authority and control in the communist movement
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table of contents
Disciplinary Problems in the Communist
Prospects for Soviet
Implications lor Policy Toward the
I. DEVELOPMENT OP RELATIONS AMONG THE COMMUNIST
Emergence of New Communist
Entry into Bloc
II. CURRENT RELATIONS AMONG THE BLOC PARTIES
of the Dispute on the European Bloc
Strain In Bloc
Europe and the
AUTHORITY AND CONTROL IN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT
To assess the cohesion of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and among the parties of the world Communist movement, to identify trends in the degree of Soviet control, and tothe future implication of these trends.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
ccording to Communist doctrine, it would be impossible for conflicts ofto disturb in any basic way thebetween Communist parties in the international movement. This is so, it is argued, because the class interests which are the source of international conflict among non-Communist states have been suppressed by the new social order, and have been replaced by the fundamental identity of views and harmony of interests of the "classless" society. In fact,the appearance of unity in themovement has been due, not so much to the absence of conflicts ofas to the overwhelming; authority exercised by Moscow. This authority has rested on the great military and economic power of the USSR, on its historicalas the first Communist state, on the long personal ascendancy of Stalin over the international Communistand on the tradition of dictatorial
centralism in that)
n the period since World Warumber of developments havethe falsity of the simplistictheory of natural harmony among Communist parties. When theparties of Eastern Europe achieved state power they naturally acquired new interests and attitudes different from those they had reflected as smallgroups wholly dependent on the protection and support provided by Moscow. Yet they were small states in Moscow's immediate sphere of power; therefore, whatever pretensions tothey may have had were bound to be extremely circumscribed. The achievement of state power by theCommunistsifferent matter, however, because it meant that for the first time Communist theory on statehad to be applied to thebetween two great powers.)
this, there was in the postwaronsiderable growth in theand in the size of Communist parties all over the world. Among them there were wide variations in the cultural and political environments in which theyin their tactical problems, and in the degree of their Marxist-Leninistand training. Over the years, moreover, there has beenumber of the more important non-Bloc parties to be increasinglyto see that their own local points of view are considered in policy deliberations of the international movement.)
All these developments have tested not only the theory of unity, but also the authority of the Soviet Party over other parties which was the practical reality on which the appearance of unity was built. In the best of circumstances it was bound to become increasingly difficult forto maintain the unity of so large andovement with soange of differing views and interests. Inthese events have aggravated the frequent conflicts between theof the foreign policy of the Soviet state and those of the internationalmovement. Altogether, it isthat Communist politicallike all other institutions, areto pressures for change and are in fact changing.
Disciplinary Problams in ihe Communis!
authority over theCommunist movement wasas soon as the newcame into existence at the endWarn. Challengede failed either to imposeor to prevent Yugoslavia'ssurvival as an independentstate. When the Chineseachieved state power inlike the Yugoslavs, largely by their owninevitably acquired astatus in the Bloc. After Stalin died and his awesome aura of personalover the parties disappeared, his less eminent successors attempted tothe abuses of bis brutal and open control byore flexibly exercised but still decisive influence. These experiments were cut short,by the Eastern European upheavalshich showed that the balance between influence and outright control wouldifficult one to strike.)
hen Peiping helpedto restore its badly shaken authority in Eastern Europe, China has become an increasingly important factor in theof the movement, and haspretensions as an authoritative source of Communist doctrine. When the Chinese leaders resorted0 to open polemics in their policywith Moscow, and also lobbied openly among Communists against Soviet policies, the Soviets responded by, in effect, putting the Chinese on trial before the other parties, first at Bucharest and later at the November conference inNevertheless, during thedispute0 the Chinese were able touccessful challenge to Soviet authority and to establish the formal principle of mandatory consultation among the parties on matters of general Communist policy. )
Prospect! for Soviet Aufhorrfy
Sinceparty conferencehe Soviets and the Chinese have continued, within limits, theirefforts to preserve and expand their own authority in the movement. It seems to us unlikely that the two major parties will be able for aome time to come to resolve their differences andtable arrangement for directing the Communist movement. On the other hand, an open rupture between themto us equally unlikely. We believe that the course of their relations will be erratic, cooperative at some times and places, competitive at others.)
In this situation the Soviet Partyenormous advantages, because of its greater military and economic power, and also because of its traditionaland prestige within theThe ability of the Chinese Party to contend for leadership is currently limited by China's serious internalThe Soviets retain someto exert pressure by virtue of China's relative economic and military weakness, though this apparently was not very effective in the disputeof the present preponderance of Soviet power, Moscow will probably be able, though with increasing difficulty, to maintain its primacy in the Communist movement for some time to come. The Soviet leaders will endeavor to maintain the substance of their former authority by exercising pressure and influenceupon other parties, by confronting their rivals with strong majorityat international gatherings, and sometimes by shrewd adjustments ofpolicies in order to undercut Chinese criticisms. Because the role ofhfls figured in some degree in the Soviet-Chinese difficulties, theof new leaders in either country could have an important influence on the further course of their relations.)
