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ihe probable interrelationships OF the independent african states
especially useful In their efforts to extend their influence and build up their)
"ConserraUTe" Isadora,such as Balewt, Houphouet-Boigny and Toulou, prefer postponing the Issue of politicalIn addition, they wish to gain ths material benefits which tbe maintenance of close ties with the former Metropoles have so far assured them. )
Neitherana-Oumea-UaU Union nor the Ccwsfl is rtntciUe Is likely to developeal federation. Broader groupings such aa the Casablanca powers (mainly radical) and the Monrovia group (mainly conearvaUve) have yet to show any bask cohesion. It Is possible that the African states may be able to create some functional organs for economicIt Is also parable that some efforts will be Initiated to create bioad regional machinery to enable African
states to settle their own dispu)
n the whole, African regionalare likely to remain fluid oyer the next several years. During thiiwe believe opportunism Is likely to prove more compelling to African leaders than ideology, and that there will almost certainly be frequent shifts andof coalitions as African kaders Tie for power and International status. Nevertheless, we anticipate that Pan-Africanism will gain support, at leastisionary proposition, and that theaitkxuonialhan of the Pan-afri-canlsta will Induce more moderate kaders to adopt neutralist foreign
estera European cultural andinfluence In Africa will probably remainelatively high level over the next several years, but Africans willlook elsewhere for aid. The US is regarded as an alternate scurceof foreign assistance, but one which does not fully understand Africa's problems or fully support Africanne Bloc will probably bare considerablein Increasing its influence withstate* and in promoting neutralist foreign policies, and lt will encourage the rmrigrnre of additional radical regimes. African leaden will try to play Bast and West against the other and to extract the mmimnm amount of aid and assist wee from both sides. )
he pace of political change in Africa bas accelerated rapidly over the past five years. While only eeven states were Independent La IBM. there arefrican nations today, and it is anticipated that the number of new units will hare increased to at leastyy and large, there statea are tooecame independentnd their leaders are too piroccupied with Um problems of their own internal poetical positions to haveany bat the most tentative cnorts toetwork of Unas with each other and with the non-African world Tbii coo -orrn with pressing dororattehared by virtually all the jura's leaden and decreases both their interest hi and their abilityonsistent pohcy on prchkna of mter-African relation*
a While Africa's new states <nftV widely inand political viability, they share
a number of difficulties In common The withdrawal of Western political controbi has produced potentially unstable situations ln the emergent states, and the maintenancelaw and order is an ovaxwnehnuig problem In most of these countries. Although European influence has produced modern Africanelites, lt bas not been sumclent In most cases to overcome traditional tribal cleavages andrrfslriet Now that Uie new African elite bas come to power. It* members And that there drnnons still exist and eons*roenuy mat their base of popular support is too subject to fluctuation and change to reduce these diri-aona appreciably. There la very Utile sense of national Identity among most Africans in the new states. In addition, Africa's leaden are faced with severe shortages of salliedfor all activities. They are desperately in need of crvQ aervants capable of rising above the nepotism and petty cc*Tuption whichand clan loyalties impose upon theAfrican.
he independent African states faceobstacles In trying to achieve economic de-
Tbey also arid privatelow to awn In and that of theirnt too wwut and ID-formed to pro-ride tha necessary Ihruat for acnccr-iic growth.
he range of problems confrontingleaders varies greatly, however, and geo graphic locationighly ligniflcajitest Africa share
a Dumber of i
vtoltn Jy afreet the pontics of over at laut the neat several Islam, which Is ua lading rapidly In Africa.ignificant political factor In some anas. CD Cw whose. It lands toivisive, rathernifying fores.
H. MAJOt KXCES SHAFWG KXJTlCAl it -lATtOHSHPS
has prodded the greatest Impetus for socio-political change Bancs, whenwith the interior Sudanta states, the coastal nations hare corns to indepeodencs with relatively men advanced politicaltbcLr
tMObaoa, the Ivory and Nigeria -a* veil as the itrategta to the Atlantic Ooaan which they can afford or deny to the In tartaraooords the coastalajor advantage In their relations with Mali, Upperiger, and the Ofcad. atost moves forhave com* froa the coast rather than the Interior.
