MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES, 1961-1966 (NIE 11-4-61)

Created: 8/24/1961

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED

41

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND

ANNEX A: SOVIET MILITARY FORCES AND CAPABILITIES

ANNEX Br TABLES OF SINO-SOVIET BLOC MILITARY STRENGTHS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

(These Annexes supersede( NIEand will be revised and reissued wiih the full texl ofcheduled forn)

S*bmlflrf by the

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

rite relieving inUliigrnc< ownttaMoiun the preparation ol this ntftafr Thentelligence Agency and the mtelhgenee o'aaiUalKmi of the Depa'tmnti ol State, the A'tng. the feet, the ta fo'ce. Thetag, end Atomic Snerer CommUaon

p the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARDugust INI Coftcnrrbip were The Director ol InUOl-gence and Research, Department ol State; the Aitistant Chiel ol Stag lor Intelligence. Depariment ol tht Army; the Assist-ant Chiel ol Naval Operation! ilnlclligencei, Departmenthe Navy; the Assistant Chief of Slag. Inielligence. USAF/OW Director for Inttlltgimee. Joint Staff, the Assistant lo tht Secretary of Detente, Special Operations, the Directorhe National Securltg Agency, and the Atomic Snergy Commission Representative to the VSIB. The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of ZmicsCipiIMn. abstained, the subject being outside

w owner

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TABLE Of CONTENTS ANNEX A

Page

CHANGES IN THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE SOVIET

ARMED

SOVIET MILITARY

FORCES FOR LONO RANGE

Long Range

Heavy

Medium

Trends and

Medium Bombers of Other

Missile Launching

AIR DEFENSE

Surface-to-Air

Antimissile

Fighter

Antiaircraft

Supporting

Civil

Warning

Current Capabilities and Future

THEATER FIELD

Strength and Composition of Ground

Ground Forces.

Air

Amphibious

Capabilities for Land

NAVAL

Submarine

Nuclear

0 H'O It-B

Conventionally-Powered

i-

Page

Surface

Naval

Capabilities for Naval

CapabiliUes Againsi Carrier Task

ASW

SPECIAL WEAPON

Nuclear

Chemical and Biological

Electronic

FORCES IN EUROPE FACING

CAPABILITIES FOR DISTANT. LIMITED MILITARY ACTIONS

MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER BLOC COUNTRIES

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NON-BLOC

MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND

annex A

SOVIET MILITARY FORCES AND CAPABILITIES

or the past several years, the general structure of the Soviet armed forces has been undergoing Its most Important changes since Lhc end of World War II. These changes have resulted primarilyapid andadaptation to new military technology, principally in the fields of nuclear weapons and missiles. They also reflect anto thc new strategic situation in which both the US and the USSR can deal vastly destructive nuclear blows at the outsetar.

he Sovietsrimaryfor long range striking forces andagainst the enemy's similar forces. They are presently devoting great efforts to strengthening these forces with new missile capabilities. Al the same time, they arcand adjusting their other military capabilities so as to maintain forces suitable for all types of warfare, nuclear andlimited and general. Along with the stress on missiles, they are pursuing research and developmenl in other weapons fields.

n reacting to lhe technological revolution in weaponry, the Soviets have come tothat They no longer need standing armies as massive as those maintained In the World War II tradition. Theyart of this manpower can be more effectively put lo use In the economy, andmaller, modernized standing force, backed uptrong mobilization capacity,ide range of combat potential. As part of the same process, they are pruning awuy unnecessary and obsolescent elements

and are developing the command structure and communications appropriate toforces. In all these changes, they are seeking military power suited lo the current strategic situation and capable of giving the strongest support to their policy.

he Soviets will continue their intensive efforts in weapons research and development wiih the object of acquiring new systems which, by their psychological, political, and military Impact, will shift the world relation of forces to their advantage. In making their decisions. Soviet planners will have to consider such problems as rapid technological change, long lead times, developments ln opposing forces, and increasing costs. Despite the rapid growth In Soviet economic resources, there will continue lo be competition among miliiary requirements as well as with theof important nonmilitary programs. In deciding whether to produce complex new weapon systems fn quantity, the USSR will probably apply increasingly severe tests as to whether these would add greaUy to current capabilities, and as to whether costs areby likely periods of use before

CHANGES IN THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES

ajor military policy statement onhrushchev described In broadrogramarge reduction In manpower and alterations in tho structure of the Soviet armed forces. The motivations for the proposed program were mixed andpolitical and economic as well as mill-

lary considerations. Politically. Khrushchev wished lo bolster the Soviet pose ol pcaeeful-ness and lo claim Lhe Initiative in theapplauded causoisarmament. On the military-strategic side, the chielwere tho Soviet confidence in their attainments in guided missiles and nuclear weapons and their belief that developments in these and other fields wouldmaller, but more effective, military force without sacrifice of military potential.

he creationew rocket command0 reflected the rising Importance ofsystems. Khrushchev declared in his0 military policy address that rocket forces arcain component of thc armed forces, while "thc air forces and the navy have lost their previousowever, authoritative Soviet militarymake It clear that ln the Soviet view balanced and varied military forces remain necessary. The trends In weaponsand military production over the last few years, thc nature of the reductions, and thc indications of the weapons systems being replaced to some extent byprovide guidance In estimating thepattern of the fuiure Soviet force

The program announced in0utillion men in the Soviet armed forces, which we estimateon. This reduction was scheduled to bc completed by the endhere have been indicationsariety of sources that substantial reductions were in fact effected, particularly in thesix monthsoviet political and miliiary leaders from time to time reaffirmed this program until Khrushchev announced its suspension Inlthough there was considerable slippage In the program wellits announced suspension, there isof some demobilisation and unitas late as the spring

We estimate that thc personnel strength of lhe Soviet armed forces totaled3 million men as ofot counting militarized security forces number-

inghis reflects theof about one-half of the originallyreduction, including thc major part of the air forces' cut. Reductions remaining to be made when the program was suspended involved aboutillion men. primarily in the ground forces. The immediate effects of the suspension, therefore, will bc to stabilize personnel strength atillion, to hold ground forces utine divisions, and in some cases lo slow down thc retirement of older ground, air. and naval equipment.

estimating future developments, weby two conflicting elements inOn the one hand, we believebasic demographic, economic,military considerations which led theleaders to decideajor reductionlarge remain. On the other hand,Westernof the Berlin crisis, and prevailingthroughout the world, involvingmilitary preparations on bothevidently ruled out further reductionstime. We believe that thc susc of thearmed forces will for some time toat roughly present levels, but theleaders will probably revert to amilitary manpower later Ifease.

SOVIET MILITARY EXPENDITURES

estimated dollar value of totalexpenditures ls now9 US dollars per annum; It Isincrease somewhat during thc period to

ven though there may be personnelThese expenditures Include those for personnel, maintenance, research andprocurement, construction, and other military activities required to support the military forces estimated in this Annex.

Soviet military expendituresmission provide an indication ofdistribution and shifts inthe military establishment. Promdata, we are able to apportion about

1 Secnor estimated personnel strength* ot the various elements of lhe Soviet armed force*

-'ftof CGoniiT-

of tho total spending among the lollowing major missions: land campaigns, air defense, long range attack, and naval missions. Tlie major part of the residual expenditures is for research and development, which Is certain to have very high priority in the next Ave years.

hc proportion of total Soviet militarydevoted to forces for landincluding tactical aviation, isto decline from aboul one-third of total spendingo aboul one-fifth. Estimated air defenserise from nearlyercent at present to nearlyercent by the end of the period, with the bulk of the Increase coming In the later years assuming antimissile defenses are Expenditures for long range attack forces, including missile-launchingare also estimated to rise from somewhat overo aboutercent, particularly through tlies as new missile forces are installed. Expenditures for the navalrise slightly ln thes but stand at aboutercent

hrushchevillion ruble, or one-third, increase In the previously announced defense budgete believe that in the main this increase was motivated by political considerations related to the Berlin crisis. Por one thing, tho figure is equivalent, at tlic official exchange rate, lo thc Increase ln US defense spendingLnhich Khrushchev cited in the same speech; for another, while Sovicl budgeting Is normallyear-by-year cash basis, It is very doubtful that this amount could actually be expended this year. About one-sixth of this totalillion rubles) represents the amount needed lo pay servicemen kept on active duty rather than demobilized as planned. TheiiHon'rubies may in part represent funds expended for military purposes but normally concealed in other portions of the budget. Thus Khrushchev's announcement may not signal any substantial change in Sovietprogramming beyond the suspension of iorce reductions.

owever. It probably represents ineal increase in miliiary expenditure. It could be used for retention of older air and naval weapon systems longer than planned. It could be used toore rapid orbuildup in offensive and defensivesystems than previously planned. Some near-term outlays could be undertakenincreasing the Immediate readiness of existing Soviet forcesntensification of training activities and maneuvers,of alerl capabilities in bomberut there Is as yet no evidence on whether or not the USSR plans such measures for theof this year.

FORCES FOR LONG RANGE ATTACK

he United StatesBoard approved. "Soviet Capabilities for Long Range Attack" (TOP SECRET). In thc following paragraphs, we summarize and update the portions ofhich deal with Soviet heavy and medium bombers, related air-to-surfaceand submarine-launched missiles. of Soviet ICBM. IRBM, and medium range ballistic missile programs Is omitted from this Annex. The updating of theseofs reservedetailed analysis, now in process, of (a) the Intensive Soviet ICBM test firing activity in thc first halfnd (b) new information on Soviet ballistic missile

long Range Aviation

he Aviation Day display at Moscowogether with other recentlyinformation, has provided more precise definition of specific developments in the field of long range bombers and relatedmissiles, along the general lines sketched In our previous estimates. The new evidence docs not alter the conclusion that within the Soviet long-range striking forces, ballisticare clearly intended to become thcweapons, bul that five years hence the USSR will still supplement Its missile forces with manned bombers for both weaponand reconnaissance. As of

4

main weightnrgc-scale nuclearagainst distant targets would probably still be carried by the bombers of Long Range Aviation.

Heavy Bombon

eliable evidence now Indicates thatoperational units were equippedeavy bombers Inncludinget-powered BISONs and BISON tankers and abouturboprop BEARs. Because of the age of the BISONlimitations in its range and alUtude capabiliUes, the very low recent rale of BISON producUon. and evidence of helicopter production as well as developmenl work on the BOUNDER at the BISON plant, we believe that the program to build new BISONs will terminate fn the relaUvely near future. The BEAR is no longer in production, but theIndicates that an extensive factory re-tflt program has been underway to modify BEARs for air-to-surface missilo delivery.