n these circumstances, the other parties will almost inevitably be tempted to bargain between Moscow and Peiping in order to obtain greater advantages for themselves. Within certain parties which develop serious prospects ofpower, and which therefore must make important tactical choices,brands of advice may tend tofactionalism. In the long run, some of the parties in Eastern Europe, orwithin them, may attempt tofurther the autonomy conceded by Stalin's successors. In the Asianwhere Chinese influence is already strong andood prospect ofif China's power continues to grow, the regimes will be better able to bargain with both Communist great powers for economic and political
Implications for Policy Toward tha Wost
t is evident that the international Communist system, for decades little more than an instrumentality of Soviet policy, is being changed, because of the forces of nationalism and diversity within it,ovement reflecting andiffusion of power. While the altered relationships within themovement and the decline in Soviet authority have not altered thehostility of the Communists toward the non-Communist world, wethat these developments are having
an important influence on Communist policy. They have already diminished to some extent the flexibility of Soviet policy towards the West, and the Soviet Party will probably encounter increasingIn Its efforts to coordinate general Communist policy. These difficulties may not be as serious in times when events generally favor Communistbut they may again erupt into open polemics during periods of adversity, or even at times when fundamentalare required for the exploitation of unfolding opportunities,
he development of the relationship between the USSR and China, and the evolution of the International Communist movement generally, will obviously be of profound significance for the security and interests of the West. In the long run Chinese power, assertiveness, andmight increase so far as greatly to impair the common policy with the USSR, and even lead the Soviets to believe that they had more in common with theenemy than they have today. For some time to come, however, the most likely prospect is that the USSR and
China will maintain their relationship in something like its present form. It will be an alliance which is from time to time troubled and inharmonious, but which nevertheless preserves sufficient unity to act in concert against the West, especially in times of major challenge. However, present trends as described in this paper point to an increasing complexity,and interplay of forces within the Communist system, andemarkable survival of old-fashioned impulses of
hese trends may have various effects. They may from time to time result in more aggressive anti-Western policiesto hold the forces of disunity in check. They may enable certain parties, free from the restrictionsigid,Communist line, to pursue more effective policies in local situations. But eventually, if such trends persist, they may considerably diminish theof the Communist movementhole. This would give the Westfor maneuver and influence which could provide importantin the world struggle.
DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS AMONG THE COMMUNIST PARTIES
A. The Comintern Period
he Comintern (Third International) was at the outset,riefollection of independent parties and groups whichond of unity ln dedication torevolutionary goals, Immediately after the Russian Revolution and the end of World War I. Communists lived In the expectation of imminent revolutions In Western Europe, and even Lenin anticipated that his own party would share leadership of the International movement with the victorious parties ofEurope. As these Illusions died, however, the Soviet Party was not long in establishing Its ascendancy, and In making the Comintern over In its own Bolshevik image. In the twenties, International Communist policy was increasingly subordinated to the needs of Soviet foreign policy, and the parties were gradually placed under increasingly stringent supervision by Moscow through the vastbureaucracy of the Comintern. Subsequently, through repeated purges and
means of pressure, Stalin acquiredcomplete control over all the partiesthe Chinese. At the same time, hemore and more with formalorgans, and in the mid-thirtiesand suspicion moved him to decimate the entire headquarters apparatus of the Comintern. Long before it washe Comintern had in fact lost its practical importance, though Stalin's tight control of the Communist movementunimpaired.
B. The Emergence of New Communist States
World War II, which disrupted partywith Moscow, nurturedtendencies among the parties and helped the French, Italian, and several East European parties to develop greater mass support ta the partisan struggles and toincreasingly self-reliant. The mosteffect of the war, however, was the fundamental alteration it wrought ta the Communist movement by the creation of new Communist stales outside the Soviet Union. Previously, Soviet control over the movement had been relatively simple. Involving only parties out of power whose very existence often depended on Moscow's political andsupport. Now the Communiststill basedingle source of power and authority, had to embrace not just parties, but also national states, each of which had its own particular national interests.
Stalin was not disposed to give much play to these national interests. As soon as the Communist Parties ta Eastern Europe were securely established In power, he took steps to impose complete, all-pervasive control, tie-tag the new states tightly to Moscow and treating them as mere extensions of thestate system. The Yugoslav Party,refused to submit to such treatment, and subsequently was able to survive expulsion from the Cominform and to establish itselfontinuous, glaring contradiction ofclaims that membership In the Bloc best serves the national interests of its individual members. In the rest of Eastern Europe,the ensuing crackdown, secret police methods of rule could only repress, but not eliminate, disaffection and nationalistwhich often infected the local parties as well as the population.
establishment of CommunistChina created an additional problembut one of far greatervirtue of Its size, population, and theInfluence of its civilization, Chinagreat power. Moreover, the Chinesemost parties in Easternits revolutionary victory largelyown efforts and established Its ownpowerountry far too large andmake the Imposition of direct controlfor Moscow. Its leader, Maoknew from experience that Stalincomprehension of local problemswhich differed greatly from thoseSoviet Union. He did not hesitate toCommunist doctrine independentlythe needs of Chinese internal policy;before Stalin's death Maooctrinal Innovator.Stalin's wishes may havepecial status ta
C. The Death of Stalin
until the death ofauthority was largelythe Soviet Party possessedfor asserting its control. It hadfirst party, and for decades the onlyachieve power andecurethe international movement. Ita powerful state, developing In thean internal system which came to beof socialism for other parties. Itspronouncements had becomeits publications served as the basicmaterial for CommunistsThe other parties were In greatupon the USSR forfinancial support, while those whichbrought to power ta Easternthat Soviet military might wasguarantee of survival against aThe leaders of the morewere usually selected by the Soviets,
trained In Soviet Party schools, and thenand maintained in positions ofby the Soviets; frequently they were also purged or liquidated by the Soviets.
