/ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD 1 ?
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.Decade of. Paras. 2
A review of the fundamental change* In the structure of world power which occurred In thedrawine. of lines between themajor powers' reassessment of their military capabilities andin Soviet leadership andvast Improvemerit ln Soviet militarynewor the USSR in the underdevelopedpeal lion of the USSR at the end ofecline ln the US world poaiuon.
Soviet economic growth and economicbelle! that the USSR can challenge the US on disputedpeaceful eo-exutencebeat* of the diapute with China.
Communist Growth and
The growing self-confidt-ee ofeconomic growth and economicCnincse nuclear developmentChlneae revolutionaryChinese view of CommurJat world strategy
Relations and the Future of Communism
The iMuei between the USSRlearof continuingthat tbe USSR will con Una* aeeklng to avoid senouiPoulbmtyleaders will misjudge WesternChina wllJ penOstiDvolred.
The objectives of the saUonalutmotivations of the revolutionarywarlneaa of communism and their attempt to carve out their ownand social msta-bUlty tn the imderdevelopedenormity of thentoward author! lartanlim andof
populauonfor outsideto the prcaentleaders.
Outside world viewed largely In lannt of local problem* -Choice of-Eeutrabam by those who thought they could safely choosetendency to eompenaale for years of Western influence by accepting closer relations with Rno-Sovletthat trend toward neutrabsa will becomeconseetueneea for US,decline of US influence in theforpenetration and subversion.
IV. PROBLEMS OP THE WESTERN ALLIANCES . . .
West fact* not only stronger Communist enemy but accumulating crises in tbe underdeveloped nations-Western asstU sOI] tit*he West-Tbe condiUon of Westernproblem In Japan -Weakness o* CENTO andB> contrast, the greater strength of NATO-MlUiary problems ofDitt.-genclesUantleorommon view of world situation among NATO members
A. The Evolving
Major problem of theposed by the aeeuroulaUoe of weapons of mass destruction by the greatside capable ofmowvoui dMirtc-jsn upon Um other-General nuclear war notbut nigb* rrrauwal response to tatemaUone)serious problems posed by strategic
B Military and Political Implications of the Evolving
ncertainty about present and future world militaryPuuismeat over fletanwSStlir.pt "position -Ccvjet view of strategicUSSR denies fromwarproblems of conducting Lrrutedofeountr.es aeouinng nuclearofcoming about through miscalculation orthst decade ahead will be an
ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION
DECADE OF THE iMCa
The past several years have witnessedchanges in the structure of world power. The corning of the space age, the Soviet bid for world leadership, the growth of CommunUt China toward world power status, the creation of new nations, and the rapid economic growth of tome of thecountries have greatly altered thefor many of the world's peoples. We believe It would be useful, as the decade ofegins, to surveyomewhat broader fashion than has been our custom the development of the world situation in the years which have gone by.
By the time the decade ofegan, the major convulsions of the postwar year* had come to an end. The Chinesehad seised control of the Chinesethe colonial powers had relinquished their hold on most of the Near East and South and Southeast Asia, most of the East-em European governments were ln the hands of Communists responsive to Moscowand the Communist drive for poUucal power in Western Europe had been curbed. The TJS had abandoned isolationism and had accepted the leadership of the Western world. Through NATO, the Marshall plan, aid to Greece and Turkey, and an activein world councils, the US had asserted Mi intention to use its economic and military power in the interests of world stability and the containment of communism The major tests of that intention came In Berlin and above al) in Korea; the firm and rapid US response in Korea made clear to all the world tha: an attempt by the CornmunlsU to acquire territory by open military conquest wasand dangerous.
In retrospect, it can be seen that these U8 actions of tbe early postwar period werefactors in creating the conditions which dominated much of the decade. They led to the drawing of lines between Communist and non-Communist territory which could not be crossed by overt military forces withoutrisk of retaliation Thus the Communists were in effect deprived of one tactic fortheir area of influence; they were obliged to confine themselves to the more devious and time-ccmsuming methods ofguerrilla action, and political and economic warfare. These US actions also gave courage and hope to many nations whose borders were being threatened and whose economic and politics! weaknesses made them subject to Internal and external Communist pressure.
The war In Korea, following upon the events ln Europe of thend upon the Chinese Communist establishment ofIn China, alsoively sense of danger in the non-Communist world. Thereeneral awareness of thealms of the Communist revolution. The US response was to rearm Itself and toilitary assistance program designed not only to bolster countries on the periphery of the Bloc but also to identify unmistakably those areas which the US was taking under Its protecuon The two blocs becamewell armed and committed to the defense of particular areas.
he Korean War. also seen In retrospect, pointed up the need for the major powers to reassess their military capabilities and
ties. In that war, the Soviet leaders had avoided overtajor factor In this decision was their recognition of US nuclear superiority and of the threat which this posed to the Soviet homeland and to the entire Communist position In the Far East. Similarly, the US limited Its militaryto the area ofajor factor in the US decision was recognition of Soviet conventional military superiority in Eurasia sod of the threat which this posed to US allies In Europe and the Near East Moreover, the US encountered the very great difficulty of bringing Its superior nuclear capabilities to bearituation in which the enemy'sgoals were limited and theworld was anxious not to expand the conflict.
The strategic reassessment and theof capabilities which took place on both sides were to some degree efforts to eliminate the shortcomings which the Korean War had made apparent On the aide of the West, this involved the establishment of NATO force goals toarger ground army inand the developmentapability for tactical employment of nuclearboth designed to offset Soviet groundIn the USSR, the Soviet leadersup the development of their air defense capability, the production of strategic nuclear weapons, and Ihe development of Jong-range delivery capabilities.