paoplt; vaawed and pdiUcaB*
frica* new stitss toelationship with one another have thrown Into sharp relief soma of ths primary forces which shape African Involve Pin-Africanism,
in-Antaan ksplratkwis are neither ofriglD nor entirely African In Inspiration. Efforts to unite the cUrided African peoples and to advance the African coksalal areasependence were Initially Inspired
erat the begtaniag ofh It was only at ths IMS FifthattoKtater, England, torominent rote. Kwame Nkrumah, Nnamds Assklwe of Nigeria, Jomo Kenyatta from Ksny* were the
prune movers among the Africans, with the Brat subeequently appointed to tbe position of secretaryest African Nationalbased in London Whenarumahquickly
Afncarusm has some resemblancesIdea of Arab unity. ItysfJmlwhich bas strong emotional appeal,In the wayoncrete program.Negro racial kinshipeelingbar* been undeservedlyscorned. It glorifies the Africanand culture. It holds that ailbrothers and that only through eventual
play the role to which ntheworid. Noi-to refect these concepts aO of them to acace degree asserthe more radical have found the slogans ofespecially useful tats to extend theirnd build up their foDowinga
from their prof eased desire forlarger political unite and enhancingof Africa ln international affairs,bad doctrinal position. However, tbe
the Africans refer to aa Western neo-eokxual influence. Such influence la reflectedlientaccording to rnrrumah. in which the metiopolltan power grants tbeattributes of Independence to African territories but retains effective contiula through -rv.ipoUUcalh* Inability of CongolM fictions to agree and the Ing threat of fragmentanon tn tha
ottenient of Individual kaders. Thus, man-am tlnentalm
the Ideaolitical union which he dominate For the present at least.
IS. The most aggressive Pan-Africanlstii are usually radicals, although this term, like moat African political labels. Is often easier to ban to.
, of ell:
follow Communist models and to close relations with Communist states. The radicals feel that their position will not benless all African leaders share their views and follow their pohciea.
African conservatism is an equally clualTt aid tenuous term, and Its adherents ant even more vailed than the radicals. Some arehe old fashioned sense, but
vlth the.ne of temperament They are leaa doctrinaire and more pragmatic, inclined to build on the past rather than break violently with it.
hile most conservatives cannot openly oppose proposals for mutual agreemeni and regional solidarity, they prefer to emphasise the esL-bUshment of "fraternal" ties baaed upon economic and cultural
beMotropoles have so far assured to therewards of positive neutralism.f Nigeria and Sierra Leone areaintaining some connections with the UK although their ecoriomlc ties are looser. At the heart of the disagreements which exist between tbe radicals and Um eon. aarrallvca,are differences inand political style, as well as jealousies fostered byaspirations.
he mixed backgrounds, sources of strength, and divergent goals of Africa's lend-era harp to explain the tangled relationships which exist among them. Varied ln levels of Western education, lnteibgence, and political the bulk of Africa's
are strong todlrldoailsts and an potential rivals, however ardent Uwy may ber professions of Pan-Africanism.
ntilew West African leaden had wide power and Influence outside their small territories. Bcuphouet-Botgny. as bead of the Raurmbicmatielded considerable politicaloat of the former French West African territories, as weal as severalAfrican areas,imilarly. Town, both as leader of RDA aad Francs
^Geaeroi* du TrutoiCewn dea powerful and Inffuendal fig-
Ghina and Azikiwe of Eastern Nigeria nave commanded prestige and pohtieel powerar exceeds their small territorial
subject to frequent change. External Influences
he ending of the colonial period has not only emoved some of the restrainpon Oka and
la to part a
are bound to attract Cold War ccunpeti'icn. Moreover, In sp*'e ofto the contrary. Africa leaders often
invite outside involvement by seekinf the aid of rico-African powers to sop-port their own position] in Use con linent.
m UK and France, despite thalr re-llriqulshracnt of controls In much of Africa, continue loignificant presence throuch their treaty rights, their eronnnue tadexpatriate clrlland teachers. In most instances, the new states also remain linked with the sterling and francara heavily dependant upon the erstwhile Metropoles fori assistance andand Inok to Western Europe for arms and other aid. .nevertheless, theiroenedumber ofts nelaUons with Um Africans The memory of tha harsher aspects of Western colonial rule Is too fresh to be easily erased, and even where than were few real grievances It Is crmvenknt to blame the former occupying powers for anywhich may now exist. Moreover, colonial and racial issues la North Africa, th* Portuguese areas. East Sud Central Africa, and Um Republic of South Africa are likely to
bwf aXQpCXwJwDwaDtsl wO OOQpwaTwsasaWwWasI wBLwaWlsJ
the period of this estimate. EvenAfricans are nagged by the fear that tooeliance upoa Lhe former Metropoles could faultevival of Western.'.inimum. Impotence Incouncils.