Their-to-surface missile displayed on BEAR at Aviation Day will extend theservice life of this aircraft by permitting it to attack targets from beyond the range of close-in defenses. Tlieupersonic missileaximum range of. It probably employs Inertial guidance toigh-yield nuclear warhead against Hand targetsEP. OfSoviet bomber types, only Uie BEAR is believed to have been modified to carry thehe modified BEAR can carry one such missileeduction ofoercent in aircraft radius; it is probably not designed toombload in addition to the missile. Virtually all BEARs willbe modified within the nexl year or Iwo, and an operational Inventory ofissiles is likely to be built up in that period. *

Research and development in new heavy bombers continues, but It uppurenUy does notigh priority. The BOUNDERat the air show wasrototype with an experimental installation of engines. At least one olher similar prototype istale of partial assembly at the BISON plant.

This aircraft type, first observed at Uie BISON plant in Moscows unsatisfactory for operational use in the form displayed. Its configuration appears designed formissionsaximum "dash" speed in excess of Mach 2. However, with present power plants its maximum "dash" speed is probably less thannd Its operating radiU3 would be inferior to that of the BADGER medium bomber. While some improvements can be made through Installa-Uon of better Jet engines, wc believe itunlikely that the BOUNDER couldefueled Intercontinental capability with supersonic "dash."

here have been fragmentary indlcaUonsoviet program to develop an ANP system over the past five years. If acUve anddevelopment Is pursued, such acould produce an aircraft nuclear power plant as early. This mighta first militarily useful nuclear-powered aircraft to become availablethe lack of evidence of the program, the decreasing frequency of Soviet statements on progress, and the apparent general level of their reactor technology Indicate that the effort may have encountered serious obstacles. Therefore, we believe It unlikely Uiat thewillilitarily useful nuclear-powered aircraft during the period of this, estimate. However, considering theimpact. Uie Soviets might at any time fly an aircraft obtaining part of its thrust from nuclear heat.

continue to believe lhatequirement for advancedintercontinental range, to be useddelivery and reconnaissanceconjunction with ballistic missiletherefore regard It as possible that aof heavy bomber will enter serviceperiod of this estimate.

Medium Bom ben

bulk of Long Range Avialion stillof BADGER bombers and tankers,of which are now in operationalproduction ceasedutof some of these aircraft have been

0 RET'

somewhat through subsequentmodifications, including the installation of better engines and electronic equipment. The international situation and theof force reductions makes it unlikely that there will be sharp cuts in medium bomber strength to the near term, as previouslyWe now believe lhat thc force will decline fairly gradually, with the new medium bomber (BLINDER) In part offsetting theof BADGERs, and with additional conversions of units to more specializedThe role of reconnaissance and other special purposes will become increasingly important.

supersonic BLINDER.fdisplayed on Aviation Day. isin service In very limitedphotography Indicated lhatunder way at Katan more than aan estimatedave been produced to

[date. We continue to estimate themaximum speed atond its unrefueled radius.0 lb. bombload. The air show revealed thatircraft Is of sophisticated design, andharacteristics should make It an excellent 'weapon system for specialized missionscoordination with large-scale ballistic mis-sile attacks. We therefore estimate that the [BLINDER will continue to be producedthrough the next five years.otal ofn Long Range Aviation units lnould be well within Soviet productionand wouldeasonable number for operational purposes.

air show revealed Soviet work onrefueling techniques and newmissiles for medium bombers. A

BADGERLINDER displayed probes suitableew type of refueling system, which should be superior to the wingtip-to-wingtip refueling hitherto employed by BADGERS. We have no evidence oftankers; BADGER or BISON tankers could probably perform this function. Onecarried what appears toewcruise-type air-to-surface missile. One of the BADGERs may also have been fitted forissile. On the basis of preliminary analysis, we believe that this ASM isoost-glide configuration, capable ofb. payloadange.erminal speed of.

Trends ond Capabilities

e continue to believe that Long Range Aviation will decline in numerical strength as thc Soviets place increasing reliance onbut we believe that over the next few years this reduction will be somewhat more gradual than previously estimated. It is likely that6 the USSR will stillubstantial long range bomber force. In the interim, it will continue to improve its proficiency and its equipment. The new trends of most importance now appear to be the conversion of BEARsng mission and the probable introduction of BLINDERS into the medium bomber force. Refueling techniques for medium bombers will probably be improved, and it Is probable that new air-to-surface missiles will become operational. There lsossibility that small numbers of new heavy bombers will be in units at the end of the period, but inoviet Long Range Aviation will probably consist almost exclusively of presently-known aircraft types, as shown in the table below:

MID- MID- MID- MID- 2 S 4 S

Bombers

BISON

Total

Medium. Bombers

BADGKR

BUNlew

Total

FWAnoUs oa loUenlnc

100

-I'

Poolnoco (or (UmliUsn oo prt'lOui pact.

andures Uiclude aircraft fitted as tankers. These areIn all BISON units and in about half thc BADGER units They can probably be reconverted to bombing useew hours.

within the next year or so. virtually all BEARs will probably have beento carry andun. alr-to-surface missiles rather Ulan bombs.

II Is possibleew heavy bombersew type will bo ln operational units

possibly be equippedew alr-to-surface missile. We have no present evidenceUNDER tanker; BADGER and BISON tankers could probablythis function.

The employment of the Soviet long range bomber force in the event of general war would dependariety of factors, including tho circumstances under which hostilities At the present time, initial Soviet attacks would rely heavily on bomberwith aircraft and missile launchlngs timed so as to minimize advance warning of the Soviet attack. Taking into accountpatternsariety of operational(including Arctic staging and refueling as necessary, but excluding combate estimate that at present thc USSR could putombers over North America on two-way missions in an initial attack, more than half of which would be medium bombers. The Sovietsonsiderably larger gross capability for attacking the US Itself, but to exercise It they would have to employ medium bombers on one-way missions and to use crews who had not had Arctic training. With thc advent of Soviet missile capabilities, wethis use of the medium bomber force as Increasingly unlikely.

Medium Bombers of Olher Components

oreADGERs are assigned to components other than Long Range Aviation. Of these,rc assigned to Navaland abouto Tactical Aviation. It is possible tflat BLINDERs will be introduced into these forces in the next few years. Naval BADGER units are specially trained and equipped lo attack such targets as carrier task forces at sea. while tactical units are Intended primarily to support ground force operations. These units, in addition to thc Long Range Aviation BADGERS not assigned to operations againsi North America, would presumably be

employed in attacks on Eurasian andtargets.

Missile Launching Submarines

planners almost certainlyto assign land targets tosubmarines in any contemplatedthe US. The principal currentrests inrange submarines of the "G" andclasses, whiclj. areto launch short range ballisticthough not while submerged.leads us to believe that thealso have nuclear-poweredequipped with similar missiles.

Z-Conversion" and "G" classsubmarines are now inConsidering the size.andof these submarines and evidenceSoviet missile development program,thoy carry liquid fueled. maximum range.are apparently carried verticallywhich extend from the keel up intoand unusual sails ofonversion" class has two such"G" class probably has three. Wesupersonic cruise-type. range are also beinguse by surfaced submarines. Afor this system has not yet beenbut we believeystem couldthis year.

unitsew Sovietdesignated the "H" class, haveobserved. Wc believe that this is the

7

of several classes of nuclear-poweredcurrently estimated to be underCertain key features of the sail of thc "H" class are similar to thc sail of the "G" class. Therefore, while wc cannot yet be certain, it is our present belief that thc "H" class is also equipped with. ballistic missiles. Thus the Sovietsdesigned their first nuclear-powered submarine class to bc equipped with surface-launched, short range missiles. The "H" class presumably formed the basis for theSoviet claim of numerical superiority over the US in nuclear-powered missile

f the foregoing three types ofwe estimate thatH" class) arc assigned to the Northern FleetG"Conversion" class submarines are ln the Pacific Fleet. An additionalthought touclear-powered missile-launching type may now be fitting out In the Pacific. Operating directly 'from home bases, the range of these submarines would permit operations within missile range of US targets, but we believe thatew have engaged in extended out-of-arca training.oderate increase in both "G" and "H" class strength over the next year or two.

e continue to believe that the Sovietsequirementystem capable of delivering ballistic missiles againstubmerged nuclear-powered sub-

MTD-IM1

Submariner

onversion" class . missile*submarine) 11

"O" class IS

ISO orm. mUsileasubmarine)4S

Wuctea'-powered Submarines

lasst

ISO orUtiles (three

per submarine)

Advanced chuw .

W njn. missilesper submarine

marine. However, lhe probability thai thc "H" class is missile-equipped, together with thc absence of evidence of developmental workissile suited to submerged launching, lead us to believe that Soviet planners have regarded an early missile-launching capabilityuclear-powered submarine as morethan the acquisitionore advanced system. We believe lhat thc Soviets will seek to Improve the range and flexibility of their submarine-launched missile systems. Into possible improvements in present systems, we believe that an advanced system could become operaUonal ln. submerged-launched missile. About six such missiles per submarine would not be inconsistent with what is now known of Soviet missile and submarine design practices and capabiliUes.

aking into account estimated Soviet capaclUes to construct nuclear-poweredand with allowance for estimated construction of torpedo attack nuclearwe esUmateradual buildup of missile-launching ships will occur over the next five years. he USSR willhave about two dozen nuclear-powered missile submarines, roughly half of them "H" class and half of more advanced design, and will retain an equal number of conventionally-powered missile submarines of Uieonver-sion" and "G" classes. Our revised estimate of Soviet operaUonal strength in missile-launching submarines is as follows:

MID-

to

IS

11

I

4

8

l?

tii-HMM^f-

, i

magnitude of effort Involved in Its deployment also argued against Its use In other, Jessareas.

incehe USSR has beena major operaUonal capability with asurface-to-air missile system which appears designed to cope with the threat posed by small numbers of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons rather thanmassed raid threat. ypical site consists of six revetted launching positions deployeduidance radar and linked byroads to facilitate loading. Maximumrange of theystem is estimatedm, but will vary depending upon type of target, approach angle, and otherfactors. Maximum alUtudeIs0 feet, with someup0 feet. The system apparently Is not intended for use against low altitude targets. Against subsonic targets, lowcapability will probably averageeet, but variations in such factors as siting conditions and target speeds couldin low altitude limits as loweet or as higheet. Against supersonic targets, low altitude limits would be higher. There Is some evidence that the Sovietsconsiderinimum SA-2altitude would be0 feet, but we do not know Uie circumstances assumed in Uie Soviet calculations.

lexibility and mobility are Uie chiefof thever the SA-1. Even at fixed installations, all operatingof the system are mounted on wheeled vehicles and can be transported by road or ralL Moreover, in contrast to the limitedcovered by anite, eachite appears capableegrees coverage. Theystem can. at relaUvely low cost, be deployed widely for defense of large cities, of small but Important fixed facilities, and of forces in thc field.

onsidering the pattern of SA-2the length of time the program has been underway, and the extent of our intelligence coverage, wo estimateites (each with six launchers) arc now operaUonal at aboutefended areas in Uie USSR. By

hc Soviets probably willites atrban industrial areas in thc USSR. There is little evidence on the level of defense to be provided for field forces, but we estimate lhat0 mobile missile units may beby the end3 for the protection of such semifixed targets as majorand logistic centers. We believe that lhe USSR Intends to provideefenses for lhe fixed launching complexes of its long range ballistic missile forces, but we arcto estimate the level and extent ofplanned.

