7 -lij.,: US!
ESTIMATES OF CONSTRUCTION AND VALUE OF NAVAL SHIFS PRODUCED BY THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Research and Repom
This report, the secondories of annua) reports on theand value of naval ships preducsd Ino-Sovie: Bloc, re-vim and usdatcs the data on coneiructlon and value ir. the Initial repor:.
. ontheeC in terms of she number of ships completed each year and the valuelaUS dollars. Moreover, theecditcre for construction of naval .hips in the USSR for [he ll-year periodstimatederm.0ollars. The estimate does not delude expenditures forand development of new models of Ships, propulsion, armament,ctromcs.
The detailed nature of the infoimeiJon. which would have involved numerous lource referencoi for each o( many oitlmatei. makes thsilon of source references ir.feaeibla. but source documentation for estimates is available in the files of this Office.
- Ill -
:. Conatruction of Naval Ships in the
Surfaceine Warfare Ships
Construction of Naval Ships in Communis; China
ii!. Construction of Naval Ships in Poland and East
iV. Value of Completed Shipsxpenditures forof
Appendix A. Statistical
1. Summary Ofurrent Submarine
he USSR, aeanuary
Z. Estimated Construe lion of Naval Ships in theShipyard and by Number.anuary
3. Estimated Construction of Naval Ships in lhe USSR.
A. Estimated Value of Naval Ships Constructed in thc
Expenditure of Funds for Construction of
Naval Ships in thc USSR,
Construction of Naval Ships In Communist
China, by Shipyard and by Number.,
and Status as1
77. Estimated Value of Naval Ship! Constructed is
8. Estimated Construction of Naval Ships lnEast Germany, by Shipyard and byand Status as oM
Estimated Value of Naval Ships Constructed In
Poland and Cast Germany.
F:gure |, Estimated Value of Completed Naval Ships and Expenditure of Funds tor theof Naval Ships in the USSR.
figure 2. Index for Estimated Naval Shipbuilding
Costs In Ihe
ESTIMATES OP CONSTRUCTION AND VALUE Or NAVAL SHIPS PRODUCED BY THE SINO-SOVIET 0
Summary and Conclusions
0 tho Slno-Soviet Sloe completed more than libalued ats follows:
Country Number (Million US S) Percent Number
Ship* completed by the USSR dropped9e value ol completions rose2 million toillion, ar. increase of aboutercer.;.
oviet military doctrjnc concerning future design and employ, men;al shipsajor change. he USSRransitionhich emphasis was shifted fromof conventional ships to more advanced models. This change wasby the development of nuclear power and missile weapons Systems thc USS3 and in thc US. O:ifferent Classes of surface Ships and suomarine* that were under construction, conen o:
* The estimates and conclusions in this report represent Ihc bestof this Office as
** The torn, comolcteg as used In this report refers to the statusnip as having been deliveredhipyard, complete and readv for ser-
hip maysvccommissioned by the Dollar values are given0 US dollars throughout thisannual construction one valuere eivea
f Including submarines.
ft Total of available data, excluding miscellaneous minor naval Snios
thai arehe value Of completed skips and that accounted ia'rillion.
2 Classes ceasednd construction program* for iO classes were phased. The program for only DM class,lass patrol boat, continued , ships ol
r.e* classes of combatad beenf ihe new classes being fubmarinea. Two of these new submarine classes,lass aulass, are conventionally powered, snorkel-equipped lassonventionally armed Bad fitted with improved sonar shipment tha:etter capability for antisubmarine(ASW). lass ts fittedarge sail* and hasalllstic-missile-launching submarine, although the possibility that it may be equipped to launch cruise types of mieellee cannot be ruled out. Bothlass andlass are estimated toangepermitting unsupported operation off the ehoresof the US. tc-jlherr.Afr.ca. The third of the three claaees of submarines '
nidentified, but Is believed to be
8 and in each year thereafter, submarines of each of these three classes have been produced.
In addition to the three new classes of Submarines, there Isnmtaetaof development.
