THE MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA

Created: 7/11/1961

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THE MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA

A Report Prepared by an Ad Hoc Committee of tbe United States Intelligence Board

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATIONTHE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAOE LAWS.HBOR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ART MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BT LAW.

Approved by the United States Intelligence Board

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SWCBFT NOPOLW

s&cncT Morons

ART II PART Ul

Annexes

BUILDUP IN CUBA

Table of Contents Conclusions (SECRET) Discussion (SECRET)

Chronology of Significant Events Since1 (SECRET NOFORN)

Annox 1 Arms and Equipment of Cuban Army (SECRET)

Annex 2 Cuban Air Force Equipment (SECRET)

Annex 3 eneral Map of Cuba Which Also Showseet or Longer (CONFIDENTIAL)

Annex 4 ist of Dates When Selected

Countries Recognized the (UNCLASSIFIED)

5 ist of Dates When Countries Broke or Suspended Relations With Cuba (UNCLASSIFIED)

THE PROBLEM

To assess tho oxtent of Sino-Soviet Bloc military collaboration with the Castro regime, and to oxamine in detail the Cuban military buildup since Castro came to power.

SBGRKT NOFORN -

C0NCLU3 IONS

Soviet Bloc continues to extend considerableto Cuba in tbe form of allltary equipment,technicians and advisers. Thus far, aircraft consistingJots, some helicopters, lightide assortment of armaments ranging fromthrough medium artillery and heavy tanks hove boon There are tenuous Indications tbat Cuba maySoviet Jet ligbt bombers. An estimate of the totaltypes of equipment received thus far Is shown in Annexes.1. Someewrobably has been received In Cuba but tbat hispositively identified or enumerated la not lncludod In Annex

1. There Is no evidence that any nuclear weooona or guided missiles are now in Cuba. Military training of Cubans in the Bloc isand some probably have nlroady returned for duty in Cuba, Soviet Bloc military technicians and probably Instructor pilots aro In Cuba. No Chinese Communist military personnel hive been identified as being In Cuba.

There is no evldenco that any Slno-Sovlet Bloc country has dispatched or isvolunteer" force for military service in Cuba.

The Sino-Soviet Bloc hasong way towarditaelf with tbe maintenance of tho Castro reglmo. Theof Cuba's economy has bocome dependent on continued Bloc

assistance. The successful Soviet effort to provide Cuba witb all its petroleum needs has been at considerable expense andto Its normal tanker operations and the Soviet Onion has given priority to other Cuban needs even on occasion at the ex-pease of other trading partners.

Slno-Soviet Bloc's support for the Castro regimeof its larger efforts to isolate the united States andand eventually destroy its influence throughout theSoviets desire to establish Cubaecure base offurthering their aims throughout Latin America. Thehas already become an offective instrument of the Blocachieving these ends in Latin America and,esaerunderdeveloped and emerging nations throughout the world.

In short, for most practical purposes, the present Cubancan be regarded as Communist, and its military dependence on the Bloo is steadily increasing. Cuba, under the present Communist control,etter base of operations for subversion and propaganda throughout Latin America than the Soviets have ever had. The strongly anti-United States and pro-Soviet regime of Castro's serves their purposes well; itative color to Communist agitation and limits the riskemisphere-wide reaction against outside Communist intervention.

Soviet Bloc military equipment already shippedas well as prior military purchases by Castro frombave contributed substantiallyajor buildup of

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ground aod air forces there. esult, the Cuban groundprobably now better equipped than those of any othercountry. The Cubanbuildup la reflected inexpansion of personnel la tbe Cuban allltary and The present Cuban ground forces consist of theArmy ofhe, and tbe militia estimated at more thancombat effectiveness of tbe combat elements of tbe armymilitia has greatly improved elace0 andmust now be considered as constituting one of theground forces in Latin America. Presentthe Cuban Navy are limited to the patrol of selectedthe coast. Tbe comb?*A'- Pirn

la still low, but it can provide limited support to the ground forces and assist in maintaining internal security. However, with the acquisition of MIO aircraft and the return of Bloc-trained personnel, the capability of the air force will beenhanced over the coming months. If augmented by aircraft of the civil airline, the Cuban Air Forceair troop and cargo transport capability.

6. Initially, tbe purpose of Cuba's military buildup was aelf defense. Anti-Castro guerrillas were active In several areas inside Cuba and exile groups badonstant invasion threat. However, the current sharpening and strengthening of all the instruments of police state control suggest tbat the related

motive of tightening tbe dictatorship is an equal, If nottbe prlnc, purpose of the military buildup. The reglae, which Ishorough socio-economic revolution on the countryaster pace than almost any other government In history,estimates that its domestic objectives can be achieved only through the regimentation of the Cuban peopleollae state. This olearly parallels the objectives of the Cuban Communist Party and thus furthers the aims of the International Communist movement.