system of control dependedenormous personal authority, anof great strength but also onea majorIt waswho determined policy, who dennedwho pronounced doctrine, whoSoviet prestige amongin great part Identical with thegenuine regard which they felt forNone of his colleagues hadamong the other parties; Inonly man who approached him Inwas in the Chinese Party. ThusId3 diminished at aauthority within theand thisime whenwas rising, and when difficultiesin Eastern Europe.
D. Khrushchev's New Approach
Even before his death, some of Stalin's lieutenants were acutely conscious of theeffects of his policies toward the other Communist parties and of the necessity toew approach which would combine less direct, though still effective methods of control with tolerationimited amount of local autonomy. The Intent behindnew approach was not to allowautonomy, but toore flexible policy In order to maintain the maximum amount of effective Soviet control.
This new approach had the effect InEurope of releasing pent up forces cryuig for reform, as well as repressed bitterness over Soviet arbitrary treatment andstimulated still further by the reversal of Stalin's policy toward Yugoslavia and the acknowledgmentommunist party's right toseparatehe destruction of the Stalin myth, which severed anthread of authority and caused confusion and soul-searching among the parties, was the final blow. The result in Polandesurgence of nationalist feeling whicharty leader to power who personified this outlook and which led Moscow to grantan important measure of bona fideautonomy. In Hungary, the resulteep division within the party which opened the way to revolt. Though therepression in Hungary abruptly checked the trend toward liberalization in Eastern Europe and made it clear that the Soviets would deal ruthlessly with any attemptedfrom the Bloc, thehole was badly shaken and therelear need for authoritative political and ideological guidance. It requiredSoviet efforts, Including substantialaid and concessions to injuredfeelings In Eastern Europe, before the Moscow Conference of7 could meet this need with an agreed reaffirmation of basic principles of "socialist development" for Communist countries, based on Soviet
E China's Entry into Bloc Affairs
eanwhile, the Chinese Communistsin the upheavals6 both aand an opportunity. They were fully as concerned as the Soviets to restore unity and stability to the Bloc. But at the same time they found themselves, in the wake of Soviet mistakes.osition to influence the re-establishment of that unityew basis. Having built up their own strength andsince coming to powernd already exercising some Influence over the Asian Parties within and outside the Bloc, they were nowosition to contributeto the Soviet effort to restore order in Eastern Europe while at the same timethe weight of their own Influence In the movementhole. Thus, both in their important doctrinal statements of this period and Chou En-lai's tour of the European Satellites, they managed to convey the idea that Soviet leadership should be respectedthey, the Chinese, said so. The result, despite Peiping's public insistence uponprimacy, was to nudge both the Bloc and the international movementreater sharing of leadership, and to show that Chinese influence and authority in the movement were now considerable.
II. CURRENT RELATIONS AMONG THE BLOC PARTIES
A. The Si no Soviei Dispute0
We have in previous estimates examined the causes of the Sino-Soviet dispute and the issues to which It has given rise.'-8oth sides limited themselves, at least in public, to setting forth theirin seemingly abstract Ideologicalwhich In fact reflectedrowing range of specific issues. In the spring, however, China finally dropped this restraint and by June was openly lobbying against the USSR among the delegates to the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) meeting in Pelping.responded sharply by, in effect, putting the Chinese on trialeeting of aof the Communist Parties in Bucharest later in the month. The Chinese held fast, and even obtained open support from theParty. The two sides agreed finallylenary session of the entire Communist movement at which disputed matters would be debated again when all the parties sent representatives to the November celebration in Moscow.
Between June and November, each side became Increasingly aggressive. Both tried to line up support by circularizing the entire movement with lengthy attacks on the other. With Moscow employing all Its powers ofand control, moat parties fell readily Into line behind the USSR,ew stayed on the fence or leaned toward China on certain issues. Meanwhile, polemics In the Bloc press became increasingly explicit, and the USSR exerted strong pressure on China ln various aspects of their state relations.' All these
n, "Main Trends In Soviet Capabilities andSino-Soviet
'This pressure included the withdrawal ot the bulk of Soviet technicians at the end olon', suspension or Chinese publications in the USSR, dtpiomaUc protests, the expulsion of certain Chinese officials, and ominous warning* In thehere Is also considerable evidence suggesting border difficulties between the lwo countries during this period.
measures faUed to deter the Chinese, and the November meetingirectWhat was at stake there was notange of disputed policy issues, but the more fundamental question of how and by whom Communist policy was to beother words, the question ofin the international movement.
