CHINESE COMMUNIST MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS FOREIGN POLICY REPORT

Created: 7/3/1961

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

iJJl^O arovrUat Kinlatry- of Foreign OATl CxST*

Affairs Foreign Policy Report

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1 Ue CMmic Ccnaxuilat Ministry ofAffairseport revlevlag Cbinit*oreign polloy> ud OMtlloina Chinese proerena end jroapccta In* reportdistributed to Chinese Coaniolftt cnfceselestgtUcu. ranslation of tie report la given below*

A Bcviev; of the Year AyfiO mi tbe Cutloofc for tbe1

1. In general, tin development of tbe intenatlooel situation0 intricatepllaated. The result of tbe stnwsle, Iwwmr,better then ve had originally expected. During the year, unity In tbe international ftemualst aoveaentachieved throuflhithin tbe socialist cut?. evide ai reached id the struggle against iBperlalian end for world peace and In tbe revolutionary struggle of tbe people- Tbe political and aeonotdc crisis ofax vu further deepened. 2be Anwricnu Imperialist tvo-faced policy set anotheronperioon of international forcss is further Ln faror of ua and in disfavor Of laperinlica, lhe violation of the Soviet territory by thelana, the eabotece of the euxnlt conference and the break up of the dlsarcsaaeat conference canned teuton in the international situation, the struggle between tha eoclellet countries and iaperialiat countries exposed thetricke of Avert cod iEperioliaxi.

2. Unity In the socialist caarji was further strengthened, and lta lDtsrnatLone influence van en the increase. Tbe Koscotr conference of brotherly partiesnanlaaua view on tony Important International protlmsi strengthened the Internal tonal Cosskunist aovenent aod tbe eociollat caatp and unified the Chinese Ccanunlst Party (CCP) and the Cnaarunist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and China and toe Soviet Union,lov to the litre rial! at conspiracy to aplit us and pushed forward tbe denoeraUc

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struggle In world. After th* Hoscow Conference, the contents Of th* Moscowion provided eaoourse>*aeat to the people of the world, tteel lac ofo Imperlallmm. ew growth of economic cocttnrtlw weea socialist countries* Im spit* of otrUU difficulties encountered la as^emlturel production, the1st countries0ate of industrial growth ofercent2 percent, compared with that of the previous veer, thus greatly sxcsedlsu the industrial growth of laperlellsa.

3* he Soviet Union leunnhed three earth satellites,

leaving the Bolted State* vay eemind la scientific technology. Im our oatloaal economy, we, umder the leacarnhip of three red banners, were ehle9 to have ooapleted ahead of schedule the mala aleeloae celiac for la oar second flve-yenr pi en- la epite of th* natural cnlaatty whichbeloua oneears aad vhlch hao effected our agriculture aad Influenced our light industry, our heavy Industry etlll aanoaed to maintain It* chief growth*

- The ceo*tructionainT ofountries increaatd tho strength of norimllam, streastbened the faith of the peopla Of all countries ln strivingeautiful future. The peaceful diplomatic policy of tbe various socialist countries la crowned vlth nev success*

5. During tha year, to* rtortet Uniontruggle against American sabotage of the summit conference, agalast colonial inn end for general dlftruetot. Our country supported re*olutely tbe liberation arvranaat* of the colonlce to Asia, Africa ana Utla-Ammrlee, ana at tbe same time, our friendly relatione vlth the coontrlea la the seas* area* vere further promoted. Efficient sfforts vara made by socialist eountrles la the direction of easing the International situation, striving for peaceful coexistence among countries of different ays tea* and supporting tha revolutionary struggle* of the people of tha world. All these boosted th* international prestige and Influence of the socialist a

6. the national liberation muyuaeutb within the capitalist world and tha revolutionary struegle* of the people of the various eountrles have beennprecedented rise- Tbe system of world imperialism ls deeply weearoed aad in Uie proceesinal collapse. ev rise Is seen In tha national noveaatnts la Aslm, Africa and Latin-America. tom of revolution against Imperialism la being ticked up. Th* national independence ao vena tit ln Africa lsn all-front high tide which emerged in the Afrleaa national Independence movement, waa pouaolaa; furlooaly at the last out poet of toloalalita. 7 lajdepeadant counrtrlesa Africa. Th* nationale rat lea war which isml ythe Algerian peoplelow to franco colonial oppression and deceptive conspiracy and nerved as an eocouragcuent to other struggles of African peoples. The avanealag of tha African people la on the upgrade* esult of the Congo incident, the Afrleaa peopleetter under-standJra; of tha true face of American imperialism end the Unitedhe unity of the Afrleaa peopleew development. The struggle gradually spread to the amsaes and little cell* of Mu^savLenlnlsm were gradually established.