W;ih the exception of the construction program for the Klldjn-claasaunching destroyer, which was an Interim program terminated3 and was succeeded9 by the program for construction of the Xripayy class missile-launching destroyer, all the new classes ofthat were started5 were still being built.
onsiderable research and development has been done in ASW, which resulted In the modernleatlon of weapons systems on existing ships and ia the appearance of new ships that have greaterfor ASW. Research and development In ASW undoubtedly was accelerated because of tha US program for construction of nuclear sob-
The primary purpose of the submarine force producedas to defend the water approaches to lhend to interdict supplys to Ejrope and northern Asia. The subsequent development Of nuclear power and of missiles that could be launched from submarines gave the Soviet Navy the Instrument* with which toore offeneire-mindedu^manne force in addition to extending the defense line around southern AsiaAfr.careas of indicated Communist expansion.
The trend In construction programs5trategiconcept aimed principally al countering the US nculbarand surface task lorces and a: destroying certain land-based Submarines currently under construction In the USSR are designed So increase attack capabilities by providing large conventional and
* The term sail is used In this report to designate the structure tha: houses th* conning tower, electronic and optical masts, snort exhaust, and Other gear, including probable missile-launching tubes Ir. some
wered submarines of considerably longer Operational range thanlass, the backbone of the present submarine force, in addition, submarines are believed lo be equipped to fire ballifttc or cruise types of missiles. Although Surface ships havereater Operational capabilities against both surface and subsurface targets, some submarines probably aeeintended lor use tn ASW. The fittingttiar.nes with surface-to-surface missiles together with theOf improved electronic gear, however, will greatly increase thi: destructive range above that of earlier models
ith the exception o: the construction programs for some minor surface ships, the number Ol Snipe producedas not beenrgc as that produced. Continuing technological improvements in propulsion, armament, and electronics undoubtedly have postponed finalination of design for mass production, it is to be expected thatew shipsingle Class will be produced until the rate of technological advancement is slowedational enter gency arises.
Since World War ]i, with the exception of the USSR. Communist China ha* been the only country of the Sino-Soviei Bloc to produceines and escort ships. China apparently believed tha: these types of ships were needed to defend lis long coastline, to establish national prestige, to generate political influence in southeast Asia, and lo counter foreign naval forces in the Taiwan area. The total value of th* naval Ships constructed by uring thcears hasrelatively steady, ranging between Siillion3 and till million Of the total value of naval ships constructed by China, submarines accounted" forercent duringand Although it is believed that the program forlass submarines was,phased outC, there are indicationsew class may be under constructionhanghai.
Construction ci naval ships in Poland and East Germanytec to mincsweepiitg ^nd coastal patrol categories. Construction in other European Satellites is negligible and is confined to craft (or harbor and river patrol-
Constructor, of Naval Ships tr. the USSR
USSRavalong tons light ship displacement) valued0 millionhe firal year6 that the value of completed ships rose aboveillion. of surface ships decreased9ut conatruction of submarines rose from9 to Thc estimated expenditure for construction of naval ships roseCI9 million9 toillionC. Although fewer ships were completedhe Increase In value Is attributed largely to in. creased complexity. *
military doctrine concerning the design and employment
naval shipsajor change The program forof naval ships that had been underway in the USSR from the end of World Warp5 was one of large-scale construction of conventional snips, includingestroyere. submarines, mine-varfare ships, and patrol boata. The main driving force behind this unprecedented peacetime buildup of conventional naval fcrces wasto be. Kusnctaov, who. with the exceptioneriod from as Commsnder-in-Chicf of the Sovist Navy9S. Admiral islllllli .had Stalin's support in the buildingarge naval force, although he did not find thecrt later from Bulganin or Khrushchev.
Statements by nigh Soviet military and political officials inof the capability of the Soviet Navy began tc appear5 retired for "reasons ofnd
.ommander-in-Chief of th* Black Sea Fleet, *a* appointed Commanuer-in-Chicf of the Soviet Navy It was apparent At that time to Soviet leaders that the development ofer and missile weapons system* would greatly change the strategic rcncept of naval warfare and that lhe conventional Soviet fleet wouldbe obsolescent. The criticism of the Soviet fleet, based on the need to counter the development and construction of nuclear-powered fleet-attack submarines and later construction of nuclear-pOweiedissile-launching submarines in the US. spurred action inSB on the rescarca and development of new ship model*.
6 the current Soviet programs for construction of ship* were reappraised. esult of this reappraisal, practically all construction programs underway at thai lime were phased qui. antuch ships a*hat already werecoaalructior. pipe-,liaalcompleted6harp reduction in theof funds for construction of naval ships took place6 Expend ttur e* (or construction of ships dropped from an elltim* high ofillion5owillion7eduction of aboutercent.**
Cf theifferent classes of surface ships and submarines thatunder construction, only two construction prcgramathose for the Shoryy-clas* destroyer and the Kola, class
See Tablea. andppendix A, pp.below.