In the most general sense, therefore, the question of authority was involved in every issue debated at the Moscow proceedings. The final document In general gave preference to Soviet propositions on world strategy and Internal Communist policy, and in signing it the Chinese subscribed to manywhich they had vigorously contested in the preceding months. But in order tothis Chinese agreement, the Soviets had at many points to allow Peiping to Include its formulations as well, although these usually received less prominence than the Soviet statements. The resultompromise document which stated both sides ofquestions and thereby clearly conveyed to the other parties that Chinese demandseal voice in policymaking for themovement had, however reluctantly, been granted by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union <CPSU).
But the issue of authority was joined even more directlyeries of proposals designed specifically to assert Soviet primacy and bind the Chinese to future obedience.any aspirations to truly Stalinistbut confident that they could stilla majority In the internationalthe Soviets fell backroposal for majority ruleeans of forcing theInto formal submission. In another maneuver, they sought to have the document acknowledge their leading role by endorsing the decisions ofht CPSUwhich had been called into question by the Chinese. Again, they proposed that the parties formally condemnlear reference to Chinese efforts to form anti-Soviet coalitions with other parties, and "nationalhrase injected to
lay the basis for future attacks upon Chinese deviations.
Although the Chinese had been willing to compromise on points of doctrine, they proved adamant in their opposition to theseproposals. They Insisted that neither they nor any other party should be bound by the decisions, even if they were correct, of Soviet Party Congresses. They contended that majority rule, while correct for the individual parties, was intolerable for the movement and that only unanimous decisions of all the parties could have universal validity. Lastly, they refused to agree to the condemnations of "factionalism" and "national communism."
In the end, the Chinese prevailed on these central issues of authority because tho Soviets found no way of imposing their will upon the Chinese. The two offending phrases werefrom the document. The Sovietwere praised, but only In limited terms, and the contributions of "other parties" were commended in the same breath. As for the mechanism for international decisionmaking, the USSR had to abandon majority rule In favorormal undertaking to observe those decisions which were "jointly worked out" at bilateral and multilateral conferences, awhich came close toeto power to the Chinese or any other party.
Thus, despite the commanding majorities which the Soviets had, they failed to gam their major points on what is toitalthe USSR's dominating role In the Communist world. The measure of this failure wasgreater than the textual compromises and losses which they had to accept Ina unanimous statement. Not only did they fail to coerce the Chinese, but in the voting they were actively opposed by Albania and on several occasions lost the support of North Korea, North Vietnam,umber of other Asian parties. In addition, they had to undergo, in full view of the entirethe unprecedented experience ofdebate and even outright vilification of their leader.
S. Effect of the Dispute on the European Bloc Parties
The Sino-Soviet dispute produceduneasiness within the Bloc. The USSR had the support of most Communists in the Satellites, but some sympathy forChinese methods and attitudes had been manifestedn the Bulgarian, East German, and Czech Parties. Thisquickly disappeared, however, as soon as the Soviets invoked their authority in coming out directly against the Chinese. The performance of all the East Europeanat the Moscow Conference, except the Albanians, was thoroughly obedient.
Albania, however, turned out toramatically different case. The Albanian Party is in the hands of unreconstructed Stalinists who are obsessed with the fear that Yugoslavia will re-establish Its formerover the Albanian Cornmunist movement. Accordingly, this leadership was gravely alarmed when,5hrushchev launched his attack upon Stalin, including in the indictment Stalin's attempts to subvert Yugoslavia, and took up the cultivation of Tito. Even after the post-Hungarianof Soviet policy, the Albanians continued tohreat to their independence in Khrushchev's advocacy of "peacefuland his reluctance to accede to an all-out attack on Tito. Thus, when the Chinese appeared as the championsard, antirevisionist line, Albania broke ranks and during meetings of the Communist Partiespenly joined the Chinese side with virulent attacks upon the CPSU.
Chinese support offers some protection for the Albanians, since the USSR must recognize that direct moves against Tirana risk the further worsening of its already delicatewith Peiping. The Albanians enjoy two other advantages, however, which are probably more important In the defense of their new anti-Soviet stance. One is their physical separation from the Bloc, which makes it difficult for the USSR to applyforce without greatly damaging itsposition. The other Is the unity of
Ihe Albanian top leadership, dating frompartisan combat and securederies of purges which cleansed it first of members sympathetic to its former mentor, theParty, and then,f pro-Soviet elements.esult, the Soviets have had to restrict themselves to Indirect methods which thus far have proven embarrassingly ineffectual. Moscow's failure to punish the defiance of another Communist state Isignominious in view of Albania's size and hitherto complete subordination.
C. The Asian Satellites
Among the Asian Satellites, Pelping has cultural and geographic advantages whichIt Ui compete with the Sovietsearly equal basis.esult, North Vietnam, North Korea, and Outer Mongolia have found themselvesosition between the two great Communist powers that Is delicate, but at the same time rewarding. In North Vietnam, most of the top leaders are Soviet-trained, but Communist China played an Important role in advising, training, and supplying the Vietminh revolution against the French. Furthermore, the geographical location of North Vietnam and the similarity of many of its problems make close cooperation withatural course for Hanoi. On the other hand, the North Vietnamese leadersthat the only way for them to avoid being completely dominated by their giant neighbor is totrong Soviet presence in North Vietnam. These conflictinghave not Impaired the essential unity with which Moscow. Pelping, and Hanoi have pressed then- objectives In Laos.