7. The militiarimary instrument of the state In strengthening and extending its control. Drawn from rural and urban lower incomeard core of the militia laequlpped snd la organized with Increasing efficiency whiletmmm.

larger portionundergoing regular part time military training. Some militia units have been assigned to duties normally carried out by tbe armed foroes. The militia provides tbe governmentubstantial armed force with which to control the populacehole andelatively large number of Cubans to military discipline and political indoctrination. At the same time, It contributes toward solving the serious unemployment problem. lnfluonoe In the militia is extensive. The militia has proven an effective fighting force in the antl-guerrllla campaigns in the Escambray mountains early this year and againat the anti-Castro force that landed onpril. The effectiveness of the militia reflected an Improved state of training, acceptableand generally good morale as well as the regime's ability to

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large numbers of men In critical areas,

8. The Castro regime is convinced that tbe Cuban revolution la the vanguard of "the antl-lmperiallst rebellion" that willsweep all of Latin America. It Is actively encouraging and covertly assisting Communist and Communist-Influencedgroups in other Latin American countries at every Its methods Include Intensive propaganda supported by the Castro-subsidized international newa agenoy that has alose working ties with Slno-Sovlet Bloc news agencies and reflects the propaganda line of Moscow and Peiplng. Cuban diplomatic missions have frequently provided Communist-oriented student and labor groups wjtl

The arms buildup In Cuba permits the Cubans to supply weapons to pro-Castro groups ia other countries. Receipt of Bloc military equipment permits Cuba to furnish Western-manufactured arms now in their possession for this purpose.

9. Cuban subversion is further supported by thetravel to Cuba of numerous Latin Americans who are exposed there to further political Indoctrination and, according toreports, given military training. During the Havana meeting in May and1 of the executive committee of the Communist-front International Union of Students, it was announced that Cuba plans tocholarships to Latin American students for study in Cuba.

btkf4>tl'*

DISCUSSION

1. Following tho seizure of power by tbe Castro regime Inntermittent Cuban military contacts were made with Sino-Sovlet Blocthesedid not result in firm military aid commitments until

the early summer Aa Cuba's efforts to purchase military

goods in the Free World became Increasingly difficult9 anduban arma purchasing missions traveled to the Bloc to investigate new sources of supply. hole range of equipment from small arms to modern Jet aircraft.

-, 2. .These preliminary contacts may.-have -craatalllaod

First Deputy Premier Mlkoyan's visit to Cuba inhon Moscow abandoned its policy of aloofness toward the Cuban revolution and publicly announced lta support of the Castro regime. Mlkoyan's visit signaled the beginningeries of trade and/or aidbetween Cuba and all countries of the Jlno-Sovlet Bloc. Aaand economic contacts were established, it became apparent that tbe Bloc intended to back up its propaganda support for Cubaajor oampalgn of material assistance.

3. Soviet activities in exploiting the rapid deterioration of OS-Cuban relations, however, were inhibited during the aprlng0 by the impending summit conference and President Elsenhower's aohoduled visit to the USSR. With the collapse of the summit in May and the cancellation of the President's trip, these Inhibitions were removed and the Blocore Intensive drive to expand Its Influence

over the Castro regine. In the post-sou It period tbla campaign has

Included public attacks on the validity of the Monroe Dootrine and assurancos of Soviet support in the event of economic or military measures that the US might undertake againat Cuba. Theseincluding the ambiguous references to retaliation withhave been phrased broadly enough to cover the supply of militaryand technical assistance without committing the USSR to speclflo military action In Support of Cuba.

4. Soon after the aumnlt collapse lauban military negotiations were undertaken with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Czech-Cuban talks in Havana during May and June were immediatelyuprip to Prague aad Moscow by Cuban Minister of Armed Forcea Raul Castro. Presumably agreements were coacludod during theseprovide for" future deliveries of Bloc arms.

6. During the summerrobably Id early July, at least one partial cargo of Czech small arms and ammunition was delivered to Cuba,along with fiveOUND helicopters. Shortly thereafter, aboutuban military porsonnel were aent to Czechoslovakia tomilitary training, including flight and artillery lostructlon. By the eod of Augustubans were receiviag allitaryin Czechoslovakia.

urther military talks during July and August probably were held concerning detailed arrangements for the delivery of Soviet Bloc arms, accompaaied by military technlciaas to provide the necessary training. Not untilowever, did major shipments get under way.hereof military material to Cuba.

