A NEW PROGRAM FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM : THE STATEMENT OF THE MOSCOW CONFERE

Created: 2/17/1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Senior Research Staff on International Communism

A NEW PROGRAM FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM:

The Statement of the Moscow Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parlies

CIA/SRS-15

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Senior Research Staff on International Communism

A NEW PROGRAM FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM: The Statement of the Moscow Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties

ClA/SRS-15

This paper is based on information available to SRS as of1

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FOREWORD

This study was completed before thef the highly controversial proceedings of the Mom/cow Conference of Communist and Workers Parties. Whatever the inspiration of the "leakage" of this information, it has had two beneficialt hasartial downgrading of classification on the intelligence discussion of the meeting, and (Z) has sharply focussed the issues of Free World and US attitude and policy toward the Sino-Soviet alliance and International Communism.

This paper, although buttressedomprehensive study of available information, is deliberately speculative in approach. It attempts to look at the Moscowrimarily "through communisthis effort has led to certain conclusions which are not optimistic in nature. Specifically, we question, more strongly than ever, the widely held belief that there exists an antagonistic "rift" or "split" within the Communist movement which can readily be deepened through divisive activity on our part. This isdefeatist" attitude so muchounsel of prudence and deliberation. Our message is simple: let all personsin any way for the security of the Free World and the United States, study and re-study the Statement itself, carefully, clinically and without inclination to either hopes or fears.

The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the Senior Research Staff on International Communism. Theybeen coordinated with other elements of the Central Intelligence Agency or of the Government. They are not to be interpreted as the official views of the Director of Central Intelligence.

A NEW PROGRAM FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM: The Statement of the Moico* Conference of Reprcsentativrg ofr.d rkcra PartiesC)

, PART

Thia paper attempts to present in speculative discourse an interpretation of the developments in the Sino-Sovietleading up to the issuance of the Statement'.of the Moscow Conference of Workers and Communist Parties, and to project the global impact of that It takes its start in the general body of earlieranalysis, and further seeks, by utilising newly available material, and byupplemental "viewoerspective in which the forestover tho trees.

The paper is divided into two sections, the first dealing with the antecedents of the Statement, the second with itsfor the future of International Communism as a

The general contention of this paper, that communist unity has been strengthened rather than weakened, may be reducedew propositions:

Prior to 'The Moscow Statement" the Sino-Soviet relation had been marked by mounting controversy, coinciding roughly with the period of ascendancy of Khrushchev,. since;

This controversy has been serious, but not, in the outcome, dangerously divisive; it has centered in what the communists call "differences" and in some cases The effort of the parties at the Moscow Conference was to resolve these, if possible, by "fraternal criticism and

self-criticism*nd in any case to prevent them from"antagonistic."

The great bulk of the points of controversy have not beenundamental ideological or strategic nature; they have not involved the ultimate goals of the movement. Rather they have been matters of emphasis or interpretation, of methods and tactics, and in the last analysis, frequently of towering personality conflict.

The Statement which emergedeal turning point in the history of the movementeneralhe first since early Cominternithin which individual parties, greater and less, can develop theirprograms, suited to their specific opportunities and

esult of the confrontation of the two senior parties sparring in "contradiction" in the presence of someesser parties, the movement hasew phase of organization and discipline, in which there is noingle "leader" orthat appears to be emerging as an expansion of the 'Stforld socialist system" (theembers of the Sino-Soviet bloc)odruzhestvo (commonwealth or community) of socialist nations, as yet without organizational form, but pregnant with such.

Although some of the earlier differences andwill persist and new ones will arise, the entire- from the Communistasuccessful

demonstration of Mao's cardinal operating principle; unity* criticism-unity. As such it will, in our judgment, usher the movementeriod of greater confidence, flexibility and power, and will heighten the threat posed to the Free World.

One may question at the outset whether any of theincluding the CPSU itself, expected that the general proceedings could be kept entirely secret from the West. Witharge number of delegates from virtually every country of the world, it was inevitable that security would sooner or later be broken. In this sense the situation may be somewhat comparable to the leakage of the secret report of Khrushchev toh Party Congress,he notorious de-Stalinization speech. The delivery of that speech waswith considerable security) but, in the process of propagandizing it throughout the party ranks of the USSR and the key satellites, it must have been anticipated that sooner or later the West would get hold of it. This indirect form of leakage may perhaps be describedeliberate takingof the realities of Communist security limitations to enhance the dramatic impact of an epoch-making event.

The first and most striking conclusion which thematerial suggests is that the November meeting, and the preparatory commission's deliberations in October, were in

fact the culminationharp and even bitter Sino-Soviet controversy. In thig icnse the new material confirms the validity of much of the Western analysis of the preceding months. This analysis which had been based largely on semi-esoteric "indications" provided by published Communisthad succeeded inumber of themes which were being antithetically treated by the two senior partners of the movement. With very few exceptions these antitheses were conspicuous in the October and November meetings. The new material thereforeurther proof of the value oft the same time, however, as we shall attempt to demonstrate in the second section of this paper, the limitations of this type of analysis have also become more apparent. For, beneath the surfaceof the controversy, lie certain deeper issues involving the unity and future dynamics of the world movement* which have now emerged, we believe,ight quite different from that projected upon them by much of the earlier commentary.

It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss in detail Lhe information which we now have on the speeches andof the two meetings. These deserve continued and profound research. We propose here to drawewconclusions which will serve in laying the foundation for the principal thesis presented in the second part of this paper.

