions andthe Social Security Bank to sound actuarial practices.

Of LEGITIMATE PTOPEgTY

*

1. To restore to the legitimate owners all property and rightconfiscated, occupied or affected by tbe Ccesnunlat regime with theof those which for reasons of national Interest tbe State should considers authorised by the Constitution and the Law.

2. Property confiscated because of wiflegyriatieo of public funds,

Illicit gains or fraudulent transactions coannitted during the tenure of public office will not be included in this restitution. eriod ofays will be granted for -the presentation of claims againstresolutions considered'unjustified.

AHD CuXTUES

ealistic educational reform, directed towardsthe citizen for assuming his responsibilitiesemocraticcreate technicians required for -the econoaic development of the country,

to promote cultural advancement of the people, to extend educational facilities

-. I

throughout the Island through the efficient use of funds destined for this

To re-establish the freedom of educational systems, promoting tbe moral formation of children and youth.

To suppress all militarization and totalitarian indoctrination of children and youth.

b. To reinstate full University autonomy, endowing official ^institutions with the necessary funds in Order to fulfill their high social mission.

1. To develop effective plans which will allow all Cubans, irrespective

i

of their financial situation, complete attention for the maintenance of their health.

1. To ratify in their present position all .members of the Pebel Army, Navy end Police vbo contribute to the overthrow of the Communist tyranny and to promote those who distinguish themselves by heroism in the struggle.

organize technical Armed Forces dedicated to the service

of the Ration to vhlch members of tbe former Army as veil as of the Rebel Army might belong, if not guilty of criminal offenses.

initiate procedures for the establishment of

k. To disband tbe Militias.

PRISONSRS ASP fsvisict 0?

1. To dictate tbe lmmedaite liberation of all prisoners condemned for acts of resistance to the Communist tyranny, to annul the correspond-lng procedures and to revise' tbe trials held by the eo-called Revolutionary Tribunals of Ordinary courts in order to rectify cases of Injustice.

of comhuhtsm and OF ALL anti-democratic activity

1. To proscribe the Ccemiunist Party and any organization contrary to our Representative Democratic regime, or vhlch threaten tbe national sovereignty ln accordance vlth the depositions of Articlef the Constitution.

xii. nrrerasATiaNAL

To denounce all treaties and international agreements vhlch undermine the national sovereignty and vhlch threaten the peace and security of the Hemisphere.

Immediate reneval of our traditional relations vlth the democratic countries of the vorld and loyal compliance vith all legitimate International agreements.

PEOPLE'S PEVOUnTOJlAPK MOVEMENT states that it further maintains:

Strengthening tha Commercial banking system, based on free competition among private Cuban firms, and avoiding excessive financial Influence concentrated in fev hands.

To definitely nationalize the Public Utilities of Light and Power, Telephone, Aqueducts and Railroedi through indemnification to former owners, and entrusting the management to efficient autonomous institutions.

Ho agreement vaa reached concerning these points, Insofar as they are not included in the Program of the Democratic Revolutionary Front, and they have been left pending further discussionree public opinion^ regime.

h

i i

I

lias adequate consideration been given to the following) The command structure

embarkation

afloat {relation between ship captains and military After debarkation

(Z) What element of command douSA personnel bave during these various pbaass.

Who controls communications between flotilla and other separate element* and any USA naval forces in area. Dohave any command function during voyage up to territorial water*.

During whatr* USA personnelduringvarious phase*. Has it been decided whether any American "soldiers of fortune" will be on beachhead.

What are communications arrangements among elements of flotilla during voymg*. Whaturlty on thi* communication and on ship-to-shore or ship-to -USA naval craft.

Who bas right and responsibility to give abort signal toSA navalh* flotillahip's captain?

{?) Who has final decision to abort and any discretion a* to where to go?

nd is tliore ono overall coumiaiuicr ai<!iu> o, orci. ol Uie thiroc orpa rated unit* have separate COUMAUuddraseparate missions.

Arc there plana for close air and taa rcconualu&axca of beachhead UH bcioxc elements of flotilla Lacoiui*hora aiiuck":

adc for l'BYs oa*pl<Mia.area.

la coiimmnicationa pattern between separateV Is there one Conirno channel or several?

l.at flag or Hags do flotilla vUiptf fly. Lei'e lUt/ li.'f.t'.^tuunl

for change on route or if threatened with atiuvU? Vl.alilo tj changv ship's, name after Jopaituvu. Io ll loawlblw Ci> jo beet of plausible ahips frwiu Lloyd's KegtaterV

(li) What information will the conuncrcUl officers auduf tL=iw abuut the undetiahiug? Vbai Ij their uailuueltiyV ny tfecurlly chocks, etc. V

(U) What counterintelligence arraugetAunta have

i

any auch units on shipu uml withla.-iiiw pa.'Licj. (IS) re the fresh watern thelu.idlna ifwis.

present arrangements forta&i^as -

wi.ci'o. when mid why? (IV) typos of uniform will bu utcJ mid are there any apoeifcl

"liberation" forces after guerrilla utugcuvorV

Is osdeting photography of airstripicudg.-uoat

a- to its V. liai is the thinking about decision for uirealan^ urn of Ami aiWa.

It; that left to local separate coiuittaiuierb aa opjt.tuniiy prwaeotJ

or coordinated by tbe overall cornmand or by HCVb.

i

Points to be considered in connection with the WAVE Program 1- Diversionary and cover-up operations

A. In addition to the one major diversionary landing, consideration should be given to approximately simultaneously sea infiltration of agents via small boats not required for the major Use of Swan Island radio (or fictitious reports of landings on basis of alleged info from Cuba.

of flares in sea along coast at several points to divert

.

attention of true destination of troops from MADD.

stories tbat detachment from MADD has been flownand if possible arrange token flights to back up thisuse Guatemala troops through maneuvers orgive impression that bulk of troops have remained at their base.

noway, drop parachutes where they canup and considered as evidence of widespread droppingarms which have been taken into tbe bush by dissidents.

desirability of arranging, prioray, forother Central American states to ask for protection against

_

* r

threatened Cuban invasion.

possible USA declaration that Cuba by its actions had become

outlaw from

/3

USA action to request legislation embargoing allCuba except under license.

Endeavor arrange maximum sabotage, particularly of oil and public utility objectives, immediatelyay.

Prepare statements by leading exiles to be published and broadcasted immediately after landing.

-representatives as possible.

onsider feasibility of declaration of war on Cuba by certain Central American and other states, including Guatemala.

9. Stimulate attacks on key Cubanith appropriate timing.

Consider desirability of broad-scale leaflet drops,.

Consider what type of unattributable action our Navy could take.

.IFIED

ONIY

confidentialr.rq. secret

Mnui

Am

Admin Bldg.

opy of the JMATE policy paper presented to and approved by the President on (Thiswas received from Mr. Parrot, DDP/EBM. )

10

13.

14,

ScrTt confidential unclassified

arch

A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME

1. Objective: The purpose of the program 'outlined herein is tothe replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to theof the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U. S. in such ato avoid any appearance of U. S. intervention. Essentially the methodthis end will be to induce, support, and so far aa possibleboth inside and outside of Cuba, by selected groups of Cubans of athey, might be expected to and could undertake on their owna crisis inevitably entailing drastic action in or toward Cuba couldby circumstances beyond control of the U. S. before the coverthas accomplished Its objective, every effort will be made to carryinay as progressively to Improve the capability of then a

Z. Summary Outline: The program contemplates four major courses of action:

a. The first requirement is the creationesponsible, appealing and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime, publicly declared as such and therefore necessarily located outside of Cuba. It is hoped that within oneolitical entity can be formed in the shapeouncil or junta, through the merger of three acceptable opposition groups with which the Central Intelligence AgencS Is already in contact. The council willbe encouraged to adopt as Its slogan "Restore theo develop a

political position consistent with that slogan, and to address itself to the Cuban people as an attractive political alt ernatlve to Castro. This vocal opposition will: serveagnet for the loyalties of the Cubans; in actuality conduct and direct various opposition activities; and provide cover for other compartmented CIA controlled operations. (Tab A)

that tha opposition may be heard and Castro's basissupport undermined, it is necessary to develop themass communication to the Cuban people so that aoffensive can be initiated in tbe name of tbe The major tool proposed to be used for this purposelong and short wave gray broadcasting facility,on Swan Island. The target date for Its completion Is This will be supplemented by broadcasting from facilities paid for by private Cuban groups and bydistribution of written material Inside the country. (Tab B)

Is al ready in progress In the creation of aand action organisation within Cuba which willto the orders and directions of theetwork must have effective communication and beto minimise the risk of penetration. An effectiveprobably be created withinays. Its role will be to provide

hard intelligence, to arrange for the Illegal infiltration andfiltration of individuals, to asalat In the internal distribution of illegal propaganda, and to plan and organise for the defection of key individual* and group* a* directed.

d. Preparation* have already been made for the development of an adequate paramilitary fore* outside of Cuba, together with mechanisms for the necessary logistic support of covert military operations on the Island. adre of leader* will be recruited after careful screening and trained as paramilitary Instructors. econdumber of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure location* outside of the U. S. so a* to be available for immediate deployment Into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there both before and after the establishment of ono or more active centers of rtfslstence. The creation of this capability willinimum of six months and probably closer to eight. In theimited air capability for resupply and for infiltration and exfilt ration already exists under CIA control and can be rather easily expanded if and 'when the situation requires. thln two months it is hoped to parallel thismall air resupply capability under deep coverommercial operation in another country.

3. Leadership: It is important to avoid distracting and devisive rivalry among the outstanding Cuban opposition loaders for the senior role

secret

/*

^CRET

in Lhe opposition. Accordingly, every effort will be made to have an eminent, non-ambltioua, politically uncon'.entious chainnsn selected. The emergenceuccessor to Castro ahould follow careful assesament of tho various personalities active In tbe opposition to identify the one who can attract, control, and lead the several forces. Aa the possibility of an overthrow of Castro becomes more Imminent, the senior leader must be selected,upport focused upon him, and his build up undertaken.