While these military' developments were going forward, various political changes were taking place in the world. The Soviet dictator died and his great persona! power passedroup of his former subordinates; in the courseew years Khrushchev emerged as the dominant personality. Underleadership, the Soviet rulersengagedomprehensive re-exara-tnation of the Soviet domestic scene and of the world situation.onsequence, there were significant Internal changes in the USSR, in the Eastern European satellite states, and ln the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet leaders evidently recognised thatrigidity had Inhibited progress at home, antagonized the satellite peoples,oalescence among the Western Powers,the exploitation of political unrest in underdeveloped and colonial areas, anddangerous tensions with tbe US Tothesethe Soviet leadershipits Internal policies by easing police terror and by taking some steps to improve living standards, loosened the reins over the Satellites, began toroader range of contacts with the Westernew policy of assistance tocountries, and sought lo reducewith the US by personal diplomacy.
a. This new Soviet policy was not pursued with thorough consistency, nor did lt meet with unqualified success. Loosening the reins over the Satellites and giving encouragement to anti-Stalliust elements In Eastern Europe led to anti-Soviet manifestations in Poland and popular revolution in Hungaryon of Soviet authority maderagic battleground and discouraged other libera] forces within the CommunistSimilarly, tbe denunciation of Stalin produced intellectual confusion at home, and the process of liberalization In the USSR was slowed down Although Khrushchev'sdiplomacy succeeded in reducingtensions intermittently5o substantial ioternaUonUtook place, and in this situation of stalemate an atmosphere of tension has
evertheless, this new Soviet policy has greatly strengthened the Soviet worldAmong other things. Its appearance coincided with developments ln theareas which gave tbe USSR newfor expanding lis influence Most of the underdeveloped countries have beentate of social and economic ferment during tbe past decade. Most of the peoples in these countries were preoccupiedesire for modernisation and self-government. They are less concerned with ideologies than with results, and more concerned to gain tangible assistance and sympatheticfrom both world power blocs than to associate themselves with either of them. They have become particularly sensitive to
any remninU of colonialism or attempt* by the West to influence or to control their domestic and foreign policies. On the other hand, the USSR, through its pose as the defender of Afro-Asian nationalism againsts the exponent ofas the party offended by alleged US provocations and stubbornness, as the example and proponent of rapid economicand as an alternative source ofand unconditional aid. has gained mueh influence and prestige.
These Soviet gains in the underdeveloped countries coincided with theastly improved military posture. The USSR's achievements In space vehicles and missiles have not only enhanced Soviet prestige but promise to give the USSRroughly equivalent In their political and strategic impact to those possessed by the US. Thus, even while itest advanced economy than that of the US and still hadoehold among thenations, the USSR had created by the end of the decade an Imposing platform from which to challenge the Western position throughout the world. While the US still continues to dispose tremendous power and to wield enormous influence, It has appeared to many of it* friends and enemies alike to be faltering in Its hold upon that powerts initiative and resourcefulness lnthat influence. In the nature of things It was impossible that the US should retain for very long the unique position itat the end of World War II. The world perceives that the US no longer enjoysinvulnerability, overwhelming economic strength, or unchallengeable world power.
At the same time, the world powerof the US* European allies had vastly deteriorated from what it was before World War n. These nations had been deprived of control over vast populations, enormous sources of raw material, and far-flungand industrial enterprises. Their ability to move freely and to operate from widely dispersed bases was drasticallyThese enormous losses wereby strong nationalist and neutralist tides running against them in their former possessions In this situation theeconomic recovery of most of these states was not matchedommensurate effort to develop an adequate national defense posture, or to share responsibility in dealing with world problems.
hese facts signify that the world has enteredew era. New leaders and new nations are arriving on the scene; thereew relationship of military power; political and social instability have become epidemic in the southern two-Uurds of the world; schisms and heresies have appeared within the Communist camp itself. There Is no longer any question that radical change will occur in the world, butuesuon of what direction it will take. The future of the West will dependarge degree upon the manner In which it mobilises and employs Its political, economic, and military resources to shape and guide the process of change. In the paragraphs below we describe theof the world situation in more detail and attempt to outline the problems for the future which are Implied In this
II. THE COMMUNIST WOfflO
A. Sovit'PiOQitH ond Policy
here can no longer be any doubt that the USSRell on the road towardthe US in many of the indices ofpower0 Soviet gross national product (ONP)ittlehird that of the US;0 it was nearly half that of the US During the remaining years of the Seven-Year Plan, the USSRprobably achieve an annual growth rate of slightly less than six percent.oviet ONP will be over half that of the US and about equal to the level which the US reachedotal investment in the USSR will probably reach about one-third of GNPs compared with the present US rate of about one-fifth of GNP. Soviet industrial investmenteasured in dollars, had already exceeded the record US figure, set7
It Overtaking the US tn total outputistant prospect. But tn more meaningful ways, the economic power of the USSRcompares favorably with thai of Its chosen competitor. By virtue of complete subordination to regime control, the Soviet economy, despite Its smaller else, is presentlyilitary effort of approximately the same size as that of the USroduction levels in certain basic Industrial products wDJ probably approach and in some case* surpass present US records, for example, tbe USSR has announced and probably willteel productionilliontonshich approximates the US recordillion achieved in.
here are and will remain certainof backwardness. Agriculturaldespite heavy Investment, will stilla very much higher proportion ofin the USSR than in the US. TheSoviet consumer, although he will gain about four percent per year In overall consumption, will stilltandard of Hving far Inferior to that of hii USespecially in housing and in range of consumer choice. Soviet society even0 will not be affluent in the sense ofarge service sector in the economylethora of gadgetry. consumer choices, and stylistic Improvements.In the decade ahead Industry will be expanding so rapidly that by th* beginning ofs the Soviet leaders will be able lo confer upon the Soviet atuen benefits considerably beyond those available today. Mosl Important of all, however, the USSR already possesses an economy sufficiently strong and flexible to permit it to assignrelatively freely and withoutself-denials to the major uses of nationalscience, and foreign political and economic operations.
he Soviet leaders obviously understand that science has become one of the key fronts in the world struggle, not only because of Its relation to military and economic strength bul alto because Itajor element In great power prestige. The scale of the Soviet effort, thankseavy Investment in training scientists hi past years, is probably now roughlyar with that of the US In some fields of the basic sciences and in some critical areas related to weapons technology.
Soviet progress in the field of rocketry has probably had more effect upon world opiruon and upon the world situation than anyof the past two or three years. This progress, together with the earlierachievements In nuclear weaponshasew strategicIn the world which wfj] be discussed In greater detail to later paragraphs of thisIt Is enough here to say that this new military capability is providing the Soviet leaderseapons system that Is valuable in terms of both political exploitation and military deterrence.