e believe that Western European cand eomomft jfl ueoee tn Africadatrveiy high level over Um next several years, bat that African) Ir.-reasingly win attempt to limit their dependyelsewhere fee aid sodThe West European nations, nevertheless, will be underressure from cc-uerratlre Africans arms and ether military support itloDs ot the more radicsd
B. Communal Blocot ion.
ommunist Bloc mfluwno* lo Africa has frown from negligible levelso substanusJ proportions today. Tbe Bloc has made sertous inroads wtth dpaomatac <nu-saocu, arms aid. sod ecooocnie aarittanrw In Guinea. Mali, and Gnana sod aa importanthas been mode tn Mixocco sod Ethlopta. Tbe Base has racenUy caTered aid to Ttsaawa. the Sudan, and the Somali Reptibbc. and Uto rebuild Its position in the Osage. In addition, growing numbers of
and economic specialists araIn Bloc schools. While these tars may be regarded as part of Atria's period of post-mdepenoeoce reoriectaUoa aDS adjustment, wt beheve that the Soviet Union regards the continent as particularly vulnerable and feels that the Bloc haso alienate Africa from the West
2S. The Cccnmunlals probably willumber of advantages In their com petition with the West, In addition to exploiting the colonial and racial tensions and disturbances to the southern quarter of the continent. Um Bloc (a) mams greater abDity totself with African socialists, who ire deeply committed to governmental direction of the economy; and (b) Is willing to provide arms and oUmt aid to radical African leaders. Its greatest advantage, bow-ever, wul b- Bar* it shares with most African leaders the abjective oftern Influence in- Africa. Whl> we believe that ths Bloc sees rJopportunities In lb* radical leaden and raovi Dxnta In Africa, lt wul criahuih ecrexxoic and political relaUoni with conservative, states as wvlL Over Um next two or three years, the Bloc will probably nave considerable success in Increasing Its influence wtth African states aril In promoting neutralist foreign policies, cno in countries now aligned with tha Wsst Becaust the Communist movement in Africa
j, in -mbiyonic Stage, and tht African ftOm haw aspirations that are In the long fan locompannle with Communist goals, we do gat tnrtaajv ihe estabosmmentuil-fr^fd Conuaunpa regime to Africa ka theof Innwe do not pjk, out (he possible cuaaaCHw of eddmonal trjictd national regimes in Africa which, be-etose of theOestern OwUoofc. would have ckwe afflnlues with toe Coram unkd Bloc
PtTtpfitral comphesruef Inpumeat
Frequent conferences end cAelalhaverowing rveosaikaalaafliii that theyawntrrIn OOawawsn. States such aaand EtnJopia,cosawdsradss cuIiuraDy distinct rrom bkackyean ago, nowayorexpanding- group ofthis cjusihIucIts originally narrow racial bam togwognphical framework has establishing a
halanfad network of mternatlonelhlpsh* new African nattonaV For example, closer reactions with North Africa and the Horn have Involved bkack Africans ka such unwanted disputes as the Klh'^caan-"wwnall boundary question, Morocco's terri-tortaJ chums In the Western Sahara, and. to some extent, even 'Jk Algerian question.
While the many divisions amongtropical African stales theoreticallythe tactical and bargainingof tha north at Pan-Africandivisions are paraJksed byamong the North Africans esult, tha latter often haveconferences, with Morocco and thethemselves with the momand Tunisia,odan,tbeurthev complicating efloru al are tbe aspirations of the VAS's Nasser referentialansonsteaders are greatly resented by black Africa'sand conserraUves alto.
