CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AOEHCY CFTIC2 CF KATICKAL
MEKOti-JaXIM FOt THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Proepecta for Early Ctinoee Notionollet MIory Action Against the rfainlncd
1. Durlne tha poet decade, Chiang Kai-shek's praises of return to tho noinland ond thoeBicned to Itylcoent those proninos vera little tore thou ritual pcrforrjODccs intended to bolster tbe oorale of hie followers. Since early this year, however, planning ond preparatloo for raid* an! attack* against the Canuoist-bold hcaoland hove taker,ow decree of urgency and credibility. Another now eleoect la tbe secrecy vlth which Chiocc hoa mated the so pknfl fron ffi eyes. Without consulting IB officials, the ORC la now training and equipping sjerial force* teow for action against specific mlnland tor acta, oo2 two
reported a. being activatedqulppod withoutauppcrt. utbouoho doubt that accelerated ailitary predion, ore un-ervay, what Ctear* fci-
ELEASE QCtUaUy ^force
It la olrjost certainverccnlnQ Chlnng cs he pocdorBituctloc. thot Just qb hunger end unrest an tits ui Inland erehln with his last groat opportunity on the mInlandpoo It Ion la bolng placed in critical Jeopardy. substantial huncor, disillusion, and unrest whichIn Ccma-fst China ar* exaggerated in QHC intelligenceto Chiang. esult he believes thot the people onare ready to overthrew tbe Coacunlst roginc end wouldMs support if ho wero to provide the otlrjulus and leadership.
fcelo thot if tbe opportunity is passed by arid Corxjunlet China is allowed to recover froa its present crlsia, tho peipinrj reglne will in tlus bee one invulnorohle. At this critical Juncture he finds the GRC position in th* UK threatened and lrtcruasincrecognition going to Peiping. With his own status on tho brinkecline and with conditions In cceramist Chinaadir, ho believes that tho tine for action is here. His son, Chiang Chlnc-kuo, probably expressed this feeling accurately wbtn be Bald tbat the GBC rust eelte the initiative Boon orear or two tbe GRC would bo flood."
added eleoent in Chiang's grc*/ing dooperation isthat the U3 is cbanginc its China policy toward one of
aceejrtcnc* of two ChUca, About two rxa.ths aco be concluded that too UB, without consulting bio, hod decided to rococxlzo Cuter toigolia ond toisa for Taiwan independence loader Thorns Lioo to vieit the IB. CMone also apparently believod that tho UB was about to arrange an invitation to Pelping to join the UN In the hope that tbe Chine so Ccurjunists would refuse to accept.* assurances Chiang cay since have received on these points, ho my still be skeptical about US policy. It is, of course, possible that Chiang does not Intend actually to use bis forces on the rain* land* Current preparations, which ha could assuro would becoao known to US officials oa Taiwan, my be mrely on effort to lend creator plausibility to his threats to attack the DQlnlncd. although Chiang is almost certainly using every prossure he eon meter to shape UB policyanner he consldero favorable to the GBC, wo believe that hie present actions derive froa otber notivos as well.
attribute Chlant'ecoocorrlng what beto bo changes in US policy.
km Even if the US could convince Chiang that it will continue its full support of the GRC and oppositionwo-Chinos policy,
his desiro to capitalise on his erjjportunlty for ailitary action agalnst the oolnlnnd would roualn. Tho Gi.C'n current accelerated pruixiratione for Military actloa against thu mainland wore lnltl-ototl int tho latest, vhich is long before the Liao and Cuter Mongolian ratters vere ovon ruDorod nod vher. thead oore oonfidence than at present that it night again got all-out US support for tho aoratoriun in tho General Asseutly, Ho natter hew sati-Xled Chiang is with the UB attitude, if the UK actsay oorlously dotriuoirtal to tho intereoto of the GHCurber of additional nations novo to recognize the Ccununlst regioe, Chiang Is likely to concluie that tine Is running out and that tho GHC uuet oct or porish.