The Soviet leaders consider themselves to beosition of great strength. They probably believe that they now possess, or will soonowerful counterdeterrent to the existing US deterrent force, and that this counterdeterrent will become more and more persuasive to the years ahead They almost certainly feel that for these reasons they can frequently and vigorously challenge the US on disputed issues They probably feel that the range of antl-Weslem actions which they can pursue with little fear of nuclearis growing, although they almostrecognize that they must act with caution lest they provoke the US IntoacUon. The Soviet leaders evidently recogniseeneral nuclear exchange could mean the destruction of the fabric of modern society.
Thecoexistence" policy of the Soviet leaders Is partly the consequence of these cautionaryt is also partly the consequence of the Soviet Ideologicalwhich views history not primarilyontest of military power between states, butong-term social revolutionary struggle. The total power position of the Communistbut not focusing exclusively around its militaryviewed as an encouragementuarantee of the success of revolutionary forces to the non-Communist states In the Soviet view the
situation especially In the underdeveloped states. Is now such that substantial andgains can be won by vigorous pursuit of all forms of struggle short of war. Theprobably also feel that ln carefully chosen circumstances they could wage limited war with Coram unist-supported. or even with Bloc forces, without themselves incurringrisk of general war. The comparative caution implied in this strategy has led to open dispute between the USSR andChina. Before we can estimate the course of Communist policy In the years ahead, we should therefore examine theand the aspirations of Communist China.
B. Chinese Communist Growth and Aspirations
During the past two or three years the Chineseegime has beena growing self-confidence. This probably reflected. In part at least, the regimessatisfaction over Its politicalwithin China andubstantial consolidation of its economic programhe second year of the Second Five-Year Plan. Chinese industrial production Increased by aboutercent. Especially dramaticwere recorded in basicsteel, coal, and electric power. There wasetter balance oforedistribution of the labor force, and an Improvement In tbe quality of the output. In short, the Communists began to receive the dividends fromean of hard andeffort on the expansion of heavy industry. ONP rose by aboutercenthen by aboutercent9 andercent0 Investment0eak of about one-third of ONP.
Despite such impressive gains. Communist China stillong way to go beforea major Industrial power. It is still largely an agricultural countrymall Industrial base relative to its huge population. Eighty percent of the population isand industrial production is less thanercent that of theommunist China's most serious problem for some years to come will be the lag In food production in the face of an annual population Increaseercent. In time some amelioration may occur,arge part of the industrial expansion is directed toward the production offertilizers, irrigationto support the agricultural sector.onsequence of population tn-crease and bad crop years9 ander capita food consumption ln China hasdeclined ONP will probably continue to Increaseapid rate, investment will continue to be heavy, and per capitamay Increase somewhat. Any such gains, however, will be realized largely by the urban population, while the vast peasantry continues barely to subsist.
he Chinese Communist militarycontinues toubstantial growth In the capacity to produce andcomplex military equipment is likely,uclear development programew years, sayhe Chinese CornmunlsU may be able touclear device and scon thereafter build an elementary nuclear weapon deliverable by medium bombers. By the end of the decade, they couldile missilelssion warhead, and they might be able to produce longer range missiles These dates could be movedor backward by Increases or decreases In the amount of Soviet aid.
he most striking characteristicot lU economic progress but lU great revolutionary elan. TheCommunist leaders are men of intense ardor who are deadly serious aboutChinese society eompleUly andThey are determined tonew CommunistndeednewCommunistnd to give to the world the benefits of their "constructiveto Communist dogma and social theory. Confident of their own righteousness and orthodoxy and reinforced in thatby what they regard a* the great achievements of the past decade, they are pushing, not only toward great power status in the world, but also toward at least co-equal status with the USSR in Ihe world of
national communism. Indeed, it became dear0 that Peiping wasajor challenge to Moscow's position as the final authority in the Communist movement
his Chinese Communist drive and sense of mission is reflected not only in suchsocial changes as the creation of the commune but also in foreign policyThe Chinese Communists* view of the world situation is strongly doctrinaire.n trie,the Soviet point ofov<-roptimist le. The Chinese leaders evidently believe that 'Imperialism- to on Its last legs, that the Sinc-Sovlet Bloc has surpassed the West in military power and political influence, and that the emerging peoples in Asia, Africa, and latin America are ripe for Communist revolution. If only they are actively supported to that end. Whereas in recent years the Soviet leaders havethecontext of belief in the Inevitabilityorld Communistcomparatively low-risk policy of peaceful competition, the Chinese Communists haveolicy of greater militancy, even at considerable risk. They probably also find this policy useful inthe Chinese people to the sacrifices they are requiring of them.
C- Slno-Soviat Relations and Ihe Future, of Commtmiwn
he character of Sino-Soviet relations in the years ahead willrofound effect upon the future of communism and thereby on the world situation. The quarrel with Peiping has put the Soviet leaders in asituation. They cannot condone Chinese contumacy without losing control of themovement. They cannot permit an open break without losing what Influence they still possess over the Chinese and without gravely weakening the internationalmovementhole. The Sovietwould consider an open break calamitous, but we do not believe that they would go so far to trying to avoid it as to surrender to the Chinese position; both the USSR'sto preserve lis supremacy In the Communist movement andnational-Interest in avoiding serious risk of general war would precludeourse. We also do not believe that the Chinese would submit fully to the Soviet position; their pride, self-righteousness, and national aspirations are too heavily committed to permit it
The Issues between the partners are basic, and will probably not be resolved in any clear-cut fashion. The meetings in Moscowlearly did not produce aagreement, or one which is likely to be lasting. The estrangement seems likely to continue, with ups and downs as new Issues arise and temporary solutions are developed, and possibly movingooserIf the Sino-Soviet relationship does in fact develop in this way, there will probablyendency for recurrent stresses and strains to weaken the Communist world posture and to dimmish the effectiveness of worldoutside the bloc. In particular,would be stimulated in the Communist movement, with parties or factions in various countries tending lo Identify either with the USSR or with Communist China. The two countries would compete with each other for Influenceariety of arenas, frommovements to worldurther widening of the Sino-Soviet split, if it should occur, would dim the Image of the blocreat and growing power center and thus reduce the pressure upon peripheralto accommodate to the Communists.
