PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AIMED AT WEAKENING THE CASTRO REGIME

Created: 5/19/1961

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PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AIMED AT WEAKENING THE

CASTRO REGIME

Z. INTRODUCTION

Tha proposals submitted la this recommended program of covert action directed against the Castro regime are baaedealistic appraisal ofeats, both in and out of Cuba; on potential assets, both inside and outside of Cuba which ara capable of development within acceptable time limits; and on certain assumptions with respect to United States policy.

For tha purpose of thl> paper ita*sun-ad that Dnltodolicy:

not contemplate tha use of Ua armed forcaa toor unilaterally in tha absence of an aggrceeive militarytho part of Cuba directed against the United States or anotherthis hemisphere.

not permit tha organising and trainingubanfore* for further action agalaat Cuba.

permit United States covert support of Cubanand tha carrying out of covert unilateral operationsherein, including tha uae of maritime and airthat United States aa tha haaaa for tha ataging of eabotage,

in-*xf titration, supply, raider and propaganda (Including la aflat dropping) operation*.

1. Th* Situation: Tha position of tha Caatro raiim* within Cuba ha* bean significantlyby tha failur* of th* mid-April invasion. Thla la) principally th* result of two factor*: (a) th* psychological effects of th* Castro victory on th* Cuban peoplehole and th* as curl tyn particular! andarkad decrease In th* capabilities of th* anti-Castrooth In exile and within Cuba. It is probable,hat there will he no major change in internal political condition* during the neat six month*.

Glvaa th* strength of th* Castro military machine and th* provenf it*nly tha slightest possibility that th* regime can be overthrown from within during th* foreseeable future. With th* expected arrival of MIC aircraft and th* probable acquisitionmall fleet of fast naval cutters, th* military capability of tha regime will increase. Coupled with thla la tha fact that th* opposition has loat some of Itsorces; th* underground has been badly hurt and willtake month* to rebuild; and confidence la th* Unitedas bean shaken.

4. Bafhs^eaadj Th* failure of th* Cuban atrik* fore* la1 to achieve It* objectiveareful removaluation of th* extant of tba

problem'assessment o( the salctlng and potential aaaata which could he employedovert effort to weaken the Caatro regime in order to accolerat* lta eventual overthrow.

Thar* appears to bo gvneral agreameat that there la no cure war of overthrowing the Caatro regime abort of Unitedilitary intervention. There) lapossibility, albeit alight, that leaser measuresovert and overtmight result in the overthrow of tho Castro regime from within. However, as loaig as Caatroie major throatth* example and stimulusorking communist revolutionwill peril.I.

in summary, it can b* said that Castro's position in Cuba le etronger than before the1 invasion attempt. aJ thoughola tad in Latin Arnarhtahale. The opposition hao loot sense of its etroagoet forcee; lta factionalism la greater, aan its confidence ba the United States has been shakes. Caatro'a armed forces and militia wore effective to an unexpected degree in defeating the invasion. Increaaed police repression and. terror baa almost certainly badly weakened existing opposition and undergroundithin Cuba. Castro'* aard-cor* supports rs are more heavily armed and more enthuslaetic in hla behalf, and tha widespread support ha hasabroad bas probably Increaaed his atature among many otherhe abortive effort to unseat him will probably provide himseful excuse la justify farther economic austerity, as wellever for additional

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80viet aid. Inultii Castrooma major mintahaog. direct armed attack on aonae other Uik AaMrlcu ceanttry or prolonga-ttea of anralgn eat terror) or tka Uniteda*ore* soma beilliaada main, Castro will probably ha able to haneiit Iron taaot him victory for eoma UM to coma.

To plan, implement aadrogram of covin action designed to exploit tan aaoaarala. political anal psychological vulnerablllif that Cootro roglmo. it le neither earpaetod nor argued that tha soaaaaaful exacusien of thla eorort program will in Ileal! raeoJl in Um ovartkrow of that Caatro Thla plan aba-aid bo via wad only aa tho eorort contribution to on ororall aallaaaal program daeignad to accelerate tha moral aad physical disintegration of tho Caatro goraramaat aad to hasten taa dayombination of actions and clKfuaotaaaao will snako pooelbl* Us replace ma ntamooratio gc^rnraarrt re spaas iv* to tba nee da, tha aapirntlaos aad tha will of tha Cuhaa pee*la.