Deployment ofites in the European Satellites has been underway for moreear. The heaviest deployment has occurred in East Germany, where as many asites may be operational or under construction. Some of these, locateding aroundarc manned by East German forces; others, which defend important Soviet militaryare assigned to Soviet field forces. Wc believe that additionalites will bein the Satellites during the next year or two, and that some mobile units may be provided for Satellite ground forces. We have no reliable evidence indicating theof surface-to-air missiles in Communist China.

The Soviets have had underurface-to-air systemhich weis specifically designed to engage targets at very low altitudesown to abouthis system is probably beinginto operational servicee believe lhat the Soviets will seek to provide some defense against low altitude attack for most of those areas defended by thendhe Soviets will take Into account the relative vulnerability of these areas to low level attack and their ability to bring other defensive weapons lo bear. Areasadjacent to coastal waters wouldbe regarded as especially vulnerable lo low altitude attack. Considering thc scale and pace of therogram, we believe thatill be extensively deployed within the next three or four years, supplementing exist-

ing missile defenses of fixed targets and field

rorces

Anlimiuile Program

develop defenses against ballisticthe Soviets have had underway foryears an extensive and high prioritywhich we believe to be directeddefense against IRBMs andmost or the research and testinghas been against short and mediumWe have no basisirmon the date of Initialoviet antiballistic missileor its effectiveness against thcof Western ballistic missiles. Foras well as military reasons, thewould wish to deployew critical areas even If thesystem providedimited,Considering these factorspresent status of thc Soviet researchprogram, we estimate thathe Soviets will begin atdeployment of an antimissilebelieve that for some years to come,are likely to have only aunder most favorable conditionswith US satellites. Witheffort, it might bea nuclearjn.launched on collision course from aif the orbital parameters were

fighter Aircraft

the Soviets arc clearlyreliance or. surface-to-air missiles,to maintain large numbers ofin service. As ofethat there were0 fightersoperational units throughoutn Soviet units. Aboutthe Soviet fighters are tn FighterAir Defense (IA-PVO) with air defense as

" their exclusive mission. The remainder, which are in Tactical Aviation, have an air defense responsibility included in their ground support role. With the elimination of the naval flghlcr force and large-scale reductions

top huoih:t

tactical fighter units, the Soviet fighter lorce has been reduced by aboul one-third over thc past two years. We believe that phasing out of older aircraft will continue over the next five years resultingurther reduction on the order ofercent.

themake Up overof the Soviet fighter5 the Soviets have beento improve thc all-weather capabilityforce, bringing into service aboutAll-weatherandodifiedDndndhave limited all-weather capabilities.

During the pastew generation air-to-air missile-equipped Soviet fighter has appeared in peripheral areas of the USSRand Eastern Europe. At least three new aircraft appear to be involved:ikoyan-designed, delta-wing Interceptor, and two Sukholswept-wingnd the delta-wing FISHPOT B. These aircraft are all based on prototypes first displayedn armament, fire-control, and speednots0hey represent significant advances over the bulk of Soviet Interceptors now in service- We estimate thatf these newfighters are now in units.

The recent Aviation Day show provided new indications on present trends in Soviet research and development on interceptorOf thc several prototypes displayed, the one which may be of greatest significance to Soviet air defense concepts Is an aircraft tentatively nicknamed the FIDDLER. Its size, configuration, very large radar, andarmament Indicate that FIDDLER isong range all-weather interceptoraximum speed aboutt optimum altitudeombat radius of as much. This would mark afrom previous Soviet fighter designs, which have generally sacrificed range toand climb capabilities. The FIDDLER may be designed to operate in peripheral areas beyond thc range of existing Soviet fighter and surface-lo-alr missiles, so as to

intercept Western bombers before they have launched lhcir missiles.

Another interceptor prototype, tentatively nicknamed FLIPPER, bears out previousof the probable trend In Soviet fighter design. FLIPPERarge delta-wing type, equipped with air-to-air missiles and anIntercept radar which ls probablyto that of thc FISHPOT. Maximum speed is tentatively estimated atnd altitude capability may be as great0 feet. Although there is no evidence that these aircraft are In current production, we continue to estimate that another new generation of Soviet interceptors will enter operational units within the next few years.

Most of the operational fighters displayed In the Soviet air show were equipped with air-to-air missiles (AAMs) which appeared toto previously known or estimated types. Theseadar beam-ridern infrared homing missileemiactive radar homing missilewo new air-to-air missiles, probablywere also observed. One type wasby the FLTPPER prototype Interceptor; the other type, carried by FIDDLER, waslarger than any currentlyAAMs.onger rangeEstimated performanceare not yet available, but we believe that thc new missiles probably Incorporate more sophisticated guidance and possibly other

Antiaircraft Guru

Soviets continue to employ largeof antiaircraft guns for defense ofand fixed targets, although thesehave declined during the past twothe widespread deployment ofmissiles, we believe that most ofmedium and heavy guns willout of thc defenses of static targetsUSSR over the next year or so.probably will be phased out inthes deployed, but will befor low altitude defense of other

Supporting Equipment

eavy primeuxiliary radar are deployed atites In thc Sino-Soviet Bloc. Radar coveraRe now extends over the entire USSR and virtually all the remainder of thc Bloc. Under optimum conditions this system now has the capability to detect and track aircraft at medium and high altitudes. of Bloc territory; under virtually all conditions, the system could delect and track such aircraft withinjn.efforts to reduce the vulnerability of their air defense radars lo electronichave included use of greater frequency diversity and Increased power. In developing new radars, the Soviets probably willon improving present limited capabilities against low altitude targets and against alr-to-surface missiles.

Ihe most important advance In Soviet air defense communications and control over the last few years has been the development and deployment of semiautomatic systems with data-handling equipment for rapid processing of air defense information and data linkfor vectoring Interceptors. Similarprobably arc used with surface-to-air missile units. These new systems willarked effect In reducing reaction time and vulnerability to saturation, increasinghandluig capacity, and Improvingwithin the air defense system.

Deployment

defense weapons and equipmentheavily concentrated in that portionUSSR westine drawn from theto the Caspian Sea, in EastPoland, and Czechoslovakia, and inportion of the Soviet Kar East.found at some specificoutside these areas, especially inThe approaches lo Moscow are bymost heavily defended area of lhe Bloc.

Civil Defense

illion Soviet citizens overofave received some instructiondefense and about one fourth of these

have probably received good basic grounding in elementary civil defense techniques The bulk of the population still lacks adequate shelters, although thc USSRubstantial lead over any of thc Western Powers in the construction of urban shelters which could provide some protection against fall-out,and fire. In the past two years, thehave given increasing attention to prc-attack evacuation of nonessential civilians ln the eventhreatening situaUon, but this program appears to be still in the planning stage. Even with limited warning,isciplined organization, the use of shelter, and the widespread knowledge of simple techniques such as first aid would probably reduce casualties considerably,among key personnel. However, Soviet civil defense Is not prepared to cope with the effects of large-scale nuclear attack. it would function extremely poorlyconditions of short warning lime.

Warning Tims

he amount of warning time availableaffects the capabilities of air defense in various areas of the Bloc. Early warning radar could now give Moscow and many other targets In thc interior more than one hour's warning of medium and high altitude attacks made with Western bombers of2 type. Soviet assurance of such detection would be greatly reduced by extremely low levelThc supersonic bombers and alr-to-surface missiles now being added to Western Inventories could reduce this warning time by as much asercent. Moreover, the more limited early warning time available in Bloc border areas would reduce thc effectiveness of the defenses of even heavily defendedin such areas. As the speeds of Western aerodynamic vehicles Increase, and as Western ballistic missilesreater threat, the problem of warning time will become more critical.

Current Capabilities ond Futurehe present capabilities of the Soviet air defense system would be greatest against penetrations by subsonic bombers tn daylight and clear weather al altitudes bclween aboul

TOI'

and0 feet. Under suchvirtually all types of Bloc air dcrensc weapons could be brought to boar againstaircraft Most Soviet fighters can operate at altitudes up to0 feet, and some up to0 feet, but theof the fighter force would bcconsiderably during periods of darkness or poor visibility. In the increasinglyareas defended by surface-to-airair defense capabilities would be virtually unimpaired by weather conditions and would extend to0 feet, with someup to about ao.OOO feet.

Despite its recent nnd considerablehowever, tho Soviet air defense system would still have great difficulty in copingarge-scale air attackariety of weapons and soptustlcated tactics, even within the foregoing altitudes. Atbeloweet, the capabilities of the system would be progressively reduced; beloweet, the system would lose most of its effectiveness. At present, the USSR has little capability for active defense against very low altitude attacks.

The Soviets are making vigorous efforts to counter Western weapon systems. Within the next five years, they will probablyimproved. radars and all-weathera surface-to-air missile systemto counter low altitude air attack, and antimissile defenses. Howover, they probably will still notigh degree ofIn copingarge-scale sophisticated attack by manned bombers. They would probably expect toarge number of the attackers, bul given the Increasingof the air defense problem, we doubt they will be confident of the extent to which they can reduce the weight of such an attack. The air defense problem has been radically altered by the advent of long range ballistic missiles. Barring an unforeseenbreakthrough, thc USSR's air defenseand uncertainties will sharplyas ballistic missilesarger proportion of the West's total nuclear delivery capability.