Orr the next several years, Nasser ta tieulM Is likely to seek an even greater role for hUnsetf in Vrica Uuough: (a) the Afro-Asianornmittoe and related organs; (b) subsidization of exiled colonial African naUonalBt groups; andnd arms support for extremisttates controlled by conservative pro-Western leaders. We beam, however, that Nasser's mtervention inanner will irritate not only conservative African leaders but even radicals such as Nrrumah and Tourf. who are Uiemselves anxious to become the rallying points for political militants in black Africa. However, it is likely that Nasser can continue to work with the African radicals on specific
INTBcVShmON AND SUBVERSION
mtervention of African leaders lnof neighboring areas Is not ainduced by the Congobreakdown of authority andm the Congo have merely accentuatedprocess which has been endemicAfrica since WorldexKh-speaUng tropical Africa,often wereprior toThis pattern was acceptedsince, until the past severalkaders in former French WestAfrica were uncertainterritories would come to mdepen-leoce
i ofowever,i the form
of mternetional political organisations such as tbe erstwhile MaliarU de Is ferWrntiow. ApiMine, which sought toeveralfrican states, founocied on the resistance of local leaders who themselves were developing ao-tboritarien one-party reftancs. Nevertheless,continue* to wield con-dderabfe Influence In Dahomey and rfiger andapable of making and unseating leaders hi these two states.
frailty and internal divisions ofthe new African states makestheir affairs byleaders thirst-
broader influence extremely tempting. Disturbed by their failure to attract burger scale support for theirgoals, and the clusteringoriservattve cccisteua-tion of African states In oraxidtion to them, radical kaders are Utery to recoup by erektng to unseat some of their more vntaereblaTbe game tftatOTeotta can be played by cnrtservaUves as wen as radical leaders, as has been deinoristrr.ted by Toutau,orved himself hi the neighboring Congo crisis as well aa In the nationalist uprising in Angola and Canmda, Screrthefco. we be-lieve tnat over the next several year3 therorocauve attempts at meddHng andwOl emanate from .the UAR, Ontoee, Ghana, andrsfalL
he emergenceew generation of African youths ever the next several wears ta likely to. to radical rivals.
products of labor union training, these youf-ia are attracted to Pan-African ideals, and are impatient with the lack of dynamic leadership in their nations. However, while willing to accept assistance from Africa's radlcaU against locale leaders, we believe that most of this new generation will prove equally cautious in surrendering power and prestige once they gain control of their national gov
fV. SKTMRCANT PATTERNS AND TRENDS rederoriwi and AtBartcas
espite sporadic efforts on the part of African leaders to fashion federal linksao. they have failed to find theorma'* to reduce the petty Jealousies and hydra headed rivalries which thus far have thwarted all attempts at political union. For example, efforts tofnVm of Central AffWi Republics out of the four formeruatorial African territories of Gabon, Chad. Congond the Central African Republic foundered0 over the refusal of the wealthiest partner, Gabon, to make any substantial contribution to the proposed federal treasury. Similarly, the Mall Federation, which was planned as s
grouping of Senegal, the Soudan (now Upper Volta, and Nicer, suffered the early dr-fectaon of the latter two states when Boo-phooet-Botgny of the leery Coast gave then financial Inducements The uneasy union be tween Senegal and Soudan brokeugust lOao when the Soudanese leaden attempted to secure greater control by fanning thearrangement Into unitaryower grab which was atroegty resisted by Senegal's Leopold Seng nor
hile proposals are freemen Uy mad* for thaion of regional federations tn North Afrtc. (Morocco. Algeria, and Tunisia) and In British East Africa once the states In these area/ all acquire Independence, the wawaWaS for their earty lm piemen tatajniikliiawlj kaatfaaaawen. As the case, Um tfrdori Ot Central African Republics and the Mall Federation, once Independence is attained meat African leaders are reluctant to sacriflce their own political power In order lo achieve political union. close ties also are Impeded by basic dlflereoc In political pblkwopfay. outlook, and aspiration on the part of most leaden, as well as the type of dornrsllcconfrocttog them. Thus, the Arab rul-rog mbaority of Zainfbar would think twice about submerging itself In an East African federation dominatedcans. Similarly political consensu! among North Africans is likely to be retarded by dawjgiiLiniiita over Isaacs such aa the future roses cf political parties sodinstitutions, uaitiot Of tbe Sahara, and so forth.