The Outer Mongolian and North Korean Communist regimes were both placed in power by the Soviets before thereommunist China. During the past decade both regimes have undergone purges that were apparently aimed, at least in part, against leaders who looked toward Pelping for guidance orAl present Soviet dominance seemsta Outer Mongolia In spite of Peiptags considerable efforts to enhance Its Influence there. Even though the present leaders of North Korea are nearly all Moscow-trained, theyronounced affinity forforced-draft industrialization andprograms8he party backed away fromChinese methods when the Sovietstheir dLspleasure. At the present time Soviet Influence probably continues to exceed that of China.
Mongolia did not back any ofpositions during the Sino-SovietNorth Korea and Northtoiddle courseof the Soviet propositions, but Joiningon the critical Issue offact that these two Asian states noand unhesitatingly followleadsonsiderableMoscow's authority. In addition,Moscow appear to have becomea competition to win support byaid Into the three Asian Satellites.
D. Continued Strain in Bloc Relations
Despite Soviet and Chinese efforts after the Moscow conference to portray Interparty harmony and fraternal solidarity, It Is evident that important differences ol view persist. Each party has made its own tendentious interpretation of the December Statement, stressing those portions which correspond most closely with its views during the dispute. The Chinese, moreover, are making the most of the advantages gained in Moscow by stress-tag the special responsibilities of the "two largest parties" in the movementalso continue to be apparent In the interpretation of contemporary world
The Albanians have been by no means as restrained as their Chinese allies since the conference. They have gone to great lengths to endorse the anti-Soviet behavior of their leaders at Moscow and to affirm that their party Une had been correct before, during, and after the dispute. They continue to criticize in indirect but unmistakable termsSoviet policy, especially towardContinued strain in Sino-Sovietmoreover, was most clearly Indicated at the Albanian Party Congress, held in Kebru-
which became the occasion for another confrontation, thoughar lesser scale, of parties in the movement who endorsed the Soviet or Albanian-Chinese positions.
Following this Congress, Albania hasto receive staunch support from China, including extensive economic aid. whilewith Moscow have steadilyA show trial staged in Tirana,Albanian naval officers among others, and ostensibly directedreek-Yugoslav-US plot, was In fact an anti-Soviet demonstration. It was followed by the evacuation by theof their important submarine base at Valona.
There have been few indications that the many serious problems In Sino-Soviet state relations which were evident0 have been resolved.rade agreement was signed in April which eased China's debtappreciably, the Soviet commitments under the agreement were far from generous, especially in view of China's serious economic problems. Moreover, the Chinese economy continues under the handicap created by the withdrawal of Soviet technicians, and there is no evidence of any agreement io send them back in their former numbers. The lack of detail in the June communique following the talks on economic, technical, and scientific cooperation suggested that, though someassistance would continue, there is little likelihood that the former degree of economic cooperation will be restored.
III. THE NON-BLOC PARTIES A. General
War II and its aftermathsubstantial and in some casesin the circumstances ofoutside the Bloc, In WesternFrench and Italian Parties developedpopular support and somefinancial resources, and even incountries the parties became anpart of the local politicalthe same period, in thefirst gained independence after theCommunist parties rapidly came toreal domestic prospects and, therefore, became more preoccupied with problems of domestic politics.
advances were, of course,to the Soviet leaders. At the sameUSSR has continued to pursue itsin ways which have oftenthose of local Communist parties; inKhrushchev has madeajorpolicy to court newly independenteven when the local parties areto discredit and replace them. Theparties have thus becometo have their own Interestsin the formulation of theChina's success has probablysome encouragement in thisimportant, China's rise hasconcept of monolithic authority in theparties, making it easier forwithin these parties to develop into
B. Western Europe and the US
The Wesiern European Parties, still led by tested veterans of the Comintern period who have alwaysirm Soviet orientation, have remained responsive tocontrol. Nevertheless, the relationship of the individual parties to the CPSU has changed considerably since the days of the prewar period. The widespread discrediting of parliamentary democracy before the war and the underground struggles of World War II enabled the parties to develop such strengthumber of them were later able to withstand prolonged adversity and political isolation.
The altered status of these parties was not particularly apparenthende-Stallnization speech had aeffect causing demoralization and in some cases large-scale defections. Theof the leaders of the Italian and French Partieslear measure of the change which had occurred. Togllattl reacted lo the Khrushchev speech by openly advocating "polycentrism" in the movement, by which he meant autonomy for the parties. The French
leaders respondedifferent way, byKhrushchev to tone down his denigration of Stalin. Though Togliatti soon ceased to advocate his proposal, both Initiatives, different as they were, showed an assertive-ness which would have been Inconceivable in Stalin's time.
Khrushchev's speech also stimulated short-lived demands for increased autonomy in the other West European parties,to the Danish Party,action under AkscI Larsonore extremeeven than Togliatti. and Anally had to be expelled. An effect of these developments was that the Soviet leaders subsequently were more attentive to the local problems andof the parties At the same time, the Soviets recognized that greater autonomy was necessary IX these parties were to play their role in the "peaceful coexistence" strategy. Thus the Rome conference of Westernparties9 reunitedolicygiving the individual partiesleeway in implementing the general line.