All actions undertaken by CIA in support and on behalfopposition council will, of course, bo explained as activities of that entity

J

(insofar aa the the actions become publicly known at all). The CIA will, however, have to direct contactsertain number of Cubans and. to protect these, will make usearefuDy screened group of U. S. businessmentated interest in Cuban affairs and desire to support the opposition. They will actunding mechanism and channel for guidance and support to the directorate of the opposition under controlled conditions. CIA personnel will be documented as representatives of this group. In order to strengthen the cover it ia hoped that substantial funds can be raised from private sources to support the opposition. as already been pledged from U. S. sources. At an appropriateond Issue will be floated by the council (as an obligationuture Cuban government) to raise an additional SZ.GCC, COO.

It is anticipated thatf CIAbe required for tbe above program. On the assumption that it willita culmination earlieronths from now, the estimated

requirements forundsith the balance,equired in The distribution of costs between fiscal years could, of course, be greatly altered by policy decisions or unforeseen contingencies which compelled accelerated paramilitary operations. (Tab C)

6. Recommendations: That the Central Intelligence Agency be authorised to undertake the above outlined program and to withdraw the fundi required for this purpose as set forth in paragraph S. from the Agency's Reserve for contingencies.

/

I

mm

a

TKE POLITICAL. OPPOSITION

Is already la close touch with throe reputable(tho Wontecrlstl. Autentlco Party and the National Democraticall meet the fundamental criteria conditional toor the revolution as originally coneolved--many beingand are not identified with either Batista or Trujlllo. anti-Castro because of his failure to live up to theh of

July platform/and his apparent willingness to sell out to Communist domination and possible ultimate enslavement. These groups, therefore, fit perfectly the

9

,/lanned opposition slogan of "Restore the Revolution."

opposition Council or Junta will be formed withinays from

representatives of these groups augmented possibly by representatives of other

I

groups. It is probably premature toixed platform for the Council but the Caracas Manifesto of8umber of exploitable points.

group leaders were signers of the Manifesto. The following IP points are suggestedew possibilities:

Castro regime is the new dictatorship of Cubastrong Slno-Sovlet Influence.

la entitled to an honest democratic governmentfree elections. There Is no hope of this as long as Castro throttles

tbe rights of legitimate political partlss and ths freedom of expression.

realistic agrarian reform program providing forof tbe land, must be put into effect.

freedoms must be restored and collectivismand education must be eliminated.

influence In tbe affairs of Cuba must bespecial research group of Cubans wltb American support Is planned toexpand these planks and to produce propaganda materials basad on thefor use by and on behalf of tbe opposition Council.

TAB B

PROPAGANDA

1. Articulation and transmission of opposition views hat already begun.

Private opposition broadcasts. purchase of commercial time by private individuals) have occurred In Miami (medium wave) and arrangements have been made with Station WRUL, for additional broadcasts from Massachusetts (short wave) and Florida (broadcast band). Presidents Be tan court and Ydlgorat have also agreed to tbe use of commercial stations for short wave broadcasts from Caracas and Guatemala City. CIA has furnished support to these efforts through

4

encouragement, negotiating help and providing some broadcast material.

2. As the major voice of Uie opposition. It Is proposed to establish at least one. -controlled station. This will probably be on Swan Island and will employ both high frequency and broadcast band equipment of substantial power. The preparation of scripts will be done In. and these will be

transmitted electronically to the site for broadcasting. After some experience and as tha operation progresses, it may be desirable to supplement the Swan Island station with at least one other to ensure fully adequate coverage of all

parts of Cuba, most especially the Havana region. Sucb an additional facility

might ba Installed. base In the Bahamas or temporary use might be

hlpborne station if it Is desired to avoid "

broadcasting from

Newspaper* are alio being supported and further support Is planned for the futura. anesadlng Cuban dally (Zayae1a* beenas has El Mundo, another Cuban dally. Dlario da la Marina, one of th* hemisphere's outstanding conservatlv* dallies published In Havana, Is having difficulty and may hav* toooo. Arrangement* have already bean made to print Ave nee weekly la. for Introduction into Cuba clandestinely and mailing throughoutl*ph*r*egular basis. As other loading newapapar* ar* expropriated, publication of "exile" editions will be considered.

insideIA-controlled action grouproducing and distributing anti-Castro and anti-Communist publications rvgularly. CIAn contact wltb groups outside Cuba who willl*ted In producing similar materials for clandestine Introduction Into Cuba.

I

promlnant Cuban* are on Uctur* tour* In Latin America. be followed by other* of equal callbr*. The mission of these men willgain hemisphere support for th* opposition to Castro. Controlledassets (press, radio, television) will support this mission as will

elected American Journalists who will be briefed prior to Latinavel.

I. Political

Support of Opposition Elements and

othar Croup

IL Propaganda

Radio Operations andestablishment of

Press and

j

In-Exf lit ration Maritime and-Air

Support Material and

Totals

These figures are baaed on the assumption that major action will not occur until If by reason of policy decisions or other contingencies over which the Agency cannot exercise control, the action program should be accelerated, additional funds will be required.

> 1

1. BACKGROUND: earttoncr

aet la motion tbe organ! iationroadlybaaed opposition to the Castro regime and tbe development of propaganda channelg, clandettlne agent nets within Cuba, and trained, par amaxy ground and air forces wherewith that oppositionCuban regime. The concept was that this should be ao far as possible a' Cuban op*ration, though it was wall understood that support In many/lor me would have te come from the United Stales. Great progrsss has boon made in thla undertaking. overnment -in-Exile will soon be formed embracing most reputable oppoaltioa eloments. It willolitical orientation and should command the support of liberals both within Cuha and throughout the hemlepher*. It willand,increasingly control trained and combat-ready military forces based In Central America. ecision must aoonba made a* to the eupport (if any) the United States will render the oppoaltioa henceforth.

2. PROSPECTS FOR THE CASTRO REGIME: The Castro regime is steadilv consolidating Its control over Cuba. Assuming that the United Stale* applies political and economic proa sure* at roughly present levels of severity. It will continue to do ao regardless of declining popular support. There ls no significant likelihood that the Castro regime will fall of Its own weight.

regime la proceeding methodically to solidifyover all tha major institution* of the aeciety andthem oa tha Communist pattern aa Instrument* The Government now directly controls alland tha preae. It haa placed politicallyla labortudent groups, and It haa nationalised moat productive andand iarogram of ao-called land reformeffective control over that haapolitical parties except the Communist party^and Increasingly effective internal aecurity andare being built*_ vw-

is la economic difficultlea but the Communistalmost certainly take whatever etapa are neceae&ry to

forestall any decisive Intensification of these troubles. Economic dislocations will occur but willnot lead to tho collapse or the significant weakening of the Castro regime.'

c. At the present time the regular Cuban militaryespecially the Navy and Air Force, are of extremely Vithln tbe next few months, however, itthat Cuba will begin to take delivery of jetwill begin to have available trained Cuban pilots ofreliability. During tbe eame period theground forces will be increaaing and their knowledge ofacquired Soviet weapons will Improve. Therefore, afterprobably [ho morejthan alx months away it willinfeasible to overthrow the Castro regimethe commitment to combatiseable organized^ force. The option of action by the Cubanno longer ba

NATURE OF THE THREAT: CubaWlU, ofirect military threat to the United Statesr'end it ia unlikelywould attempt open Invasion of any ether Latin American countryU. S. could and almost certainly would enter the conflict on the sideinvaded country. Nevertheless, as Castro further stabilises hismore sophisticated weapons, and further trains the militia,provide an effective and solidly defended base for Soviet operationsof Influence la the Western Hemisphere. Arms, money,and other support can be provided from Cuba to dissident loadcro

and groups throughout Latin America in order to create political instability, encourage Communism, weaken the prestige of thend foster the Inevitable popular support that Castro's continuance of power willational Estimate states: "For the Communist powers, Cuba represents an opportunity of Incalculableore importantly, tha advent of Castro has provided the Communistsriendly base for propaganda and agitation throughout the rest'" America andighly exploitable examples of revolutionary achievement and auccessful defiance of the United States."

COURSES OF ACTION: For reasons whichelaboration the overt useilitary forces to mount an invasionhas been excludedractical alteruatlvot/ Broadly defined the

following three possible alternative courses of action remain for

of economic and politicalwith continued covert support of sabotage andactions but excluding substantial commitment ofopposition's paramilitary force.

of the paramilitary force but iu awould not have the appearance cf an invasion of Cubaoutside.

c Commitment of the paramilitary forceurprisethe installation under Its protection on Cuban soil of the opposition government and cither the rapid spread of tha revolt or (he continuation of large scale guerrilla action In terrain suited for that purpose.

These alternatives are discussed id the following paragraphs.

5. DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE; There ia little that can be done to Impose real political and economic pressure on the Castro regime and no such course of action now under seriousseems likely to bring about Its overthrow.

a. rue blockade of Cuba enforced by the United States would involve technical acts of war and has now bean dismissed as Infessible.

b. Action to halt arms shipments from Cuba into any other part of the hemisphere would be cumbersome and easily ovaded if air transport ware employed. While undoubtedly of some value it Is difficult to see that the institution of such measures would either Impose severe pressure on the Castro rsgime or effectively insulate tb*ofi*ph*ra from It, Castro's principal tool* of subversion ar* people. id*alogy. tha force of example and money. Tho flow oftems cannot bo dammed up.

re? mu

economic sanction* arebut can quite readily be offset by an increasewith the Bloc j

any event, tt Is eetimated that theeffective international action axe poor.

6. THE MIDDLE COURSE: areful study has been given to tho possibility of infiltrating tha paramilitary force gradually to an assembly point in suitable terrain, hopefully avoiding major encounters In the proceos and committing it to extensive gnerrUa action. This course of action would have the advantage of rendering,ingle major landing which could be described as an Invasion. The infiltration phase would take on the coloration of efforts by small groups of Cubans to join an already existing resistance movement. Unfortunately, it has been found to be infeasible on military grounde. Basically the reasons (explained mora fully In the attachment) are:

is considered militarily Infeasible toorce of this elseingle area where itreceive supplies, and engage in coordinated Such an operation would have to be done over atime and the loss of the element of aurpriae afterwould permit government forces to frustrateto the same area.

units significantly smaller than theundergoing unit training would fall abort ofcritical raaaa'| required to give any significantof success. Smaller scale Infiltrationa would not produceeffect sufficient to precipitate general uprisingsrevolt among disaffected elements of Castro's

-

c Actually, the least costly and moat efficient way to infiltrate the forceerrain auitable for protracted and powerful guerilla operation* would belngle landing of the whole force as currently planned and Its retirement from tho landing point Into tbe chosen redoubt.