THEATER FIELD FORCES General

Thc Soviel ground forces, which represent the largest part of the Soviet militaryare well-balanced and equipped with excellent materiel. Air support for these forces is provided by Tactical Aviation and by military transports assigned to the Airborne Troops. Long Range Aviation and the Rocket Forces would also support theater operations In addition to fulfilling their primaryCombat troops are distributed among theilitary districts in the USSR and the three groups of forces In the EuropeanThe strongest concentrations are East Germany, the western and southern border regions of the USSR, and the maritime area of thc Soviet Far East.

Soviet ground forces arc organized Into field armies with combat and service support for the line divisions. The complement of support is heaviest in certain key areas, such as East Germany. Units of Tactical Aviation are organized into tactical air armies under the operational control of the militaryor group-of-forces commander. Other supporting units include large numbers ofmissile, and antiaircraft artilleryand regiments which are either assigned to field armies or retained under higherheadquarters.

Developments of the past two years have significantly affected the composition and capabilities of the theater field forces. Of tho personnel reductions actually carried out, about half probably came out of the ground forces. Wc believe that these reductions have been accompaniedreater emphasis on armored mobility and firepower Inrowing reliance on guided missiles and unguided rockets for support of field force units. Tactical fighter and light bomber forces were sharply reduced, although some of the remaining units have been strengthened by the addition of new fighters. Airlift capabilities have also Improved with the introduction of new transports and

SBCR-E'r^

Strength and Composition of Ground Forces

he total number of line divisions as1 is estimated at8 lank divisions.otorized rifle and mechanized divisions.ifle divisions,irborne divisions. re believed to be sufficiently manned (averaging aboutercent of authorized strength) to be classed as combat ready. The remainder, including most of the rifleare al such low strength (averaging less thanercent) as to require considerable buildup before being committed. These totalseduction of aboutinefor the most part low strength rifle divisions, since the announcement of forcein At that time Uie number of line divisions was estimated at. ofere classed asready.

c believe that present force levels will be maintained for some time to come. has raised the possibility of increasing thc size of the Soviet armed forces, but we doubt that the ground forces will be substan-Ually enlarged except perhapsighly tense situation. The Soviets now have on hand sufficient trained manpower andsufficient reserve stocks of equipment lo double the number of their divisions In one monUi. These divisions would, of course,several weeks training and additional support before they could be fully effecUve, Although there were Indications last year that the Soviets might have been planning the organization of "territorial" reserve forces along the lines of ihe US National Guard, wc believe that thc USSR has not established an organized mobilization structure outside the acUvc armed forces.

Ground Forces Weapons

he program of modernization andof Soviet ground forces hasolved the Introduction over thc last several years of more advanced designs of practically all types of equipment, Including tanks,personnel carriers, nuclear-capable free rockets with ranges toalllsUc and antiaircraft guided missiles, artillery and anti-

aircraft pieces, recoillcss antitank weapons,ide variety of transport vehicles. In some Instances, there have been iwogenerations of weapons since World War IL The increasing number of tracked and wheeled amphibians and amphibious tanks has greaUy improved Soviet river-crossingew types of specialized weapons have been produced for airborne troops, but for lhe most part airborne units are armed with standard infantry weapons. Present trends In the ground weapons development program pointontinuing emphasis on firepower and mobility. Specific areas of probably will Include defensive weajxins against low-flying aircraft, airweapons and equipment, weightof existing equipment, and improved communications.

oviet development of guided missiles has greatly improved the fire support available to field forces. Road mobile surface-to-surface balllsUc missiles with maximum ranges..ave been available for several years. Themissile which uses storable liquid propellants, became operational innd then upon operational considerations and thc availability of nuclear materials, HE,CW, and BW warheads could bein all these weapons. We believe that thendissiles are intended for use primarilyround aupport role, and are assigned to direct operaUonal centrol of field commanders. Evidence on trainingthe activaUon ofndnits In substantial numbers. We estimate that aboutattalions (with six launchers each) andattalions (probably with two launchers each) are now operaUonal. Although there is little evidence on theirareas, these missile systems arelocated in the artillery support structure of major Soviet theater field force commands. We believe Uiat the numbers ofndnits will remain fairly stable over thc next few years. However, within the next year, the Soviets probably will begin replacing theiih an improved, follow-on system ofrange.

. ballistic missilentered service. ballistic missile In8 oruclear warheads would probably be used In virtually.. missiles. MRU Ms will probably be used In support of theater operations; at least in thc Initial phaseeneral war their employment would be largely against Western nuclear attack forces and major urban-industrial areas. It seems likely that operational control of suchIs retained in Moscow, and at least most of them are probably directly under thein Chief of Rocket Troops.

Air Support

uring the past two years Tacticalhas undergone drastic reductions. Jet fighter strength was reduced fromohrough deactivation of units with older models and transfers to the IA-PVO. The assignment ofo Tactical Aviation unitslosefunction for this aircraft in addition to its intercept role. During the next five years, tactical fighter strength probably will bereduced by aboutercent- Light bomber and reconnaissance units, equipped with the obsolescent BEAGLE, were cut fromircraft at the beginning0 toircrafl as of TheBEAGLEs will also be phased out In time, but we believe that the strength ofbomber/reconnaissance units will be stabilized aty the introduction of new aircraft. An incipient trendew years ago to provide medium bombers to Tactical Aviation has been reversed. There remains at present one division of ADGERs but we believe It will be deactivated or transferred to Long Range Aviationew years.

mong the new aircraft shown In theSoviet air showew tacticallane, tentatively nicknamed FIREBARby the Sovietsultipurpose type, lt could probably be used for ground attack, bombing, and reconnaissance missions. Some of theIREBARS displayed were equippedelly radome. suggesting installation

of bombing/navigation radar; one wasas an all-weather fighter. Itsspeed ls tentatively estimated al aboutnd its combat radiusround support mission is. FIREBAR isew aircraft, though It appears tourther development along the lines of FLASHLIGHTround support version of thc all-weather interceptor FLASHLIGHT A. SomeLASHLIGHT Bs wore displayed,probable operational use in at least limited numbers. In addition. FIDDLER may be adapted for useong range tactical strike aircraft.

oviet military transports are under the administrative authority of MilitaryAviation which furnishes airlift support to all Soviet military forces except the Navy, and coordinates military air transport activity. The Soviet Navy bas its own air transports. Military Transport Aviation liasight and medium transports, almost all of which arc allocated to the support of various forces: Long Range Aviation, IA-PVO,Aviation, and Airborne Troops. Aboutrc retainedeadquarters unit toair support for the staff of the Ministry of Defense. Transports assigned In support of Airborne Troops alsoeneralpool for the support of all major cargo and personnel lifts of the Soviet armed forces.

ght transports of the CAB. COACH, and CRATE types andedium transports are assigned by MUI-tary Transport Aviation to support of Airborne Troops. Moref the latter are the new medium turboprop transports CAT, CAMP, and CUB. the latter two beingdesigned for military transport use. The remainder of thc medium transports areBULL piston medium bombers. The assigned transports of the Airborne Troops are sufficient to airlift simultaneously the assault echelons of two0 man)divisions. Each divisional assaultwnuld be limited loroops,headquarters elements, nine rifleand light regimental support elements. Divisional combat and service support as well as transport vehicles of the rifle companies

Bi^C-

not bcecond sortie of the entire transport force would be needed tothe balance of thc two divisions.

he limitation on Soviet airliftcausedack of heavy drop capabilityhortage of assault aircraft have been reduced In thc past year, and the probable addition in the fuiure of more of the new type transports will enhance Soviet capabiliUes to lift large numbers of troops or cargo to peripheral areas. We believe that by the end of the period of this estimate, transports' to support of Airborne Troops will have the capability of transportingingle lift thc assault echelons of about five airborne divisions or about two and one-half fulldivisions. Soviet airlift capabiliUes could be augmented byet and turboprop transports now in Civil Aviation; these include the CAMEL jet mediumthe CAT and COOT turboprop medium transports, and limited numbers of theurboprop heavy transport. These aircraft together have an airlift capability of nearly two additional divisional assaultWe believe that the two highlight transports, theet and theurboprop, probably are now instatus with Civil Aviation and will rapidly replace the outmoded andCAB. COACH, and CRATE.

Amphibioui Capabilities

sing all available naval landing ships and craft, the Soviet amphibious assaultvariesaximum of onein the Northern or Pacific Fleet areas to two regiments in thc Baltic. For longer range operations, the Sovietsotal merchant ship lilt* sufficient lo transport approximatelyotorized rific divisions; however,ift would require port or other extensive orT-Ioading facilities in Uie landing area- The Soviets are apparenUy seeking to further develop their amphibious lift capability, but significant improvement will depend upon their acquisition ofamphibious craft, extensive training, and reliable logistic support.

nnex 8.

Copabililiej far Land Warfare

Soviet theater field forces havedeveloped and maintainedfor the conduct concurrently orof large-scale Invasions of areasto the Communist Bloc suchEurope, the exits of the BalticSeas, northern Norway, and TurkeyWe do not believe Uiat thisbeen significantly Impaired by forceForces in the border areas andcould effecUvely initiatewithout prior reinforcement.that decreases in troop strengthlargely offset by improvements inand firepower. Land campaignsthe periphery would bc supported bymissile forces. Naval forces wouldforloc coastalsupport of ground campaigns. In aSoviet capabilities to undertakecampaigns would depend upon the

' outcome of the nuclear exchange.

NAVAl FORCES

USSR has developed annaval force, capable of longoperations and of surface andin areas adjacent to thethe conclusion7 ol anshipbuilding'program, new shiphas continuedodestmain emphasis given to qualitativeSoviet surface forces, whichcruisers, conventional destroyers,ships, have been strengthened byof guided missile destroyers,and mine warfare ships,craft equipped with missiles orsubmarines andsubmarines have enteredsome older submarines have beenAttack capabilities of Navalbeen improved by additionalequipped with air-to-surfaceits fighter arm has beenSoviet Navy is organized into fourfleets, in recent years, theand Pacific Fleets, with access toseas, have been reinforced by transfers

'V OP GEOn B9

Die land-looked Baltic and Blnck Sea Fleets.

TS. The Soviet Navy does noteserve fleet of major shipsecommissioned status.umber of ships aretate of reduced readinesseduced complement. Allowing for ships undergoing trials, training, overhaul, or with reduced manning, we esUmate lhat roughly two-thirds of Soviet surface ships andarger proportion of Soviet submarines arc normally capable of operationsew days noUce. Overall readiness of thc fleethole for combat operations could be Increased lo aboutercent with six months noUce.