ft Theae stark nchi*venwnts served to drive hone to the American paopl* the slgnlficsuc* of aruei struggles, luwever, tbe facte of the yeer also indicate that the new colonialism can be cunning and intriguing and that leaders of the Independence acvmmant ln Africa cam be moft and Deceptive. Tbe atruggl* of tbe African peoples ls lntrlcat* and ec**pl*x.

6* The stress* of teela .South Korea, Turkey, Japan- SouthLaoe And otber couetrlas Im Asia agai^at lacjerlalla* aad it* running dog* bare ahaaaa the aggressive alllUry policy ofrl*liee la these areas. Th* peopl*'* atriteal* in South Korea ceueec tha Vial lado understand teat even bar scat reliable puppet raalaa could aot aa Oepandad upon. Tb* Japanese people haverenafidoua force behind then, Aa alaoit all-front atrugcl* of the auset causedto cancel hie visit to Japan, all theae indicate that the national denocratle noveanat hao reachednee beat*

9- The encoth davolopnanl of the Cuban revolution pronged and pushed on

thef tbe people or other Latin Aaarlcan countries, novenent* atfulnet Aaarlcan larperlallan and Ue running dogG, la different forns and scales, are spreading over UUn Aaartc*- Tne national patrioticf nanyuriuft theirave forncd,radual procese. an extenaive nev national danocrattc united front, thue Ecnaclng the rear of the American aexrceolvc force.

10. Within the capitalist countries, the struggle of the vorfcingabor eaeaaa for the Improvement or their llveutood and deaocratle right* andcnopoL/rcah oe^clccaant. . large-scale econanle a* veil aa political itriAea broke out In the United Statee, Brttala, Prance, Italy, rod Belgium aa -ell aaew countries in Latla America* Tne scope of tbe struf&le for peaceeing enlarged- la nany capitalm countries, claaa people hawae itx-cile for safeguarding world cppoeiag aaclear warfare-

U- The econanle dlfricalUea of lapenaliaa are aeeyned andt* ramiaanrpinil. aWr ot economic criae* occurred la tae Ualtwa gtetee. The jreeeatBroke outma when tne Lilted State* bad not rally recovered froa itsrisis. TJae preaent crieie wme oaueafl by surplus produrtloa la sericulture end induetry- The preoent crlaia ta *tlll deepening.

the aane tine, the economic condition* in eastern feircpr are not vary good, la nany countrlee, the industrial Growth ratealowuO down ortandstill. Conditions for onare present. Th*r* hasrisis concerning the supply of

raw net*rial froa colonies or fron aeai-colonino off and oo,

nav econoalc crisis of the united States, the biggestbrought asvereo the vbol* capitalistrecant yaern, tbs contradict lone between the United taste*lnperlallet eountries, es well as th* contradictioncountries, lacreaaad. The deterioration of thein econoalc, political aad miliary field* bacones nor*order to avert an seonoale criaia *nd to save herself froala* United Itctae baa tiontefied bar control* overt branny and Prance atteapt to resisttbey are taking the opportunity to reaenert theirand political position*, mis etriatgle oetveea thethe controlled conpU.etea and intensifies the iftUimlthe laperialiat ceam. The ccmredaction tetveen tb* taltsdBritain hasew envelopment. Prance Is giving thenore tro<*lt. The atteapt of vest >rnany tothe United* comingead. In *wroce, thetne tait*dBritain, trance and west Germanysaropena memanoaj be scan* all tha mere intense. I* thla

thef wet. Hrw power is an lasortaai far tor- 7b*

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corArnciletion between Britaint fitter; Lo turninginto th* chief contradictionturocs- in northern end Central Europe, tha expaoaloo ofb caueee panic.