The cohesive forces between the USSR and China are strong, and we believe that the two states will not abandon their alliance against the West The Soviet leaders would be confrontedost serious dilemma, however, if the Chineseilium policy as to become engagedajor war. Caughtesire to avoid Soviet involvement, with its attendant dangers,esire toommunist state, with its attendantto re-establish Soviet influence in China, the Soviet leaders might tend toward the latter course.iderdivergency would not necessarily leadess dangerous world.
t Is Impossible to predict with confidence the course of Communist policy in the decade
particularly in ihe light of thefuture course in Sino-Soviet relations. We believe that the USSR will stick to its present policy of seeking to win, victories without incurring serious risks, and ofor combining shows of anger andwith poses of reasonableness andWe say this largely because wethat the relationship of power between the US and the USSR will cause the Soviet leaders to desire to avoid general war. and that within the limits which this desire places on their action there will be constantlyideas of the potential risks and gainsin the various situations which willanger exists, ofcourse, that in assessing the risks involved in particularor proposed courses of action, the Soviet leaders might overestimate theirwhile underestimating that of the West. In particular, they might misjudge Western will and determination in the face of Soviet threats or encroachments.olitical miscalculation could lead lo the incurring of serious risks without the intention to do so; It could even lead to general war.
e believe that China will persist inthe USSRore militant bloc policy. It will continue its hostility to the US. and as It becomesituclearmight press its objectives much more aggressively than at present. On the other hand, the Chinese have in recent years assessed risks carefully, and despite their bellicose talk they havefrom actions which involved serious risk of large-scale military operations. Thus, their militancy has been tempered by some degree of prudence, and this tendency toward prudence mighl in time become somewhat stronger as they become more familiar with the dangers of nuclear war and as they come to recognise the vulnerability of theirindustrial capacity. On the whole, how-ever, we do noteneral shift in the Chinese domestic or world outlook for some lime lo come, and Chinese militancy willtoerious danger of local or general hostilities in the far East, and even of general war.
ver the next decade at least, theretoreater likelihood of flexibility in Soviet than in Chinese policy. The Soviet leadership's desire toeneral war, the wider range of Soviet contacts with the outside world, the continuing pressure at home for liberalisation, and the growingof the USSR to provide lis citizensore confortablefactors taken together may tend toward moderation inpobcy andecognition of some areas of common interest with the West. It Is even possible that the Soviet leaders will come lo feel that the USSR has little In common with China except an ideology which the Chinese Interpret In their own way. and that0 Communist China, with nuclear weaponsopulation ofwillangerous neighbor and
III. THE EMERGING AREAS A. The Polriieol end Soeiol Mlliaw
t is one of the key points in the Soviet estimate of the world situation thatare favorable for Communist gains In the colonial and ex-colonial areas of the world; there is much to support this Soviet view. The nationalist revolutions in such areas as Africa and the Arab states have been directed largely toward revamping political and social systems in order to modernizeand tolace in the sun. The Communist revolutions in Russia and China arose from broadly comparable aspirations. Indeed, the system in these countries is widely admired in the newer nations of the worldit has been demonstrably effective in achieving rapid modernization, while the West Is associated In their minds with thewhich they blame for most of theirand miseries, both real and fancied.
any of these countries ln emergingin Africa and the Middlein the charge of revolullonary-minded leaders; in others of them such leaders areid for power These leaders are members of an intelligentsia who havehad an education along Western lines, some of It In military schools, and who
Western tostituUons, and culturalWhereas Latin America isis predominantly Western in language and culture, andong history ofAfricaelange of languages, religions, and cultures, and Is only nowfrom foreign domination. Evenontinent such as Latin America, there are societies which have passedajor social revolution and others which still possess small social elitesarge mass of Illiterate and poverty-stricken peasants and tribes.
here is,arge commonin the underdeveloped world. This Is tbe political and social instability which is either manifest or dormant and which arises from the rapidity with which knowledge is growing and from the revolutionary manner to which large numbers of people areto the changes in the world around them. Nearly all the nations of the underdevelopedto Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America-are beset by problems springing fromgrowth, lack of development capital, rising popular expectations, internal political strife and competing ideological pressures, lack of political prowess and administrative and technical competence, and an inadequate sense of national identity. While some states, especially those barely emerging fromas to Africa, suffer more intensely thanothers from these assorted His, even states such as India and the more advanced Latin American countries confront several of themost serious degree. Many states have adopted strongly socialist methods; some have held to constitutional methods of government with only the greatest difficulty, some have thrown out bloody dictators only to acquire equally distasteful successors; some have taken halting and others more dramatic steps toward the establishment of democratic
n states confronted by these enormous problems, the tendency toward some band of authoritarianism and socialism seems likely to continue Revolutionary leadersto deal with backwardness,feudalism, corruption, economic pres-
and ineptitude often have nobut lo stifle political opposition Western states which set store by economic Individual-Ism and political freedom will probably be mereasingly shocked by methods which will be adopted, but in the eyes of local teadeis Western standards of political and economic conduct are likely to be irrelevant to theRevolutionary leaders are likely tothe West to Judge them more by what they are trying to do than by the manner in whichre doing lt. If the West does not understand and help them, they will tend to rely more and more heavily upon the Communists,oint is reached when they can no longer extricate themselves from the Communist embrace.
f all the problems confronting thesethat of the relation between population and economic growth may be the mostIndeed, population growthrave world problem, with present rates makingoubling of the world's populationears0 the world population was two billion; today it is three billion; in twenty years it will probably be four billion; In forty years It may be six or sever, billion Orowth is most rapid in the underdeveloped areas, where nearly everywhere It exceeds twoear. Ten years ago almost no nationopulation growth rate of three percent; now such rates are notand there ls no reasonable prospect that they can be significantly reduced in the next decade, whatever means might be tried These Increases impede capital formation in the areas where It is needed most, sinceIn production simply go to keep alive the larger numbers of unproductive old people and children In some cases total ONP grows while per capita GNP falls.of living are declining In some countries at precisely the time when the revolutionary leaders now in charge must begin to meet the expectations which have arisen in their own and in their fellow countrymen's minds
he problem of maintaining standards of living and even that of satisfyingegree rising economic expectations probably can be met with substantial infusions of outside aid and with the execution of nationalprograms However, even if thesereceived outside aid in massivethey would still confront the graveand social problems of backward andsocieties. Indeed, these problems will inhibit both the receipt and proper use of needed economic assistance. The presentleaders must surmount this great complex of problems if they are to sustain the nationalist character of their revolutions; if they fall, they may be replaced byleaders ready to use Draconian methods and determined to Impose permanentinstitutions.