Seendppendix A. pp.espectively.
escort were terminated,ifferent classes were phaaed out. rogramnat forlaaa motor torpedo botiaaa continued
The results o( the reappraisal, however, were not all negative. There ba>radual change In the attitude of high Soviet officials toward the Soviet Navy, and support has bean mustered to rebuild the Soviet fleet along modern lines.
esult, ships of new designs began appearingnd the expenditure of funds swung up Sharply. Expenditures for construction Of Ships rose5 million7illionn increase of abouthssa amounts cover only the costs of models under construction and do not Include the expenditure of funda for research and development of future naval ships and weapons. If these coats were included, the amount of expenditures5 wouldar greater.
.ew classes of combat ahipa appeared,eavy emphasis on construction of submarines. Thrse ol thesere submarines.
onsiderable research and development has been done er. AfiW. The effect of this effort has been obeerved in theies of weapons systems Del existing ships and in the appearance of new ships having greater ASW capability- HeSearch and development Ia
tltis field undoubtedly waa accelerated by ihs programa for nuclearin the US.
SSR has engaged in extensive oceanographic research In thePacific, and Indian Oceans. One of ihe benefits of this re-teareh hae been to provide data both for Soviet engineers engaged in tne research and development of new types of underwater detection devices and navigational instruments for submarines andwarfare ships and for the planners of ASW.
5cv-.et leaders, on the occasion of Navy Day cnulyegan to boast of the potential capability of the Soviet Navy. DeputyCoJovko Hated, "Submarine forces assume ths greatestIn ths Navy: Uvsy are capable of dealing powerful blowa not only against enemy navies but also againat objeeUvss eituated on remote enemy territory." Onhrushchev announced, "Our csumrv alsoosls with stomic engines and equipped with rockets."
Because the program for Tallin-class deatroyera consisted of only one ship that was completed latehis program is not Included. Seendppendix A, pp. respectively, below.
Ths trend in construction programsndicatesstrategic operational concept aimed a: countering the US nuclear submarine andtalk forces as well as the destruction of certain landurthermore, the program is consistent with statements by Admiral L- Vladimirekly. quotedomsomol skay* Pravda On5 as followa: "The destruction resulting from rockets, which with the help of different devices can be guided perfectly to the target, haathe role of heavy ships to an appreciable degree, sinceamall ships equipped with rocket weapons can successfully defeat th* largest battleships and cruisersw:th normal. ocket weapons which can be installed in the submarines undoubtedly Increase th* striking power of the Submarines. No: only can they carry out traditional war activity againstlln*e, but also they can attack targets along the
ithexcaptkon of tho construction programs for come minor surface ships, rates of construction of ships hav* notprograms of th* magnilud* (that is, in numbers of ships) of those Continuing technological improvements marmament, and electronics undoubtedly have postponed final:-aa:ion of designs for mass construction. It Is to b* expected thatelatively few shipslngle class will be produced until the rato of technological advancement shows signs of slackening orational emergency arises.
At the end of 1VS1 the Soviet shipbuilding industrylass.laas, andlass submarines, all of which were of post-World War II design. All Ihese programs had been phased oul, and construction All tho above submarines are conventionally powered and armed, flee'.-attack snorkel-equipped submarines, except forlass submarine, which, in addition to conventional propulsion, is believed tooaed-cycls diesel system. Six of thclass submarines have enlarged sails, thc purpose of which is believed to be to lautt-hmissiles, although there Is no evidence to confirm this theory. Of thslasses, onlylass haa the range capability to operate unsupported off the shores of the US, southern Asia, und Africa. The Operational range of thelass submarine Is limited to the North Atlantic and North Pacific areaa. lass submarineonfined to coastal patrol. Theaeof submarinesorce the primary purposes of which ar* to interdictes to Enropf and northern Asia and to defend the homeland from attack from the
The expenditure of funds for construction o; subma rir.e? droppe from an alltime highillion52 millionecrease ofercent.