Ik- In tbe Sect, tha ceconmy of Japan and har pusa to the south brings ber into conflict with the intereete of the United States aad Britain. All thoae things ei^nlf/ that the croceaa o: disintegration of that imperialist canm la tains

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1> Judged frcai every angle of the situation, the fialijjSMLt ofcrnat'onal situation1 vill continue to he Intricate ana complicate*, pw ua, iwwever. It augurs veil,

During this year, tha Aswrlcan econonlc crisis will continue to develop-It urn possibly becoBKt the noet aevere crisis since tbe war. It la also possible thai when the crisis he* developedertain extent, lt will then cose off. In any event, the various contradictions which are peculiar to Imperial isn will only become nor* sharply roouoed. the Kennedy administration won bom during these internal and external difficulties. He willwo-faced colicy, only nore obviously. Co tbe one band, ne will puah for sttiltor? expansion in prep* reor war, and on theand, he will carry out allof deceptive conspiracies ln order to gala time for vat.

Tme Soviet Onion Is aleo anxious to lamr-TO ter relations with th* IrbUted State*. IharuTere, it is poeai&lo that there actghtunmit coafereuce andertain agreeasrat cm the eaepension of njcleer tcata and other related prnrilana eugnt ba reached, Another feasibility, however, com also te erased. If the summit conference does not materialise and

if no asTMaret eaa a* rwhad tatavce the 'Jaitad BemtJM and the Soviet Utioo, than the eocinllet reuntriae willeperete peace treaty with the Democratic Republic of Oernany*

the activities of tnv Imited States and other tfeetern countrlsi for the ortwoill be on the Inereeee- lulwan vlU be

pivot for such trickery. They will use the Halted Bations to hook us nd participationisarovussnt conference to tempt us. Ue saist ba prepored for that. The imperialist canp needed by tbe Umited States will continue to try to split and soften Eastern Europe- However, they will not give la on anything. The Aoarican iajperlalist tvevfaeed policy baa its llnit. Tha two-raced policy of Kennedy has Ita limit. This limit is determined by the very nature of ixsperioiism- As far ass ccmocrned, the Kennedy edmlal it ration does not dare to riska long as the United State* is still hackvord and unprepared mill tartly,

oai Psjtt brainy t* .till racaTxlexedore afraidavjor vmr. Therefore, the wogicgntfor war la of the united States' need to tuppreea national

o solve their own tccmoatlc crises, sssve the poealhlltty of local vara dee* aot only cxlsi but la area lac

| nw*rafore, ve snort anke aefflelemtnd preparation la eeuMt

Anwrican inpcrlelletalocal ware in Cuba, Laoa and other

s far aa jw? la ccewaimed, the frnncdy ecmlnlatraticrj baa to gala time to prepare for war and with thla end in view, it Ig possiblehey will play tricks to split the socialist camp. In any event, they will not obondon tha true stand of tha United States,nor will they charge their boalc policy and give ln aubstontlelly lo socialist countries. Generally spooking tha two camps ore still poised, and the relatlonohip between the two oompa will otlll remain as before. At

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Urns, th* situation vill beccne tenee, butnotso tens*n all-out war vill start* At tines, th* situation will be relaxed, hut not so relaxedealhe situation trill develop*

he national democratic aovcacnt la Asia, Africa and Latin America, particularly la Africa, will be puahinc forward nore extensively and deeply, lhe vava or IndepeiuSence of the African people, after having hit Trench Sorth Africa, West Africa and the Belgian Congo, la turnlns to British and Portugese East Africa and South Africa. On tbe one hand, American lsa?srlallsn vill etep up its Invasion in Africa to expel the old-brand colonial force of Britain and Trance. trugglo for the redistribution of oorXeto nod spbereo of Influence vill intensify. On the other band, tbe old-style colonial countries, particularly old British rogue, vill ploy all sorts of trior*. Therefore, the struggle of tbe African people against nev coloolallsai will becon* nore violent* Tor tnooe countries which have already sained independence tha struggle vill be pore deep and coaplicated* Tor those countries which are fighting for independence, th* struggle vill be nore sharp and intricate. Davelopotau ia U* Congo and Algeria ar* particularly worthy of attention* It la possible that the struggle in Asia andmerica against Atssrlcan imperialism and Ita running dogs vill becorte nore otorny. In theseudden outbreak of incidents is completely poaslbl*. At present, the Laotian situation is the central problem of the anti-ins*rial 1st struggle ln Asia. The development of the Laotian situation is ln our favor and not in favorperlallsm. The struggle there willong, cr*ur>out affair* Cur relations with Asia, Africa and Latin America will be further developed

hough the antl-Chlnase mnvecsmtstionnry cliques in Inda arju Indonesia bare already been brcrjbttop, ve nust still guard against them, capeclolly in India.