Submarine Force

oviet naval capabiliUes for conducting long range offensive operaUons rest primarily upon the submarine force. Its numerical strength appears stabilized for at least the next few years atirst lineeclining number of second lino ships.its composition is changing significantly. In addlUon to improved conventionalarmed with torpedoes, wc believe that Uie force now Includesonventionally-powered missile submarines and about 7submarines, most of which probably are equipped with missiles.nuclear-powered ships, aboutoviet submarines are believed capable of operating near Uie continental US from bases In the USSR.

Nuclear Submarines

he USSR has acUvely pursued thcof nuclear-powered submarinesumber of years. There is evidence that the first suclj submarine.was launched8 at the Severodvinsk shipyard in the northern USSR. After fitting out and trials, thisprobably Joined the Northern Fleet in9 We esUmate Uiat about seven of these submarines arc now operaUonal with Uie Northern Fleet We believe that these submarines are probably of the new "H" class. The direct evidence on the "H" classsystem Is inconclusive except that itthe use of conventional diesel or bat-

tery propulsion. Considering oil available evidence, we have concluded that the "H" class probably is nuclear-powered, but we have Insufficient Information to esUmate Itscharacteristics or reliability. The similarity of the "H" class sail to Uiat of the "G" class indicates that it. too. probablyballistic missiles.'

hc USSRtrong requirement for conventionally armed, nuclear-poweredfor offensive operations againstforces and for employment Inwarfare. We believe that, within the nexl few years, other classes of Soviet nuclear-powered submarines will enter service,both torpedo attack and missile-launching types. Two Soviet shipyards are believed to be engaged in nuclear submarine production, Komsomolsk in the Soviet Far East and Total production of these two yards will probably be up to eight per year over the nexl five years. On the basis of available evidence. Soviet requirements, and producUon capabiliUes. wcuildup in Soviet nuclear submarine strength tonndn We esUmate Uiat by Uie end of Uie period about half of these ships will bc missile-launching types, and about half, torpedo attack.

Conventionally-Powered Submorlnoi

he bulk of the Soviet submarine force consists of conventionally-powered, torpedo attack submarines, built for Uie most part in Uie early ands. These includeW" class,Z" class, andQ" class submarines. Theubmarines of the newly designated "R" class are believed to be "W" class conversions, whose appearance suggests general modernization with Improved sonar equipment. Six "Z" class submarines have undergone conversion to launch ballistic missilesie Soviets haveaboutF" class large, long range submarines with improved sonar equipment

'Present cnpablllUes and future trends In Soviet missile-launchIm: submarines, both nuclear and convcnUonully-powered, are discussed under Forces lor Long Itaiigc Attack, parauraphn

GGORIW

fiCnET

whichre operational, andf the "O" class missile-launching ships.

oviet conventional submarines areofarge-scale torpedo attack and mining campaign against Allied naval targets and sea communications tn theNorth Atlantic and northwestern Pacific. The" class and "F" class torpedo-attack submarines, theG" class missileandZ Conversion" class are believed capable ol operating near theTJS from Soviet bases. The missile launching types can also conduct torpedo attack and mining operation. The Soviets will probablyew more "G" and "P" class ships, but considering their present strength and probable requirements, wcthat construction of conventionally-powered submarines will have ended by

Surface Force*

naval surface forces, whichdependent upon land-basedah* support, appear suited primarilyoperations in waters adjacent toConventionally-armed, majornow stand at aboutdestroyers, andscort ships.

only type of major surfacenow being built in the USSR is thcdestroyer. The Soviets now haveships, armed with cruise-type missilesagainst surface targets and withgear. Ofre of theeach of which has two launchers andan estimatedissUes;hipsearlier "Kildin" class eachissiles. Two types ofareandof which have speeds in the Mach 1and an effective rangethc use of aircraft for forwardthe maximum range of thecan be extended toofo about. production of missile destroyers,the "Krupnyy" classewthes estimated at sixumber of conventionally-armed de-

stroyer types have been modernized by the installation of improved cquipmenl forwarfare and electronics warfare.

ther new construction during the past few years has Involved small, specialized craft for use in Antisubmarine warfare, amphibious operations, mine warfare, coastal defense, and logistic support. Two classes of patrol boats, equipped with guided missiles or free rockets, ure now operational. The Soviet auxUlary fleet, composed primarily of older ships, has recently been augmented by newer tanker nnd cargo ships, and submarine support has been reinforced by the addition of newtenders, rescue ships, and repair ships. Additional logistic support could be provided by the growing Soviet merchant marine. In terms of net tonnage, additions to the Soviet merchant fleet0 were the largest of any ycur to date and more than double9 increase. The widespread Soviet fishing fleets can provide limited logistic support to submarines, and thoy have considerablefor training, mine warfare, and coUcctlon of electronic intelligence.

ver thc next five years, we believe that cruiser and conventional destroyer strength will continue to decline, while escort ship strength wiU remain fairly stable.of destroyer types will continue, and some surface ships may be equipped withmissiles. Sovici production of missile destroyers probably will continue at the present rate for the period of this estimate. We estimate that byoviet first line surface strength will consist ofuided missile destroyers,ruisers,onventional destroyers, andscort ships as well asissile or rocket equipped patrol craft.

Naval Aviation

oviet naval air forcesrastic .reduction and reorganization0 with the deactivation or transfer of aU naval fighter units and the virtual elimination of Ught bomber units. The principal components of Naval Avialion arc now Jet medium bombers, patrol aircraft, and land-based helicopters. Ita capabilities are focused primarily onand strike missions against

GIIBT'

targets and un antisubmarineAir cover for naval operatlona would have lo bc provided by other than Navalcomponents.

bout two-thirds of NavalADGER jet medium bombers are each equipped to deliver one or two antiship alr-to-surface missiles. ubsonic missile with. ranges the most widely deployed, but It is being supplemented or replacedupersonic missilehichange. Both systems arc estimated toEPeel against surface ships, and It is likelymall portion of the inventory Is equipped with nuclear warheads. We estimate that thc combined Sovietof these antiship weapons will remain fairly stable atissiles over the next fow years. Naval Aviation may receive some BUNDER supersonic dash mediums, bul we believe that its medium bomber strength will remain fairly stable or increase slightly during the period of this estimate.

new flying boats were displayed inAviation Day Show. One of these, nIs probably intended as athc obsolescent MADGE. Itsmagnetic anomaly detection (MAD)an ASW capability. The other,turbojet, may be suited forminelaylng. or possibly transportwo estimate that this aircraft willthc operational force.

Capabilities for Naval Warfare

addition to the assignment ofsubmarines to long rangemissions of the Soviet Navydistinct objectives: (a) defense ofapproaches lo the USSR andSatellite areas. Including offensivehostile navalcarriers and missile-launchingof long range altack;f enemy sea lines ofand (c) support of the seawardthe ground forces, includingOf thesehecertainly attach thc greaterstrengthening their naval defenses against

strategic atlack Soviet naval forces could provide fire support for ground operations ln coastal areas, but capabilities for amphibious assault remain quite limited. The grave threat to Allied sea communicalions already posed by thc Soviet submarine force willremain relatively constant.

Capabililio* AgaiiHt Carrier Talk Forces

he Soviets evidently regard the carrier task forceajor slrategic threat Their capabilities against such forces have been greaUy improved by the increased allocation lo Naval Aviation of jet medium bombers equipped with antiship missiles. The unre-fuelled combat radius of thc BADGER, so equipped, is estimatedn the mission profile and type of missile employed- In Uie European area, therefore, these aircraft could operate against surface ships ln Uie eastern North AUanUc, Uie Norwegian and Barents Seas, and much of the Mediterranean These capabilities are, of course, limited by problems of detection and identification, and by carrier task force air defenses. Submarine operations againsttask forces could extend to US coastal waters. In waters adjacent to the USSR, all types of Soviet naval weapons could be brought to bear against opposing surface forces.

ASW Capabilities

he USSR has placed increasingon thc Improvement of its previouslyantisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces. For detection and localization of enemyUie Soviets are employing direction -finding equipment, short range shore-based detecUon equipment, air launched sonobuoys. helicopters, and airborne MAD equipment. They haveajor effort in Uieof ASW ships, particularly small coastal types, and have equipped some of theirand many smaller surface ships with mulUple tube ASW rocket launchers, as well as improved detection equipmentesult. Uie Soviel Navy is capable of carrying out fairly effective antisubmarine operaUons In sea areas wllhlniles of the Soviet

19

but Is severely limited lit carrying out such operations beyond this range.

With thc development of .US missilethe Soviet Navy recently has placed increased emphasis on its open sea ASW needs. ASW exercises have expanded in scope, and training doctrine has become moreBoth the "F" and "B" classhave been fitted wllh improved sonar, and nuclear submarines suitable for ASW may enter service in the next year or so. There is evidence of developmental work on ASWnnd although direct evidence iswc believe missiles for ASW may also be under development. Thc turboprop seaplane which nppeared in1 Moscow Air Show suggests the Soviels may berogram to modernize their obsolescent and relatively small force of ASW patrol aircraft. In addition, the Soviets have continued toin oceanographic research which could have ASW application.

In order to expand significantly theiropen sea ASW capabilily. thc Soviets would have toarge-scaleprogram.rogram couldmodification of additional destroyers with ASW rocket launchers, construction of new classes of long range ASW ships,of larger numbers of "W" and "Z" class submarines and production of nuclearsuitable for ASW. construction of long range ASW patrol aircraft with detection equipment designed for wide-area search,of shore-based ocean surveillance systems of maritime approaches to the USSR, and several years of intensive trainingcoordinated operations. Although the Soviets have shown increased interest tn ASW. there Is no indication that their improvement program is onomprehensive scale. Moreover, It is doubtful, primarily because of geographic factors, lhat the Soviets can achieve an effective, long range underwater sound detection system to enable them lo maintain continuous surveillance over large ocean areas except in the northwesternIn aum. we believe lhat over lhc next five years, thc USSR will haveimited capability to detect, identify, localize, and

maintain surveillance on submarinesin the open seas.

he principal naval weaknesses of thc USSR are its Inability to control the sea routes between its widely separated fleets and itslo project its surface forces foroperations at great distances from Soviet shores. Thc lack of adequate supply lines to Northern and Far Eastern fleet areas and the stationingajor portion of Soviet naval strength in the Baltic and Black Seas have been additional handicaps. However,in logistics and the transfer of ships lo the Northern and Pacific fleets have reduced these weaknesses somewhat.