Despite this loosening of discipline, the Western European parties have been among Moscow's strongest supporters in the dispute with Peiping, and Chinese attempts tothem were unavailing. These parlies have been greatly assisted In their internal campaigns by the Soviet line on nonviolent methods of achieving power and theof war. and they saw China's advocacy of violence and high risks as threatening their prospects for winning popular support. Some groups within these parties have at tiroes sought to use various Chinese arguments for factional purposes, but at the Moscowthe interventions of the Westwere ul) In support of Soviei positions. However, their leaders did not behave atto the obsequious manner of former days and even showed some evidence of resenting Soviet pressure. They showed reluctance to commit themselves lo accept future Soviet guidance unreservedly, and were bolder than they had ever been before to urging theto Rive greater heed, in working out general policy, to their own local problems
ith Its traditional deference to Soviet guidance, the Communist Party, USAave the Soviet Union Itssupport at the Moscow Conference. In addition, the CPUSA has enthusiasticallySoviet "peaceful coexistence" tactics as most favorable to its efforts in the USof the more militant, revolutionaryposition would place the party under still more handicaps to operating in the US. At present, there appears little prospect that the Chinese position will gain any significantIn the CPUSA.
C. Tha Middle east
he Communist movement to the Middle East historically has been under close Soviet direction, especially those parties which, banned at home, are forced to operate from bases within the Bloc and thus arc completely dependent upon Soviet support. In recent years, however, signs of friction have become visible In the Syrian and Iraqi Parties. Both these parties were strong enough to nourish Immediate political ambitions, and both have been hampered by Soviet cultivation of their domestic opponents, the "national bourgeois" regime* of Nasser and Qasim.
he formation of the United Arab(UAR)8 was facilitated by theof an imminent Communist bid for power ln Syria. Since that time. Syrian Communist leader Bakdash has been unable fully tohimself to Soviet policy toward Nasser and has resisted acceptance of the Syro-Egyptlan union. In Iraq, traditional factionalism in the Communist Party became bitter9 when the Communists overreached themselvesampaign of violence, bringing on arepression from which the party still has not recovered. The USSRof this tactic, regarding it not only as premature but as likely to spoil Its ownwith Qasim. The Chinese, however, probably encouraged it and thereby gained the sympathy of the radical faction within the Iraqi Party. Chinese attempts to broaden their Influence among Middle Easternhave, however, brought few results to date. At the Moscow meeting Bakdash, the
s f. QJCE t
Influential Communist in the area,his resentment of Chinese attempts to proselytize members of his own parly, and violently criticized Chinese disobedience. The other parties also lined up behind the Soviet position.
D. The Asian Parties
Among the non-Bloc parties of Asia,authority is far less secure. Among the smaller parties Chinese influence is strong andew cases outweighs that of the USSR. The larger ones, those of India, Indonesia, and Japan, contain pro-Chinese elements and. In addition, are reluctant to come out openly against the major Communist power of the region. When put to the test at the Moscow Conference, some of the Asian partiesa degree of support to the Chinese, and none of them lined up solidly behind thein the manner of their European and Arab colleagues. Further, this pattern was repeated at the Albanian Party Congress in
In Japan, after the Communist Party had thoroughly discredited itself in the eyes of the Japanese public by Its violent and Illegal activities0he post-Stalin trends in Soviet foreign policy have favored the efforts of the JapaneseParty (JCP) lo rehabilitate itself. The party can the more convincingly portray itself to the people as Independent, and in favor of peaceful accession to power, and thus pursue its current strategy ofroadfront against American imperialism and domestic monopoly capitalism. Support for China exists among minority elements within the Communist Party and among certainstudent and trade union groups outside the party. The JCP is likely to retain its pro-Soviet orientation as long as the present leaders remain in control of the Japanese Party. However, recent Soviet and Chinese moves suggest that each is seeking to strengthen its influence in the JCP.
The domestic position of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) Is unique. It is one of the largest Communist parties outside the Bloc, has an important popular fallowing, and
enjoys the protection of Sukarno, who has drawn it, along with the anti-Communist Army, into the national leadership. Thus the Soviet line on the nonviolent, parliamentary road to socialism is far better suited to the PKl's needs than the more radical andapproach advocated by China, which at this stage could only serve to forfeitprotection against the army and diminish the party's popular support as well. Soviet foreignofprovision of economic and military aid, and support of Indonesia's claim to West NewIdeally with the PKT'stactics and enhance its domesticDespite all thosehinese-oriented faction does exist within the party, and had sufficient strength to influence the conduct of the PKI delegation In Moscow.
oviet foreign policy hasuch more mixed effect upon the prospects of domestic Communists in India, where Moscow's aid and encouragement has been extended to awhich treats the local party as anratherartner. While"peaceful coexistence" tactics have given communism some respectability In India, It has been difficult for the local party toSoviet courtship of Nehru with his ousting of the Communist Government in Kerala and the current trend of Indian foreign policy, which the party regards as pro-Western. These tactics have intensified the traditional factionalism in the Indian Party, with afrankly sympathetic to China andto steer the partyore revolutionary course. This minorityevere check, however, when the Tibetan revolt and the Sino-Indian border dispute aroused Indianelings against China and placed the Communists in an exceedingly awkwardSuslov, attending the Indian Partyinound It more Important to keep the Indian Party togetherague and generally moderate political line than to try to impose discipline on the pro-Chinese faction, andesult the party remains uncertain, divided, and subject to serious disputes in the future.
contrast with the largerumber of the smallerexample, those of Malaya,not in their viewgradualist tactics generally advocatedFor many of them prospectspower via parliamentaryexceedingly remote. They thereforeby Soviet "peaceful"united front" tactics, and are anxiousthis approach for more directmethods. The effect of thisevident during the discussions InNovember, and afterward, at thewhere several of these partiesthe Chinese against the Soviet positions.