ince the Moscowrend in tbe International CcrsmnUst rnovenent has arisen basedhe Hoacov rxsclmration. Relations between jtfco various- countries Inside thallot camp. Generally speaking, tnr* good- This is the rutin current* There la, however, another aspect; :va should be aware that tbeiferemc* did not aolv. all thein dispute

hina mist be particularly oa guard wben Uie Soviet Dhionetente with Vestem countries or wneo on Incident breaks out within the socialist camp. China Mould be olco cm guard ln her relation* vttb those socialist countries ami parties whichiitber already shown their bonds against China or criticised China before tbe Moscow conferenc

Tbe Main gxaerlencea end the Lecaooe teemed in Diplomacy0

a far as our externalla0ost axcltiag and violent year. This we*he year during which our diplomacy caw the greatest expansion. here has been no increase in anti-Chinese activities, particularly ia Indiaonesla. In the Intemational Ccoawiat Doveaent, another adverse current emerged acslnat *vjr country within the social!at camp* The imperialist countries by the UnlteO States, rode this wave, and with two-faced tricks tried to destroy ^no-dovlet unity* Tbe united States starred up ill' feeling botween us nod socialist countries.

never before on an international scale una there such an antl-Cblnesa Ue ware forced to counterattack, with attacks Iron three sides,India*Indonesia and tba United States) the at^-ugglo assumednagnltu&c. Even under such circumstances, tbe

thinking of the Central Committee of the CC? enabled us to carry on a eries of ctrusgles and achieve an Important victory.

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rariog tbe tOAx. lotted blgaboomer onooing America*tevi strliiA* at tbe tvo-foeed policy ofemd-on otrueglm with tha United States. l efficiently tbe revolrticoar/ storm againstandtnnc dog*in the

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In our country theremas* cemcnetratlom*. In Peiping, tnerc vereuch eemonotraUone0 and moreO people participated in them. 0 miHloa peopla thre^aout the country participated in demon*tration* in support of the people In thaOnion, South Korea, Japan and Turkey* Chairman KAO'a private talk* vitb visitor* from Amlm, Africa and Latin America especially favorably encouraged and puahed that just etrueml* of tbe people In the world ogolnat Lnperlollan. Chairman MAO'a thinking for unitingercent of the world's populationnited front against Awrlcnn imparl all on and Its running dogs and for depending irpon th* anaaea for the struggle greatly encouraged the people under oppression.

2d, The three article* published by the CCFmofh Spiinlwersary of lomnn'n birth emtaekad the ogjcroialre nature of laperiallam. criticised Yugoslavia's molera revielcolam and other erroneous thinking Inside the later-nationalit and clarified the vmyn to protect vorld peace.

friendship rroots, our

the nmticco! af Asia, African America,r eeuttriee* Cuba.rleaajye With marrna, frlaaoamlp earn aammal amd friendship treaties wereordererder agreementith ftrpal- Hitblmn for the endorsement of tn* dual nationality treaty governing oraraea* Chinese wma elgned, thus aeaoingrully easing the conflict between overseas Chinese end the lntareeta of Indonesian nationals.

ur premier took tbe initiative ln going to Jfew Delhi to negotiate vitb ammru and exposed the refusal of tbe Indian ruling group to aetti* the border dispute. In the diplomat tc atrvajgle between China andhe initiative is ln our bemu*. Thus, va prevented the mntl-Chlnes* Intrigue of India, consolidated andurposition and elevated our International prestige, vm forced the imperialists and the various reactionary cliques in every country Into an Isolated position.

uring: th* year, an efficient struggle ln line vith oar policy waa monad agoJamt thooe erroneous concepts wnieh were narnful to the important prcmlema or the InterrmUonml CcammmUat aovenmet amd oftei^tiooal ait^ticm coafrcmAlng th* international Ctmmualct

n gmamral amd basically, omr relation* vttt to* Sovietith concr brotherly ccamrtrlee and parties vara tackle* correctly, am amfea^aumed the purity of fmurmiemvle^nlem, protected the inter-aaUcmal Cceamanlsr movesmmi. and etremgthened the umity af the socialist romp. The talk* amd interview*TJ Shoo-ch'l

had after the rtosccw CoaJereGce enabled u* to taidarstamd tie Olrmctloa

in which 3ino-Sorter unity should go.