If. as we suggest above, the emerging countries will be preoccupied with their own problems, their attitudes toward the outside world will be deUrmined largely by the way in which they feel the outside world impinges upon these problems. These countries and their leaders will not be concerned so much with ideological, moral, and culturalSI they will with manipulatinginfluences in order to protect themselves or to advance their particular interests The two great powers are likely to be viewed largely In terms of the threat or succor which they will afford
Some of the emerging states have clearly aligned themselves with one or another of the two great powers Many of these are slates on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc-Iran, Pakistan, Thailand. South Vietnam, and South Korea -and their leaders have aligned themselves with the US in order to obtain that military and economic assistance which they hoped would enable them to keep any domestic enemies at bay and to stand up against pressures from their powerfulCuba alleges similar reasons forlUelf with the USSR
In general, however, those-avho thought they could safely do so have chosen neutral-Ism, and indeed some of them have maderofitable thing of It. in theirto achieve and maintain nationalthey have sought to avoidto either side, and they have recog-
nized the value to both sides of their not falling under the domination of the other. This has permitted some of them successfully to seek economic assistance from both and some others to seek assistance from one side by suggesting that they might appeal to the other. Nevertheless, many of these countries, in the course of their colonial or semicclonia' history, have been subjected to Westernand Institutions and have therefore come to feel that "neutralism" requires areaction away from these influences and some closer relationship with the Sino-Soviet Bloc
This trend bas been accelerated bySoviet willingness to compete with the West In providing economic assistance and diplomatic support. Bloc economic assistance overall is stilt considerably less than the US equivalent, but the USSR in particular can substantially enlarge Its program. Moreover, the USSR has some advantages over the US in carrying out aid programs, lt can move more quickly and without regardariety of politically-imposed restrictions whichUS activities On the other hand, as Soviet aid becomes more commonplace and taken for granted, the USSR la beginning to encounter some of the criticisms andwhich the US has faced in its foreign aid programs.
We believe that If the present trendneutralism is not reversed. It will become so strong that it will draw away from the West some of those nations now associated with It. This might come about throughin some of theseIran or Southseizure of power by nationalist-neutralist forces; It could occur because existing regimes might decide to seek the supposed benefits and safety of neutrality; It could come about because these nations might decide that tbe US was becoming inferior to the Sino-Soviet Bloc in military' power and therefore would no longer bt willing or able to support them.
The neutralist posture of these countries seems to us likely to produce In the decade ahead some most serious policy problems for the US. Aside from the probability olfrom Western association andto balance Western with Soviet or Chinese influence, there will be continual pressures for economic aid and politicalfor denunciations of colonialism, foron disarmament, and for further Western retreat from positions ofor Influence. The US position in the UN will probably become increasinglyparticularly since many of thesesuch influential members as India and theappear to believe that the UN machinery has been used by the major Western powers and especially by the US as an Instrument of national, and hence in their viewolicy. For this reason, the idea of revising th* UN charter and proposals to bring in Communist China have received widespread sympathy among the emerging nations. Their numbers are now so great that when their views become morenow seemshitherto predominant Westernin the UN will be greatly reduced.
is obvious that neutralism as ais fundamentally Incompatible withobjectiveommunist worldneutralism may often providewith opportunities forsubversion. Particularly in tbe areasnew states, the Communists willrivalries among nations and tribes,need for economic and technical aid.the naivete and weaknesses ofleaders. Hence the problem forstates is to keep out ofNevertheless. Insofar as theunderdeveloped nations canproblems, they may take on astature which will enable them totheir neutrality against Communist
IV. MOBIEMS OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCES
statesmen are faced withmore complicated problems thanto face ten years ago. Whereas thenthink of military containment indefining vital areas or lines ofthe Communist world and the Free
World, or even providing economic aid and diplomatic support in order to achieve political containment, the West must now contend not only with stronger, more flexible, and more dangerous enemies, but also with crises in the southern two-thirds of the world. These crises, as we have seen, arise only partly from Soviet and Chinese Communist machinations; many other factors are at work, such as the natural growth of population, knowledge, communication, and human aspirations, and the social dislocations that accompany rapid change.
he West has substantial and growing assets. The Western European economies, especially those In the Common Market area, are booming. Rates of economic growth In France and West Oermany are about as high as in the USSR, averaging around six or seven percent per annum0 In the UK and the US growth rates are somewhat lower, averaging around three or four percent; at the moment, the UK economy is in danger of stagnation, while that of the US has markedly slowed down. Nevertheless, the Westernare for the most part highly advanced and flexible, and they respond to trade and fiscal policies designed to adjust them. The greater emphasis in the Western economies upon privatend upon the allocation of resources through the market place, makes it more difficult for them than for those of the Communist countries to concentrate upon the development of national power; however, in tirr.es of emergency they can readily be made to serve that objective.
Likewise, the major Western Powers, with their systems of alliances, overseas bases, and worldwide deployments of ground, naval, and air forces, possess enormous military power. Crave problems exist with respect to strategic doctrine, weapons systems, and the political application of military power. These webelowut even with the deficiencies and gaps which are generally recognised this military power of the West Is great and widely respected.