By naw.it has become clear that the controversy between the CPSU and the CPC was generally coeval with the rule of. it emerged during the "crisis"e-Stalinization, Poland andnd the "stabilization" process of| The fact that the CPC leaders, Mao Tse-tung, had personally come to the rescue of the

CI'SU, especially between6 and the springow stands forth clearlyajor source of ill-feeling. Mao's two famous statements, "More on the Historicalof the Proletariat" and "On the Correct Handling oftruck some Western observers at the time as containing the seeds of potential animosity. The rather Olympian and apodlctic tone of these articles must have struck the CPSU leaders as, to say the least, highly condescending: "This is how it's done, boys I" They were probably all the more galling, because in fact they did contribute effectively to bailing out Khrushchev.

At the same time the very success of thesemay also have contributed to the rapid inflation of Mao's already far from insubstantial ego and to the crescendoof his "cult of personality" which reached its climax withh Anniversary of the Chinese revolution, Peking, The subsequent heavy stress in Communist China on study of the "'t'hought of Mao Tae-tung" led to one of the sharpest notes of criticism in the October and0 meetings. The Chinese were accused by.the Sovietand to some extent by other party leaders, of attempting to "Sinicize" Marxism-Leninism. This in turn was associated with "dogmatic-sectarian" deviation and with a'Hivorce" from reality, the masses, andharge which waa bitterly resented by the Chinese delegates and of course by Mao him-

.Clm "The Tenth Anniversary Celebration of the People's Republic of China"

^One of the more interesting revelations of the new material is the fact that Mao, at the Moscow conference ofdmittedertain degree of illness which his doctors had diagnosed as "brain anemia. " Whatever this malady may have been, there is no definite evidence to bear out theof some Western analysts that it isaranoidtill less that it has ted the CPC to put Mao in effect into cotton. withdrawing real power

The Chinese in both the preparatory and the fullof course denied categorically the adverse imputations of Sinicization. They claimed that they have stood firmly on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and that the genius of Mao lay in his adaptation of these universal precepts to the specific conditions of China. They professed that the lessons of their experience could be of value to other partieslaim which the CPSU could hardly "deny

they did not attempt to put theirs ahead of the richer and more varied experience of the senior party.

This matter of personal sensitivity of the two topbreaks out repeatedly in the reports of the proceedings. Mao, of course, appears only vicariously through his dogged mouthpiece, Teng Hsiao-ping. But the resentful and at times even petulant voice of tibe latter must have echoed the somber jealousies of his chief, "sulking in his tent" back in China. Khrushchev on the other hand was "in thereear "shoe-pounding" vigor. He made at least three important speeches, eneral tone of conciliation andwith ill-cdhcealed undertones of vexation and pique and occasional righteous indignation. During the preparatory meeting, from which Khrushchev waseing at the UN

phalanx of senior CPSU leaders headed by Comrade Suslov appeared to bn trying to intimidate, if not overpower. Comrade Teng. One is left with the impression that thisituation to which the Soviet leaders were unaccustomed, the persistent refusalayward but embattled comrade to be browbeaten,r simply out-talked by the voice of established

from him while exaggerating his role as father-demigod of the revolution. It may turn out that this interpretation is indeed partly correct, but so far there is abundant testimony that Mao not only is active but is fully in command of the Chinese party.

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A striking feature of the continuing controversy was the inflammatory effect of an exchange of disputatious letters between the two parties obviously addressed not so much to each other as to an attendant claque of Lesser parties. This series of provocation and counterprovocation can now bewith considerable precision, and it conforms rather closely to the theses derived from open material by earlier Western analysis. page letter circulated by the CPSU at Bucharest, the Septemberetter of the CPC, and theounter-rebuttal letter of the CPSUto the delegates at the Moscow conference are the high points in this thicket of mutual recrimination.

For the purpose of the present analysis, it is the last of these three documents which presents the most serious problem. The deliberations of the preparatory commission, though sharp and even acrimonious, had in fact endedeneral acceptance by the CPC of the draft submitted by the CPSU, subject to reservations which would be aired before the full conference. It would have seemed, therefore, that the Chinese had displayed sufficient conciliatory spirit and willingness to make concessions so that the CPSU might have been satisfied to let the conference take its normal course. Instead, however, it circulated theetter to the delegates at the beginning of the conference, therebya new flareup of all the angry themes which had been damped in October.

The question arises, why was this renewal ofprecipitated by the CPSU? Possibly Khrushchev felt that so many of the basic issues remained unresolved despiteaccommodation by the Chinese that it was better to bring them out in the open before the plenary session of the He may also have believed that the radical, bellicose and impetuous nature of the CPC and the CPR had to bebefore all the brethren in order to show the gravity

of the contradiction with the CP5U. Be that as it may, the act of circulating this letter certainly contributed to the prolonged forensics of the Novemberact which the Chinese peevishly pointed out-One of the most striking conclusions which emerges from the speeches of the November meeting is that the points at issue, whatever they may have been at earlier stages, were notundamental ideological, or strategic nature, so far as the move ment was concerned. The broad themes of the Statement, with the character and nature of the epoch, the aggressive nature of imperialism, the "non-inevitability" of war, and the dual possibility of violent and non-violent transition tohad virtually been reduced to accepted formulas. The points at Issue between the Chinese and the Soviet parties had come, therefore, to be primarily matters of emphasis, and as such they should have been susceptible of either immediate or longer term resolution. In other words, the potentially "antagonistic contradictions" had largely been removed and what remained were either limited "non-antagonistic"ortill lower level, differences* 1