of the stringent security precautionsoff-loading of military cargoes In Cuba, information on thequantities of Bloc material is fragmentary. Shipmentsof NIG-type aircraft, helicopters, pistonomplete range of land armaments, inoludlngand antiaircraft artillery, military vehicles, andof infantry weapons and ammunition. In addition,communications equipment have been delivered. Totalof these shipments iandthe type of equipment and estimated Bloc deliveries,

tho Cuban ground forces are probably now bettor equipped than those

of any other Latin American country. They will probably experience

some initial difficulty in providing adequately trained maintenance personnel for this equipment. Over tho long run some spare parts problems may arise. These estimated Bloc deliveries provide the Castro regime with suitable armaments for defensive purposes against external invasion by non-nuclear forces, as well as being very useful for Cuban internal security needs.

jet fighters and trainers are being assembledout at San Antonio de los Banos Air Base. state thatave also been assembled at thisare now being flown. More thanIG-type aircraft,apparently were delivered to Cuba near the end ofaddition,uno tho Soviet ship Leninsky Komsomol

SECRET

at loast some of them could have contained FARMERupersonic Jet fighters. There are indications tbat Cuba may receive someet light bombers froa the USSR, but these reports cannot be confirmed at proaent.

Bloc military deliveries to Cuba thua far havethe Castro regime in its attempts toreatorcapability. The Cuban ground forces now have for thean antiaircraft defense capabilityreatlyand armor capability. In addition, tbeof modern Bloc small arms and ammunition have enablad

ruglmu Lu tlstlblUh mfdlii&Trrtaln an oxpoodlag

mill tin. There is no evidence that any nuclsar weapons or guidedare now in Cuba.

small groups of Cuban military traineessent to the Bloc prior to the summerut noavailable to confirm those reports. In July and August,two large groupu of Cubans wera sent to Czechoslovakiamission probably Involved military instruction,methods and training as pilots and ground crews. ubans have probably beentraining in Czechoslovakia,mall number In the UflSB. *

deliveredrates to Cuba which probably contained airoraft.

At least some of these have probably returned. It appears likely that cadets aeut for pilot training In the Bloc bad little previous military experience. If so, some of these student pilots may have received only preliminary flight instruction In Czechoslovakia and they may reoelve Jet transition training on Bloc aircraft In Cuba.

information Is unavailable on the numbersof Bloc military technicians in Cuba. Baaed primarily

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on Bloc military technical assistance to other non-Bloo countries and the estimated arms shipments to Cuba thus far, it la believed thatzech and Soviet technicians currently ara working in military capacities for the Cuban government. Other reports have indicated that this number may be somewhat larger, but we believe that moat of these havo tended to bo exaggerated. No Chinese Communist military personnel are believed to be In Cuba, although the possibility cannot be entirely discounted.

Soon after the arrival of the first large Bloc arms shipment Inzech and Soviet technicians reportedly were assisting the Cuban military in assembling equipment andsuch weapons as antiaircraft batteries. Thay are employed also as instructors in military courses and as advisor* to in* dividual military units and nn maintenance porsonnel.

Thore is no evidence that Soviet Bloc or other nationals are being trained la the Bloc for military duty In Cuba. There Is no evldenco that any Sino-Sovlet Bloc country has dispatched or Is organizing "volunteer" forces for military service la Cuba.

Tbe ground foroes under Batista consistedman Armyational Pollco Forceho were relatively well-trained and well-disciplined by Latin American standard*. Following Castro's victory, virtually all elements of Batlsta'a ground forces were gradually reaovad. About one-fifth of tho present Revolutionary Army of0 men were active In guerrilla operatlona against Batista, and tbe remainder la composed of personnel who Joined the Revolutionary movement whan ita succeaa bad been assured. imilar situation la believed to oxlst InOO-aan Revolutionary National Pollco organisation, which in1 waa placed under tho newly-created Ministry of the Interior. Muoh of the Army effort9 has been devoted to non-military activities; parsonnel assigned to public works projects account for much of the troop streogth increase over Batlata's army.

The capabilities of the Cuban ground forces have beensteadily since tho fall Soviet Bloc arms deliveries have provided Cuban ground forces with an armor, artillery,and antitank potential hitherto largely lacking and unknown In other countries of the Caribbean area. Intensive training of Army and Militia units with new Bloc equipment, under the supervision of Bloc advlaors, has boon conducted since the Fall odest Bchool syatsm Including armor, field and antiaircraft artillery, Infantry, guerrilla, medical and signal training has been instituted. Inastroourse toew corps of revolutionary Instructors who will be assigned to troop units to

raise the morale and Increase the "revolutionary awaroness" of all military elements. Field and antiaircraft artillery and tank firing exercises are conductedegular basis; unit firing exorcises have been conducted. It is estimated that the combat elements of the Army and Militia have completed basic and email unit training and are capable of handling and firing all weapons with which thay ara equipped. Level of training of Infantry units appears to vary widely. Armor units have probably achieved tha capability of platoon employment. Recent operations againstforces indicated that at least somo combined arms training has been conducted. While tactical communications continue to be Inadequate for modern combat, the delivery of large amounts of

of the Cuban ground forces as evidenced by the rapid deployment of combat elements to the Invasion area In April.