Moreover, despite the anticolonialism of many of the world's peoples, the Western powers still wield great Influence in many areis of the emerging world English and French are still the linguae francae of Africa, the Middle Eist. and Southern Asia; they are still the languages of the revolutionaryand of the universities. While Western influence has tended to decline in some areu. as for example among the Arab states. It has tended to rise in other areas, as for example ln India. The Western, not the Communist, states are still the principal trading partners of most of the emergingand still their principal bankers,and developers. Despite the interest shown by many leaders of tbe emergingin Communist methods of development and in Soviet economic assistance, these same leaders still have borrowed from the West most of their basic concepts of the good life.
Nevertheless, the Western countries have grave and continuing problems. Politicalwhile becoming epidemic in the southern two-thirds Df the world. Is stillIn parts of the northern third.unhealthy political situations exist in Western Europe itself; Spain and Portugal are restive under personal dictatorships, Italy continues to struggle with finding abasis for constitutional government, and France has put Its burdens upon one man who holds warring factions ln harnessovernmental system created by him and for him alone. On the periphery of Europe. Greece remains poverty-stricken and poUtt-cally weak, while Turkey is passingrisis of regime, the outcome of which can only be surmised.
Outside Europe, the condition of thealliance system is deteriorating Japan, by far the most important non-Westernassociated with the system, enjoys aeconomy, but ls passing throughpolitical and social changes Although the rulers of Japan had successfully Imposedelements of Western societyraditionalist society graduallyeriod ofentury, the Impact of nuclear warfare, defeat, and US occupation shook Japanese society to Its foundations Inthe psychological atmosphere is still overcast with the memories generated by the
only two nuclear weapons ever used In war. Today the country,ecade of USis seeking, not only toay of life common to Itself, but toatisfactory stance between attractions toward China and the USSResire for protection by the US. In this atmosphere sharply contending political alternatives are being presented to the Japaneseadical left whichneutralism and closer association with the Sino-Soviet Bloc,onservative right that is generally disposed to association with the US. ossible that the existing US-Japanese defense agreement may proveokeneality, in any event the US is likely to have increasing difficulties In the years ahead in carrying out actions under the agreement .
he minor alliances. CENTO and SEATO, are floundering. ery effectiveCENTO was gravely shaken6 by the revolution in Iraq and that country! subsequent withdrawal. Iran seems to be almost continuouslyondition of Insta-btUty, and the British military position and general influence in the Middle East areweak. Moreover, neutralisthave emerged In Iran and Pakistan. 8EATO has alwaysoose assoclaUon. It has only one member, Thailand, inSoutheast Asia, and the course of events In Laos. Cambodia, and South Vietnam willreat effect upon Thailand's policy. The continuing failure of the principalof theUK, US,ommon estimate of the situation Ln.ommon policy toward, the Indo-Chinese states makes It extremely difficult for SEATO to serve as an effective Instrument for stability in the area.
hese problems and weaknesses In USoutside Europe put in sharp relief the
much greater vigor and strength of NATO. Despite its many weaknesses, NATO has shown
itself toseful Instrument of Western cooperation, and It has absorbed numerous shocks and crises arising both within and outside the alliance. It bears promise ofso to serve and, with some increase of constructive support by Its members, even oftility.
ut NATO contains centrifugal as well as centripetal forces. Some of these relate to tbe NATO military program. France's opposition to an integrated force structure is well known, as is France's recurrent removal of NATO-committed forces from NATO command. Most NATO members, of course, maintain forces, and in the case of tbe US veryforces, which they have neverputting under NATO authority In peacetime. The most important of these are the US nuclear-capable strategic forces, and the desire to possess similar forcesymbol of prestige andalance to US powerthe Atlantic alliance contributed to the British and French decisions to developnuclear capabilities.
xclusive US control of the majorhas troubled Europeans in the pastthey feared that the US would brandish It in tooashion More recently many have also become troubled by thefear: that the US could no longer be xeiied upon to risk nuclear devastation ln order to counter Soviet pressures in Europe, and that the Soviet leaders, judging this to be the case, would not be restrained from such pressures. Various suggestions have been made for solving the dilemmas presented by the evolving world strategicsharing, revision of the mission and armament of the shield forces on thearms limitations in the European area or in special European zones, revisedfor consultation and decision making. Whatever position may ultimately be taken regarding these suggestions, virtually all of NATO's military concepts seem likely to come under Increasing questioning and to beto strong pressures for substantialIn the decade ahead
n addition to these military problems NATO as an organization confronts various internal divergencies and rivalries which not only sap Its capacity to act but shadow the image which it presents to the world. The basic relationship between the US and its European NATO allies is coming under strain.
V. THE MILITARYM A. The Evolving Strateofcidespread feeling1 out nuclear war Is unlikely, the problem posed by the accumulation of offensive weapons of mass destruction by the great powers will remain the major problem of. Although we have been unable to agree upon anof the site of the Soviet ICBM program (estimates range fromperhapsn launcher forhe Soviet capability even at the lowest estimated figure willrave threat to the US. To Illustrate, If one assumes the number on launcher tond applies reasonable reus of reliability to the missile, the USSR could detonate in the US in the target areaegatons. The even greater delivery capability provided by shorter range missiles and nuclear weaponsby aircraft or submarines and ships poses an additional threat to the US. to US bases overseas, to US allies, and Indeed to most of the northern hemisphere.
o far as we can see now, If the USSR undertook to deliver such an attack, the US could do little to prevent enormousS pre-emptiveis, an attack deliveredoviet attack was believed to benot prevent suchunless the various types of Soviet missile launchers had been precisely located, and there is doubtigh proportion could be so located An ti ballistic missile systems of presently unproven effectiveness willbe available about the middle of thebut such early systems almost certainly will not be sufficienUy developed or widely-enough deployed to give assurance ofor neutralizing moremall pro-
both because of the growing strength and as-eertlveness of the larger European NATO countries and because of growing European doubts about the future of US policy and US commitments to Europe Relationships among the European members are also marked by considerable suspicion and jockeying foras between the UK and its principal continentalthe growing economic division of Europe between the Com-rnon Market and the Outer Seven countries compounding the mistrust.