The Soviet and Chinese theories on contradictions are both derived of course from Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism but their practical development has followed somewhatcourses. It is rather noteworthy that ih the texts which we have of the conference speeches, the emphasis throughout is on differences rather than contradictions. Khrushchev,

The Russian distinction between protivorechie (contradiction) andr razlichie (difference) is paralleled in Chinese by the terms mao tun and ch'a pieh. Chou En-lai, in his intei view with Edgar Snow (Look Magazine,aid that the latter term should be translated ast would be more accurate to define ch'a pieh as difference: in degree or in this case in approach; not in kind or in this case in the fundamentals; comparison rather than contrast; certainly contradiction is not suggested.

however, in his final speech admits that contradictions will persist even among Socialist states, apparently an important, and from the Chinese point of view overdue, acceptance of one of Mao's cardinalhe universality of contradictions even under socialism. *

If, then, the fundamental issues had been generally- or at leastonhat were the contradictions or differences that persisted during the discussions, and were deplored as threatening unity? On the surface they had to do almost entirely with matters of discipline in the movement and the conduct of relations among the parties. Specifically the Chinese were opposed to passages in the draftactionalism, (Z) national communism,he universal significance for the movement ofht Congresses of the CPSU. In the discussion of these points the Chinese delegates several times resortederm which Mao had used admonishingly ingreatpecifically Russian, which implied exclusive orpredominance of the CPSU in the movement.

Outwardly the tension of charge and counter-charge was somewhat relievedurious "Gaston-Alphonse" act between the CPSU and the CPC over the titular aspect of the former's position,. whether it was the "leader of the camp" or the "center of the movement" or both.

The byplay of this delicate piece of communist semantics and etiquette had been noticeable for some time. As far back

Ve areloser analysis of this aspect of the cur rent dialectic; we believe that the topic isatter of communist jargon or logic-chopping but as of fundamental importance for understanding therelationship.

1

This in turn may have been influenced by the promulgation of the so-called Herter doctrine, holding the USSR responsible in part for the foreign activities of the lesser Communist states. Part of the difficulty in the Herter doctrine lies in its failure to distinguish between the Party and the State aspects of Soviet influence and control. At any rate, the doctrine appears to have been short-lived, though it may have accomplished something -not necessarily to oury focussing the issue of Soviet hegemony within the movement.

2See below,

3The Chinese representative also reacted against the father-son analogy but on different grounds.

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ash Anniversary celebration in Pekinghe Chinese had dropped the ritualistic reference to the CPSU as the "center of the movement" while retaining itsof the socialisthis significant emendation may have contributed to Khrushchev's decision att Party Congresso deny the general responsibility of the CPSU for, and to proclaim the absolute equality and independence of, the separate member parties. In all of his three speeches Khrushchev spiritedly (and on occasion in unprintable language) refused the proffered leadership. Any pre-eminence which the CPSU might enjoy, heaffirmed, should be attributed solely to its rich experience and its good work ln inspiring, aiding and defending the "world socialist system" and the other components of the movement. The Chinese on the other hand persisted in according adeferential role of both leadership to the USSR and cen-trality to the CPSU. In part this may reflect the old Chinese tradition of veneration for the elder members of the family, applied here to the "big socialist family" or aodruzhestvo. If so, however, Khrushchev would have none of it. Inlanguage, he blasted such profession of father-sonas misleading if not deceitful,evice to put the blame on the CPSU whenever things went wrong. *

The long-range significance of this dialogue onand centrality will be discussed in the second section of this paper. It is sufficient to note here that it was aaspect of the "comradely" exchanges of the meeting.

Closely related, and recurrent in the Chinese speeches, is the charge that the CPSU had sought to "stifle criticism" and had avoided the fraternal consultation which Leninfor Marxist parties. The exchanges on this subject frequently degeneratedwho struckype of bickering which must have offended the sense of dignity of many of the observers and participants among the other And yet, takenhole, one may judge that theexercise was in theiremonstration ofcriticism. " That it grated harshly on communist ears,ortiori it does onoea-nOt invalidate its authenticity. One can even imagine that behind the scenes many of themust have rubbed their hands after particularly juicy bouts, gloating over the liveliest demonstration of communist forensics since the golden days of the Comintern. The fact that the Albanian leader, Enver Hoxha, waa particularlyeven childish at times, greatly annoyed the Soviet Leaders and perhaps even the Chinese themselves who must have been dismayed torotege'behave so obstreperously. But by its very reductio ad absurdum the Albanian tirade may have reinforced the Chinese contention that hard hitting criticism is vital to the movement.

These are some of the impressions which emerge from the reports on the course of the debate down toovember. Here, however, we move abruptly from the known to the Having, in effect, agreed to agree on fundamentals and to disagree on secondary although burning differences, the Chinese and the Russian parties adjourned into secret huddle, apparently of several days duration. There is some evidence that the other parties had urged them to do this in the hope of restoring basic unity, and that the combinedof the Conference of Communist and Workers' parties

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had to be taken into consideration. Whether in fact the two big brothers had to have their arms severely twisted before retiring intothe" may be doubted. In fact,uspicious mind mightather deliberately manipulative course of mounting acrimony, intended, incidentally if not primarily, to dramatize the denouement of unity.