Communist movement in Africa isand the focus of Sovietis the radical nationalist leadershipthe USSR can cooperate inThe longer term Communistis the conversion of radicalto communism, and the Bloc hasmuch more effort to this than toof Communist parties fromthe Sino-Soviet clash over strategyareas is potentiallythe African Communist movement,al present little specific evidence offriction. There have been vagueexample, that at theonference, the Soviet and Chineseclashed over specific details ofbut the nature of theseactuallynot known. Theparties represented at MoscowTunisia, Morocco, and Sudan) allto have supported the Soviet side ofdispute with China.
leaders of the Latin Americanin nearly all instances veteranwho were trained in the USSR andlook to Moscow for materialStalin's death the Soviets began tomore activo hand in directingin Latin America. At the Moscow
Conference ofnd again att CPSU Congress inhe Latin American parties wore given direct,instructions on tactics in support of the "peace campaign" in their countries.
In recent years the Chinese Communists have enlarged their efforts lo acquire influence among these parties They have beenby their lack of official representation In most of the Latin American countries. By bringing Latin American Communists tofor visits and extended training,and by greatly stepping up theirin the area, they have succeeded in making known their divergent views.revolutionary tactics have won someparticularly among youngerbut Chinese Influence has to date not become an important factor within these parties.
As the Sino-Soviet dispute developed.party leaders managed tothe differences and to prevent discussion among their memberships. During the early stages of the Moscow Conference, there were some indications of support for Chinese views in some of the smaller parties (Honduras. Nicaragua, Panama, Peru) which felt that they had no prospects for achieving power by nonviolent means,erious splitIn the Uruguayan Party. On the other hand, the Important Cuban and Brazilian parties were among the strongest Sovieton the key Issue of discipline within the international movement. En the last analysis, all the Latin American parties, in certain cases under some pressure, stood firm In support of Ihe Soviet* against the Chinese.
The success of the Cuban revolution hasew factor of major importance into the structure of Communist authority and control in Latin America. Cuba is heavilyupon Soviet material support, and the Cuban Communists look primarily to Moscow rather than Peiping At the same time, the Cuban Communisls apparently feel that their revolutionary auccess had unique features which allowertain pride andand they also consider that their success in Cuba hasodel and
inspiration for the other parties in Latin America. At the Moscow Conference, both the Cubans and the Drasllians initially voiced reservations about the Soviet conceptnational democraticwhich Cuba is the first example -showing reluctance to bind themselves to any rigid policy formulation which might not fit future conditionsin Latin America.
avanapecial importance as abase for Communist activities in Latin America. For one thing, it has provided the Chineseoint of entry into an area where they have found it difflcult tooothold. For another. It has become the logical meeting place and training ground for Latin American Communists. Some of these, however, apparenUy are concerned that the great prestige of the Cubans In their ownmay weaken their own leadership, and they may suspect their Cuban comrades of ambitions to lead the movement in the area. Thus the future Interaction of Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban aspirations and interests in the Communist movement of Latin America is at present far from clear.
IV. THE OUTIOOK
t is evident from the foregoing account that the international Communist movement, for decades little more than anof Soviet policy. Is being changed, because of the forces of nationalism and diversityit,ovement reflecting andiffusion of power The realof authority Is at present uncertain and shifting. We believe that Ln spite of theshow of harmony the Soviet and Chinese leaders are not agreed upon the futureof relations among the parties. The Chinese have carefully avoided making any claim to primacy and have insisted only upon an enlarged role for themselves with the CPSU in the direction ol the movement. But it is not at all certain that their ambitions end at that point. During the strugglest appeared that the Chinese wereid for codeterminatlon of policy in themovement. In part because they believe that they have better preserved the purity of
Communist doctrine We believe that, though in future they may exercise more Judicious tactics, they will miss few opportunities totheir claims. For the present,they are refraining from open challenges to the CPSU, but are nonetheless continuing to develop their coterie of supporters among the other parties.
Tho Soviets, for their part, are finding It difficult to reconcUc themselves to theof their control over the Communist movement. At the same time they recognize that the rise of Communist China, theof non-Bloc parties, and the drawbacks of Stalin's coercive techniques require them toew approach to the problem of authority and conirol in the CommunistThey have experimented with looser methods of supervision, especially In Eastern Europe, and have tried to establish the Idea that therecomity" of equalnations. But in all this they have merely been seeking new forms fortheir authority undiminished. Thus they did not hesitate, when confrontedirect challenge, to use coercion in state relations with China and Albania and.arty level, to try to railroad through internationaltheir views on ideology and globalThough they have renounced formal leadership of the movement, they hope tothe substance of their former authority by exercising pressure and Influence bilaterally upon other parties and by confronting their rivals with strong majority coalitions atgatherings.