-5-

svniuaJdf^ "* Mefc of St.fi have evaluated the military aspecU of the pUaanding kv

opposition. They have concluded thatplan hai a

tavorable terrainpowerful guerrLUa force which could belmost Indefinitely. The Utter outcome would not oeTand neec^ A

r . .. V orc*r. ould create an opportuoitv for an oae intervenuon^toeaae-flre and hold eJ^cUona"

oIofault militia- Ho deflnxtive conclusions can ba advanced but It must

ChoicetV, not -tUtlMra* by thei/ow* choice. Their training ha. been alight and they have never bean exposed to actual fir* (particularly any heavy

.trcog that .ubatantialt or change .idea

b. There is no doubt that th* paramilitaryld.upporUd. NeJTrtLle.awould be difficult to prov and the scale of iu

would not be inconsistent with th* potentialities for ^pcril private Cuban and American groups rather than by thTu S

Undlo, in forceo. cl.or how .orioux

V.'jst Latin American Governments would at laaatof unobtrusive U. S. support for audi anespecially If the political coloration of thelaft-of-csnter. The reaction of the rest of theit is estimated, would be minimal In the caseU.S. support for such an attempt. Ita good deal of cynicism throughout the worldU.S. role but If quickly successful little lastingspeaking It ls believed that the political costlow in the eventairly quick success. Thedangers flowing from long continued large scalewould be groator but there axe diplomaticcould be made to forestall extreme adverse reactionsthis. .

ISSOLUTION OP THE MILITARY FORCE: ecision not to use the paramilitary-fore* must consider the problem of dlsoolutlon, since its dissolution will surely "bs the only alternative If It is not used within the next four to six weeksv' It is hoped that at least one hundred volunteers could be retained for Infiltration ia small teams but it is doubtful whether more than this number would be available or useful for this typo of activity.

a. There ls no doulbt that dissolution in and of itself willlow. prestige as It will be Interpreted in many Latin American countries and elsewhere as evidnece of tbe U. S. Inability to take decisive action with regard to Castro. David will again have defeated Goliath. . regimes like that of Trujlllo would gain strength while pro-U. S. Betancourt would undoubtedly suffer. Surely Ydlgoras. who has been an excoadln^ly strong ally, would also he placedery difficult position for his supportisbanded effort. It must be rsmembered in this connection tbat there arc eoctors of Latin American opinion which criticise the U. S. for not dealing sufficiently forcefully with the Castro regime. In fact, one reason why many Latin American governments are holding back In opposing Castro is bocausc they feci that soonsr or later. will be compelled to take atron^ measures.

b. Tha resettlement of the military force will unavoidably cause practical problems. Ita me tubers will bo angry,and aggressive with tbe inevitable reault that they will provide honey for the preaa beea and. will bave to face the resulting indignities and embarrassments. Perhaps more Important, howeVer, will be the loes of good relations with the opposition Cuban leaders. To date almost all non-Batista, nen-Co:ainunlst political leaders have been encouraged or offered help in fighting Castro. An abandonment of tbo military force will be considered by thornithdrawal of all practical eupport.In view of the breadth of the political spectrumhis will cause some difficulties |for the future since it Is bard to Imagine any acceptable post-Castro leadership that will not include some of the exiles dealth with during the past year.

CONXLUSIONS:

posirloh'ie daily getting stronger and willconsolidated to tbe point that bio overthrow will onlyby drastic, politically undesirable actions such aoembargo or an overt use ofymilitary force.

failure to remove Castro by external action willthe near future to tbe elimination of all internal andopposition of any effective nature. Moreover,of the Castro regime willubstantialthe Slao-Soviet Bloc which will use Cuhaaseactivity throughout the Western Hemisphere,political instability andnfluence,

J

Cuban paramilitary force. If used,oodoverthrowing Castro or at the very least causing awar without requiring. to commit Itself toagainst Cuba. Whatever embarrassment the allegedU.S. eupport may cause. It may well bethan that resulting from the continuation of tho Castrofrom the more drastic ard more attributable actions necessaryaccomplish the resultater date.

to amevenwDta.tro indicate, problem,USfrom the removal or .ub.tantial 'political moveTwilf

atwaat. oTthe

U. S. than would the re.ult.ailure to remove Caatro.

A CLANDESTINE IN FILTRATION BY SEA OF SMALL, GROUPS (UP TOEN)

onlyof Cuba with mountainous terrain of sufficient

i

extent andor guerrilla operations are the Sierra Eecambray of Ln Villas Province in Central Cuba and the Sierra Maestra of Oriente Province at tbe eastern extremity of the Island. The Sierra de los Organos of Western Cuba do not encompass sufficient area aod are not rugged enough to sustain guerrilla operations against strong opposition.

Of the.two areas with adequate terrain, only the Sierra Escambray ia

j

truly suitable for our purposes, since the mountains in Eastern Cuba are too distant from air bases In Latin America available to CIA for air logistical support operations. Primary reliance would bave to be placed gn this method of supply for guerrilla forces.

Government of Cuba (GOC) ha* concentrated large forcesand militia in both Las Villas and Orienteroop strength In La* Villas have varied recently00 men, while up0 men are believed to be stationed

In Orient* .

of dublou* efficiency end morale, the militia, byof numbers has been able to surround and eliminate smallInsurgent*. anding byen of the Masferrer Group inexample, was pursued and eliminatedilitia, imilar

group of insurgent* in Western Cuba, waa attacked and deatroyed by six battalions of army and militiaen).

4.uild-up of farceiven area by infiltration ofwoulderies of night landings in tho ume Discovery of the initial landing by GOC forces woulda certainty, since security posts are located at allareas. If the initial landing were successful, tbsbe expected to move troops and naval patrol craft to th*further landings difficult if not Impossible. Any emailexperience has ehown, will be rapidly engaged by forcesin number*. Therefore, it is considered unlikely thatlanding on successive occasions would succeed in joiningA series of surrounded pockets ot resistance would b*

approaches to the Cuban coast by vessels largeland up toen would probably provoke attack by the CubanAir Force, either of which is capable of destroying any vessels

which could b* used by CIA for these purposes.

j

the Sierra Escambray, which Is the only area of Cuba inguerrilla operations are now being conducted, ill-equippedgroups of upen have been hard pressedand have been unable to conduct effective operations. The

only worthwhile accomplishment of these bands has been to aervo as a

symbol of resistance. Smaller groups, even though bettor trained and equipped, could net be expected to be effective.

7. There are very few site* on the south' coaat of the Sierra Eicambray where email boata can be landed. These are found principally at tbe mouthe of rivers and are all guarded by militia posts armed with machinemall group landing at such a

point by shuttlingarger vessel in small boata would probably rs-.sr heavy casualties.

8.- Small-scale infiltrations would netsychological

/

effect sufficient to precipitate general uprisings and widespread revolt smong disaffected element* of Castro's armed forces. These conditions must bs produced before the Castro Government can be overthrown by any means short of overt Intervention by United Stales armed forces. As long as the armsd forcea respond torders, he canhimsalf In power Indefinitely. The history of all police-type states bears out this conclusion.

'). The CIA Cuban Aasault Force, composed entirely of volunteers, has been trained for actionompact, heavily armed, hard-hitting military unit, and the troops are aware of the combat power which they possessnit. They have been Indoctrinated ln the military principle of mass and instructed that dispersion of force leads to defeat In detail. Thsy will be quick to recognise the disadvantages of tbe Infiltration concept, and it Is unlikely that all would volunteer for piecemeal

commitment

comrr.ltn.nM to military action In Cab*. Th* troopsn

combtt onlyol notary bail*. Thenzn*nl of tha United

Statesno legal commacd or disciplinary aaihorlty over

CONCLUSIONS: .

Tbla coots* of action wo old result la largo scale lose of Ufa, both through military actios agaloat forces vastly superior in numbers andesult of dram-head Jnslice and firing squad execution of those captured.

This alternative could achieve no effective military or psychological results.

i

PRESS ALLEGATIONS REGARDING CUBAN OPERATION

The "invasion" was supposed to triggerpontaneous uprising within Cuba.

The Cuban underground was not notified in advance of the invasion so could not give any aid.

*

Thereailure of intelligence as to the strength of Castro's forces and tbe speed of their reaction.

The enemy was tipped off as to the time and place of landing so/that the invasion force was anticipated and liquidated.

a

invasion force was penetrated by Batistaitea.

group of Manuelo Ray which "claimed" thein Cuba was neglected in connection with the planningof the operation.

put in battalion commanders who were political

hacks.

(8) ubanere imprisoned for some II weeks by,rison compound in Guatemala. Allegedly this was becauae they did not like the way. waa running the show.

, chose the members of the Cuban Revolutionary Council and it was largely representative of the reactionary Cuban elements. (Others claim it had representatives of Communists in it).

j . tied to right wing Cuban elements.

recruited Cubans in Miami.

political leaders were imprisoned in Miamijust prior to the landing and misleading information puttheir name.

False information was put out by. Government as to numbers involved in the landing.

. placed its reputation in the handsoorly trained and squabbly band of refugees.

i) When Cuban Naval officers commanding the invasion were given their destination after sailing from Puerto Cabezas, thereear mutiny aboard the ships.

The propaganda harangues from Radio Swan (theuban people were abruptly suspended two weeksnd known Cuban voices were replaced by unknown voices.

) The Air Force was not destroyed as was boasted afterf

The entire psychological warfare phase of tho operation inated from thever since Radio Swan began to uba.

The first trainees who went to the camp sites in Guatemalaangled, tropical, snake-infested underbrush and many of the within view of passing travelers.

Ar time was CIA's fair-haired boy among theoup in the camps in January.

D-Day was hastily moved up fromo Aprilecause Russian MlGs were reported arriving; in Cuba. In the haste, CIA neglected to coordinate the invasion with the planned uprising. Thousands waiting in Cuba to spring into action never got the signal.

A series of allegations by Drew Pearson particularly containing criticisms of the choice and handling of the invasion ships; their officers and crews; failure to check on loyalty of crew members misconduct of officers, etc.