already find that by refusing to commit themselves to any one neighbor theyreater potential for: (a) paying off neighbors com pettng far their loyalty; (b) gaining material and flnanrail advantages froro the resulting com peri bion: andhe risk of poOUcal absorption After the collapse of the Mali federation, fortbe Soudan (which became thaof Mali) found that It could establish alternative (though Inferior! access routes to ths ar' via Guinea, tha Ivory Coast, and evwn Ghana, ail of whose leaders have provedlo urge their financial and other favors upon Mall In exchange for some upraavion of loyalty. Vameogo of Upper Volta has taken the Mall example to heart and apparently Is now prepared to cut back his cependence upon the Ivory Coast by developing complementary economic and other ties with Ghana, Guinea, and Mall Tbe resultant impact of Swan maneuvers upon African regional relations, however, is to accentuate toe alreadyimpression of estierae fluidity andwith alliances crumbling as Issues and opportunities fee personal dixement i
General Groupings ond Coolitiors
hus far. only two very looae groupings of states, tfinftliim called the Casablanca powers and the Monrovia group, have emerged from this welter of eraqftincri Thepowers Ghana.nd thethat theyan-Africannlflca-UOn aWd the need to eliminateIn pursuing thesehey bawtendency to cooperate with the Communist Bloc Tbe cortdoerahlc number of African states which fall into the so-calledoose coalition which is primarily concerned with social andcooperation. By and large aligned with the West, the Monrovia group tends to be mora relaxed on such lanes as BaHanlxatioo. colon la Hat threats to the newly Independent states, and tbe maintenance of heavy reliance upon the former Metropoles for economic aid.
'Tba parUclpanta in UM May 1SSIa Coo-Lfaeela: ait modi ft "ftthe Sahara, wttb the
The Monrovia toecUai bas been onlyrowlns aeries of ATrKan eonfrrfnen
wo coalitions are at the core of these groupings the Court'Knt-nit for the Monrovia conferees and the Ghao. -Guinea-Mali Union for the Casablanca powers.
listing of UM Ivory Coast, Niger. Dane and Upper Volta, the KtUndaonsultalin' body inspired and rubuttnad by Houpfcouet-Bcigny which bas no bsUUitiona] iramewcrt beyond the period Presidents and Chief vigor and oabealwneasofj was ahrnat entirely dependent upon the Strength of personality and financial assets ofwith thehe otwjM command ln the Frenchappaars to bsigoresult of ID health and probably will not be able to hold th* fnti-li together (or more than three or four years. Indeed. Yarneogo bas repeatedly thraatcned to hmJ Upper Volta out of the Entnta.
e also bentve tha ehanccsare eonnoer-abfy teas than ms that tha kaders of theunion willed-
erauon out of their present looseant hampered by dgninfantlanguage snd cuiUuv. They wOinoahst to resist the centrifugal fortesof African reglcrial pobtira largelyof
tbe Union has failed to take on any realand is euentlaliyianc* whichcommon views on same foreign policy issues The leaders of both Mali snd Guinea bars restated Kkrumah's prodding* to strengthen their ties through the creationoint Parliament snd the Issuance of acurrency. In many respects, rTkrumsh clearly attribute* mora substance toucleus for Pan-African unity than do the kaders of either Oumea or Matt, who continue to manifestlihesurrecting soma of their former corrections with iicsghborlng Frencb^paalong nations.
Despite their faOuri to regnter anyadvances In creating pohtlcalor federatkna, the African states are miring some rarm In forming regional UutitaUore for raotaal cooperation. Twelve states from former French tropkal Afrtoa already are tn process of negotiating igreerncrits for what is to be called tbe Union of African States and
Malt guyorpecialised agency, the Organization for Alro-Walagary Econornlc Cooperationas already been created. These agreementssupposed to cover foreign and tariff*.
states which subsequently convened atin May lMl agreed to work out dentin for ccoperatlan ln similar fields, at the same time creating afor sttachment to the OAMEC
could ked to ttn in need to forces. They msUtuUons fa
arbttratlon. as weD as annate other sxrangi the ones of tba Organisation of American States. Tbe main problem Is Ukety to be whether this awareness of cornmon interests can span the present rJeavags bctwaan radicals and coroervBtlves and ovarshadow therivalry of leaders.
V. GB4EXA1 OUTLOOK
e teller* that snorts to foster Pan-ArrV can unity win continue to find expression in numerous conferences and meetingsack African kaders. However, we do not expect many concrete achievements to emerge from these conclaves, at least over the next three or four years. Schemes for functional organ taa tion probably haveft pr-apecU forIn general, African leaders probablyremain as drrldad as at present, and Intervention, subversion and Irredenusm wOl characterise regional relationshipaUna period, we betteve outside Involvement in African disagreements will grow andsccantuate the differences alreadybetween Africans.