It seems to us unlikely, therefore, that the Soviet and Chinese parties will soonay to resolve their differences andtable arrangement for directing the Communist movement. For one thing, the relationsthe two suits are already clutterederies of political, economic andIssues which keep mistrust alive. Forthere appears to be no Intimacy, and little regard, between the leaders of the two powers. Most Important, however, each has strongly-held views on the strategy which can best serve both its own interests and those of
the movement, and the differences in these views go deeper than personal Jealousies.
On the other hand, each side Is aware of the Immense damage that would result from an open rupture. It may be that both will take the events0arning not to ullow their relations to become so openlyin the future. But. we believe that the course of these relations will be erratic,at some times and places,at others. This course will also beby external and even fortuitousWestern policy, for example, might act either to drive the USSR and China closeror to widen the breach between them.ajor change in the leadership of either party, while It probably would notthe fundamentals of their relationship, could alter the vigor with which one or the other prosecutes its claims.
nder these circumstances, with authority diffused and both Peiping and Moscow solicit ing their support, the other parties will almost Inevitably be tempted to bargain between them In order toreater measure offor themselves. Some of theIn Eastern Europe, or factions within them, may attempt to develop further the autonomy conceded by Stalin's successors. In this connection, Yugoslavia, which stands as an exampleuccessful Communist state enjoying full independence, would exercise an increasingly strong attraction, particularly if Khrushchev's policies toward Belgrade belie the formal proscription of Yugoslavia as de-vlationist. In the Asian Salellites, where Chinese influence is already strong andood prospect of increasing, the regimes will bo better able to bargain for economic and political support.
he parties outside the Bloc, even those still closely tied to Moscow, will also find their positions affected by Sino-Soviet competition. Some of these parties, particularly those which are less doctrinaire and less accustomed to close Soviet tutelage, will be inclined tofrom differing Soviet and Chinese tactical advice whatever happens to fit their particular needs of the moment. Those smaller parties of Asia, In which pro-Chinese inclinations are already strong, will probably tend to solidfy their ties with Peiping. The sharpest effects will probably be felt in those purties in the underdeveloped countries, such as India and Indonesia, which enjoy real political prospects and therefore must make important tactical choices. The two brands of advice, often sharply different, now being urged upon those parties will probably intensify thewhich already plagues their ranks.
A. Policy Effects
hile the altered relationships within the Communist movement and the decline inauthority have not altered thehostility of the Communists toward the non-Communist world, we believe that these developments are having an important influence on Communist policy. The Chinese Party, through the disputes of the past year, has already diminished to some extent the flexibility of Soviet policy toward the West, and the Soviet Party will probably encounter increasing difficulties in coordinating general Communist policy. Soviet and Chineseof view on general tactics for the parties as well as the differences in theInterests of the two states, areenough to make the working out of an agreed course of policy more, rather than leas, complicated. These difficulties may not be as serious in times when events generally favor Communist Interests, but they may again erupt into open polemics during periods ofor even at times when fundamental decisions are required for the exploitation of unfolding opportunities. This would betrue If the Chinese thought the Soviets showed signs of making concessions to the West on Important matters, or if the Soviets felt that Chinese actions threatened tothe USSR in war.
he hardening of Soviet policy over the past year or so almost certainly owesto the CPSU's desire to counter Chinese charges of insufficient revolutionary zeal. We think that this effort is partly responsible, for example, for the vigor with which the Soviets have attacked the West on the issues of
colonlaUsm and the structure of the UN. It may haveari ln their reversal of position in the nuclear tost talks and their total subordination of disarmament policy to political struggle. This Is not to say the Chinese can noweto power over Soviet policy. Moscow's present tacticsto be guided by much the sameof risk which the Chinese earlieras overly cautious. Nor hasbeen deterred from renewing personal diplomacy with the US or reviving contacts with Yugoslavia, leaving Pelping to swauow its objections But the Chinese probably have succeeded in limiting somewhat the USSK's freedom to engage the West on any basis other than militancy.
he development of the relationshipthe USSR and China, and the evolution of the international Communist movement generally, will obviously be of profoundfor the security and Interests of the West. In tho long runwcr, as-sertiveness, and self-interest might increase so far as greatly to impair the common policy with the USSR, and even lead the Soviets to believe that they had more In common with the Ideological enemy than they have today. For some time to come, however, the most likely prospect Is that the USSR and China will maintain their relationship in something like its present form. It will be an alliance which Is from time to time troubled andbul which nevertheless preserves sufficient unity to act In concert against the West, especially in times of major challenge. However, present trends as described in this paper point to an tacreasing complexity,and Interplay of forces within the Communist system, andemarkableof old-fashioned impulses of nationalism.
hese trends may have various effects. They may from time to time result In more aggressiveestern policies intended to hold the forces of disunity in check. They may enable certain parties, free fromigid, general Communist line, to pursue more effective policies In localBut eventually, if such trends persist, they may considerably dirruhish theof the Communist movementhole. This would give the West opportunities for maneuver and influence which could provide Important advantages in the world struggle.Original document.