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En tne eiplnmetie atnacal*ach valamml* experience gained in employing nlortoualy tne tactics end etrategy of Cfceiraan HAC andIn tne scope of Imternmttoaml struggle. Tbe following vere learned.

a- Ok* correct treftiawnl lp coordinating the vti&le and Itaparta.

Chalrxait WO Instructed ue lo tne lmoortsnc* of iefeinfl ciguiinnc* of the Be snid again thet only when vc understand the whole will we be sole to maneuver the parts, because th* put* belong to tbe whole. Cal/ wtxen ve undemtand tbe whole will ve be mblshe part* sad to use the parteetter way. Xa our International etrwl'i our Strategic pulley Is to unlta mil the force* vaien can be united end to point the tip of our award at Aaerleee laaerlmllmn- This la tea whole and also tbe core of ear strategy. All our work should *volve around tbl* neoerel strategy. During thealfc pursued an ell-out counterattackh* antl-Chiocec struggle of India. In the lirternettoaal contest, hover* r, ourndia should be subservient to tne struggle against lmnerlellua. Our struggle agalast India should not go beyond this limit* for instance, we have actively controlled our etr*ac&Ic against Indonesia, relegating ltoaition next to our straggle against India, tf* have even restrained ouraelve* in attacking the reactionary clique of Indonesia. When an araud conflict brake cut at the Slno-ladla border, ve team further xeexur*** Cur strangle against India could mot aaanmal our struggle agalast tne United States. And in Sout-Seeet Asia, ladle la oar mala target. r struggle against Inaoneeia could notar struggle against India, amen the Sino-Soviet dispute arose, wa cgaln controlledour struggle against ladle- At the aaae timm. our ralationa with the Soviet union ware handled with extreae csutlou* fiiju>-Soviet unity is regarded, by us aa an isrportant natter All along, tbe dlfference* between us were considered to be alnor difference*. Wc have aXvsyn insisted on the unity of tbe socialist canu, Ue have always eupported whatever struggles of the socialist coop benefited the eause of anti*ingerlallsa and tn* protection of peace. laeeausb a* the wtolc sod the psrts have bean treated by ua correctly, we were able to arrange *acb complicated struggle of ours in perfect

b. The correct oaaliceticci of tyivMnlca and feasibility. Tta Central Ceaaltvee pointed Qjtn our aiploaatlo work, principles and the tactic of flexibility euet bedroitlyt ve can caiploy ourreely and cleverly. For Instance, within the International Cofnuunist nova meat and in tbe Socialist samp, an ideological dispute arose, wa had to strtsHl* and could not back. down. However, ln launching our etrugsle, wa hod to chooae an opportune moment and Halt its scope,bod* of vmglng Uie struggle bad to be studied very carefully. From beginning to *nd, th* point of departure was unity. Our polley la "do not startch to th*leave *oa*insist on unit/ andita India and other natlocallst countrlss, we have had both struggle and unity. Tor Imatsrjee, India started on anti-Chlaema mnummsst aad this we opposed wlta hrteralaatl 00 Sfo.rthaent to Brv Delhi to aegotiate with Jfeirj. Tbe two chiefs of states net. At theisen wa* avoided. 2r* relations between tbe two countries again coined down temporarily. The atr^ALa *jtel*st India tfcow* bow

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we applied our principle* and used to* tactic ofln. la the cue of "two Chines1', ve oppose flnsly the conspiratorial activities of the United States sad CfTJAATJ Kai-shek for tbe creation of "two CrJana". Ve do not carry on anv official activities with countries vhlch re-cognise CHIAKO. Severthelesa. in consideration of the actual conditions in Africa and Latin Ancrlca and the special relations CKUJtt and the United States nave In these countries and for tbe purpose ofight opportunity for establishing our raachhasd in Africa and Latin America and of preventing tho Halted States and CKtAH^ fron carrying out their conspiracy, our strategy adopted ln Africa and Latin America is different fron that adopted ln Suropc and Asia. While Cuba atiU bad diplomatic relation* vlth CflTJUW, ve estnr^aoed official contacts with Cuba, when Guinea was receiving OUAJfTo envoy froa Libya, our ambassador reported for duty- Ve under-tand tbe predicament of those countries in Africa which cxpresa their wish to have friendly relatione vttb us but previously established cdplcnatic relations with CTTTAW only becaune of tbe pressure fron lap? rl oil Oft.