16. The civilian Revolutionary Militia represents the major Increase in the size and capability of Castro's ground forces over those available to Batista. It is estimated to hove moreembers. First appearing as early asooBely-organlzod units of students, workors, and farmers were officially established in early Training varied widely from unit to unit and reflected the initiative and energy of individual commanders. Io general, howevor, militia training has been more uniform and extonsive than that oonductod by the Army. izeable proportion of the militia are voluntoers,

there have boon large numbers of young men and women pressured Into barvtcon' militia, and there are reportsonscripthaving bean Initiated.

ilitia units gradually assumed manyformerly were exclusively performed by the Army and They effectively performed orowd control duties, suchthe time of the Cayo Cruz ammunition dump explosion, andacted as security forces In port areas while Soviet Blochave been unloaded. In addition,they have effectedof intervened businesses snd are used in guardingand utilities against possible sabotage efforts. The

rapid reaction of the Cuban Militia In concert with tbs National

Pollco in establishing control of Cuban cities during the recent invasion attemptlear demonstration of their effectlveneee. Becent reports indicate that the militia's role of controlling

the populace may be supplanted by tha Ministry of the Interior, which Includes tbe Department of State Security, the National Police, and the Maritime Police, and which controls tho Committees of Vigilance.

ineorganization waathe design of producing better organized, raoro closelycommanded by Militia officers who ware graduatesOCS-typs training. Uniforms and modern Soviet Bloc small

arms are being issued all Militia units. Additionally, training of the Militia units on heavier Bloc equipment, and organization of

Militia mortar aod artillery units wore startad In earlyIn these units function as full-tins aatlvethey are betweenndears of age and arsthe maximum posslbls extent. Their level of training Isthat of equivalent Cuban Army units. The combatthe Militia has been partially tested Inwhich have been successful in eliminating, at leastpresent, the guerrilla threat to the Castro regime. InBay operations, even though the Militia battalionswere not the elite of ths Militia forces, they warsin containing the Invaders until selected combat unitsneither of the two cited operations wasodern

combat force it nonetheless must be concluded that by Latin American standards tbe Cuban ground fores combat elements ars effective and furtber that they could be defeated onlyodern substantial combined-arms fores.

19. The Cuban Navyersonnel strength of, is composedFACOMAfoot PCE"AG andP. Of these ships, atP is non-operational due to the shortage of spare parts,TR are laid up, and only someP are operational. On the other band, an unknown number of private pleasure craft has beon taken over by the navy and armed with light machine guns for uso as patrol craft. The PGM ha IRE, sunk at Nueva Gerona onpril by rebel aircraft, is being raised but it is expected that it will be many months

before tbe ship Is reconditioned. During the past two years the Cuban Navy has unsuccessfully attempted to acquire patrol croft in Western Surope. Recently there have been rumors that Cuba might receive naval ships, including destroyers, from tho Soviet Bloc. As far as is known, no Cuban naval personnel have been sent to the Bloc for training but the fact that the Chief of the Navy,

supports the possibility that some naval craft might be transferred in the future. There haveew reports of tho Navy receiving Bloc equipment, mainly radar and sonar, but theee have not been confirmed. The only Bloc equipment known to be in use in the Navy are anti-aircraft guns installed on at least one TACOMA class PF and possibly on othera.

capabilities of the Cuban Navy are limited toof selected portions of the coast. Tho larger shipsF,

1 AG)atrol of both coasts of Havana and Plnar del Rio provinces and tho Isle of Pines. The remainder of the coast is patroled by YP and other small craft. Combat effectiveness of the Navy is negligible. Crews consist of naval, Haritimo Police and militia personnel, the latter manning anti-aircraft guns.

combat capability of the Cuban Revolutionary Airis still low, but it can provide limited support toforces and assist in maintaining Internal security. the acquisition of MIG aircraft and the return ofthe capability of the air force will bo greatly enhanced

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ovor the cominght-.. If augmented by aircraft of the civil airline, the Cuban air forceair troop and cargo transport capability.

22. Tha total porsonnel strength of the Cuban Revolutionary Air Porco remains unknown, it la currently estimated that there aro aboutxperienced pilots in the air force and thatir force personnel are or havo beon undergoing training in Soviet BlocCzechoslovakia. Feasibly as aauy aa half of theso have been receiving pilotand probably some are now jet qualified. Some training is probably being conduotod in Cuba, but the types of training,and numbers participating are unidentified.