1

MU-IQRAJOUK Kfl THE DEUiCTOR.

memorandum la for in Cor aanly.

his press conference on Friday,residentanswer to an inquiry by Sander Van Ocher aaidi

"Further statements and detailed discussions are not to conceal responsibilitya tbs responsible officer of tbs Government, but surelyand thatTls'qulte obviousbut merelyo not believe thatiscussion would benefit us during tbe preaeat difficult situation.*

Van Ocher had asked vby background sessions ware not being held by the State

Department and tho Vbits Houseesponsible group of reporters to let

then know what had happened on the Cuban sitnatlon^^^

eplyingtateaeot^ony Secretary Mall

implying Elsenhower aeadnlstration responsibility for tbs Cuban incident,

Pierre Salinger Issued this statement:

"President Kennedy has stated froa the beginning that as President he bears full responsibility for the events of past days, he has stated this on all occasions and he restates It now so that It will be understood by all. Tbe President is strongly opposed to anyone within or without tbe Adainlatratloa attexpting to shift the responsibility

Secretary Udall than issued this statement!

"The President and his Administration have taken full responsibility in regard to our. relations with Cuba. If my remarks on television yesterday gave any othereeply regret it."

Mr. Dalits:

' They had been trained togethera fore*. They knewfire powsr, which wii vary high ead.ny, the geatral military estimate of the situation was that If they get ashore with their equipment, they could hold this beachheadonsiderable rime on HI they could have beea very . ataatlally reinforced.

' -That seemed to be the military Judgment at the time, and people who have come bach from the beaches have saidcould handle the situation, they could have handled this situation if tbty could have had,the ammunition aad the air cover. Senator Capehart: (p. '

Are you gentleman telling us here today that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and our high military people who fought ln^ Worldad World War H. aad who know how to win wars aad win battles, approved thla. what would appear to me tooy Scoutr. Dulles: Well,o not want to put responsibility or blama on anyone slse. an say we took the highest, ths bsst, military advice that we could gat. Senator Capehart: Well,ayas not directing thla toward you necessarily.

JOP^RLT.

Mr. Dulles: WKtl do yoaby dlricUai?

Senator Capehart:ean you"wa, "ean 'J the CIA did not particularly direct tali.Invasion, did they, . or train thoaa people? Mr. Dulles: Well, we hadart. In the first place

had loaaad to us aa extremely capable number of military an In this field ef training, logistics. Air aad other branches of the Services; and In addition to mat the plans were considered, , as has beta already Indicated,ary high level, and that ' consideration Included high military easa.

TCP StSRET

. 54 What Ido not understand la why It'""*

was thought thatoundrsdacked with threepleather threeeaee. could beevacuation, could possiblyeachhead inof Cuba or two bsachbsads In this area of Cuba, whenand w* knew this from past brlaflngs, thatonsiderable amount of artillery and tanks and 'was their military decision and not the decision of

our advisers? .

Mr. Blaisll: Well, it washe judgment as to its feasibility was

concur red In, sir, by the various Americans who were familiar with these plans, and this included, ofhe military officer* who helped to formulate tho plans, and also, tho Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator Eongbart; [p.ould Ilk* to know this, Mr.

ll tboae who did advis* did rmcommend that thi*

maasar* be undertak*a, andhat they thought

. which

It could Wa* It your agency who mad* the initialthat they felt thla landing could aucceed?

t

Mr. Bis sail: Wouppose, the; earliest evaluation

la time, air. aad than It was, aa Mr. Dulles haa said, the plana wars reviewed,reat many alternative plana ware reviewed by the military authorities, and all the highest authorities of tha Executive Branch.

Senator Long: Fromead aboet thla landing It

sounds to me asreat number of people looked at this thing and agreed to It, based on the fact that somebody else thought Itood Idea or somebody else thought this i was the way to do it.

Mr.hink, sir, that the military advisers who were

concerned with this didareful and detailed look at it aad, indeed, thera was at one time, thtsisit roup of military officers to the units In training toirst-hand Impression of their skill and effectiveness and morale.

Senator Symington: Now, on the question of this military operation, tha columnists haveield day In socking the CIA about It and, of course, that la easy to do. It la likeaper bag because the CIA cannot reply.

But didn't you hava advice on this from the various military units? BissaU: We did. si: .

Kp-^r,

Senator- Symington: (p.

Well, based on history, didn't wa know that IX they did bave

any fighter defense that oar position woulddifficult, if not

hopeless, with6ay we? Mr. Biisell: We did indeed know that sir; and we counted on

knocking out their air strength on ths ground before this

operation started. Senator Symington: Was this dlscusaed with the other Services, the

Air Force, the Navy, Army? Mr. BlsseU: Yes, sir; it

Senator Symington: What was their position with respect to it? Mr.elieve It was their position,hink my

immediate advisers felt it even more strongly, that we must

knock out the enemy air bo later than earlyay If

I

this operation was toood chance of success.

Tha Chairman:..

nderstood under the law that this,ense.reature of ths NSC; that you are supposed to and It Is under the direction of NSCnd you report to them. -

Mr. Blssall: That ls correct.

Senatorean my point ls that, therefore, ths

Central Intelligence Agency reports directly to the President of the United States because it reportsody that is strictly

ma advisory body, by statute, to tho President.

.

The Chairman: Tha only significance might be that other agencies of tha government would have an opportunity through their representatives on the NSC present their views, whereas if you reported directly to the President they do not.

Senator Symington: That Isas trying to say, air.

Theas just trying to get on the record that on occasion they do not report to NSC; they report directly to the President^ -

Senator Symington: Thaa It Is not in accordance withr. Bisaall:ay,,Mr. Chairman, to repeatnow of

no case in which the agency has reported directly to the

I i

President without the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense also being involved and,ule, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and other agencies. now of no case where tho Secretaries of those two Departments have not been involved.

The Chairman:nderstood it correctly ln this particular case you

did not report to'the NSC? Mr. Blseell: No, air; we did not. There were many reviews of the

plans for and policies toward this operation and they,ule.

involved several officers in the State Department, the Defense

Department, plus the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and on

occasion other officers.

ISP SEQRET

1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Generalaylor

The following document* are tranamlttad herewith:

1. Comment* oo Drew Purioa'i Column otriginal.

- I. Comment* oo Draw Pcaraon'a Column ofriginal.

omment onr*on'a Column of Wadnaaday,riginal.

4. Comment onAllegation* Regarding Cubanriginal.

I

-

J. C. KZNC

PLEASE SIGN AND RETURN ONE COPY ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OPISTED ABOVE.

Concents on Erev Pe&rocn'a Colana of1

la now trying desperately to hide Ita mistakes. Agento

have been rushed to Tlorlca to house tba Cubana vbo knev tbe enbex-

rassing troth.

CQWCTT: untrue.atter of fact ae have expedited the return of all Cubans to tbe XT.S, and hare permitted then free and unfettered access to family and friends.

ha first trainees vbo vent to the canp sites Infound only tangled, tropical, snake-infested underbrush- For the irst veek they lived on corn flakes and rain vater."evolution

Air Force cent to Ouatesnalal^caent toaae vlth rather

The atatenente are untrue.

fcny of the caapo vera vithln vlav of paaalng travelers.

COt&SgT: Pie ground training camps vera located In rcoote axeea of Guatemala and could not be seen by paaalng travelers. The air cj-erotdcoa base at Eot&lhuleu vaa somevhat. esrpoaed*

rtdjae vaa CIA's faix-baixodhlassir vlth Bender throughtoarker spurts caax lnCuba.

COWCTT: Art Joe vaa acceptedeader by tha Cuban exile cccTJunlty Ineefflbcr of the original axecutlvo ccmitteeha FED vhlch vas farmed onuneend vas

flfS ONLY

SECRET

extremely popular with the troop*.

rtJacoup In the camps inrallied the sen vithalked at Turing hla their lendere arrested and Isolated theseapproximately So escaped Into tbe Jungle end on to Mexico vlth the exception oftubborn corpa ofho remained In Isolation until the ljrraalon was over."

onpiet* falsehood. The troope cheered

Art loo on each of the two oocaalons Yhea he Tlalted them in the training eampa. The troope and diaaldent leaders Inside fre^aantly requested that Artine Join thee. There verealnontants and aecurlty risks vho vere detained under guard. These personnel,vere Isolated from the main body by their Cuban peers. Artlne

i

did not participate In thla decision aa It was aade before he oaae to t'rj camp to remain there.

X)By vaa noved up freeo Aprilecause Russian stLOS vera reported arriving In Cuba. In the haste, CIA reflected to coordinate the Invasion vlth the planned uprising. vol ting In Cuba to spring Into action merer got the signal.

The first sentencealsehood. atter of fact principally because of favorable alisartic conditions,pril vaa tha original date and the presence or absence of sTXOS vasonsiderntion. Ee tho second snd third sentences, all assets vere urged to activate large-scale and intensive sabotage operatlona about two vceksay. 1

mm

IA stopped prcpa^indn broadcasto from Radio Svanays before the invasion. Svan Radio finally vent back on tbe air as tbe invasion began end announced vhexc the landing vaa taking place after the flret snail party bad scarcely bit tbe bench.

CCWCTTi Thla otctcQent ia not true. Propaganda broadcaata vere not suspended. Bather, thereeorganisation of the efforts, including elimination of bcobostlc and exanrterprodnctive progress and tbe Insertion of acre professionally cocpetesrt Cuban personnel; vhich vaa directed toward the achlevacent of unity and increased lapeet of psychological prassTxreathe realization of tba(fundoauffltal objective. The Cuban Covernsamt, through President Dcn-ticce, in concent ing on thla change stated i "the iaperlaldats are intensifying their peychcloglcal warfare." rjpT vas nonltaring

the/Cuban radio and baaed on reports received fraa thla ncsaltorlng

broke the nevs of the invasion at.ay. Radio 8van

did not go on tbe air vlth the story until-ay

and only after' forcea bad snaoeetsfatUy 3and cctnerciai etations

throughout tha Hemisphere vere anr^xny the invasion.

hree ships packed vlth radio Jamming eouipnent vere welting in Rissl far the big accent. Under secret plan, eocceinicationa vera to be sabotaged ashore and those that oould not be sabotaged vere supposed to ba JsaoecL. ay they vere still tied up et tha

docks.