c. The correct treatment ol the first step .mleen Chairnan mo pointed out during the Korean nacotiatlons that when taking the first step, conslueratlon must be given for the following steps. The first step should not be restricted by the situation prevailing* r^rnan KAO again instructed us repeatedly that In our struggles, sone leeway oust be provided. Thisigh degree of strategic and tactical thinning* The struggles of the pant year proved that directives from tbe Central Committee and Chairnan MAC led uslorious victory. For instance, in tha Sino-Aaarlcan* baw insistedettlement of the Taiwan issue before other discuaalons caneversal of our previous strategy of totaling the details before touching on the principle. Thus, the United States ls prevented froncries of attacks on our country. As another example, our struggle against Sebru wna, in fact, not beneficial to our relations with Indonesia. Im our atrjgAle against* never attacked Sukarno personally* In our struggle against sone erroneous concepts of our brotherly countries, our criticisms were targeted at problem instead of nt individuals, tte do not lsbel people. This la beneficial to our coxnoo cause* onplloated struggle, to ^ive consideration only to tbe novnaent of one cheat piece It not enough. Con uc replace policy with emotion to give vent to our feeling? Ue oust be ablehine* clearly and be prepared to think about the next stepa*

W* la the proccaa of executing our directives froa the Central Ccoxdttee, _meny mistake* have teca wxmwttcd. Such mihall be analysed end conclusion* most lnportnnt *xi?tnxea were the following;

ii. WW do not knovo oomblne correctly the relations of struggle aad unity. Our relations with brotherly countries constituted cur chiaf external work Despite the fact that tbe relear-cut directive frouentral Coanlttee on each struacle concept, in execution big deviation* still occurred. After three articles were published scon of our centrales still lacked the courage to express our view* confldcntlY, whereas eorc -vvunJcfl openly discussed with crau-sdrn iron other brotherly cnrtlcs our internal dispute vita the bifj brother- Wnen th* dlepute becrorhe struggle started unfolding, come ccvuode* did not

iarc tot gcod in etruiilr In explaining

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out viewpoint some or our comrades tended lo simplify and to become dogmatic, falLlng to sec tbe whole and to erjju* the points. Sone comrades rolled to understand the seriousness of the struggle. Trey refused to believe that differences between brotherly parties could sharpen. Therefore* they lacked atopic preparation. Ihey were buoy in sect log blova and fellassiven general, ve cannot look at now problem* from an old angle. After the Moscow conference, we could detect laxvdlately the nev factor which caused the development of events* Sere the concept lies- Tb*reev factor behind the development of each event* One is unable tohange if he keep* on looking at new problems from an old angle*

b- In our work, at tinea, we only sec the mound without seeing th* mountain, we only psy attention to the obvious and the porta, ueigh degree of strategic thinking* Jor Instance, during one period of our struggle against Indonesia, we foiled to take Into consideration our

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dggle against India* In enforcing the Central Comittcc's Icy for orcraeas Chinese and tbe Indonesian eoveruacnt, TatLed to differentiate between the struggle of the ?es and the diplomatic etr*cgl*. During the Slno*auraeoc ier nsgeddatiooe. man/ such alstakc* were else node. In speedily ectiling tbe China-Duma border problan. ve failed to take into consideration every situation* In sone African countries, wc, in opposing "two chinas", foiled topecific target, and our presentation was general.

c. Ibere were reasons ror tha nistakes we made in our external workS. It was due to the fact that ve did not study properly and carry out ttoroughly the directives frononmittee.

Ojt diplomatic work willrcnt develojaeat and our diplcoatic army will be greatly enlarged. Just as our construction policy does, th* policy for our diplonatic work1 will stress readjustnent and consolidation, while at the same tine continuing devclcpasmt.

