delegate Tsarapkin at the Geneva test talks has dropped all pretense of serious interest in concluding anand is seeking to induce the VStmmmmmmmUam]to take tho
negotiations. He charged onune that the West now is interested only in ending the talks and placing the blame on the USSR.
At the same sessionformally introduced the Soviet aide-memoireune on nuclear testing which was handed to the US at theof the President's talks with Khrushchev in Vienna. This memorandum proposed that,
ln view of the failure to reach an agreementest ban, the powers take up the "cardinal question" of general and complete disarmament and settle theand nuclear testinterdependently.
The Soviet memorandum stated that the USSR would agree toeneral disarmament treaty including Western proposals on the cessation of nuclearand impliedest ban could bo part of the first stage ofreaty. Tsarapkin contended that these proposals demonstrated the USSR'sand "constructive approach" and denied any intention ofan ultimatum. He stressed,
however, that the West has the choice of eitherest ban treaty on Soviet terms or merging these talks with negotiations on general.
The Soviet proposal is clearly aimed at prolonging the present uncontrolled moratorium on testing. Moscow probably also calculates that the opening of bilateral Soviet-UStalks onune and the international conference on general disarmament scheduled to begin onuly in Geneva will actrake on any US move to resume nuclear weapons tests this summer.
The Soviet move toseparate negotiations on the nuclear test issue bythem in the complex subject of general disarmament probably springs from two main considerations. Now thathas restored top-level contact with the US by hiswith the President, which he believes will open the way for negotiations on the keyissues of Berlin andhe has no furtherin keeping the test talks aliveeans of promoting an accommodation with
Another and probably more important motivating factor is Communist China's long-standing oppositionest banthe complete destruction of all existing nuclear weaponcondition which Peiping insists on in order toest ban agreement. This issue seems to haveajor role in the long and bitter Sino-Soviet dispute last year,ommitment byto downgrade andwithdraw from separate talks on nuclear testing mayeen an important element in the behind-the-scenesworked out at the Moscow meeting of Communist leaders last November. The Moscow Declaration called for "banning
atomic weapons as well tests andu contrast to the statement sued by7 conference Communist chiefs, it failed toest ban alone.
reduced interest in a test cessation treaty was evident in the monthsthe Moscow conference. Two weeks before the latest round of talks opened at Geneva last March, Khrushchev,alk with Ambassador Thompson at Novosibirsk, adopted aattitude toward the possibility of an agreement and minimized the importance of the issue. Furthermore, Khrushchev for the first time singled out French tests as an obstacle to agreement. When the talksthe Soviet delegation followed up Khrushchev'sand charged that French testingeriousto agreement. Inthe Soviets withdrew their previous consentingle administrator and proposed tohree-membercounciluilt-in Soviet veto.
After tbe Western powersumber of important revisions in their position in order to meet previous Soviet objections, the Soviet delegate refused to negotiate on the details of implementation, insisting on the standardof recording "agreement inespite important unresolved points. Privately, the Soviets took pains tothat Moscow did not intend to break off the talks, and the French test in late April passed with only routine Soviet criticism.
Tsarapkin made no effort to respond to the new Western concessions on the main issues before the conference, or to offer serious counterproposals. Instead, he virtually ignored the Western position and began to reiterate at great length the new Soviet position. On
ay the Soviets reverted to the question of French testing, warning in an officialstatement that further testing wouldreaty "impossible" and might compel the USSR to resume its own weapons tests. In preparation Tor the meeting between the President and Khrushchev,deliveredminute review of the conference, which suggested that the USSR was prepared to maintain itsduring the Vienna talks.
The USSR's unyieldingwas confirmed bystatements during the Vienna talks and in the aide-memoire to the US, Thesuggested threeissues" the USSR would insist that the West accept.
On the question of amoratorium on smalltests, the memorandum reaffirmed that the Soviet Government "is firmly convinced" that at the expiration of the moratorium, the three powers should not automatically be released from their commitment to cease underground testing. This argument is consistent with the long-standing Soviet Insistence that any treaty must ban "weapons tests of all kinds, everywhere and for allts current position would have the effect of extending the ban on underground testsregardless of whether detection techniques could be sufficiently improved during the moratorium so as tosuch tests effectively.
The memorandum alsoagain the Sovietfor three inspections in the USSR as "adequateagainst violations and called for the US torealistic approach" to the issue. Since the Sovietsthe quota of threelnarious officials have hinted that the specific number would beto bargaining. However,
when the USew formula for calculating the number of inspections which could have the effect ofdown the number for the USSRange, the Soviet delegation promptlylt as "unrealistic" and calledenunciation of the "technical approach" to inspections. He stated that the crux of the matter was the difference of approach and that unless the Western delegations were willing to solve this phase of the problem on the basisolitical compromise, no agreement was in sight,
A major portion of the Soviet aide-memoire was devoted to the so-calledhree-membercouncil. In the same vein as Khrushchev'sto Walter Llppmann in April, tbe memorandum declared that "while there are neutral states, there are not nor can there be neutral men," The memorandum replied to theobjectioneto by claiming that if the Soviet inspection quota proposal is agreed on, inspections will proceed "without anyn other questions on which the executive will have to make decisions, however, the memorandum stated that the tripartite proposals will "arbitrariness" in such cases.
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko frankly admittedonversation with Secretary Rusk in Viennaune that the USSR iseto. He said if there were no veto aspects to the Soviet proposal, it would make no sense. He asserted that one-thirdwas the USSR's "naturalnd that while he did not describe it as a demand, tbe USSR was vera firm on this point.Original document.