CQWESTTi There was scoe very United planning along thla line. Agents vere Instructed ln theo be employed in sabotagingrousve cystect vhich extends through central Cuba. also, vlth

llljtO

fSECffil

regardmi rig, there ls bo p:

TJ. S. Anry signal Corp*rt rtonmouth eld bare an canpcrlaental ce-rice vhlch at oex recnest vaa rushed Into cocple-tlooohan

teen vaa instructed in Ita uae, Eovever, ln thla planning, ve vere not able to overtake the invasion achednle and neitherlpaent nor the personnel--vhlch again ccoelstcd of one act of emolumentrev of five Cuban* aa opposed to the "three ahipe peeked vlth radio fanning ecuipaent" aa reported- tarag left XLtcL.

he LCT's vera saamed by defector* from the Cuban Bevy bat ccooandad by hired American effieers. Setae of tbe latter turned cat to ba druska. Other* vere actBally anti-Cuban and refuaed to

busk vlth the nan- esult, half tba Cuban crev deserted one ahlp

i

at Vleoueo.

CCWCfT: Bhlps nentlened vere ecasaanded by American sssrebant effleer* and xertially; astuned by effector* fron tbe Cuban Bavy. The balance of thla Itemrot* distort ion. There vaa one oileressel vho vaa relieved for excessive drinking. One captain van relieved for sub-standard performance in that capacity but vaa retained on other duty. Serration of tha officers end crev followed com en-tioml protocol. At one tine after thead cede three ua-sueceesful attesEpte to land teens ond supplies on the scntbern coast of Cuba (reception pert tea did not appear) aba returned to VIeaues-The teassev members of the crev vho vere disappointed and impatient to get into action did leave. Tbe incident had nothing vnatever to do vlth the relations betveen tbo crcva and the ahlpa1 officer*.

nocortaa Ctt'a etreeVacciirlty, no one bad bctbered to check, on the erev nenbers. One radioabas, confessed that he vu loral to Coatro. It vaa decided that tbe Barest coarse voald be to take hla along vbere ha could be vatcbed. Bat no one vas assigned to vetch Ma. later, at eea, ba vaa discovered la tha radio roan, eanding frantic neeeagaa to Havana shout the approaching iirraoion-

COWfWJ: Tha itenceailete fahrieatlon, Thara vaa no such incidentadio operator.

i

i t

i *

Cements on Drev Pearson's Colnm of1

ne skipper, C< C. Jollinn, insisted upon Tw^ng his Cuban freedom vessel tbeJ" after hla vtTc.

ccf-tCTTTi Mr. Jul linnachelor and aseuacd cocrjand of the "Barbara J" after aha vaa nosed and afloat.

hat the Americas skipper of an LCI, vhlle crunk! forced underground leaders to flee fron his ship's floodllghta end threatened, on snotber cccaslon, toabotage tone near Santiago de Cuba.

cerebri Thla Is the cccplete opposite of the truth. The skipper vas heroic throughout the operation and all hands returned safely-

or the Invasion, tho CIA asBenbled probably the most ootley, makeshift armada that has ever embarked upon eoracueet. It included three eccraercialRio Eacondido, Hasten end Atlantic

-"leased fron the Garcia lines in such haste that the crevs vere never checked for eecurtty. At least tvo membere turned out to be loyal Castroites vho tried to signal Cuba of the coming invasion."

ccrgCTT: In fact,essels owned by the Garcia lines were chartered for the operation, aa opposed toentioned by Kr. Pearson. Althoughecherv of the crevs of the various Garcia ships involved preferred not to go forvard vlth the aseanlt brigade when informed of their true mission by Kr. Garcia at Puerto Cabeus, Kicaragno, ve bave no information indicating that any meaner of any ship's crevastroite or Conaiie. To the best of our

ksovledge aad belief, tie statement that two rxnbers tried to elgnal

Caotro of tbo cooing invasion la a

TTSidare vaa also cccslderable eonfuslen over vho vaatbe invasion fleet. Zcnerdo Cere la, aa boas of the Garcia lines, considered hlnselfnenfl and none the Rio Bseondlco the flagship."

Eduardoasflber of tbo family owning the Garcia lines, did la fact go vlth the aaaanlt brigade aboard the Caribe. Garcia vas briefed on the complete? Invasion plan vlth portieular ecxhosis on the role of the invasion ships at Puerto Cabezas, Hlcnragno. Se accepted the plan cocyletely and never indicated In any vsy or manner that his role vaa anything other than as an obacrver.

/

The Tree Cuban navy, vhlch eorrtrlbuted two Ids end several landing bargea to tbe tank force, deaignatad the ICI Blagnri as the flagship. This was rfrrvinded by an Anerieea nerchast officer for vhoaa benefit tbe invasion plan vaa neatly spelled oat in English."

CCTWSTfT: The LCI's participating in the Invasion vere purchased by and wholly owned by the Agency, neither vaa ln any vsy Influenced or coaasnded by tha ao-calledCubanha LCI "Blager" vas tbe ^ifCiT^tbe flagtba nor!tine force. Both tba Blagax and tbe sisterarbara J, the altercate cccEand vessel, vere captained by contract American poreccoel, supplemented by. ecratrect case officer poreocnel.

His Job as flagship cccaianflcr vas to direct the lending bargea by radio. But in the middle of the action, he forgot tho battle pins."

EYES 8HLY

COMET: Tbe ststenent that tbo Blsgar QPnawjoflp forgot tbe tattle planalsehood.

A Cubes underwater dsaolitioa expert, SchaDrdo ZAyac Bazas, happened to hare saoDTised the plan, vaa huetled to tbe skipper'sand uirii,ited Ma on vhat orders to issue next."

CCfegHTi Zdnardo Sfeynx Bases vaa part of the assault brigade and could not here been conceivably at ths skipper's side procptlng hln on anything, ftrrther, Zayax Boron vaa part of the ooaault brigade andanber of the invading force would bare Tory United knowledge cf the Invasion plan other then that portion of th? plea that pertained to hW Teartr unit.

4 I

Thus ths Invasion started off vlth tvo flagahlpe ln eecoond, each giving cedars. In addition, several crev Beahers vould take orders fron only Jesusorner Cuban naval off leer, vho bad recruited

CCjeggTt As Indicated previously, theonly the nagar--soa la ecenaad. It Is mdarstoodeeus Blanco vaa used on one of tha ships as an Interpreter. Be vas certainly not gtrlag coanaaade.

Dnfbrtunately, the CIA had leaded all the eviction gas, tank shells and antitank nines aboard the slcv-uoving Bio Early in the fighting, one of Castro's See Fury fightersoob Into her side, end she vent dovn in flnaes vlth ell her cargo."

CtWHgfT: Aviation gas and other Inportant nunitlons vere aboard

j

lateronbat situation. It ia true aa etated In tbla allegation^"

and previously, that the Mo Zsc^mdido vas slow-wring. This vaa due ..

to en accident suffered oa tbe vay to tbe staging area, vhich meantthat bar speed bod to be.reaped.She did reach hex required rendcvoux points vlthout difficulty.

XEDCen eoanmoed bv Kino Edna vere ordered to

lverslceatry loading at an unfagrtliar epot la Casoaguey Province.-

c<TWESri roops vere to havelvernd^cnary landing pre-ZMfcy in Crleste Province but Old not accomplish the sdaslon. Oriente vas selected because of JUno's reported popularity vlthdlasldents end lntenigence reports thataucity of rdlltia inMng1 area.

Concent cm Drew Pearson'* Colnca ox Wedneitnay,

li

Point 2i

one adllion dollar* for building en elr atrip in Qoatcnela, ef whichvoucher0 voa tarned ln for labor. rreedan fighter* claljBfcanedf the labor yet ware not paid any pert ofoco.

The Pacta:

Total Coot of Ccnetroctlon of

ccess roods, fendng,

racilitie* end ntllltle*

TOTAL

Cuban trainee* did not errlTo la Centenala until the airstrip wea wrnOeted. All labor for tba alratrlp-and ralateA cccatruction vaa hired and aunerrieed. by fiaasjam-Ccanwall Co. end was largely OoatesaUna ead Aaarlcan. CiJieas vctbto cccatri.-berreeks, warahouaes, offloM and claaaroonaeporcto Bit*adlea fron the airstrip) no Cuban participated Inof the airstrip.

CIA purthaaed two ICT'aotal coat ofCohen frec-doa flghtars who fcnov ahlpa eatlnatad. that tha vessels were worthach.

Paetar

BerbaraPrice

Prico

Popaire, reactivation, Bonification,

outfitting, proviaions:

lagor Orand Total

_lhO,Eh7.e3

Point Si

acte:

Point hi

A total of five ships CRio Zscondido, Lohs Charles,Cexlbe end Houston) vara chartered by the Agency. The cbartera celledix-eccth period with provision that tho egreeaaesrt could, be extended or, teradnated by asrtual ecneent, ovnar or charterer, do charterer agreed to pay all coats curing tba tern of charter inching bareboat charter0 axcthly pins all expenses, it was eatiBatad that tbe eocpenaee wealder ship per nonth orer and aboveCO0 bareboat charter.

In the event of loss tba Agency agreed to pey tbe owner tbe depreciated valne of tba-) less bareboat charter payaecta caused to date of lose.oxine survey of tha Bio KaconrUdo revealed the reasonableness of0 figure. Tbe remainder of the fourvere largar than tha Bio but tbo owner agreed to0 for all ships.

Tha CTA leased the Santa Anaonth for tba Vino Dies group vlth the0 goarantae. Tha Santa Ana did not get into action.

Factai

The Baata Ana vaa hiredua0 for uae of tha veaael for eachays or pea-tlon thereof. In caae of loae it vas egreed to pay tba mat0 (which was bald in escrow) to tha owner of the ship. Th* vessel va* in fact hired and uaed by lino Diaz who was toiversionary IsnrTtngay in Oriente Province Vino Diss, nains tha Baata Ana, started bis session but latsr eevBlooaenta ceased bin to change his plan; his mission waa never acccsn?llabed.

ha "invasion" was supposed to triggerpontaneous uprising vlthIn Cuba.