I. To achieve thasa objectives aof abort lirm aad long term taaka will ho und*rtaken. Woareree feasible aad pasalblo, thasa aetiritioa will ha carriad outgio mi tha Oataaa aUroloftaoary Co una U. Koweror, slnoo this will not always ba practicable or daslrablo, for a

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rariaty of raiiam, antry operation- ia| ir.dep.nd ant operation*

by acceptable groupa and el amenta outelde Um fraanawnrk ol th* Council, will iIn b* uadtruJua. Ibort Ttrrn Tanta

fauolligonco Collection: Every effort will boImprove and expand our capabUltioo /or lb* collection oion Caatro'* plane,ad capabilltioa; onmilitary and cammunlcatlona target a. anoa the maral* cd tb* civil population and tba extent ofaf and eUeeoatent with tba Caatro regime. This will coll*tr engtiiening oi* existing Internal agent notai tho rocruitmontIr aval era; tho recruitment, training and Infiltration of nowliaison with Cuban aula groups aad individuals withto targets, aad th* continuation and Intensification of oxleting

SpOCial intelligence effort

liens again et Selected Taegoloi Sabotagebo planned and executed against suchaicro wnv* stations, radio and TV Installations,bridges and railroad facilities, military and navalequipment, certain industrial plants aad sugar refineries. Thlarequire building up present capabilities through recruitmoot,ond infiltration of sabotage loams.

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C Operations ia_ aaaewoet of OunrrlUa jVctivitiosi Ope ratill be planned end. executed la support of guerrilla baaaU which exlet or may emerge la tba bills of Cuba utilising both air and maritime operations for tha daliverr of irml and euapllce and for thaand enfUtretleet af paraeaaol, Since wo boll ova that there la tittle llsolihood af significant accomplishments by gaorrllla eetlvitlee for eoana time te oonae we wLU dlscournga offensive guerrilla activillee at tale time ln order that the strength of such forced may bo preservedaare propltlooj moment. Doponalng onccess In building solid, roaawaably dependable and raa sen ably oarru>artmontod assets, la oatabllBbing communication with them, and equipping them, tbe ecale of sabotage and guerrilla aetivtttee will be stepped ap. Our flret concern le the rebuilding oi our internal nets and of our capability for mounting significant soar aliens.

D. Operations PI see ted at Dofottion of Caatro Oaitcleis: Operations directed at defection, wherever poeelble in place, of well-placed officials of the Caatro government and armed forcee will ba planned and executed. Tbe objective le two-fold

in the caeca of defect!ene ln place, to gain an Insight Into tho intentions, plane and capabilities of the regime, and

in the caeea of open and publicised defections, to

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and los* of prestige tor the regime, especially In Um rant oi Latin America.

I- Cfrotallano Piratedtroring th* Popularoi Caatro: In Um Iisldy.ps r- ill bo planned ond executed aimed at destroying ton image nf Castrorueinter eated Ln Uto welfare of Kia people and too ropineament oi that Image with oneafales* dictator who, uader Um false bnnnare of revolutionary reform, haa deprived bla people oi their basic liberties and turned their countryoviet satellite. This will requireoialsting cavort prooe, radio and other media asset* outside of Cube and tha sftreaagthenlag oi clandestine propaganda mecbanleme inside oi Cuba, including underground printed propaganda, clandestine radta broadcastingadio and TV intrusion operations. AIoo required willirection of fl.tlo Swan .tUrtu.i. with theCouncil playing an Important role La tha programming of the Cuban propaganda efJort.

T, Cperatiena Aimed at serengtflnnlnfl ih* Prestige and Acceptability of lb* RovcJuiloaary Council: Through all available propaganda warfar* assets and mechanisms an effort will bo made so strengthen tho prestige of th* Remlurionar/ Council aad its programs, aa wall ao the preotlg* oi its individual mam bars, Ln ardor to a* sure Lt* acceptability aa a

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i'rarit'.troMj luccmor to the Cutrs regime. Through adoptionrogram of political action on effort will bo madeto maintain cleee and cordial coated with the Revolutionary Council lor the purpose of providing onobtvuolve guidance aad material support for its organisational structure end lta clandestine ecttvittee; (b) to Improve the position of they encouraging suayort of tho Conaeil by acceptable political groupe and peroonalltloe who are now oppoaod to or da not recognise the Council aa loaderehip of the opposition; (c) to encourage the Council toonciliatory attitude towards all acceptable political groups; and (d) to broaden Ue baae to make it mare representative af all political thought (with encluetaa oi extreme left and extreme right) and important social and economic(church, labor, military, students, intcU actuals,. Long Term Tathei

A. Political Action: Develop friendly and close contact with lead are of thoCouncil, and loader* (end/or potential loadere) af all political partis* and social end economic sector* (church, labor, military,ntellectuals, et al) ia order to eaaur* friendly and belpful contact* and attitude* towards the United State* thjromghoul the entire political aad social spectrum daring th* post-Centra *ra.

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relations which

with exile preee and radio entities and

ia order to an sure friendly end helpful contacts and art lt wise within macs media circles during ths post-Caatro era. XV. AnaUtTl AVAILABLE

The following covert assets are believed to be in existence aa of

I May Itel:

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4. Political Annate: The primary politicaltea are thatho Horoluttooary Council with our secondary aaooto being thoCubanor, tho periphery of political aetlvitlot with whom wo arena bo in coaataet.

V. MCOMMP.IXATION

h ia racomniended that tha above described program of covert action, doeignod ta exploit any ecanaanlc. political and psychological miner abilities oi tho Caatro regime, be approved.

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