What really happened during this inner conclave, we may never know. Possibly there were importantuch as resumption of normal technological or economic assistance by the USSR, or agreement by the Chinese to "lay off" whilegave USossibly there was an exchange of cables between Liuitherto silent while Comrade Teng carried the brunt of thend Mao Tse-tung. Mao may have concluded that he had made his points, that comradely criticism had gone far enough, and that now was the time to revert to the classic quietus of unity. Be this as it may, the spectacle of Liu Shao-chi blandly and benignly reappearing before the conference, and assuring the hundreds of delegates that China was satisfied with the Statement in toto and that unity was stronger than ever, must haveeal deus ex machina impact.

Looking back, however, peculative analysis, which does seem to account for many of the known facts, we are left stillaunting question: What was it all about? Was "this criticism really necessary?

If we assume that it takes two touarrel, both the Chinese and the Russians must for some time haveserious misgivings about each other's general conduct.

Quite possibly the real roots of these apprehensions were not revealed at all in the open disputation. One may conjecture that what bothered the Chinese was the broad drift of the CPSU under Khrushchev away from the true dynamics of revolution. The charge that Khrushchev's visit to the

United States and his praise of Eisenhoweran of peace had "prettified" and "embellished" imperialism may come close to revealing the depths of their passionately expressedote of human anger strikes through the cold discourse of Teng Hsiao-ping on thisort of "how could you, of all people, do anything like this? "

On the other hand* Khrushchev probablyincere and profound conviction that the Chinese were alarm* ingly "dizzy withs revolutionists. Whether he had regarded such episodes as6 attack on Que moy as ad-venturistic or had been sincerely outraged by the Indian bordei fracas, we do not know. But there is enough evidence in the tenor of his speeches to suggest that Khrushchev genuinelythat the Chinese were prone to act with dangerous ery significant passagepeech which he deliverederemonial dinner for the members of the preparatory commission after their workhrushchev spoke earnestly of hisstudy of Marx, Engels, Bebel andoto Lenin orhich had convinced him that the doctrine of Communism is essentially moral. As such, it cannot envisage war, with its destruction and inhumanity, ac an acceptable means of bringing about the triumph of If we assume that Khrushchev was speaking from one of the deeper levels of Communistnd as Dedijer has pointed out, there are several levels, sometimes,

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in grotse may well have been giving voiceurning conviction that the Chinese were wanton, il not potentially criminal, in their attitude toward nuclear war. Thia emotional position,emnant of his childhood religion, would not, however, dominate his overall strategy nor soften his Communist consciousness if any opportunity should arise tot imperialism without running tooisk.

Thisery difficult matter to analyze and hadbest be held In abeyance pending further evidence. One of the important insights provided by the new materialthe famous remark attributed to Mao that in the event of totalillion Chinese would survive andew and more beautiful socialist society would emerge. Thetext of what he said at Moscow in7 places this themeifferent and somewhat Less Armageddon type of light. What Mao actually appears to have said was that world atomic war would be indeed horrible but that communists had to face the fact that the imperialists might nevertheless launch it. If they should, and even if half the population of the world were killed, wellillion would. notillionnd eventually they wouldew socialist system, free from imperialism, better and more beautiful than before. This is hardly the fire-eating concept frequently attributed to him. In point of fact it closelythe orthodox view of the USSR* prior to its achievement of full nuclear capability.

In sum, we are not inclined to believe that the Chinese really think that the Russians have "gone soft" on imperialism.

promoting "peace at anynd weakening tho resistance of the masses by their talk of "peacefulther hand, the CPSU and Khrushchev, while subjectively alarmed by such colorful phrases as "paperxplained away by Teng Hsiao-pingarable from classrd Chineserobably do not objectively regard the Chinese as incurableao had clearly stated that China neededears of peace, as did the Soviet Union and the rest of the "world socialisthere is no reason that theny more thanhould believe that Maoet aloneuclear holocaust.

If in the last analysis the CPSU and the CPC under - -each other's views on the world situation, and whileeach other are still in basic unity, can the same be said with regard to their internal development? Here too themay have been sharper beneath the surface and at the same time more susceptible of resolution than Western analysis has supposed. In view of tho greatly/ differing stages of development and historic backgrounds of the two economies, it would not be surprising if differences verging onhad indeed arisen between the two parties. Khrushchev had made it clear that he did not Like the impetuosity with which the communes and the "great leap forward" were launched. Whether officially and at the highest level of party councils tlie CPSU had expressed serious criticism to its Chinesewarning against the danger of actual collapse of thewe do not know. But Marxist-Leninist theory andbothertain measure of laissez-faire; the CPC and the CPR have the right to adapt their plans to specificconditions as they see them. The Soviet leadersfraternal" spirit, but in the last analysis lt is not they who decide what Is best for China.

Reversing the picture, the Chinese unquestionably must be resentful and mistrustful of mounting "bourgeois"which they note ln the Soviet society. The almost untchaste with which, following the visits of Mikoyan, Kozlov,

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and Khrushchev, the Central Committee of the CPSUeries of decrees virtually laying down the blueprint for an American system of benefits for the masses, must have been galling to the leaders of communist China, still in the throes of privation and primitive consumer gratification*' Theovermighty materialor theto Communism" and for maintaining the motive ofincentive during the transition must have seemed to the Chinese like rationalisation or "embellishment" of capitalist economic methods* They must have resented bring chided on their own "heroic" efforts, such as the wasteful backyard steel mills,rother party which had graduated after itirec decades of Stalinesque austerityelative American type of affluence, with all its enervating consequences.