1ut there had been little chango in tho totala of combat-type aircraft until the recent arrival of anGs. Tbo Increase Is reflected mainly in, helicopters, piston trainer, and transport aircraft, with the latter probably representing expropriations of aircraft from private owners. There is no information concerning tho serviceability rate of CRAF aircraft at the present timo. (Seereakdown by type of Cuban military aircraft8 and at tbe present time.)

24. In Cuba there areirfields, excluding the USNon the Guantanamo Naval Base, with hard-surface' or more. All of these fields havo runways that are capable

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of supporting jet fighter operations. Parking and fuel faoilitiee are generally limited at most of tho airfield*. This air facility system la more than adequate for tho CBAF and wouldajor Increase therein. (Sea map. Annex 3)

25. Sincehe Castro regime ha*erious effort to augroont Cuban air facilities capabilities. Several new airfields have bean built and many of the already existing facilities have been significantly Improved. This construction is summarized aa follows:

E ofow runwaynder construction. aro', and the surface Is

aof Piaes, haa one runway which ba* recently been extendedits width'. The surface te crushed marblobase. Construction appoars to be temporarily suspended.

natural-surface landing'

' has recently been preparod at.

Claraew airfield,autical milea NNE ofSanta Clara airfield. Present dimensions of grading workto be'. Constructionslowly. The runway la not completedortion

suable for light aircraft.

runway at Baracoaformerly referred to as Domingo Boslllo,'.

delanding stripad been extended' Its surface has been reported as probably hardand gravel. Considerable clearing and excavation at theof the strip has been reported which could indicatepreparation for additional construction andnsv airstrip Is under construction near Jaguey Grands Dimensions areSO',

and the surface appears to be packed sand or gravol, which Is ready for either macadam or concrete surfacing. ew airstrip Is under construction In the Playa Glron, and Cayo Ramona area. Approximate dimensions; surfaoo Is probably rolled and crushod rock. iles west of San BiasOW, an unidentifiedis under construction which mayossible BT/DT sits. The site consistsircular depressed cloared area' in diameter, which has four equally spaced lines of' In length each. There are grading and clearing activities in the goneral area. This area suggests early stagesDF construction.

Macoo airfield athave beon completed ot both ends of each runway. The

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length of the main runway land the secondary runway Is' long.

h. Jaime Gonzalez airfield atextension Is underway at both runways. The main runway Is being extended to' and the secondary runway is being sxtsnded to approximately

1. Jose Martirunway is being extended0 fast and grading is under way. The soutbwsstsrn two-thirds of tha runway is being blacktopped. This extension is probably Intended for Increased commerclsl operations and possibly to lnoludo some military operations.

26. The principal objectives of the current military buildup

are self-defense, internal security, sndesser extent the export of arms and trained men to other Latin American countries for revolutionary and subvsrslve purposes. Given tho Cuban emphasis on guerrillaivilian militia, and subversion, the arms the Cubans have beentho largo quantities of small arms and automaticthemselves to use in connection with all of these objectives. The weapons employed for defense against attack from abroad can be used with equal facility against internal subversion and anti-Caatro rebel forces, to arm the militia, or to supply revolutionary groups locatad in or moving Into other Latin American countries.

27. Cuba's efforts to strengthen Its military posturo have resulted, at least initially,enuine fear of forolgn-based

Invasion. Various Cuban statements Indicate that Castro views another Invasion of the Island by ant1-government Cubans, supported indirectly or covertly by tbe united States,robability.

36. In addition toenulns fear ofbeatsd and continuing Cuban charges of atheir propaganda exploitation of the abortiveprilbeen portajor propaganda effort to villlfy the This effort Is designed to enlist world sympathycause of the Cuban David against the US Goliath, and toattention of the Cuban people away from thewhich they now face and to prepare them for

well-equipped military fores (with special emphasis

on on elite, politically reliable bard core within ths revolutionary militia) serves two principal functions in maintaining order within Cuba. First, Ig onablos the roglmo to deal effectively with any anti-Castro rebels which might develop in Cuba. Second, it provides Castroeans of extending government control over Cubanpolicy which is presently consldorod at least of oqual importanco to the objoctive of self-defense.

current buildup in arms may now betoward extending the Castro government's controlsociety and institutions. Ths major tool of controlRevolutionary Militia, which serves several purposes. the governmentubstantial armed force through

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which the Cuban populacehole can be controlled, and It pronotea loyalty to Castro byelatively large number of Cubans to military discipline and politicalunder the leadership of pooplo dedicated to the revolutionary government. Finally, the militia offora the government an organized work force for use In economic development and military construction projects, and to reduce the high unemployment which la plaguing the Castro regime.