C0mE3Tt da troth it that neither military nor propaganda plannersasa uprisingeejilreaant for successful completion of the nllitary operation. It la partinant to note that in the Propaganda Action Plan vhich vaa vritten aod carried oat in direct snypuul cf the ailitary effort, there are) strategic and tactical objectives. Sena of these objectives anticipate ora mass uprising. It vas hoped that tho fighting vould occur only betveen Castro's hard core of cafendar* and the hard core of Invaders, vlth the mass cf population remaining passive until such time as It vas obvious that the Invading force had expended Ita beachhead. There are reports that substantiate tbe belief that tbe Cuban peoplehol* did not tabs up arts against tbe Invaders. It is true that CIAairly rapid increase in tha number of anti-Castro fighters by accruals fron tba nearby local population andeserting elements of the Castro aroed fare**. However, this vas not expected to occur until the strike fores had demonstrated its staying powereries of successes and by the securinghysical area accessible to those vho wished to Join tbe freedcn fighters.

hs Cuban underground vas not notified in advance of the invasion so could not give any aid.

CCWgTTi Tber* is no concrete evidence, in spite ofssertions by Cuban exiles, that any of/tb* exile political groups

had significant, coordinated underground orgsaination*. It la true that tha various Waal exile political loaders vere not inrOreedayobvious security reasons. Thus, should suboecueat review prove these leaders did have underground groups, tbonight then be classified as partially valid. Tbe fact resnlns, hovwver, thet Agency clandestine radio coananl cations vlth underground groups throughout the Island vas the nest effective link and noet proavl sing trigger for underground action. These groups vere inforncd of the invasion and ashed to support tbe landing force ln every vay possible.

har*ailure of intelligence as to tha strength ef Castrb's forces and tha speed of their reaction.

CC^^CTT: The allegation Is not true. For each of tha several plans vhichtage of final preparation (The Trinidad Plan, The Blno das reversionary landing Plan, and the Behia de Cochino*n Intelligence annex vas suhultted snd is presently available for study. Tb* nature and: extent of Castro's military force vere veil knovn. Tbe location cf his Navy and Air units vas fixed. Sub-secuont studies, some of vhich are based on the debriefings cf survivors of the operation^ do not point out any major gaps in the intelligence programs vhich supported tho landing onh of

he eaeey vas tipped off as to the time and place of landing so that the invasion force vas anticipated and liquidated.

CCfeCTTl This allegation is untrue. Debriefings of returnees

1 mum

vho vere cm the beech indicate thet tha area vaa lightly defended and there vas no Indication that Castro vas informed prior to the laTwUne "of either its tine or place. The strike force vas successful Ina surprise assault against light opposition and gave an excellent account of Itself until the enemy controlled the air and aade their position untenable. horough review of all intelligence assets refutes this allegation.

he invasion force was penetrated by Botlstianos.

ca*gT7i On ths adlltsry plane, Cuban exiles, as veil as CIA, felt that professional, competent officers and nOT-ecsamUsioned officers vers essentialuccessful nilitary operation. TJnevoIdably, such personnel had to bs drawn fron the rank and file of the CubanAmy, an amy which, of course, existed also during the Batista era. Great pains vere taken to screen out any "obnoxious.ndividuals vho had comcltted or could be charged vith actual crimes. The minority of ex-Batista soldiers vho vere used In tbe operation vere screened, non-polltlcal elements. In the*over-ell planning, end especially ln political organization, Batista adherents vers excluded from tba operation except in those eases where acceptable officers vere utilised in the strike force (in one instance tbe Agency did establish local contact vith tbe Batista follower, Sanchez Jtoocuera; however, this contact with and support to Mcsauera vas dropped the Enuent possible political eonseeuenoee vere analyzed).

he group of Manolo Ray vhich "claimed" the greatest assets in Cuba vaa neglected ln connection with tbe planning and execution cf

mm

tbe operation.

CCWCTT: Tbe nueh-tcuted "underground" of Hanolo Say vas Dr.tr pro-red. In any evert, Waaolo Bay vas never neglected In connection vltb our planning. On several occasions subetantlal support vaa

offered to Bay; oa each occasion he failed to produce even individual

units of tbe underground vhlch has been chained ln his name ln the press. Of course Bay, and several of his followers, have participated in the revolutionary Council.

HPI 7CIA put in battalion commanders vho vere political hacks.

COT-CTTi This allegBtlon la patently false. Battalion commanders, most of vhom vorked their vay up from the ranks, vere chosen for (a) military ability, and (b) acceptability to their fallov soldiers. Bone bad significant pollticsl beck^*cuada.

7 Cuban "volunteers" vere imprisoned for someeersCIArison octapousd in Guatemala. Allegedly this vaadid not like the vsyCIA vas running the

CCgoPOT: There is no basis in fact that these Cubans vere la-prisoned because tbe Cubans did not like tbe vay CIA vas IsassfsBj the shew. Tha records sbov that the only persons detained vere those vho vere detained by their ovn Cuban leaders, as persona vho vereAVCXe, agitators, and deserters. As such,'they threatened the security snd lnpelred the efficiency of tbe strike force. Seme of these vere removed froa tbe scene to protect then from their Cuban colleagues, vho threatened violence. Allf these Cubans have now. been returned to the united States arid havo culetly gone to their booes.

sil

See*.

IA ehce* tba members of tbo CubanCouncil and It vaa largely representative of the reactionary CubanOthers claim it bad representatives of Cocnsmlsts ln It.)

COS'MS'iC: It Is not true that CIA chose tbe members of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. In fact, the Cubans representing someifferent groups, vho did elect these Council nenbers did so freely. There vas no pressure froa CIA during these elections. Indeed, the Agency node It clear to Cuban participants that It vas cxtreocly important that this election shoulduban one, free of anypressure. The political spectrtm of the Council la vide, but extremes of left and right have been excluded by tba Cubans themselves. Because of the vidth of this political speetrua aceuaatlons have been made 'that the Council contains on the one hand reactionary rightist elements, and oa the other. Communists.

ITEMIA tied to right viag Cuban elements.

CQMMETTi As indicated above, there bare been accusations that CIA, through its political contacts vlthaa tied itself to rlgbt-ving Cuban eleaests. It is true that there bas been contact vithelements, as vail as all others, but supporters of the Batista dictatorship vera excluded froa the political (it ia interesting to not* that on tb* morning of IBCsrdona vas labelledallas Morning 5evs editorialpro-Cono.ci1 st").

rrZNCIA- recruited Cubans in Miami.

CCMXt3Tj The Agency did recruit Cohans in Miami for unilateral

Cubans

"sfir*

intelligence and propaganda activities vithln Cuba, Theof Cubans for the strike force, hovever, wed carriedby tbe Cuban political

ITKauban political leaders vere iapriaoned in Mtssat by CIA Just prior to tbe landing and nlslaadlng lnf ornotlon put out in their

CWCTTTi At no tins vere Bejabers of tba Council lapriaoaed or kidnapped as bos been alleged. KIro Cardona and Tony Varonaeeting vlth CZA officials and agreed to go into isolation prior to and during tha solitary action, vlth tbe idea of proceeding to Cuban soil In order torovisional Ccverraant. Thus, Cuban leaders proceeded voluntarily to Cpalocka, rlorlda. In as auch as Cpelocka vas st that tla*overt Installation, tha Cuban leaders vara naked to restrict tbeaselvea to tbe immediate surroundings of the forcer Ccnnaadant's Quarters. It bad bean aatiolpated that this period of leolatlos voold not exceed ho boura. It torned out to have been aboutours. At no tine vaa any outside pressure used. The information put out in the name of Cubaning this period vas done so only after review end approval ofuban representative of the Council. Thla information vaa deaigned to keep the Cubans fighting end took the form of official statements or bulletins on tbe progress of tb* ailitexy operation.

TEENalse information vas put out by tbe U. 6. Coverrawnt ox to nunhers involved la the landing.

COWCTT: Ho official of CIA ever revealed prior to the invasicn

any indication of the 'else Of the strike force. Agency nropeganda nedia only mentioned rlgureB vhen they vere reprinting or rebroad-castlng other BOureeB. The figures referringbcnsand- men strike force originated in speculation In the IT.ress, eventually perpetuating the fictionuge strike force.

ITEMhe. placed its reputation in th* handsoorly trained and tfenabbly band of refugees.

CCWCTT: It is untrue that the refugee members of the strike force vere poorlv trained. They, aa veil as th* political refugees used by tha Agency in HI aai, vera tha cost representative cross

section available, excluding right and left political extrencs.

i

ITEMhen Cuban Kara! officers cconandlng the invasion transports vere given their destination after flailing from Puerto Cnbezas, Bicaragua, thereear mutiny aboard the abipa.

C^KSTT: The statement is untrue. There ware no Cuban Baval officers cTHgrandlng the invasion transports and there vas no cLiaogrec-nent or "mutiny" vhen the crevs of the various craft vere informed of their ultimate destination. It Is also untrue that the naval officers forecast disaster.

TEEMhe propaganda haranguen free. Bndlo Svan (the rebel radio) to the Cuban people vere abruptly suspended two veeks before the Invasion and knovn Cuban voices vere replaced by unknown voices.

CQHteTOi This statement ia not true. Propagandaere not suspended. Bather, theree organ! sat ion of tho efforts,

and tne insertion cf ncre professionally competent Cuban personnel, vhlch vas directed tovard the achievement of unity and increased

Impact of psychological pressures supporting the realisation of taa fundamental objective. The Cuban Government, through President Porticos, in ccezaenting on thla change stated! "the impcrisliste are intensifying their psychological verf ere."

nZKhe Air Porce vaa not destroyed aa vaa boasted after the bombing raid of

COT-PTi Bo claim vas made that tbe Cuban Air Porce had been completely destroyed. Bee fury fighters vere engaged in the beach action. Despite extensive efforts to verifyf EG. aircraft ln Cube, no verification baa ever been made of their presence.

ITEMhe entire psychological warfare phase of the operation vas uncocrdlnated free the outset, ever since Radio Swan began to broadcast

to Cuba.

CPogTTTt Tbe statement la untrue. Policy guidance andof those psychological programs vhlch vere under our control or Influence vere continuous. It Is true, bovever, that divergent Cuban political groups of various hues maintained their ova selfishly moti-

vated programs that defied coordination.