he harmonization of economic policies among the Industrial nations of Western Europe, and of these policies with those of the US, willajor problem of thedecade.ajor recession ln the Free World economy occur, there would be danger of resort by the industrial nations to protectionist measures, undermining the pattern of economic cooperation stimulated by the US In the postwar period. In any case, the rapid emergence of Germany as the most powerful nation economically In Westernand the relative weakness of the UKthe problem of bridging the gapthe Common Market end Outer Seven groups.
nother serious problem for the alliance is crested by the impact of colonial problems This issue Is at present posed most gravely by the Algerian conflict, which has stirred up anti-Westerni sm among the emerging peoples and dissension within the alliance. Butand Dutch sensitivities regarding the Congo and West New Ouinea problems, the British dilemmas in Nyasaland, Rhodesia, Kenya, and Uganda, and the strongattitude of Portugal add to the difficulties of individual states and tend to cause tensions among them Until some of these Issues are resolved it will be almost impossible for NATOhole to escape reproachesrotector of colonialism.
part from these more obvious signs of malaise there is, weroblem of deeper significance. The world situation Is not seenommon Ught among theWestern states. This lackommon understanding Is due partlyailure to
consider that the first nation to deploy such weapons will gain major psychologicaland military advantages. Nevertheless, we believe it almost certain that thesethroughout the period will remainto shield large areas of the USSR from widespread devastation.
hus it appears likely that during most of the decade ahead the strategic situation will be one in which both the US and the USSR will possess relatively invulnerableweapons systems capable of inflicting enormous destruction upon the other. The world must face the possibilityeneral nuclearto pass throughdesign, orkill many millions of people, destroy the capital accumulation of many decades, render large section* of the earth virtually uninhabitableime, and destroy the power of most of the modern nation* of the world.
his strategic situation does not make general nuclear war impossible, but it does makeighly Irrational response todisputes. As long as this situation continues, each aide will be deterred by fear of the consequences (if by nothing else) from deliberately initiating general war. It iscertain, moreover, that each side will be deterred from action or policies whichserious risk of general war. Thequestion Is: how will the risksiven aeUon be judged in the context ofwhich exists when the action is To be more specific' how far will the Sc..ft! -or the Chineseemboldened by Judging that Westernto some Communist aggression will beby Western aversion to incurring serious risk of general war? To what extent will the Western reaction actually be so inhibited' Such questions as these are likely to be decisive in any sharp International crisis.
ut apart from the calculation of risks in times of crisis, this strategic situation poses other serious problems for policymakers. Row long will It persist? Can either sidelear military superiority? If the situation of mutual deterrence does persist.
can nuclear war be prevented from occurring by accident? Can nuclear blackmail be countered? Can nuclear armamenu beor eliminated without creating unfair advantage or opportunities for evasion? We do not pretend to offer answers, but only to point out in the paragraphs below some of the military and political problems which we believe this strategic situation has created and will create in the decade ahead.
B. Miliiory and Political Implication* of the
Evolving Strategichere is much Ignorance and uncertainty among military and civilian leaderstheboth Communist and non-Communistthe present and future world military situation. This is due in part to security restrictions betweenand even within governments, in part to the complex technical and operational factors involved In modern military actions, and in part to the fact that the destructive potential of modem weapons ls unprecedented in human history. Even among theand militarily sophisticated, there ispuzzlement and disagreement about
'The Director for Intelligence. Joint Sis" aad Use Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. Specialbelieve that the tone off this 6ecUon, comperes aCommunlsl Bloctatic Free World. While emphasising the capabilities of the Bloc, ft fives Huk or no credit lo the capability or determination of Uie West to ahape the course of events. Tot example: q
e. Paragraph tt charge* "large numbers of peopleVceplanee of the Ber-trand Russell thesis of preferring Communist ehalna to nuclear war. The Director forJoint Btaft. and the Aaslalant to theof Defense. Special OperaUons. doubt the vaUditi of this yaerOoo.
b Paragraphorecast* Communist poBUcal manipulation In crisis situation* to a* to try to make Western lot* event Ion stem "capricious ordroitness In the poilUcal arena by Uieby the Director forJoint Staff and Uie Assistant to theof Defense. Special Operations, to be equallyto be discountedactor for cor. sideraUon.
the deterrent effect of present and futurecapabilities, about the probableof states in critical situations, and about the most suitable and effective strategicand weapons systems to develop.
hese problems must trouble the Soviet leaders as much as they trouble those of the West. We do not believe that the Soviet leaders conceive the ICBM to be the final answer to their military problems, and we doubt that they have formed definite Ideas about their force structure ten years hence or about the precise role they will assign to military power In their campaign toworld communism. They now seeas emergingeriod of strategic inferiority, and they surely considerrime objective not to let tbe US draw ahead once more. As long as the weapons race persists, they will not be contenttrategic equilibrium, or with the progress they have hitherto made ln weapons development. that, they will continue to carry onand weapons research andprogramsigh sense of urgency in order to find new weapons systems andagainst existing ones They would do this even without dream Of vast militarysimply in the interest of defense heyeapon* system which gave promise of decided advantage over the US, they would certainly seek to gainprofit from It.
n the decade ahead some richfor example, one providing defense againstachieve operational status and tend to upset the nuclear missile terrorwe have described. Prom what we know of Soviet Ideas, however, we conclude that during the next fiveperhapsSoviet leaders will conceive of their long-range striking capability ln terms ofand of employmenteavy blow should they finally conclude that deterrence had failed, rather than in terms of theInitiation of general war. In theirondition of mutual deterrence will provide an umbrella under which they canigorous campaign,ide
riety olhroughout theworld.'
nircumstance the Soviet leaders will have substantial advantages. They can create crises and Issue threats overminor matterseasonable degree of confidence that one or more of thepowers will give way because of the risks of general war Involved ln resisting. Inwhere they Judge the risk Is not too great they might engage In militarypossibly with Soviet forces but morewith other bloc forces or with localarmed groups. In any case where It appeared that the choice for reststers was one between massive nuclear destruction and compromise of principle (including evenofarge numbers of people around the world would choose the latter.
t is now widely held that, in order to preventaralyzing choice from being presented. It is necessary to have limited war capabilities, so that comparatively minor threats can be countered with appropriate means. But in recent years limited warin the West have been declining rather than rising. There hasrend toward the reduction of budgetary allocations for the modernisation and mobUily of limited-war-capable forces. Two of the US allies, for reasons of national prestige, or because they fear that the US will not always support them, have carried on strategic nuclear weaponsof their own and have reduced their conventional forces.