The development of nuclear power and of missiles thai could be lurched from submarines gave the Soviet Navy ihe instruments with
* It is clear from thc quotation and another by the same author6 that the term rocket can refer to either ballistic or cruise type of missile.
ee Tableppendix A.elow.
which toore offensive-minded submarine force andefense line around sosthern Asia and Africa, areas of indicated
Ac of information on construction of ships indicates that probably late* or early5 Soviet naval architects knewclear reactor forould be satisfactorily constructed within specified apace limitation for us* both in the nuclear-powered icebr.aket Lenin and ,r. submarine*. The Soviet announcement in6 of the proposed conatruction during the abandoned Sixthearuclear-powered icebreaker probably would not have been made unless there was assuranceatisfactory rueleer reertO'
the completion late6 atShipyardrobable nuclear-powered submarine would require plan development as early aa4 ort i* esttmaiedr possiblyuclear-powered submarine*had
beer completed by the end
Thesubmarine, of whichave been completeds believed to be thc successor tolaas conversion.lssionven'lcfially powered, snorkel-equipped submarine. This SubenirlMery large sail and te believed toallistiomissilc-LBWKa.ne submarine, although the poseibillly that It mayruise typeannot oe ruled out.laa* submarine is estimated toapability that would permit unaupported operation off the store* of the US. southern Asia, and Africa. Tt
- ollows on p. 9. Aoosndl* 19 helow.
Text continued on
The I ubmarine, of whichave beer, completed ie currently under construction in Leningrad andarge, snorkel-equipped submarineange capabilityropulsion system believed to be similar to that oflass. laseit-ettack type of submarine and ie fitted with Improved passive and active sonar inaiallatione,etter capability for ASW.
Although experimental models oland small submarines may have been built, there Is no known constructionfor these types.
The expenditure of funds for conatruction of submarines rose from Hit million79 millionn increase of moreercent.
0. Major Surface Ship*
The greatest reduction in construction of naval surface ships5 took place in the category of major surface shlpa. The value of completed ships dropped8 million5eduction ofercent. Construction9 was me lowest ineriod. The value of completed shipsowever, rose9 million. Construction90 was eonflned to only one type of shipthe Krupnyy-claes missile-launching destroyer. Two ships of this class were delivered9 and
The phasing out of Sverdlov-claes cruisers began as early, but the last cruiser to be completed was delivered in the last half Six of the cruisers launched between'the first halfnd6 were not completed, and all thesets probably either were scrapped0 or are now in advanced stages of scrapping.
Construction of the Skoryy-claa* and XotUn-clatsdestroyers was terminated2 respectively. otlir.-class hull was completeduided-miestle destroyer that was fittedingle surface-to-surface missile launcher. This ship along with three other similar guidcd-mlealle destroyers appeared8 and were designated Kildin-class ewly designed guided-missile destroyer, designateC Kr.oayy class, larger than the Kildm class and fittedurface-to-surface missile launcher both forward and aft. appeared
5 the design and developmenturface-to-aurfate missile launcher, which became part of the main armament on the later Klldin-class and Krupnyy-claas guided-miss lie destroyers,wasufficiently advanced developmental atage lo assure He feasibilityeaponurface ship. It is believed that constructionrototype destroyer, whichotUn-clasa deelroyeruided-missile destroyer, was underway late5 or early
- See the chart. Figureollowingnd Tables. andppendix A,espectively, below.here Is tenuous evidence of the completion of an additional Krupnyy-class destroyer in the Black Sea.
7 th* last ce.Rventlor.al KotUn-clasa destroyerand late in the *pring8 there appeared the first of th* Kiidja-cUe* guides-missile destroyer*. Theae destroyer* mounted one missile launcher each. Only four of thia elaie were built, one of which was the prototype mentioned above. It ia believed that the lastee o! this clasa were ship* already in conatruction asestroyersecision was made to stop this program. The three ships then were completed as gjlded-mtteil* deatreyers and were designated Klldln-class.
The firs: ship of Ae Krupnyy class appeared ia the fallndicating that the plan* for these snipe were well underway early6 or about thc same time that the probable decision was made to complete the last three Kotlin-claee destroyers as Klldin-class guided-missile destroyers. At the end0 the program for construction of the Kmpnyy-cl*ss guided-m'.sslle destroyers wasbut there is evidence of constructionrobable successor to this class.
Conatruction ofescort ships was terminated early Although it Is expecteduccessor to this program will follow shortly, there I* no evidence ofplana.