5. The kind of action which Chiang apparently plans is not suicidal or even unreasonable frorioint of vlow. Pre cent piano, as far as they have boon reported, call for two or throe pre11nlnary phases of operaticus by special forces airdrops in tease ofo collect intelligence, stioulatu dlssldenee, ond, if possible,esistance uoveuent. Probably no large cuphlblouo attacks oa tbeare to benless tbeeo pro lint nary efforts ceet with success. The prel nary efforts are considered pnranilitary by tho GRC leaders and thus excluded fron
thocar tbegreeusnt of^ which they Interpret to cover only orthodox military operations. Thus, they beliavc that they are undor no inhibitionB against launching ouch probes and raldo without consulting the US.
6.ollow-up anphibious attack, however, would clearly cane under the cgreetwnt end require prior US consent. If the probes had been cncouraginG and tho GBC had decided to launch an airphibious ossault across tho Strait, any UQ attonpts to otop the effort wouldojor crisis in US-SC relations.
Tining. If Chiangotemdnod to launch attacks on tho
doinland, he nay launch air-drop operations cs early no August if
he feels sufficiently prcBsed. Indeed soae ipoclnl farces toons
have been ordered to bo ready for August action. uBbor of
things miltcte against this, however, including tbo Incidence of
the peak typhoon period in Septonbor (which would interfere with
on aqphlbloua follow-up of an initialhe apparently
confused state af CftC preparations, and the locate ndlltory coo-
oorvatisu of the Oeneralioeioo. In particular, if Chiang is con-will probably
vineod af aoxlcun US support in tho UN, he / await dovelopoontB in tbe UK in September. The cutcccx cf the do inland's autucccould also affect his decision and tho tlalng.
9. Proboblef GiiC PL-rsActivate'.. Wo believe
that tho specialeens would be quickly or-iil hi Intel or rounded up by the allitory end oocurity forces of the Cooouniatrj. However, It is possibleDC special forces tcau operating in one of the areas of coxlnui econode distress and politicalnight be able to generate enough local support to gain local control and putrief fight against the Chinese Ccrxainist regular forces when they reached the aroa. Ai> initial success of this sort could lead Chiang to increasend teaat substantially, with tho risk that the adventure eight assune tho proportionsar and threaten to involve the US.
10. If tbe GRC thrusts were United to snail air-droppedand raiding teans which were quickly round oJ up, Feiping night prefer to remin silent or deny the incidents, especially if the CRC were trying to publicise the Incidents as examples of popular uprisings against the re-rim. Xt is also possible that Pclplng would welcoca the opportunity to launch mBslve propaganda ccnpairjno against "Chiang banditry" and "US iaperiallst sabotage." Pulping certainly has reason to want to distract its people fron domestic troubles. In this case Pulping night decide to stop up nllitary pressures against the offshore islands. It is unlikely that even
In this overt cry air strikes or ether counterblows appinst Taiwan ltoelf would be attempted ir. response to snail air-dropped operations.
11* If the ORC decided to go beyond snail olr-dropped pora-tdUtary operations. It eight be able to conduct raids up to brigade strength, but the losses would be costly. An actuol invasion would bo United initially by lift andivision or lees. In such an operation the ORG Air Force could probably naintain local air superiorityew days, at cost, because of distance and logistic considerations. Ue do not bolioveonchhoad could be retained uuch beyond that tine.
12. Even in the facearge attack or raid, Folplng probably would not want to counterattack Taiwan itself for fear of droving UB ndlltary attacks upon itsut, with large scale air battles along the Strait, the CflC would probably attack nearby Conounlst airfields,rocess of escalation nightUS forces. In any case the US would suffer widespreadblare for tbe Invasion efforts. FOB THE BOARD CF NATIOlwVL ESTIMATES
In the unllkuly event that Peiplng feared an Invasion attack was noeting with success, this inhibition would obviously not bold.
t -Original document.