SPECIAl WEAPON DEVELOPMENTS Nuclear Weapons*

heoviet nuclear tests detected since9 have reflected the development of nuclear weapons toide variety of military requirements. Soviet tests conducted8 included^ jlhermonuclearranging in yield

Q The weapon designs tested8 could now be stockpiled inquantities. We estimate that only marginal improvements will be made in future weapons unless nuclear testing Is resumed. However, the Soviets now haveide spectrum of fission and thermonuclear weapons which is probably adequate to meet their basic military requirements. Wethat at present the Soviet stockpileincludes nuclear weapons in the range of tcstedyields.r

Jddition, this stockpile mightuntested weapons with yields as large asT.

here is insufficient evidence toirm estimate of the numbers and types of nuclear weapons in thc Soviet stockpile. We believe that the USSR has sufficient nuclear weapons lo support massive nuclear attacks against targets in North America and Eurasia

'ore detailed discussion, see the forth-comlnt HIEil. "The Soviet Atomic EnergySfil rLIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

30

ils long range slriking forces. Thc size and nature of the materials stockpiled imposes limitations on the numbers of weaponsfor other air. ground, and naval forces. We haveonsiderable growth in the Soviet fissionable materials stockpile over the next few years, which should keep pace with the estimated growth in Soviet lone; range atiack capabilities as well as easing the present limitations on other military uses.

Chemical and Biological Warfare

he Soviet Union is believed to beto use chemical warfarearge scale Soviet military forces receive training in the offensive use of toxic chemical agents as well as in defense against them. The amount of toxic agents currently produced in the USSR and the size and disposition of the Sovietare not known, but are believed to be At least half of the stockpileconsists of nerve agents, principally tabunmaller quantity of sarinnd some toxic agents ofype. Wethat further development could produce only small increases in the toxicity of known agents and that some research probably isdirected toward development of new, lethal agents. The Soviets are also aware of the potentialities on nonlethal. Incapacitating agents.

ho Soviets have developed spray devices for disseminating chemical agents fromas well as artillery shells and short range rockets dissemination, and It is within their technical capabilities to employ such agents in the warheads of ballistic missiles. Tactical requirements might dictate that toxic chemical warheads be provided for some portion of Soviet ballistic missiles withranges upt is possible that CW agents might be used in. balllsUc missile for certain limited purposes.

here Is insufficient evidence on which toirm assessment of Soviet BW offensive activiUes. The Soviet Union has abiological warfare defensive program; knowledge obtained from Uie development of this program could lead lo an ofTcnslvc The Soviets have conducted research

on antipersonnel, ant (livestock, and possibly antrcrop BW agents No UW agentfacility has been identified, but many existing biological plants could be converted for production of BW agents.

Electronic Warfare

ide range of active and passivefor electronic countermeasures (ECM) use is now operational In Soviet air and naval units. The devices, designed to counterelectronic systems at all the widely usedfrequencies, include Improved chaff, radar, and communications Jammers, and variousdevices. Soviet military ECM capabilities arc complemented by the unique SovietIn extensive, centrally controlled,jamming of Western broadcasts. Atthe USSR has an appreciable capability for Jamming Western radars at most of the commonly-used frequencies (up0nd possiblynd especially forat those frequencies normally used In Western long range radio communications. Within the period of this estimate, we believe that it will have in operational use equipment for Jamming all frequencies likely to beloyed by Western communications, radar, and navigation equipment.

9S. Thus Soviet capabilities to disruptstrategic and tactical communications at the time of attack appear formidable. The Soviet ground-based jamming capability Is most effecUve withiniles of Soviet territory. In addition, the cutting of trans-AtlanUc cables by Soviet trawlers hasthe vulnerability of thissystem. The Soviets probably are aware of at least some of Uie effects of high alUtude nuclear bursts on radar and com municalions, although they have conducted no such tests.

FORCES IN EUROPE FACINGeriod of rapid change andin the Soviet armed forces has altered the military situaUon in the NATO area. While Soviet and Satellite capabilities in Eastern Europe have remained relatively constant, the Soviel ground, air, and missile strengths In the USSR backing up Iheir forward deploy-

lUiGUBT-

ment have been undergoing considerable change

e believe lhat Ihere has been abuildup ot surlace-to-surface missiles covering all of NATO in Europe. The nature and scale of the air thrcal has changed. Very large numbers ot jet light bombers and day fighters have been withdrawn from the order oi battle. Al Lhe same time, medium bombers of Long Range Aviation are available for use againsi targets in and near Western Europe. Finally, while the tactical air forces in the north have been virtually eliminated (as have those In lhc Farhose In East Oermany have actually been increased slightly. The preponderance of Soviet tactical aviationIn the European area facing. Some of the reductions0 affected the ground forces ln the western USSR,the numbers of divisions which could be committed to combat without prior Nonetheless, thc Soviet groundremain very considerable, and the Soviets

21

apparenUy consider that they retain afor any war in Europe, as well as the base for larger scale mobillxallon if required.

hc Soviel naval Ihreal to NATO is changing,oderate decrease In older surface and submarine units and an Increase in missile-launch ing ships and small craft as well as naval medium bomber antlshipping strength. Re-evaluation of Soviet submarine capabiliUes on Uie basis of intelligence acquired over Uie past year or two hasUiat the scale of Uie submarine threat to shipping near US coasts Is much less than heretofore believed, though itreat threat to sea communicalions in lhe eastern North AtianUc.

oviet ground strength ln Eastern Europe remains atombat ready divisions, backed up byombat ready andow strength divisions in the Western USSR from Uie Barents to Uie Black Seas, and back to Moscow. Five of these are airborne divisions.

LINE DIVISIONS FACING NATO '

MOTORIZED RIKLK/MECH-

AREA

Europe

Ready ..

0

0

0

Strength

0

Western USSR

Ready

1

strength

2

USSR

Ready

0

Strength

5

31

Western USSR

Ready

1

Strength

0

Ready

2

27

Strength

7

addition, thereombat ready andlow strength Ciiueasui facing Turkey.

Soviet Tactical Aviation now haset light bombersighters inEurope, and an additionalediumight bombers, andlghtera in the European USSR" The Soviet Navy hasodern long range (including 21 missile launchingruisers, andestroyers andln the Northern Fleet capable oiIn the North Atlantic, in addition to units in the Baltic and Black Seas There arcaval BADGER medium bombers with the Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleets Medium bombers of Long Rangeand medium and intermediate range missiles of the Rocket Forces would also be available to support theater campaigns In Europe. We have estimated that the USSR noworce of medium0allistic missiles whichperational launchers, the majority of which are deployed within range of West European targets.'

The Satellite armiesotal of nearlyivisions, of varying degrees ofand reliability The Satellites together haveight bombers, andighters intended primarily for air defense. None of the Satellites have effective naval combat forces. There will probably bemodernization, and modestIn Satellite standing forces in the years ahead.

Soviet forces in East Germanyowerful armored striking force ofank andotorized rifle divisions, with wellanks, and supporting artillery and other units. These forces are combat ready, andenerally high slate of readiness whicheak in thc early autumnThe USSR has the back-up capability for reinforcement and continuing resupply so long as the logistical lines from thc USSR are intact. In local actions arising out of the Berlin situation, the SovieLi could of course

detailed disposition ot soviet aircraft, seeff this estimate.

'See NIESoviet capabiliues for Low-RangeOP SECRET.

use their own forces, but probably would use East German forces, at least initially'

forces stationed in Eastequipped with dual-capable weaponsThere Is some evidence thatare presently stocked in Eastfor Soviet forces, although storagenot been identified. There areno nuclear weapons ln the othercountries. Thc Soviets couldtactical nuclear weapons toin Eastern Europe, although we doon what scale these weapons arein the Western USSR for use by theand tactical air forces.

CAPABILITIES FOR DISTANT, LIMITED ACTIONS

Soviet theater forces, including ground armies and supporting air and naval strengths, are primarily designed to conduct large-scale campaigns In areas contiguous to the Bloc. In recent years, there hasendency on the part of the Soviets to concern themselves politically with critical situations at considerable distances from centers of Bloc power: for example, in Laos. Cuba, and the Congo. The Soviet attitude with respect to such situations has more than oncehreat of military intervention Wc do not believe that thc USSR intendsatterof policy to conduct limited war in areas remote from the USSR, but occasions may ariseilitary presence or show of force would be regarded by the Soviets as useful.

In any present effort lo deploy military forces rapidly lo distant areas, and tothem once deployed, the USSR would be greaUy handicapped, partly by limitations on air and sealift and even more by Uie lack of political arrangements to insure adequatesupport. Moreover, the USSR has not established any special military component trained and equipped specifically forsmall-scale opcraUons, although of course it could employ portions of its existing

' The capabilities ot the East German forces are assessed inf East Germany In Ihe Berlinated ISECRET.

2:i

During the past year Uie USSRin Laos the capability to provide small-scale airliftistant periphery of Uie Bloc.

is possible that over the nextlhc Soviets will seek to improvefor distant, limited militarythrough thc designation and trainingforces, and Uie developmentequipment for their use andThey may attempt to overcomedisadvantage for applyingby negotiating with neutralistutilize available facilities for refuelingof Soviet militaryecent Soviet proposal toof Mali's main airports with Sovietincluding communicationsorder to service tbe transport aircraftby Mali, Guinea, and Ghana frommayove toward the

MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER BLOC COUNTRIES

Political relationships among thecountries vary considerably, and thc degree and forms of military cooperation vary accordingly. Thc USSRuch closer tie and more dominant role over the EasternSatellites (excepting Albania) than it does over the Asian countries, particularly Communist China. Tbe forces of the Warsaw Pact, again excepting Albania, are clearly tied operationally to Uie Soviet militaryTheir air defense forces arc integrated into thc Soviet air defense system, and from time to Ume the Soviet and Eastern European ground and tactical air forces conductexercises. In contrast, there is noof any combined exercises of Soviet with Chinese, North Korean, or North Vietnamese forces. Moreover, there is evidence of both Chinese Communist and Soviet refusals tocombined commands. Joint or reciprocal use of military facilities, and jointof installations on one another's territory.