On the basis of the Moacov Declaration, we will continueenfrthen and consolidate the Internal relatione within the socialist camp. We will support actively the liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America as well an tne revolutionary otrurele of the people of ovary country ln the world ana strive for unity with natlonmllat and peace-loving countries, we willurther step to expand the international united front by otilJmins the contradiction existing once* Western countries. l exert saxJbud efforts to isolate end strike at American imperial! an. Since tbe dispute vas already brought to the endhapter after the Moscow Conference,iew to consolidating and strengthening the unity oaor* socidint countries, we will utilize

a right ivnment to strucctheo tbe unity In the international ComnunlAt covonrnt and tbe friendly cooperation uu^ socialist countries. WC will not violate the spirit of the Mo*cow Conference, oar will we kickispute, nor will we do aaythinj which is haraful to the unity* At tbe sex* tine, bovever, ve ahould be also always preparedispute*irective from the Central Conmlttee, w* must notolitical probieas on our own with brotherly parties*

will be an enlarged celebration of tne anniversary of theand prestation* will be aadc to settle between tbe twotrade, scientific collection and other problems, tflmita of

Choi ran LIU and tbe Premier to Kaxt frirope are being considered. Iberc

will b* oil-out political and economic Support for Albania. Various

friend*hip and mutual*aid traatlas will be signed. Tbeimperialist

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rtr^tle of th* social lot co-art rter will tn* octtvalyndteraotIcevalnitiativeawem viib the tretoerly four-tries. Jo probanda, fr lamely arttyop*ret3cfi anon^ brotherly countries and the psaoeful foreign pol" ay of Aur country will be atjenocd. In our political prepay; tntai th*orn'-renca scmll b* viewed from ell oldeo end aot only free: the direction toroute.

upjort for theurrrenratsia* Africalnatrunii* of1 vn; cuuvtry in tht world nnd the

& triple tor vorld peace sill b*J. l> willbarrier

o* ophite; inpertaliat eolcraalia*rtjnj liberationendt4*tlon*ryv peopleo* vorld, ub*-erv* already hove in tfci*ppor* and aid villto (he countries end people'in unl srrunulca ortnlcarle,y:ooonrlnoe to be trupjoeted

An all-out support ofel*rticevai> strug^l* or the Joaoaea*be ccettixkjrd, Aid lianAirt aav* alreadyvill be pwitv'ed contortr vithpet net rrotiCO will beand dewlotW. Ibv*and political strvcclee ofof tier Unitedart*ltalUt cocerlriea

Lo th* vcrld vill be . lUuv^le cf the peoele ir.try ac&inatrvl Tor wo. Id jenee "ill contiju* to be given active aupport.

attack th*f ittua'e reactionary cUeue- ecoccbxic aid to rhqaialjatlityeuontity vill be atreonavl. friecsU;mtiouv vits Hxrna,CearaoUirotherwill conclaveadyht borderpai will be atrlvcnwill aloe atriwe ior th* ot^lnrr 01 Meaty n Coaabodia, v>j rutmof rcconnic

aid ia 9ura*i, Sepal aac Canltodia. zrs kvpal and thevtU be invited to vldit Nina. Ve will uvrkn*rjairlin- choice ofof overoeaa CKitavD* lo i* ry to develop

IrleooUy re Let lose win. Ceylon. v* will otnoea.ee belterIndia and imflumc* ladlo inUapotltlon onprnblefi. Ibi* la inpor^an1 i Cnlna on*>*

afiala will be cansl&ered at an* orV*roe called -vain endthe aaae Me* ^v* prerarad forva-aa to beby tse leairotent. Theaerrcenaeir* wh;rh it. otrire

for an appropriate imr (rial ^i'. fh4hjston nuOh* boraarar* ripe. w* will

maintain noraaUcacountrtea, will try to

Llf tr friaokUy coartaetoaaa.itelptjbllc, Morocco, and fenten. An iavxt^tlano *ne King of Morocco to vioit China, w* irlli try to fitf'Ui with rjulmea, Ghana, aryJ hmll. ft*of fieavt #tol< atlt b* Invttad to vialt Oiln* V* will atrive for dl^lcevrtirrla eac th* Congo, v*xport ruba't ifip.nijwtacninat Ajnrricanr* and further Btno*-Cuban fnenriLy MaHiolll Tn* cb>f* D?

jy.h countriee in tv.Jn* Africa .jw Let la Aaw rite vill he further developed, rjthvouch lotvc- already eaveoiteoed diplcnettlc relation* vith us. Jrierrdl; relations vltl be further consolidated arrmill be ar.> n*-standirvt issues. v* will strive for U*ahlp arJith newly laeepeadiotn ifrlea, vet vtlt try to ettanllebltion*. Ir, me will continue to counter

Bolivia and Braait vill be

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Original document.

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