Finally, the Chinese may have seen behind this ,Tprett:-fication" of capitalist economic methods an even more sinister danger of generalentering in the widely touted program of the CPSU tosocialistere in the field of social conditioning may lie the most deep-rooted of all the actual or potential contradictions between the CPC and the CPSU. Chinaour thousand year old tradition which is being simultaneously uprooted and adapted to the construction of socialism. It has its own balance of individualist and collectivist elements and principles. The Soviet Union, especially in its European Slavic parts, uch shallower tradition, heavily derivative from Western

InPSU Central Committee decree of0 must have been truly shocking to the Chinese: it laidrogram for massive expansion of production of such frills as frozen fruit juices, preparedugar-coated jthrough super-markets or by home delivery, withadvertising. The acme of "bourgeois" complacency must have been the claim that this program could be financed by the savings from the demobilizationhird of the Soviet armed forces (these savings incidentally appear to have been over-hypothecated for more than one "noble" cause).

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Europe. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Chineseleaders should look upon their Soviet counterparts as upstarts, lacking in that "highf purpose which the challenge of history demands.

'We may conclude thatfthere waa quite enough in thebackground of the Moscow meeting to have accounted for its note of acrimony. How much these issues were ventilat ed behind the scenes, to what extent this tissue of differences and contradictions was put in order, we do not know. We can only proceed on the basis of what emerged, the Statementand the program which it announces.

PART 11

The Moscow Statcmrnt: ew Program for International Communism

The Moscow Statement is being hailed as "of worldimportance,ingle common platform of the entire communist movement, and the ideologicalfor its further rallying and freshprogram of action for the whole internationalmovement for many years to come . .he documents will raise the international workersew level andresh, powerful impetus to the national liberation movement, as well as to the peoples to avert war, toasting peace onhe words are those of Mikhail Suslov1 but they are being faithfully echoed by all of theommunist parties throughout the world.

In the West, the prevailing evaluation is antithetical. The Declaration is viewedhedge podge ofscissors and pastepapering over of cracks in the monolith,issue of concessions and counter-concessions between Communist China and the USSR (box-scoremanship aboutnominal" ratherocument from which each and every faction can quote what itere "facade oftimulus ratherestraint to forces of disunity within the Bloc

Can these antitheses be synthesized?

We may state at the outset ourntuitive rather thanhat Western analysis has been influencedubjective tendency to underrate the forces

Report to the Plenum of the CPSU, Moscow,anuary, FB1S,.

working for unity in tbe movement, and to see in the sharp discussion evidenceolarization and antagonism, which, between Western allies, would seem Surely.t?reak. The analysis has not contendedreak of Tito-likei.e. on the Party but not the Stateas inevitable, but rather hasrocking along" course for theaxis, plagued with deepening difficulties andbut somehow held together by fear of the consequencesecisive split.

On the other side, we may affirm that the Communists have displayed their own form of subjectivism in continuing to proclaim on faith that history is on their side, with thethat the Moscow Statementecular revelation of "lifehey may or may not have erred objectively in their estimate of the character of the era as one "whose mainis the transition from capitalism to socialism initiated by the Great Octoberime of struggle between the two opposing socialime of socialist revolutions and national liberation revolutions, of the breakdown of of the abolition of the colonialime ofof more peoples to the socialist path, of the triumph of socialism and communismorldwidehe test of the validity of this estimate lies with us as much as with them*

lnynthesis, let us assume that what we arc dealing with does, in fact, as the communistsew Program. As such it would be the first and only general program of the movement, at least since the early days of the Comintern. It stands to reason thatrogram, clearly stated to be applicable in essentials to all parties of the movement, could not have sprung forth, full-blown from the brow of that latter day 2Jeus, Marxism-Leninism- Rather it had to be elaborated in heat and travail, patiently with trial and much error,onsiderable expanse of time and space.

Jt is difficult to decide when this process emergedere Sturm und Drang of the movementonscious driveoal.

In an effort to place the Moscow Conference in its historic perspective one may begin with the Second Worldomewhathe following phases orin the development of Ihlernational Communism:

issolution of the Comintern, marking the end of that interpretation of "proletarian internationalism" whichmonopolistic allegiance to the "fatherland ofhe Soviet Union. By this symbolic act,from the isolation of "socialism in onetalin bought needed transitory reassurance for his wartime allies, and opened the way for the postwar expansion of the Soviet im-perium and the international communist movement, whilein abeyance the question of the letter's future organization. Conditions of worldwide belligerency had made communications among the parties extremely difficult; not much would actually be lost by giving up the Comintern for the time being; after theew situation would arise callingifferent mcthofd of Communist organization.

atellitization of Eastern Europe under the wing of the Red Army. This period marked the emergence of the "world socialistot yet rounded out by the addition of Communist China. This full-blown, later Stalinism, amethod of rule coupled with absolute polarization of two world systems (exclusion of neutrals) may be regardedarryover of the"Sovietocentric" practice of the Comintern. The more pallid influence of its successor, the Cominform, reflected the continuing requirement for an internationaland indoctrinating center for communist partiesthe confines of the "world socialist system,specially the French and Italian CPs which, having emerged from the

1

war period as mass organizations, faced difficult tactical situations.

- The Yugoslav Crisis and the expulsion of Tito from the Cominform showed the limits beyond which.Stalinist control could not be pushed, andenter ofpower for "national communism" andnd an alternative model of foreign and domestic policy forstates.