The USSR has used the Warsaw Pact botholitical instrument, and as the channel for control al the highest level over

thc Eastern European Communist forces. Thc Soviets have reduced the exercise of direct control of Satellite military establishments by removing almost all Soviet officers previously stationed within those forces. However, the Soviets have retained substantial forces in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary. The whole of the Satellite areaaluableglacis and extension of air defenses for the Western USSR. Accordingly, theare provided nonnuclear surface-to-air missiles and fighter interceptors, while the USSR retains for itself offensive air, naval, and missile nuclear striking forces.

A marked change has occurred in the past year in Soviet military relationsesult of Uie deterioration ofrelations. While Albanian Ues with the Warsaw Pact have not been severed, military cooperation has been sharply reduced.attaches have been withdrawn fromand Moscow, and Albanian studentsmilitary training in Uie USSR havereturned home. Thc Soviet Union has evacuated its submarine base at Valona, withdrawing its eight submarines and one tender which had been based there. Thelour submarines and one tender of the Albanian Navy do not possess acombat capability. There isevidence that in the past year thc Soviets have threatened the Albanians with withdrawal of theafforded by thc Warsaw Pact if ils leaders refused to accede to Moscow's political line.

Sino-Soviet military cooperation reached its zenith during and In the wake of tbeWar. Military assistance had been slightnd has again been slight during the past five years, in Uie early andhe Soviets supplied large quantities of ground force weapons and jet fighters, some piston and jel light bombers,ewand submarines. At thc same Ume, substantial numbers of Soviel militarylhe lowin training the Chinese. Subsequently,from5hc USSRthe Chinese in developing their own conventional weapons production base, and assistance in training tapered off-

23

down payments andhe USSR has signed agreements accounting for roughly two-thirds of the total. Cxcchoslo-vakia for about one-fourth, and Poland and Communist China for the rest.

terms of value received orthe UAR. andthatbeen the principal beneficiaries ofaid. Bloc agreements signed withprobably account for somethingneighborhood ofercent of thevalue. In rough terms Blocwith Indonesia (chiefly those

rc responsible for aroundercent of the total, with the UAR (including theagreementor about one-third, and with Iraq for aboutercentand Cuba together accountr so; the remainder has been dividedYemen, the Algerian rebels. Morocco. Guinea, and Mali.

estimated value of Blocsupplied to Cuba nowhipmentsMIG-type jet fighters (more thanin May and aniston trainers, lighta wide range of conventionaland large quantities ofIn addition,ndpersonnel have probably beentraining In Czechoslovakia, andnumber in the USSR.are currently working In Cuba In

miliiarysecond largestof such technicians presenton-Bloc state.

Elsewhere, during the first six monthsloc military technicians, mostly from the USSR, were assigned to duty for one or more months in such countries as the UAR. Iraq, and Afghanistan. The largest number,, were In the UAR, though thiseduction of about one-quarter from thc preceding six-month period. Two hundred or so other technicians were in Indonesia, Morocco, Yemen, and Guinea. Military personnel from these countries who received training within the Bloc (principally in the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia) during the period from5 through1 totalled,f whom were from the UAR and Indonesia.

1 thc Sovietsillingness to provide more modern arms to certain recipients. The UAR and Iraqlong-soughtFARMER)Indonesia isodern light cruisermall number of BADGER mediumnot possessed by Communist China or any of theand has been promisedsariety of short range offensive and defensiveIn general, however, the Soviet program provides recipients with arms of older types frequently drawn from surplus stocks; thus demands on current Soviet military needs are minimal.

MAJOR BLOC ARMS PROVIDED SELECTED UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

UAK

AN

9

-

NESIA

6

AIRCRAFT (minimumJet medium bomben

et ught

et nghters

et fighters

* Af hlert

Otber aircraft. Including hellcopten

LAND ARMAMENTS (rnlrJmum eatl males >

eavy

edium tanks

mphibious light tanks

elf-propelled assaultpieces

NAVAL VESSELS

Cruisers ..

Destroyers

Submarines

Sab Chasers

Mine Sweepers

Othersncluding MTB's .

' Mostly on order.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Personnel Strength of the Soviet Armed Forces, 27

11

Military Personnel Strengths of European Satel- 28

lite and Asian Communist1

Strength of Soviet Oround Forces in Line Dlvl- 28

1

Strength of European Satellite and Asian Com- 29

munist Ground Forces in Line1

Estimated Bloc Air Strength,hrough 30

Estimated Soviet Aircraft Strength by Role Within Major 32

1

Distribution of Soviet Air Strength by Role, 33

11

Estimated Performance of Soviet Interceptor

Estimated Soviet Long Range Aircraft Performance Under 35

an Optimum Mission Profile

Estimated Performance of Soviet Transport

Estimated Performance of Soviet

Estimated Bloc Surface Naval Strengths.

Estimated Bloc Submarine Strengths,

Estimated Characteristics and Performance of Soviet Post- 40

war Submarines

Soviet Bloc Merchant Fleet 41

T O t

Table I

ESTIMATED FBRSONNEL STRENGTH OF THE SOVIET AHMUD FOltCeS,

11

0

0

0

0

i

Hcadauanera

Reafareh ud

TkMit Field Form

Ground Poreea, PWd

Tactical Avlatfoa

Alt Defense Force*

8iirface-lo-Air MlaMlw

Antiaircraft Artillery (Gun)

Fighter Aviation ol Air Defense

w lining and Control

Loon Rup Atlack Forcta

long Range

laailca,ndaval Forces (exel. penwonel counted

I-1'- Afloat

Shore Ealahlikhinenl

Coastal Defeaaa

..

Military Transport AiMUoa

0

Uoii Training

Security Forces (not Included in above total).

Border Troop*

Internal

There are atubatantlal but unknown number of civilian*fo* the Soviet military raUblitlimcnt. Thare ia evidence that *ome functlom proVrOualyby militaryave In tlie course of reduction* in re-^iit veari curat in-ecMairudy to be filled by civilian eaaployeae,in tonslinctMn and otberactivity.

Tlie nature uf our evidence on reductionsrecaharil) more certain and more preciM for Uune component*iven ratio of personnel to Order of Haiti* of uruti and majorit clearly esutritafced- ConarqvefiUj. our information on iuu in the nirore complete-ur evidence on other mmponenla Rnderte* on pemoline! Btrengllia of Ih" ndministf alive und logallral loll, haa nlnnyn been meager and incomplete, and our estimate* of Uleae nategoriea mim be baaed on indirect evidence and

Militaryresearch aad development io the USSondiieled by civilian agcnciai, In particular the Aoademy of Sciences. Uie .Stale Committee* for Defense Teeltliology. At ml ton Technology,it em.eelrolilo. and Shipbuilding, and by lhe MinlMry of Medium Machine Enlt tic (nuclear weapons) Tlie numbers of active duty otiUlary penoaaet eaUsuled here ara those primarily subordinate lo the Miniatry of Deft tine and at misaue teat ranaea, inuclear devctopmaol, and aviation (ethnology. Otber military personnel in Research and Development and allied fuuCliotis *re Conn led In other categories.

TV- Aaatttaat CtUaf of Naval OprealMMepaiUoanl of the Navy,< that Ihea* Forcea Anoal. Saorr KatablauUacat and Caaatal IMctiw arehigher than shown. Ha helMvee that the followingnccumle inflectionpersonnel nlienRth in Ihe Soviet Nmj:

forceinnnel counted eatesvhnr* In Table

C*1lIII0

Naral0

l.u. :

STI MATED MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF EUROPEAN SATELLITE AND ASIAN COMMUNIST

ULY IMI

i -

LIT tail's

Total*

Foatn

Force*

Foacaa

Sscunrrr Fanes*)

P. nl limn

'

I'wl Germany..

Hungary

Poland

Hum*n

0

0

II.OOO

ASIA

OOO

K. "i ..

1

iRAND TOTAL (Hound-id)

SO

1 ooo

*c bawdimalcd order of bnltledc,iin/t'rim MiaMrios of

rial Ion

n.toof NaUonalB*tr total.

et crtaonod uaeriHliUry capacity when artiiny.

ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN LINE1

vra.

Divisions

Rim,1

ii KU Division*

DlVIBIOHS

Division*

1

t.11

Htr.nct.

20

34

s

o-*rtnit* in-Had*TI Do; dtvaHoa,itaaaaUalofruttcry. aaU-aArorari arWWf. anUtaaa. andrigade, aad rapnmrta

KMlmatadoflaw di.kion*USSR, t. mmmttmmtk.oMrn USSR,clcmloviet Far* IKaatoland.uo-

4).

.SktHur

Table 4

riMATED STRENGTH OF EUROPEAN SATELLITE AND ASIAN COMMUNIST GROUND FORCES

IN LIKEULY

TO/E

ivisions NoT

TO;E

Motohiiimi Roul MeihaNiibd

.Ulu.-I

OU

v

i I

li

13

J

0

KLITE8

Bulgaria

link

Ctechoalovnkia.Germany.

ll.SOC

JI

ff

Hungary

BO

31

Rumania

Toial

Oil MUN18T

3

112

9 14

0

18

0

ASIA Communist

China

151

Northorth

TOTALS

114

Il is estimated thail the Chinese Communist riSe divisions have ao actual strength ofnd lluu actual rength of the remainingivisions Is

In addition. Chinese Communist forces include three small cavalry divisions.

ESTIMATED BLOC AIR STRENGTH. MID-IM1 THROUGH

.

mt

>M

> iatic Com-muDllta

It

fiaial.

Coaa-

Hale.

Cow-I

223

Bombtc.'KaconBauaaip

J,l

Bomber/Tank*.

|H

;

at

(Med)

IN

140

170

100

70

m

(Mad)

- r

350

70

30

iplmii Pl*p. .

Traiaer

Jet (Fir)

400

350

2T5

700

Footnotes (or TsbJa s.

* The light bomber figure* include reconnaissance aircraft, numberingn Soviet units andn Satellite wills In IHGi. We believe lhat anproportion of light bombers, at least in Soviet service, will be usedeconnaissance role. Tbe Satellite figure* Include altoistoo-propelled attack alrcrafi, aod the Asian figuresuch aircraft, in lOAl-

' We believe lhat during the oeit few years the Soviels will probably begin producing and entering Inloew tactical support light/fighter bomber and reconnaissance aircraft, and the estimates for later years include il in Uie light bomber category.

umber of Ibe medium bomber aircraft are assigned to reconnaissance activities, aboutong Range and Naval aircraft at the present time. Wethat an increasing proportion of the medium bomber aircraft force will be used for reconnaissance during the period of thisa W-

' Depending on developments in political relations between tbe USSR and Communist China, the Soviets may provide some yet medium bombers, or the technical knowledge necessary for the Chinese Communists to build medium bombers, during the period of this estimate.