31. Since Fidel Castro'a aaaumptlon of power, Cuba has boon involved In several attempts to overthrow other Caribbean. ha Castro regime aponsorod or gave indirect support to invasion attempts against Panama, the Dominican Republic, Nloaragua and Haiti, The military buildup provides Cuba with an increased ability to furnish military aid to Communist and pro-Comnuniet revolutionary groups in these or other Latin American countries in the future. Soviet Bloc military equipment now lo Cuba permits the use of older, Weatara-aade equipment which would be difficult to trace, for theae purposes.

33. Cuba has with heavy assistance from Communist funds put to work on Itsropaganda and subversive campaign of unpracadonted proportions In Latin America. Cuban leaders and propaganda media repeatedly refer to the Cuban revolution as the vanguard of tho antl-lmperlallst revolution that will "inevitably swoop" tbe rest of Latin America. Private atatements of Fidel Caetro reveal his conviction that the united States la

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"finished"reat power and that Cuba must therefore side with the "socialist countries which will win the current ideological struggle." During Its prosent confusedhe United States must be kept on tho defensive, Castro told an old friend last September. Tbe Castro regiao has become an effective Instrument of the Slno-Sovlet Bloc in Its drive to weaken and eventually destroy US influence in Latin Amorlca as well as in other underdeveloped and emerging nations.

Castro government has made no secret oftoward most of ths governments of ths otherrepublics, charging that these governments do not

roprosoat ths will of the ^people. It Is cloar that Cuba Is

determined to export is revolution to the rest of the hemlsphsre.

Cuban government is engaged In organizing,training of revolutionary movements. One facet ofIn the training of potential revolutionariesLatin American governments is the Castro regime'sof travel to Cuba of numerous Latin Americans for purposes

of ideological and military Indoctrination. Numerous delegates to the Latin American Youth Congress In Cuba last summer, for Instance, remslned to participate In the international Communist-financed "International Work Brigade." The weok-long congress of the youth section of the Cuban Popular Socialist (Communist) Party last April also brought delegatssumber of Latin American countries, as did tho coremonlos in March marking ths "Week of Solidarity with the Struggles of ths Latin American

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Peoples." The latter event, sponsored by the Communist-controlled labor arm of the Castro regime, endedanifesto calling for the initiation of an "anti-imperialist and anti-foudalin all of Latin Amorlca." This manifesto did not Include any call for an open Communist revolution. During the Havana meeting in Hay and1 of the executive committee of the Communist front International Union of Students, it was announced that Cuba plans tocholarships to Latin American students for study in Cuba. It has frequently been reported that Latin Americans from various countries havo received military training as well as political indoctrination in Cuba after

participating In these events. Also frequently reported are

instances where representatives of various Latin American Communist

and pro-Communist organizations who are sont to Slno-Sovlet Bloc countries for trainingeriod of time in Cuba on the outward or the homeward leg of their Journeys.

35. ajor effort toatin American government was the attempt In9 to oust the unpopular Trujilloin the Dominican Republic. In this case the Cubansthe strength of the Dominican regime. The two forces which landed ia the Dominican Republic fromby air and the other bytroined and armed In Cuba and led into battle by officers of Castro's army. The group that landed on the Dominican coast was escorted there by units of the Cuban Navy. The invading forces, primarily composed of Dominican

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exilos,eavy sprinkling of Communists.

36. The abortive "invasions" of Panama lo9 and of Haiti In August of the same year were by small groups from Cuba who evidently did. not have high-level Cuban official support but in the Panamanian case, at least, the expedition's preparations and departure probably took place with the knowlodge and approval of some Cuban authorities. Of the numerous rebel raids intoew were equipped with weapons from Cuba and led by Nlcaxaguans who had sought Cuban support for their adventures. However, none of these efforts is bslleved to have been directed or fully supported by Cuba. In fact, Cuban lsaders are known to have had difficulty with tho highly faotlonallEsd

nicaraguan exile groups that had sought support In Cuba. The Cubans had difficulties in decidingtrustworthy" Nicaraguan group which at tbs same time had any significant revolutionary capability.

37. Thero is evidence that Cuban officials decidedrogram of support for the Guatemalan Communist and pro-Communist revolutionaries.

'Cho" Guevara has

orierca arms and money to tho Guatemalan Communist party and to

a'Communist-influenced Guatemalan revolutionary group on the condition that the Guatemalan Coaarunlsta have the principal directing role In tbe revolution. Kx-President Arbonz of Guatemala is in Cuba andegular radio program beamed at Guatemala on Guatemalan Communist loader Pellecer recently returned to Guatemala from Cuba and fortuny, former secretary genoral of th* party, may alao have left Cuba for Guatemala. In tho caae of Guatemala, aa with other Latin Amerloan* countries, tho Cubans maintainenuine revolution can be achieved only after the regular armed force* are destroyed and the "maaaes" aro armed, as In Cuba. In his frequent speeches in Cuba, Arbenz hoB ropootedly aald that his greatest mistake waa In not arming theomlBAlon which permitted theought with "imperialistventually to seize power and destroy the revolution.