- The triumph of Communism in mainland China (with ensuing satcllitization of North Korea and North Vietnam) established the boundaries of the "world socialist system" for, consolidating the northern half of the Eurasianas the base for future expansion. On the state side, the Sino-Soviet alliance established the foundations for the long-range political and economic drive to power of the "socialisthe achievement by the USSRuclear capability radically altered the balance of military power, and ushered

in the era of "mutual deterrence by terror. "

he death of Stalinam of new forces which had been piling up within the USSR and the "system" during his later years. It is not sufficient to characterize the post-Stalin actions merelyegation of his policies,udden access of "flexibility" after hisather the entire complex period must be regarded as one of intenseevolution within the framework of inherited Marxist-Leninist ideology, the combination of "theory anduring these four years, the central focus within the Soviet Union lay in the struggle for consolidation of the succession, resolved in Elsewhere in the "system" it layeries of attendant crises resulting from the process of de-Stalinizationnd the liberalization of the mechanisms of control in the satellites(Poland andhese were reflectedeneral crisis among the Free World parties. As wc have noted above, the process of "stabilization"

had begun in the last monthsnd was powerfully assisted and influenced in its outcome by Communist China. This intervention marked the coming of age of anotheroreshadowed by its 'Victory" in the KoreanndMao as the only living personal exfemplar of continuous, successful socialist revolution.

he Moscow Conference of theandarties in celebration ofh Anniversary of the October Revolution was at once the triumphalOf stabilization in the USSR, and the first ecumenicalof the "world socialist system" and the international As such it was regarded by Communists as the greatest landmark since the Bolshevik Revolution.

The significance of7 Declaration of theations of the "world socialist system" and the Peace Appeal of thettending communist parties, was profoundly enhanced by the launching of the first Sputnik From then on, the balance of world power has been held by the communists to be shifting "decisively" in favor of the "socialist camp. "

If one asks what is the essential nature of the three-year period between the two Moscow conclaves, two answers are at hand. One is the basic Western analysis, mentioned above, which may be recapitulated as follows: during this period the Sino-Soviet relation increasingly displayed the characteristicsh century type of alliance of national states with divergentower, control, security, hich came into heightened and finally acute conflict. antle of "ideological"evisionism" versus "dogmatism, the two super powers of the alliance, flanked by lesser factions, moved in the direction of an interim showdown. Recognizing the dangeromplete break, the senior partners sought by lobby* ing among the junior partners first to enlist their support, and then toompromise which would keep the movement

Intact,till more decisive showdown. The basic Issues remain unresolved, and the prospect is for further sharp conflict, damaging to the monolithic unity of the

The essential point of this analysis is that it proceeds from Western patterns of thought, broadly speaking,in content and optimistic in outlook. It concludes that the USSR, China, and their satellites react very much as other nation states have inndlliances. They will not be able to conduct their internal adjustments withoutconsequences. In other words, we can reckonwith the prospect that International Communism willincreasingly ineffectiveower grouping, and may -the accent is oneclinehreat to the West,

The other answer, aa we have noted above, is theone. What has been taking place Is an intense stage in the forward thrust of the movement. "Contradictions" have arisen, as, according to life, history and Marx, they must. Opposites arc in conflict. But the movement, armed with Marxist-Leninist dialectic, hasassive operation of scientific analysis, of criticism and self-criticism, from which it has emerged strengthened, and confident, with many, though not all, contradictions resolved,ew program and with an ever brighter outlook.

In our searchynthesis, we would turn theon the central problem: the organization and discipline of International Communismovement. As we have noted in Part I, most of what has been brought into theasinevitability ofpeaceful coexistence,ttitudes toward 'imperialism" and the "national liberation"s Ln factatter of tactical emphasisroadly agreed strategy. Behind it looms the vast issue, how is the "world socialist system"-

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theation-states constituting the Sino-Sovieto Become the matrix of integral World Communism? How canovement grow and triumph, unless itingle center,ingle head? In our judgment, thend it has beenithin the movement has ledrovisional,ermanent answer to these burning questions. The answer is, however, not one from which we should derive much reassurance.

e called attention to the significance the term sodruzhestvo, frequently used in Soviet

on the relations between socialist countries. Translated as "commonwealth,r "community" this concept of association in friendship is one basic elementriad, of which the other twosocialist camp" and "world socialist system.ong series of references, and above all0 Moscow Statement, show that these three elements are not merelythey are, under differing aspects, one and the same thing, The "system'1 refers to the homogeneity of state, party and society among the component members; the "camp" expresses their militant solidarity in defense and offense; the sodruzhestvo connotes their independence, equality and practice of mutual assistance*

We further advanced the speculation that the concept of sodruzhestvo contained in itself the seeds of organizational form which might lead to the development of new institutions, procedures and relationships going far beyond those of the existing Sino-Soviet Bloc. We ventured the conjecture that steps would be taken in the not too distant future to actualize the potential of this concept. We suggestedort of counter-UN might emerge. At the same time, we recognized that the divergences of China and thespecially the

seeming reluctance of the Chinese to accept the term" preferring in its stead the looser image of the "bigight lead to the developmentort of dual sodruzhestvo, analogous, within >thc Secular religion" ofto the Eastern and Western Christian churches, and eventuallyrotestant Reformation, We held such aas less likely, however, than the preservationnitary movement.

It appears to us of great significance that the Moscow Statement, and subsequent reinforcing utterances, especially Khrushchev's speechnd Suslov's Report to the Central Committee, datedanuary, explicitlythe equation: system-camp-sodruzhestvo.1 Any effort to analyze the Moscow Conferenceandmark in theof international communism must, therefore, clearly take account of the sodruzhestvo.