' Helicopter numbers represent our estimate of light and medium helicopters In all military components. In addition to the types listed in this table, il '* csiii.nated lhat the USSR has considerably moremall helicopters in service. Because of Iheir variedantisubmarine warfarv. and genercl utilityprobably will enter service in substantially larger numbers during lhe period of this estimate. Tbe USSR has also developed heavy helicopters some ot which may now be assigned to military unils.

Tnl.tr- C

ESTIMATED SOVIET AIRCRAFT STRENGTH BY ROLE WITHINULY 1U1

RaKOB

iui'.iik Aviation or AlB Demise

ai. aviatiok

Aviation

TuANSroBT Aviation

Bomber

Bomber/Tanker

Bomber/Tanker

(Med)

a

(Med)

(Med)

280

460

75

(Ftr)

(Li Bmr)

(Med

(Seaplane)

(Rounded)

transport ngu"fare not included in tbo totals of Ihe component under which they arc lisled; they are, however, included in the Military Transport Aviation figures

footnoteto Table 5.

Tab- T

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF IOV1CT AIR STRENGTH AYULY INI-

Eiaor*

ussr -

Ach

i

sn

m

ITS

47

Jn

L-bM Bomb**

Jm

J*l MrdiWi Bomber/

Ta*Mf

J.i Hra.y /

t

DM

M

M

T.ioipn, laltdi

IU)

IB

FOpllX

llfhl

Medium

II i' roil<Pu)

.'ll (U

Jm (Mod

TralBa*

Jot PU

TOTALS (Bonr-lfd:

Military Dmntta

East Gormaej. H'in|ary. and Poland. ID.

orut*lftii, Carpathian,and Odaaaa MD*.

olga, aod Ural MD*.

Nonh Cavcaoui aadMD*.Turhwta* aodD*.

Far Cwt and TraoabaiaaJ MD*

USSR '

I Affl

S 33

: Ml

1

USSR'

Aon

.1

II

ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT

100

C

D

-

BED

a

H

A

FISH-

B

Into

iAM

;

Ural

ft

n

*

HI

H.M0

w Out*0 Ii

[mm

ATWW***

Ciibal Wiaf(araj: 4

1

0

0.0

* *

s.t

S.S

T

B.I

i-Jim

OpUlmm/Estaraal Ftart

on

540

a to

468

660

sts

300

TOO

IK* Onlv

Only

Only

ga ii ml

Armament.

1 mm

Un*

T ram

3 mm

30

mm

m

31

am

m

lOiWoaa*

m

m

MaSS mb

6 mm

iMl i

em

m

m

m

m

in

m

m

A AM

AAM

AAM

AAM

AAM

AAM

AAM

AAM

Thi* Table duo* not Inrlud* data on certain ruin Bghvri typra not yet In operational Mirviec, and for which only preliminaryfrharartetaile* an available

fconto* r> fa* maaimxm altiludr al attack Lha rate wfm* par MouW allhand al ooaabal wight All of In* ar'f Ml'rwM Oglilin can attaiaJaamly higtmap to(<vi -uatag aoomMnwnt oparatiaoaJ oattaMlrtM*at mttmrnmimj iiganilmkm*

to climbCaWkttad mm Iba baa. of gram taki-of angMi^craalnly

T.-t. | r. ! BayjBl j i.rt gg .t.'r..| .. i

Ubc aatoof FLASHLIGHT Atarrtao on* bogy tan*

rr cooaadanrd to a* nauwan load* aith nunuly, aod do oo* cadud*of rocart aad mamto araaatacat

FRKSCO "E" ha* porformannl*uc* Mmilnr lof FRESCO "A" andut atlrboro* iaUrotp* radar of Ih* FRESCO

"D" type.

nd "D" vrraloiw ant alio tn operational urn. FARMER "C" and "D" have rang* only radar. FARMEH "B" haa ararch *nd track radar with acarehVtrauklmllar to thoH of ih* FAIIMKit "E" radar

" A* tlx ra*ull of cvid*no* acQUliod dunng the put yoar. our wlimaln. o< combat rrlllng lav* tirrn lowrrrd byIn lie caaa ol FAR MLR.0 fee for PISH BED. FITTER and FISHPOT

Table H

Combat Radius/Range (nm) '

0 lb. bombload

one refuel

I.0 lb. bombload

one refuel '

0 lb. bombload

one refaat1

Speed Al'.itude lie 'ti I

a. Maximum Speed at Optimum AlUtude

(hu/ftj

b Target Bpeed/Tarfei Allituda

fttajli.)

Combat Ceding (ft.)

Terminal Target Allituda (fll '

boraNoad

lb. bombload

b bombload

0

0

0

BISON

OO

OO

0

0

IH.INDEK

rutcrven are reduced operale nl alUUidea

tJA'tl

0

0

Thc range aod radius figure, given In that table are rruuimum figures They ar. applicants lo the meet up-to-date model* of thee alrcralt. flying optimum miasma profiles on direct route* Thoof older modal aircraft standard mission pronb* indirect ran- level penelralions or olher teeUea designed to deUy or evade detection endioi. would reduce the efl-cuv- range. The ealeulaUoii of dcgradaUon In range and rad.ua resultingsophisllcsted penetration lueliosomplex process which can beat be accomplished for individual mission*.

ulc-of thumb measure however, foroperaUons by heavyhe radius at optimum altitude will be decreasedlta lor every mile flown at sea level.

For missions with air-io-aw/are missile* carried externally, ruk-of-lhuinb figure, for combat radius are given in Table

3 of this Annos.

plus bombload aboaid. No range ngura It associated

Refueling estimate, baaed upon use of compaUble lanhers which provide approximatelyercent increase In radius/

0 lb bombload.

Service ceiling al msiimum power with one hour fool res with this alUtude.

Jet mediumwith superx-l* "dash" capability of aboutslim.lt. uf range and.s at Una speed.

'evsdenccor the BLINDER.

'I Ul' i-

"'cin'T

37

i bcBaft

Operational Date

Soviet Designation

Power Plant

Number

Type

Radius/Range <nm)

Payload

Troops

Cargo Obs)

Maximum Speedt SeaSpeed/Alllludeelling (fl.)

Mi-1

I

0

Ka-18

i240

Hr.N

IMS

Ka-iS

t

Pfeion

I

:

PiSlOu

140

ESTIMATED BLOC SO It FACE NAVAL

Areas

Sea

All Flkkts

Cbimi

China

Cliinu

China

Missile

Light Cmuera

Destroyers

E?<orl Ships

3

27

22

61

0

3

4.

64

0

1

2

49

a

4

4

8 06

0

4

0 4

4

8 62

8

8

0 4

a

6 68

9 38

l

Old Heavy

4

0

0

0

jj

0 4

0

A

0

0

Light Cruiser*

Oldi>

4

2

0

-1

5

207

2M

8

216

8

8

Estimate* of futuie ittengths have taken into account Uie scheduled deliveriesightestroyers,scort ships lo Indonesia: Ihey do not make allowance for passible additional transfers tu Bloc or neutral states during the period of this estimate. In addition lo the major surface ships listed Soviei navsl strength1 is also estimated touxiliary aod amphibious craftinor surface ships <mlnecrafl, patrol emit, and service emit). The Satellites and Communist China possessedinor surface ships

b At any givenroportion of the total Soviet first aud second line ships arc In Ulsls, training, overhaul or "reserve" wiih reduced manning and activity, About two-thirds of the surface fleet ia available for combat operationsew days.

' Unils which aie at leastears old are carriedsecond line" status until there is evidence of their removal from lhe fleet or until, in accordance with accepted guide tines, they ere finally considered removed (in the absence of contrary evidence) whenears old.

Table

ESTIMATED BLOC SUBMARINE

Asua

Sea

Ail Fleets

n iry

Chi ui

Chin,

China

China

It ST LINE

Missile (Nuclear H

Nuclear Torpedo 1

Missile

. . Lout; Rangeedium Ra.-ige (Q) Short BaileeJ

0

14

0

3

aa

26

0

a

0

0 0

44

0 4

0

'1

l

0

c

0

7 S

111

0

i

0

0 43

0

)

) i

3 I

4

0 37

'.i

74

44

0 30

14

4

212

3D

0

0

0

0 4

18

4

0 8

Tl

0 3

0

.i

SECOND LINE

Long Rcnge

Mud.ii in Riuigc

Short IIii nee

i

0 1

0

3

0

0

I)

4

0 i;

3 13

1

3

4

i

11

3 17

2 3

1

0 0

0 0

7

>

0 0

TOTAL

line units are those Ol modem construcuon. The second line category lists unils overears old which, by virtue of age and design, arccfulraining or perhaps coastal defense. Some of Lhe second line ships will probably be retired from service earlier than on an age criterion, and it is likclv that some first line ships will be transferred to other Bloc or non-Bloc countries. Eicept for accountending transfer of fourclass submarines IO Indonesia, this table does not provide for such retirement* or transfer*.

The "W" class, thoughaximum surface cruising range lees than half thai of thc "Z" and "T" class, still meets the arbitrary criterion for tlassili-cuiloiilong range"aximum surface cruising range in excess.t. per hour. (See) The "R" class submarine is evaluatedonverted "W" class; five of Ihese unit* have been Identified In tho Northern Fleet, and six more are believed to be In thc Black Sea Fleet.

difficulties evidently resulting from Ihe withdrawal of Soviel technical assistance have seriously delayed the completion and filling out of eight additionallass" submarines.

addition lo the "H" class, one O' more other classes of nuclear-powered submarines are believed to bc under construction.

TON SVC If ii-T

Table JS

ESTIMATED SINO-SOVIET BLOC MERCHANT FLEET0

(eel-

(eel

(eel

locJ

Smo&tea

Cora mucin CUbsNona Korea .

TOTALS

I

10

0

T 9

0

2

J7.OO0

7

R

sateih'u*:

CoanuMKid Nona Korea ..

TOTALS

n

(ee)

Ice)

WT (cc)

.. M

S

0

S

0

7 0 0

0

-'If..

. TOD

y.

Deadweight Tonnage cargothe total weight of cargoe^ae) can carry In full load condition. DWT (cc) is equal lo dcad-

i elglii Io.mugc (DWT) minus the lull load allowance aright oirovUiotis, furl, water, and other tlcms nerawHrr for useoyage

Original document.

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