XTEKhe first trainees vho vent to the osap sites ln Guatemala"found only tangled, tropical, snake-infested underbrush and naay

of tbe caaps vere vithln viev of passing travelers.

rXKBrtlne vas CIA'6 fair-haired bey among the political refugees. Eeoup ln the camps In January.

cevf-CTT: Artlne vas acceptedeadar.by the Cuban exile community Ineember of the original executive ccedttee of the 7TO vhich vaa Tcraed on0 and vos extremely popular vlth the troops. Artlne eld notoup. The troops cheered Artlne on each of the tvo occasions vhen he visited then in the training camps. Tha troops and dissident leaders inside frecuently requested that Arthns Join them.

.1

ITEM,ay vas hsstily moved up froo.o Aprilecause Russian HZOs vere reported arriving in Cuba. In tbe haste, CIA neglected to coordinate the Invasion vith the planned uprising. Thousands waiting in Cuba to spring Into action never got the'slgnal.

CCga-EPT: ay vas not moved up for the reason stated shove.atter of fact, principally because of favorablepril vas the original date and ths presence or absence of KTCe vasonsideration. Re the sacond and third sentences, ell assets vere urged to activate large-oeale and Intensive sabotage operations about tvo weeksey..-

V /' '

ITEMeries of allegations by Drew 'Pearson particularly containing crltlclsss of tba choice and handling of the Invasion ships; their officers and crevs; failure to Chech on loyalty of crev members; misconduct of offleers, etc*

CCWZBT: Mr. Pearson coos many allegationseries of articles which vere largely based on mie-statcsezrto and distortions of tbeearson claimed.tbat one boat skipper, S. C. Jullisa, Insisted upon naming his 'Cuban Free dec Vessel tbefter hla -wife. Tbe truth ls that Mr. Jail lagachelor and assumed command of thefter aba vas named and afloat. Pearson claimed that the American shipper of an ICI, while crunk, fcreed underground leaders to flee from his ships* floodlights and threatened, on another occasion, toabotage team near Santiago da Cuba. This is the complete opposite of the truth. The skipper vas heroic throughout the operation and all hands returned safely. Pearson also claimed that CXAmotley, makeshift, armesc?'. and that at least two members of tho ships* crews turned out to be loyal Castro-

iteo who triad to signal Cuba of the cccingn fact, five

l

vessels owned by the Garcia Line vere purchased for tho operation. Ve havo no information indicating that any member of any ships crev

aatroite oro the beat of our kncvledge and belief,

i

the statement that tvo members tried to signal Castro of the ceding invasionolsehood. Brew Pearson also indicated that the flags hip cccmnnder forgot the battle plan in the middle of thetate-thatomplete falsehood. The remainder of allegations concerning the choice end handling of the "invasion ships are based on half-truths and point-by-point refutations are available for study.

fff*

1

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Maxell D. Taylor

The following document* are transmitted herewith:

,l- Release, in the Name of the Revolution, Council During the Period7

otthe Development and

the Revolutionary Council,av inftl

J. C. KING

riginal).

PLEASE SIGN AND RETURN ONE COPY ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF ITEMS ONE AND TWO ABOVE:

IV f

Press Releases is toe Hose of the Revolutionary Council Curiae the Periodhrough1

the periodhroughixvere released in Rev York free the office of Mr.public relations, advisor to the Revolutionaryvas during this time that the members of thevere In isolation In Opalocka, Pier Ida. Thein tbo form of bulletins, and vere released in the nameRevolutionary Council.

information contained in tbo six bulletins vac

prepared by CIA, at least in basic form, and fcrvoxded to Mr.

.1

Jones. Beforeach of tbe six reports vas reviewed end approved by Dr. Antonio Sillo, tha Cuban representative of the Council in Rev York. Dr. Bilio had been named to this post by the Council, not by CIA.

information in the bulletins vas designed tomorale of the members of the strike force on Cuban soil;impetus to the peychologieal campaign being ccrried out

to Influence Cubans vithln Cuba, snd to present the. participation in tbe invasionvorld opinion. The bulletins vere based on tbo information available on the progress of the strike force.

U. Mr. Jones hod been hired by the Revolutionary Democratic Front as public relations advisor several months previously. Heuban choice,IA recruit. Agency contact vlth Jones began only after he approached CIA to request guidance on whether

fa. tow Blta

CoyBaUf

CIA.

' SUBJECT: Chranolocy of tho rkrvelcpmcnt and Emergence of the Revolutionary Council

1. Ac Castro's true position became progressively more apparent ln the first halfuch consideration vas given by the State Dcpcrtxjent hare and "the Country Team" in Havana to the possible posture of U.olicy tovurd Cubo. The General conclusion reached ln the latter port9 van that any group or coalition of groups vhich could hope to supplant tho Castro rcgine could sain popular acceptance only on the basis of continuing the revolution vith more practical rwnagcaent and less nationalist, soclallat and Marxist contact; tbe United States would have to disassociate itself from Batista elements vhich vould rush to undo the revolution. Xlement3 vithln theof State catalogued actual or potential opposition to Castro asfollows:

a. The Autentlcos (Antonio de. The Kanticristi (Junto Carrillo).

A (Sanchez Arongo).

Labor and uly Members.

f. Xx-Batlete elements.

hila the foregoing analysis of the situation vna inavana Station, whichetter of routine SO? bed been insntl-Costro elements sinceup its contacts, evalua-

tion and assessment of individuals sad/or groups, vith tha erceptlon of former Batista followers, falling into the above categories.

3* As the project approached its stage of. approval oo the highest governmental level, the possible compositionjunta" vas discussed on tha appropriate Assistant Secretary of State level. After the project vns approved onhe DeuaruBcnt vas kept fully Informed of each step leading to the eventual formation of the FRD on0 and its advice en personalities end substance was sought regularly: There ves no objection to the original Varona, Carrillo, Rosco, Artime (and later Sanchez Arongo) conotellatloa. Coordination vith the Department continued, throughout the entire project: In0 the Deportment's advice was sought on the inclusion of additional personalities into the TRD Executive Committee, such ns Mcnuel Ray; inI the problems inherent inProvisional Government" vere dlocussed both ia terms of personalities and substance;31 approval vas received for the eotabUobmentevolutionary Council vith the understanding that there ehculd be. interference end that the Cubans vere to ncnlnate anyone they ocv fit as

Council President; oloo, tne Proflldent vas to be free to select hi* own Council oaAcrc. 2ic current Council ccoposition in tbe re colt of tbio understanding. CBlccrupbleo of FED end Council srnabera vere previously transmitted to Oenaral Taylor.)

k, PHD political platforg end tbe SotoIcV.ornery Council'sere tbe result of and resoensive to gcidsnoo rooelved Iron the Dcportaent of State: In tbe early stages of tbo projoct pamarcl TTO utterances fell Into tbe broad categorythe revolution." Inter the FED end Councilcento became more specific on the basis of guidance received. By end largo, the tenor end pceture of the Council end FED is liocrel snd fairly progressive; ita legal framework IsO Cuban Ccostitutlon; land leforp is port of Ito program aa ia the possible nationalisation of cor tela industries. Rone of tbe Council mnafeexs cVwlres to turn tbe clod beck) there are naturally dif-fcrenoeethe Cubans as to detail and pace for future ectlons.

1

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Maxwell D. Taylor

The following document le transmitted herewith: I. Brief Hlatory of Radio Swanriginal).

J.ING

PLEASE SIGN AND RETURN ONE COPY ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF THE ITEM LISTED ABOVE:

1* Onresident Elsenhowerovert action program to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime. Within the propoganda framework of that program, an Importantvas to create andigh-powered medium and short wove radio station. CIA was salced to providetation, outside the continental limits of the United States, and have it ready for operation within) days.

Swan Island, in the Caribbean, was chosen ss en appropriate site. The United States Navy furnished CIA with splendid support: within sixty days, equipment had been brought fromwas cleared on tbe island, and the station was able to go on the air onay of the same year, precisely on schedule.

Originally it wae planned that Radio Swan would be astationclassified misBlle and space project" as cover). Just prior to inauguration, however, it was decided tbe

station shouldommercial one. This was at tbe request of tbe

I

Ravy, which reasonably argued that ahould their participation in constructionlack facility be known, explanations would be difficult.

h. commercial" station for the tactical end strategic tasks envisaged for Radio Swan is not, of course, tbe most desirable way toovert operation. Tho only practical method of operation ls to "sell space". Thus, program time on Radio Swan was sold to various Cuban croups. These included organisations of workers, students, women, two publications in exile, two radio

la exile, ond several political groups. There vere eleo programs created and controlled by CIA. -Programs (on tape) vere produced ln Sev York, Klanl, and later, on Svan Zaland.

Svan effectively reached act only Ita targetCuba, but tbe entire Caribbean as veil. Goon afterCaetro started jamming, but vas successful inonly in the City of Eavnna. Scorea of lettcra vere re-

9

calved froa all porta of Cuba to show that tha station had listeners. As late asurvey vas nade to deteralne the extent of listening coverage. An inexpensive ballpoint pen vas offered to those listeners vho would vrlte In to the station. Tbe reply vaa immediate: ettersountries. This barrage of'sail Included significant amounts frca all parts of Cuba.

Radio Svan progressed, it becaae the symbol of theeffort vithln Cuba and of opposition to Castro throughout Toward the endhe effectiveness of Radioto diminish. Although great numbers of Cubans stillthe station, its credibility and reputation began to sufferresult of statements representing tbe selfish Interests ofgroups producing the various programs. In the firstgroupo talked overmuch about their activities ln Miami andfight they were conducting along Blscayae Boulevard. Cubans vho were suffering under tbe Castro dictatorshipresented this. Secondly, tbe Cuban programs became athe individual political ambitions of Cuban exiles iapresented to the other Cubans In Miami, forgetting thetarget audience within Cuba. Finally, each program fought

vlth the other for "scoops". Aa time passed and the Cubana found that their. sources of Information vere no better than the next fellow's, the program producers began to exaggerate in order to give theirouch of sensationalism. They made state-meate vhich vere obvious lies to the listeners. An example: One of tbe announcers ntoted that thereussiansark in Santiago da Cubathe residents had only to walk to the perk to see that ibis vas untrue. Moreovor, the various programs began to defy coordination. All programs but one told the Cubanthat he vouldero on tho day that he defected from Castro. The oole exception told the Cuban militiaman that he vould be hanged regardleee of vhot he did. rolonged effort vas made by CIA to exert tighter control over the programs. The officers of Radio Svan

eeting of all program producers and gaveist of

j

ropaganda points upon vhich they vere all to coordinate before use in broadcasts. This action failed to achieve proper control.