What then is its significance?

In our judgment, the Moscow proceedings must be viewed as the second ecumenical council of the secular world religion of International Communism, the conference of7 being the first. Because ofs opposed toartiesuration (four weeks instead of one)

It is perhaps significant that official Soviet English language translations no longer use the wordubati-tuting the less historically charged term "community. "thiaoncession to Chinese or even to Free World Party sensibilities, mistrustful of the connotations of any term recalling the British Commonwealth. At any rate, the Chinese version of the Moscow statement, which is generally very precise and seems to have equal status with the Russian text, still uses the earlier translation ta chia t'ing, "bigThe term is used four times in the Statement, andis authoritative. We shall continue to translate it as"

and significance of agenda, the second meeting is clearly more important than the first.

We have suggested that Western analysis has tended to view0 gatheringrisis in anhowdown forced on the Russians by theof the Chinese. In this analysis, the presence of thether parties is of secondary or even minor We do not believe that this interpretation does justice to the occasion* Thisorld encounter, the greater and the lesser of the Communist parties, gathered, not to be manipulated by two quarreling senior brothers, butolemn creative action* the formulationew propram for international communism.

It is in this positive light that we should view not only the Conference itself but its antecedents, the long Byzantine discourse and intrigue of the preceding months, the Aesopian dialectical utterances of the ideologists, the exchange ofveiled insults among the leaders, the fantastic lobbying such as the near disruption by the Chinese of the WFTUin Peking, the "Dennis the Menace" act of the Albanians, or the flamboyant house-party of Khrushchev and his Cast European stooges on the Baltica. It is indeed an odd way toailroad,ut it is essential for us to bear in mind that it is their way.

That the Conference itselfomentous gathering cannot be doubted. Never before has there been such an assemblage of Communist leaders. Khrushchev, Liu, and even the absent Mao can hardly have failed to be impressed by the formidable array if not the augustness of the occasion.

Even the absence of one of the most outstanding brethren, Palmiro Togliatti, must be interpretedribute to its significance.

Inevitably, Western analysis has sought for evidence in the outcome that one or the other of the disputants 'Von. " We have noted that this typeof^boxscoremanehip" has yieldedresults, depending considerably on previously held views, or whether the individual analyst was morepecialist in Soviet or Chinese affairs. Advance expectations that China would be pressed to "recant" were not borne out. Indeed, there is some evidence that the CPSU, rather than the CPC, indulgedeasure ofhatever theof concession or compromise, the outcome was probably viewed by the assemblage as the achievement of satisfactory consensus, proclaimed as "unanimity." There was no general "victory" by either side, no tltriumph" of Khrushchev, and no "loss of face" by Mao.

For us. the significant concern should be with thewhich the Conference produced, the Statement, andesser extent the propagandists Appeal. These are there for all to read, as are the encomia, elaborations and glosses which are pouring out in abundance. asic counsel of prudence, we would recommend that the Statement be studied

Togliatti is reported to htvc been unwilling to be associated personally with the outcome which he claims to have foreseen. It is highly doubtful, however, that one of the few surviving stalwarts of the Comintern, the leader of the largest "mass" party outside the Bloc, the spokesman of criticism against the "degeneration" of the CPSU revealed by Khrushchev's -de-Stalinization speech, the author of the theory ofikehoose to "sulk in his tent" on such grounds, At any rate, his subsequent authoritative interpretation and praise of the Statement suggest that he is not "out of line. "

and re-studied carefully and clinically by all persons inthroughout the Free World, lt isreludehott certainly is no assurance of peace in our sense; it pledges only "peaceful coexistence" which, by precisedefinition, is the highest order of class struggle. Hence, it can only be regardedommitment to indefinite continuance of "cold war,unctuated by blackmailing threats of violence, and at least risk of limited "just" wars inof "liberation from imperialism and colonialism. 11

The formidable threatening tone of the Statement,its clear designation of the United States, "heading the imperialist camp,s the main enemy, has not escaped the notice of the West. Nevertheless, in the face ofblandishments! conciliatory gestures, hints of promising negotiation, the West continues to be bemused. Perhaps, it hopes, the USSR is really gropinguH' settlement, spurred on by alarm over Communist China.

It is natural that Western analysis should continue, under its earlier momentum, to scrutinize Chinese and Soviet follow-up for evidence of persistent divergence. But it would seem unwise to try to prove that the earlier analysis was right on all points, that nothing has changed, that the "rift" mustbe greater *han ever.

Rather we suggest that the analysis proceed from the assumption that "something new has beenhisnew is the public acceptance by the CPSU of the end of "monocentrism. " Whether the appropriate new formula would bepolycentrism" or "acentrism" remains to be seen. Under whatever formula the movement is now viewed, it clearly covers the entire world. And the USSR, like the US, has long since been made aware that the world islux of history, so complex and mighty that traditional patterns of authority and techniques of power are swept before it.

Just as the US is seeing and accepting the rapidof its position as "leader of the Freeo the USSR has been adjusting itself to the exigencies imposed upon it by shifts in political alignment of the old and the new world order. The two ghiei foci of global polarization are aliketo recognize the hard fact that the greater and the less -cr nations standooting of equality when it comes towhether in the United Nations or in the Conference of Communist *nd.Wor1ters Parties.