Tho government of Venezuelan Preeldent Botancourt Is another target for Cuban aubvorslve action. Leftist Venezuelan deputy Fabriclo OJeda, who has spent eonalderable time in Cuba in recent months,eported to have secured official Cuban aupport for an arnod revolt in Venezuela.

Caatro agents, of both Cuban and foreign nationality, are traveling from Cuba to Latin Amoricon countriea to promote revolutionary activities. Their objectives range from courier mlasions to organizing of atudent, labor, and revolutionary

groups and tho carrying out of sabotage mlasions.

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Cuban propaganda Is furthered by Cubanmissions which in numerous cases,

"lhave provided Commualst-orlenTea student sad labor groups with propaganda material and financial support. Humor oub reports connect the Cuban Embassy In most Latin American countries with the distribution of anti-US and pro-Castro propaganda and financial support to local "Friends 'vi UUBI" soeioties and'Teftist organisations.

Cuban revolutionary line is also spreadAmerica through the facilities of the Castro-subsidizednews agency Prensa Latlna. which has close working

ties with the nows agencies of the Slno-Sovlet Bloc. This propaganda organisation which has offices established in many Latin American countries disseminates the propaganda line of Moscow and Pelping throughout Latin America. It frequently has distorted news stories so as to reflect unfavorably on the localcourse which has evoked protests from the officials of several Latin American countries, Including Moxlco, Venezuela, and Costa Rlca. owerful new radio station was Inaugurated in Cubaay to dlssemlnato pro-Castro propaganda throughout the hemisphere.

Tho activities of Castro agents throughout tho hemisphere havo frequently resulted in countortceaeures being takon by security and diplomatic authorities in many Latin American countries. umber of cases, blatant attempts to undermine tbe sovereign rights of other Latin American governments have resulted In the arrest of pro-Castro agents and ths expulsion of Cuban diplomatic personnel.

Ill,

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS SINCE1

anuaryAmerican embassy in Moscow reported

that "solidarity meetings" in Soviet factories, as describedumber of press reports, featured pledges'of support by Soviet trade union groups for the Cuban revolution. Accounts of these meetings usually featured the "warning" that in the evontS attack on Cuba, the Cuban people would have the support of all peoples, "and first In line will be the heroic working class of tho Soviet Union."

1

ebruarya speech given at the conclusion of

a meeting of technical advisers in Havana, Fidel Castro savagely attacked tho Kennedy administration and then said: "Aa of today Cuba is going to declare that if the United States has the right to promote counter-revolution in Cuba and Latin America, Cuba has the right to encourage

revolution in Latin America." Che Guevara, speaking at the same meeting, told the delegates: "You must recall that we have already overcome many obstacles and our responsibility extends beyond the frontiers of Cuba. Each time wetep ahead

we are aiding the liberation of fall

Americaavage yoke."

ebruaryforce minister Raul Castro, in an

addressroup of militiamengraduatingrainingthat when the Elsenhower"threatened to attack Cuba,-People's Republic sent Cuba

hundreds of machine guns for whichof Cuba did not havo to paycentavo,ift fromand farmers of the CPR." the only-occasion uponregime leader mentioned direct Chi com

military assistance to'Cuba.

March lBoT

Havana radio broadcast-containea xhe announcement thatuban students- ware going to the Soviet Union for nine months of "aeronauticalnd that they would specialize in "handling helicopters,"

61

Cubans referred to in an early May reportubanIn West Berlin, who said that "SO Cubans" arrived in Praguearch and left the next day for tho USSR, where they were to undergo "eight months of pilot training" for an unspecified type ofaircraft. The report added that tbe Cubans would return to Cuba with the planes for which they had been trained. "

1

Fidel Caatro referring to alleged US plana to aupport aa anti-Castro Cuban government-in-exila, said: "Very well' Let the Yankees name the govemeant-in-exile when they want to; we will nameand to begin with, the government-ln-exlle of Free Puerto Rico."

Salvadoran newspaper featured several two-page spreads whloh reproduoedpurportedly taken from secret Cuban embassy files directly implicating embassy officials and the Cuban foreign office in Intervention In Salvadoran

1

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The Panamanian governaent declaredconsul In Colon persona nonhim with associating withelements. The Cubanhad arrived In Panamaad never been Issued an exequaturPanamanian government. He hada consul expelled on similar

chargesecember. I

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American embassy in Prague reported thatecent recruiting drive for speolalists to go tozechoslovak

official notedpecial teas of Czech experts had already been sent to train Cubans In modern police actboda. The official, who was from the Ministry of the Interior, stated thatwas actively recruiting medical specialists, party workers,and production engineers to go to Cuba for two- or three-year tours.