C. Minor Surface and Mine Warfare Ship*
Conatruction of minor surface and mine warfare shipshas beer, on the basis of maintenance of the fleet strength. Therefore, construction has remained farily constant. As In otherfor naval ships,umber of types of ships were phased out6nd construction of new and Improved types was begun immediately. * Two types of patrol boats and two types cf mm*sweeping boats were phased cm:nd four new types of patrol boats and two new type* of mlne*weeping boats appeared
The most notable of 'Ji* new typesatrol boa: for launch' ing short-range, surface-to-surface micelles or large freehis boat, designated Osa-tlam. iseet long aunchers.
With the exceptionhen th* value of completed1 million, the lowest inyear period, th* average value per year of completed ahipsillion. Construction0 wae valued0 million.
D. Auxiliary and Amphibious Ships
he principal shipyards la the USSR were ccupied with construction of surface combat ships for the Soviet Navy. With the slackening of constructionpace inways became available. Ae space became available, it *li
ee Tableppendix A.elow.ee the chart. Figureollowing p.
givsn to construction ol merchant ships and auxiliary and amphibious ahipi for thaieretofora. requirements forategories offor the navy were largely filled by converting merchant ahipa.
The moat notable of the new ahipa constructed was th* Don-claat submarine tender. This ship ist long and displaces aboutong tons. It is the heaviest armed auxiliaryla th* Soviet Navy and probably operatesubmarine squadronehlp aa wallubmarine tender.
Th* level of known construction does not Indicate great emphasis on construction of auxiliary and amphibious ships, but th* significance of thisn ths fsct that the USSR now is engaged Innew ships for these services rather than In converting merchant ships. Th* value of constructionillion per year, and ths value of construction0illion.
U. Construction of Naval Ships In Communist China
With ths exception of the USSR, Communist China has been the only country of the Slno-Soviet Bloc to construct submarines andships since World War II.** China apparently believed that these types of ships were needed to defend its long coaatline, lo eaiabhah national prestige, to generate political influence in southeast Asia, and to counter foreign naval forces in thc Taiwan area.
The program for construction of th*lass sub-maris* orobably was phased out. and construction was terminated in
Th* total value of naval sh>ps constructed in Communist China during th*ears has held relatively steady, ranging1 million1 to Sill millionf Ih* total value of naval ships conatructed by China, submarines accounted forerentnd forercent
m- Construction of Naval Ships in Poland and East Germany'
Construction of naval ship* in Poland and East Germany is confined to th* categories ofand coastal patrol ehips.
. p. elow, and Fig-re .. following I For construction of naval ships in Communiat China, se*ppendix A.elow.
Se* TabI*ppendix A.elow.
Construction in the other European Satellites is negligible and is confined to harbor and river patrol vessels.
Poland completedhips9 valuedillion andC valued ai illlthough tha number of ships completed -it i: the aame for ears, the reduction In value it attributedtCu::ia= ia the number of the relativelyelait mtr.eiv-eeper.
East Germany did not complete any ehlpi The lfat o! the types under coaitrucllonl wae phaeed out changed over to eonatruction of four new typea and0 nine ih'.pi valued a: about SS million were completed.
V Valueiof Completed Shine and Expenditures for Construction
A compariaon of the estimated value of completed ehlpa with the estimated actual expenditures for construction of shipsshown In Figurehe vertical bars In this graph show the iota!
f all ships completed In any one year. For ihe purposes of the tjwluehip is credited only io the year of delivery The ci'vvf "how the climated amounts expended for eon-:we"Mp* inone year. Because ships of the stae of cruisers.vcrSj escorts, submarines, and soma auxiliaries requireuyears tc build, depending on the stae and complexity of the ship, titc construction method used, and the urgency of the individuallursi are budgeted for the entire construction period, . accordance with construction schedules. For this reason, the emounce shown in* and in the two curves inhould bc compared with ths estimated annual Soviet budget for constructionval ships rather than with the amounts shown in the vertical bars ir.r the data in Tablehich represent the value ofS ships-
Tne dollar value of ships completed and the dollar value ol esti-
matedlor construction ol Ships, shown innd
.na1are estimate* of the eosts to conatruct
.KArfele. intW *tprices.
! ilti'-K, Fluiirt* r p'ti nn1 nnv.il vHVf tnUSfcC, baaed On theMf
' See Tableppendix A, p. JO, below.ollowingbove. Appendix A. p.elow. " Appendix A, pp. espectively, below.
S - - . *5 a
si at s> a
RSSI i |,
h ai ajj|
al ass i
= 3- J