Khrushchev appears to have adjusted himself to the reality of this new dispensation. He affirmed the basicof all Communist parties in his speech att CPSU Congress and repeated it with heightenedear later:

From the tribune of the Congress we declared before the whole world that in the communistjust as in the socialist camp, there has existed and exists complete equality of rights and solidarity of all communist and workers parties and socialist countries. The CPSU in reality docs not exercise leadership over other parties. In the communist movement there are no parties that are superior or subordinate. All communist parties are equal and independent. (FBIS, Daily Report Supplement, USSR and East Europe, No. 1, .

This pious profession will of course be viewed in the West with understandable skepticism. It is already being stated that the Moscow Conference was in fact the Eighth Meeting of the Communist International (the Seventh was. By this interpretation, Moscow would have in effect

i

Cf. Branko Lazitch,uest,,

restored its primacy in the world movement, and the lesser parties would be bound to the writ of the CPSU as in the past, subject to accommodationew and growing rival, the Chinese Party. Such an interpretation gains color from the emphasis in both Moscow and Peking on the fact that their two parties are of course still the "biggest,ndpecial role in the movement.

Nevertheless, even makjng allowances for the persistence of established patterns of dependence, and for the massive, if intangible influence which the "senior brothers" can continue to exert, the fact remains that the juniors have been admittedew role in the governance of the ,fbighe scores of delegates who spoke their pieces and listened throughout the month of November were acknowledged as partners. The tightation nucleus of the "world socialist system" stands poisedast drive toward universality. In the global diversity of International Communism, theand the least are indeedeal sense collectivelyand it is no longer sufficient for the West to speak meaningly of one or two being "more equal" than the rest.

Wc do not state that the sodruzhestvo has fully Much time and effort must still be spent by the com* munists in determining what they actually achieved and where they must direct their main effort of "construction,11 The World Marxist Review (organized in Praguetep in the coordination of ideology and tactics among parties. The Chinese at Moscow protested plaintively over the fact thatear they had beenfrom its pages; it will bo interesting to note whether this ostracism is permanently liftedesult of the conference. The Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) is being gradually transformedotent instrument of economic coordination and integration; here, ew roleitherto only anay emerge. Militaryore point at the Moscow Conference,

mayore harmonious phase, and theo us atf China's prospects in the nuclear warfare field may be clarified* Scientific cooperation in the "world socialist system" has not. so far as we know, been interrupted by the controversy on other matters. In the driveniversal application of cybernetics, especially to the conditioning of the new "communisthina and the USSR have every interest in common endeavor. The joint nuclear research program (Dubna) and other areas of burgeoning science may be expanded as the new "scientific city" of Novosibirsk begins to function.

In shorti goals, objectives, interests, convictions and even habit all seem tolosing of ranks and atogether of strategy and tactics. How this process can be carried out in the intervals between multilateral meetings remains to be seen. There has been, and will continue to be, both pressure for, and resistance to the creation of some form of standing mechanism for coordination within the The chief consequence of the demonstration ofand "comradely criticism" in Moscow may prove toonsensus among the parties in favor of developingmeans to guide the movement under the new program, to enforce discipline, and to protect the unity whichhc apple of its eye. 11

Conclusion

We have attempted to establish the thesis that theDeclaration, as the end productrolonged phase of inner contradiction,ew program forCommunism, correcting the damage to its unity and usheringew phase of heightened offensive against the "capitalist-imperialisthe weapons of this program are dialectic in nature, i. e, strategic and tactical, "hard" andong and short range, universal and particular. The "inevitability of war" is averted by the "favorable shift" in the

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world balance of power, yet war can still be unleashed by the franticPeaceful coexistence" is identifiedeightened form of "classt isactictrategy, depending on circumstances. The Number One enemy, the United States, has been pilloried, yet it is declared possible to negotiate with him. Disarmament isanip* ulative sloganealizable ideal. Massive support ofliberation" and the authenticationew form ofstate, "nationalre powerful means for hastening the ineluctable historic disintegration of" but the goal is the rapid creation of conditions for the assumption of power by the ,lproletariat" and its communist "vanguard. " "Peaceful transition to socialism" is possible, and so is its opposite. "Broad united democratic fronts" are an instrument of progress but only if they yield to the advanced leadership of true Marxist-Leninist parties. In backwardthe "national bourgeoisie"egitimate, if temporary partner, and the "imperialist, compradore" bourgeoisiethe enemy. In advanced countries "monopolies" are the primary target of working class "struggle."

But, whatever the variations in method and tempo, revolution is the essence of the movement. Its progress will not bc constant or uniform, and its leadership and its center are indeterminate, but not, eo ipso, without objective existence Differences will remain in the movement; as Chou En-Lai said to Edgar Snow, it would be strange if they did not. These may betome contradictions, for despite some latent dispute among Communists, the doctrine of Mao is authoritative: are the law of life, and they will exist universally even after the triumph of socialism.

But Mao also declares that contradictions cannot become antagonistic within the domain of the Marxist-Leninist parties so long as they are true to themselves. These bodies, steeled in action and guided by scientific doctrine and method, have

the ability to resolve all contradictions within and among them selveson-antagonistic basis. This process, the unity and conflict of opposites, Mao affirms, and Communists generally believe, is the dynamic force of history and of "life itself.11

We do not have to believe that Mao'st is derived from Lenin ands objectively valid. Nor are its world-conquering potentialities certain of It is not necessary for the Free World to think and plan and actt could not, even if itut it must recognize that the Communists do; therein lies the main weapon of their choice. On the principle "know yourt would be wise for us tovoluntary suspension of disbelief" in its realityhreat.

Original document.

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