ven If substantial limited war forces should be available, many of the principles of their political and military us*uclear age remain to be developed and to beIt is clear, for example, that only limited objectives can be won by limited means, and that pursuit of broad objectives or extension of the conflictell de-
AsaUlant Chief ot Staff. TnUUiifnec. CSAP. dee* not concur tn this paragraph. It is hi* belief that the evidence of offensive missile and bomber produeUon and deploymenten-nlie intent by Lhe Soviet rulers lolear military superiority at the earliest practicable date.
fined area of combat threatens expansionajor war and poxes for both sides the question ofarge-scaleattack on the enemy's homeland-Even when both parties accept limitations upon their objectives and upon the area of combat, the rules of combat within thatarea still pose problems One of these Is that of using nuclear weapons for tactical advantage. The use of nuclearin almost any form would greatlyboth the military and politicalIt would almost certainly confuse the enemy and the neutrals as to the user's realdistinct from his announcedalienate large and Influentialof world opinion from the cause of the user, however just It may have been. The Soviets would presumably regard the use of nuclear weapons in the light of thewhich they repeatedly assert andLimited wars would carry particularly great risks of spreading Intowar if nuclear weapons were Introduced.
olitical point of view, there are also questions about the circumstances in which one can intervene with limited forces.eneral rule andesult of theof Korea, the Communist powers will probably try to avoid clear-cut provocations which would permit the West to bring limited war capabilities to bear They will Instead attempt to use situations which are legally or politically anomalous,ituations in which theyefensible color of right for the use of force or ln which the political Issue ha* become or can be mad* to appear so confused as to make Western intervention seem capricious or Imperialistic. Much will depend upon the way ln which the issue ts presented to the world and Is handled by both sides. In many circumstance* fear of the spread of th* conflicteneral nuclear war might be so great that the Intervener would find himself severely condemned by large segments of world opinion. .
ajor problem during the next decade is also posed by the probability that additional nations willuclear weapon* France alreadyrogram
my, and Communist China and Israel almost certainly have started such weaponsOther nations might enter thenly to counter the power and prestige which their rivals or their enemies might gain through the acquisitionuelear ca-pabtllty.mall increase in the number of nations possessing nuclear weapons will add to the dangers inherent in criticalas they arise. An increase in theof states capable of using nuclearas aalso increase the chances for irrational and desperate action.inimum, the spread of nuclearcapabilities will stir up additionalturmoil by encouraging intransigence In their possessors and by encouraging fear and counteraction among those who mightthemselves threatened.
elated to these problems of limited war and spread of nuclear capabilities Is theof preventing miscalculations which might precipitate general war unintentionally. Whenever Internationa! disputes arise thereatural tendency for the parties concerned to place their forces on an alert status and progressively to strengthen the alert byforms ol deployment. In some cases these might be normal precautions and in some cases they might be intended to frighten the adversary, or both. In any case, there is likely to be considerable concern amongand US allies that the US and the USSR will act in tooashion, that both the US and the USSR might become sothat they would be unable to back down and thus would become involved in war, or that the state of alerl on one side or both will become so advanced that,urprise attack, one would take pre-emptive action against the other. As the decade advances and surprise attack against retaliatorysystems loses much of its advantage,reasons forre-emptive attack will no longer exist. Nevertheless, fear of surprise attack will probably persist and might weigh more heavily in the minds of policymakers than would in fact be Justified.
nother concern is that general war may come about by sheer accident The worry here Is that with an Increasing number and variety of space capsules in orbit or being flred into orbit, with an increasing number ofnuclear-armed and on the ready, with strategic air forces airborne and armed with nuclear weapons,ew and untested ballistic missile early warning system inwar could come about throughfailures or anomalies, irrationalby local crews or commanders, or errors in judgment, without either side wishing this to happen. As the decade advances and surprise attack loses some of its advantages, there will no longer be compelling reasons to respond immediately to supposed or actualof air space by presumably hostileor aircraft. Nevertheless, fear of attack might In some circumstances be so great that general war could come about in ways we have noted.
In this situation of widespread feareneral nuclear war, lt Is natural that theof the world should look to arms controleans of reducing the danger.Its motivation, the USSR has carriedany-sided campaign for general anddisarmament. The Soviet leadersare interested ln achieving some degree of disarmament, to an extent which would at least slow down or stop developments which might harm their strategic position or increase the danger of accidental war. During the decade, it Is possible that both sides willsufficiently concerned with stabilising the balance of terror that some limitedmay be reached In any case, It isorder both to achieveand to meet world pressures for reducing the danger oftwo sides willtacit agreements resulting in some degree of arms limitation.
Also, the UN is likely to continue to beby its members as an instrument for the prevention of war. If two nations arein dispute that threatens to resulteneral war which they wish to avoid, the UN mightseful forum for airing the dispute and UNseful excuse for emerging from the dispute with less than full satisfaction. Moreover, the underdeveloped
ho are likely to become anpowerful voice in the UK, will almostfeel It in their interest toen-eral war and will therefore exert theirfor the pteserjation of peace.
hile there is some reason to expect, therefore, that the UN mayole inpeace, that the present balance of forces will persist or become sUbiliied, that the limited war concept may be sufficiently capable of development to provide an escape from nuclear blackmail and general nuclear war, and that chances of general war coming about by accident or fear of surprise attack may be reduced, the decade ahead will still be an extremely dangerous one. The Soviets
see increasing opportunities for political gains In their new strategic position, in theirgrowth, and in the changing situation in the underdeveloped areas. They are almost certain to test these opportunities, and such tests could give rise to serious crises. Berlin and the Offshore Islands exemplify situations ln which retreat may become impossible, and civil wars in such areas on th* periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc as Laos could pose graveconcerning the objectives and rules for the conduct of limited operations. The world contest In the decade ahead will necessarily be conducted In the shadow of this strategic situation, and It will affect the decisions of statesmen everywhere.Original document.