7. As this unfortunate oituntion developed, the military

1

operation vac about to bo launched. It vbb obvious that CIA could not allov uncoordinated programming to continue vhile the station attempted to provide tactical support x> military forces. Onb ofI each program produceretter froo theof Radio Svan informing him of the termination of bis program. Broadcasting vas apt suspended. Rather, it van lrmcrt lately replacedew, overall programming schedule--more broadcasting hours than before--vhich vaa implacably under CIA control. Also, CIA iamediately began hourly novo programsonventional nature on Radio Svan. Thus Radio Svan vas converted- into a- station vhich

provided the Cuban peoplo vlth straight neve as veilrogram vhichts mly function vas to assist those vho vere fighting Castro vithin Cuba. This vas the beginning of an intensifiedcampaign directed against Castro, ew days after the change, Radiouban government station, sold to Its listeners, "the hysterical parrots of Radio Swan have recently raised their voices scandalously.1' On tbe day following these declarations by Radio Msnbi, President Osvaldo Ecrticoa declaredpeech over another radio station, "Cubans must be alert for lies and attempts to destroy the revolution through psychological warfare."uban newspaper, at the same tine, repeated Dortieos' statement: "our enemies are

intensifying psychological warfare to find weak points in cur domes-

tic front."

8. During the military action in Cuba, Radio Svan vas used in tactical support of tbe strike force, as welleons of cccsmnl-catloo to independent agents vithin the country. Radio Swan was monitored by hemisphere radio stations and by world news services, and vas an important factor in presenting the desired picture of tbe fighting In Cuba to world opinion. Despite soa* press allegations. Radio Swan was not responsible for th* wild rumors during those hectic days. It did, of course, engage in the varied activitieslandestine radio station is colled upon to handle on such an occasion. Ono of these activities vas to implement,ew hours notice andtand-by transmitter, the "Voice of tbehe clandestine broadcast vhich bolstered ^he propaganda theme that at least some of the eurvivors of tho strike force successfully reached the safe haven of tbe Escambruy mountains.

as there eny doubt about tba necessity of *aao sucb solitary action against Castro:

C. Vhat vcd tba estimto of tbo probability of success of ZAPAIAay'

bat una tba foaling of llrrl'hfrVopular uprising foliovinc tbo landing? Bow essential vas sucb en uprising regarded for tbe succccc of tbo opcretionT 5oveaction vaa expected by Castro?

V. Shot vaa expected to happen If tba la-rUng force effected aloegsant but tbsro vas no uprising?

het vas tbe man standInc of the position of tbe JC3 as to ZAPATA? Was it appreciated tbat they favored TJCDTXTjAD over ZAPATA? Vhat did the Pre oldest erpaet frca tbe Chiefs?

-cc it understood that control of the air vas cccslaercd eaaential to the succeoa of tha landing7

Vtast were tho circaastaaccn surrounding tbe cancellation ofay oir strikest Bear serious vas tha decision vlevcdT Vbat vas the understanding about pre-lending etrikos?

fi. Vhct vaa tbe uadcrstaadiae; as to the ability of tbs iiWMng force to poosuerrilla status in aa emergency?ahet extent did this factor influence approval of the operation?

ast vas the uaderatcndiag ofltlon situation by the ead of

hat degree of oon-attrfbvtloa vas sought aad vhy? More thedieadvrstages arialnc free: sose of tho restriction* ixposod by tbe efforts to ochievc nca-attributica clearly presented aad understood?

what extent did the CIA cpeMtiona representatives havothe operation to tho other agencies of goromaintl Van any

consideration glTen to transferring the operation to Eereaae?

ow couldtnl planning andbe better effectedinllsr

tbs principal leasona learned?

1 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

echanism for Cold War Strategy

1. Thi* appear, toost constructive way out of the continually increasing maze ol individual task forces, etc. As youndave foreseen, the proliferation of such groups following on the heel, of the elimination of moat of the established infra-structure has led to considerable confusion.

A few assorted comments:

U) Personnel

Certainly the key to successful operation of

this plan ia the selection not only of the Chairman,

but of the Director, of the permanent Working Group.

Unless two really top-notch people are obtained.

the operation will backfire. Very important also

be the "lection of personnel for the

(2) Functions ofrr.br

The members of the Committee itself would

of course have to restrict their development of

Cold War plans and programs to the "broad

outline- specified in the proposal. This is an

obvious point, but one that could be easily overlooked

thereby leading lo moreurden than men of

these departmental responsibilities could

(3) Security

netJTIhink the ch*rt is grossly undcrgraded, at Official Use. If the existence of thi. Committee, and particularly the functions of its Chairman, quickly become common knowledge, its usefulness will be greatly impaired. Some sort of cover should be

duthC Ch*lrman"*ff. (Remember the OCB's quite properly negative reaction to the name of the Defense "Cold Waromplete secrecy i. no doubt too much to expect but we ought to strive for it.

DC

b. The proposal to keep "useful. . . ata. or all sensitive spots" at the Indications Center is potentially dangerous. It seems better to keep finished intelligence on these spots, but to bring in really sensitive data onlyountry is designated for the full treatment.

(4) Working Croup

Should Treasury be included on the same basis as State, Defense and CIA, as proposed? The experience in the OCB after Treasuryachieved full status at all levels was frustrating. Evenossible change in Treasury's philosophy, it seems to me unwise to have it represented in this manner. It would seem preferable to call in Treasury and/or Budget representatives to assess new plans from the point of view of extraordinary funding that might be required, after at least the broad outlines of the plan are developed.

THOMAS A. FARROTT

s

Subject: Meeting nthent on1

Present: President Kennedy Genernl Taylor Attorney Cenernlr. Alien Dalles

r

Cube, Study Group net ot lirnrhron vlth tbe President to give orally an interln report on thsir conclusions to date. In the course of tba conversation tbe folloving points vere developed.

There vas no formal govanmicntal reviev aTter0 of tbs nocesoltyaramilitary operation to replace the Castro goveripcnt.

Although the Preoldent had nany doubts vith regard to such an operation,

the pressure for en afflroative decision arising front the need to use the Cuban Brigade Quickly or disband Ittrong factor in DssMlng an affirmative decision. In the Prealfient's mdnd there vss reasonable hopeopular uprisinguccessful landing as veil es the possIblllt7 of settingree Cuban government in the beachhead after It bad been firmly secured-

The President vas always reassured by tbe assumption that tbe Cuban Brigade in sn emergency could passttnra llle status. Therereekdovn in conroilcatloaa sose place betveen the training base in Cuatemala and tbe eenior officials in Vashington vhich occasioned the nisunderstandlng of the feasibility of exercicing tbe guerrilla option.

It vaa clear to tbe President that. tbe IRIfiTDAD Plan bed alutary edvnatagB" ewer ZAPAZA. Bovtiar, tbe chelae of tbe letter overcame aaay of tbe political objection* raised against win nun

Vltb regard to tb*ofay strikes, tba President Is inclined to thinkpecial BSC Meeting should have been called to deal vltb this Sanca-teat Eovever, the CIA officials In charge of the operation did not speak to bin directly vlth regard to tbe critical nature of the^

The President vaa evare of the aeriooa shortage af caeaniitloa in the beachhead at tha and. Bovevar, be vas never approached for mthority to extend the Bevy air cover ovar the anannitlon convoy in Its aoreraent to Blue Beach. .

In connectioa vith perecraph ll* of theaper "Study of the Anti-Castro Invasion EAP ATA" datedi, the Chart end paper entitledechanise for the Planning and Coordination .of Cold War Strategy" vera discussed. Tha President encouraged the Croup to develop thla ni"fc**r^ 1 conmyt in greater detail for laafcuasflop in their final report. The latter is to ba oral, supportedritten Bajxrandna. It vas agreed that thla final report end the supporting accnrunihat vould not go beyond the President, but tba possibility vas left open of sec* oealtiBed coetnent to set right the poet adcetatcocats of tbe preaa.

There vns soae discussion of tbe desirability of changing tbe" sanel of CIA la order to reduce its visibility. Mr. Duileo undertook to study the natter and see if he couldccosacndntlon.

M

SEG^T

behind the invading troops and "purge" the captured cities and tothat the operation vas planned by SANJEMIS andn one of the members vas CALVINOSwar criminal" whoa the invasion.

he

ac' said tCat hia operations were not supportiWby the Centra] 'ntelligence Agency, and talked at some length aboutefforts to obtain air drops for bis partisans in the Sierra EscambnJMoins during According to the Subject, not one kWdrop vhich hes delivered. Ho vas critical of the lack of^Hport, and said that, while ho was still in Kabana hr act with an officiJKf the United States Embassy, byepresentative of the CentraljBKili pence Arcr.cv and that he was proceed full snd unconditional logisjflE support. hen he arrived in Miami, Florida, he found that thjplspcrt was neither'r unconditional. He said that support wasjDEitior.ed upon hla acceptance of theand he tolde where air drr-c

artisans, aeain in the Sierra EscasdirayjKntaiiis, were to carry the nark c. thsondition which he found inJBrable.

ther, complaints by the Subject ccjWned the lack cf financialnd he said that the only method jMrhich he could support his organization was by obtaining money insid/Kba, selling the Cuban pesos on the black market, and sending tho UrJjSr States dollars to Miami.ted his grievance against Radio SwanflBTaying his organization woo not represented in the programing, and odfHg that later Radio Swan fell into complete disrepute through its use cgtSes and contradictions.

the large number ofutile efforts to rid the camps of ified Jose "Pepe" PEREZ San Ramon,EREZ Sanrigadedmitted that thev vere not charged t, "They liked One point he eraal organisation could use ex-memberst the same tine they were not suitable if

period which remainod the Subject spoke of what can' Ee favored the support of individual organizations, own action work inside Cuba. He said that in the

;hat it was his representatives, members of the for successful sabotage in Cuba, and said that i, the Habana department store, and the Habana

r

SECRET

t.OJ. (LaXca?

j. c. kikg/*^

Chief

jiFern Hemisphere Division

SBbkT

Original document.

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