Onay the embassy reported receiving informationzechthat the Interior Ministry had sent training teams to Havana for all fields of police work, with particular emphasis on polltioal police activity. Czechoslovakia was about toorder Police team to Havana with its own dogs in order to train Cuban dog handlers, the source reported.

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Paris radio report said thatf the Cubans sent to Czechoslovakiahree-year training programeir stay and returned to Havana "in view of the critical situation in Cuba." The report did not specify the type of training the Cubans were receiving.

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Soviet government statement said tbat continuation of tbe invasion of Cuba "may have the gravest consequences for world peace." The statement alsothat the USSR "reserves the right to take all measures, with all states, to render the necessary assistance to the Republic of Cuba if tbe armedin the affairs of the Cuban peoples is not stopped." It also expressed the hope that the US government wouldtbat the invasion of Cuba could "endanger the peaceful life of theof the United States itself.11

SECRET

w

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his second letter to President Kennedy on tho subject of Cuba, Soviet Premier Khrushchev sought to establish the im-presslon that the strong position taken by the USSRey factor in turning back the rebel effort to overthrow tbs Castro regime. As in his previous letter and the Soviet government"statement ofpril, Khrushchev carefullygvplded committing the USSR to any specific measures in support ofis reference to the US presence at Guantanamo "against the dearly expressed wish of the Cuban people and government"waa Intended to serve notice that the USSR would stronglyuban demand that tbe US relinquish Its Naval Base there. On the other hand, Khrushchev said, "We do not have any bases in Cuba and we id to establish any."

1

Honduran government of President

American government to break offrelations with Cuba. The action came as the resultass anti-Castroonpril which evidentlythe president that the majority of Hondurans desired to break with Cuba until it submitted "to the norms and discipline^ of the lnter-Amerlonn system.1'

1

In an addressrospective membersew corps of "revolutionary instructors' for the armed forces, Fidel Castro said that "political and revolutionary awareness" was tbe "most important thing" within the Cuban military organization. He referred to Havana as the primary targetossible invasion by "USnd he declared tbat combat units bad to be prepared and fortifications made "lmpregnablo" so that the Cuban oapltal could be defended "in tbs same manner in whloh Soviet soldiers defended Leningrad and Stalingrad" In World War II.

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Cuban governmentrogram to processen between tha ages ofndn order tof the best qualified candidates for flight -training, accordingairly reliable source. The government reportedly hoped thatrfould become qualified as pilots, with the remainder than being assigned as members of flight crews. No training site was mentioned In tbe report, but assuming that adequate trainingand personnol remain unavailable in Cuba, the trainees presumably would to to the Bloc for such instruction.

May1

Venezuelan government announced the suspension of the activities of tba Caracas branch of Prensaha Castro regime's international "propaganda agency. The office was shut down because of the distorted pro-Castro and anti-frvtflucourt.trbtttmantoiUiral

economic news items disseminated by Prenaa Latlna within Venezuela.

1

Cubans, estimated to be abouto

years old, were observed departingrague airport for the USSR. All wore dark civilian clothes but carried Czech Aray insignia in their lapels, moat of which were Identified as artillery insignia. Tbe Cubans were almost certainly aray personnel who were to receive military training in the USSR, some of whom may have received preliminary training in Czechoslovakia. Atubans had previously been reportod to be receiving military training in Czechoslovakia, as well as an undetermined number in th* USSR.

1

Air Force sources reported that Soviet Jetwould be received In Cuba duringubaca Airline pilot who defected at about the same time also reported that

"light bombers" would arrive la June. The bombers,to tbla source, would be "very similar to those sold to Egypt by the

7 Junetransfer of tbeecret

police organization and other police and intelligence organsew Ministry of the Interior was announced. Ramlro Valdas, chief ofto be called tbe Department of State Securlty--waa named as head of tbe new ministry. The Ministry of the Interior appeare to have been modelled after the organlzationa responsible for internal security Id Bloc countries, aad its creation mayurther Increase in the efficiency of tbe Castro regime's security apparatus.

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oan nntonio.Tirnapo. ununo three ofpositively identified aa Alao In mid-June

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SECRET

17Slno/Soviet Bloc diplomat in Czechos-

slovakia reportedubans were due to arrive in Czechoslovakia betweenndune for pilot training.

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21

The Cuban preaa warmlyumber of Czech pilots who had taken part Inacrobatic demonstrations" inircraft at Rancbo Boyeros airfield In Havana,

Original document.

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