3 May1
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
OUTLOOK FOR YUGOSLAVIA
Slbwilttlt bt the
DIRECTOR Or CENTRAL INTELUCENCf The loBoaingarttapaled In the preparation ol this eitlmate Thr Central Intelligence Agency and Ihe Intelligence wpoinalicni ol Ihi Departments of Slate, the Army, thr Navy, the Air force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in bySTATES INTELLIGENCE21ueit The Director of Intelli-
gence and Research, Deportment of State: the Assistant Chief ol Staff for IntelUgence. Department of the Army: the Assistant Chief ot Naval Operationsepart-ment ol the Maim: the Assistant chlel of Staff, Intelligence, VSAF. the Director for IntelUgence. Joint Staff: the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. Special Operations: and the Director ol the National Security Agency. The AtomK Energy Commission Bepresentatioe to the USIB. and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Intestigation. abstained, the subject being outilde ot Ihetr lumdsctton.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
his estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy is for thc information and use of the recipient and ot persons under his jurisdictioneed to know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by thc following officials within their respective departments.
of Inielligence and Research, for the Department of State
Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Chief of Naval Operationsor the DepartmentNavy
of intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for The Joint Staff
of Intelligence. ABC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
Director, FBI. for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, for theDefense
irector of NSA far the National Security Agency
j. Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department or
Agency
This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning In accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of Central Reference, CIA.
When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain iteriod not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate should either be destroyed, returned to thc forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain It in accordance with2
Thc title cf this estimate when used separately Irom the text, should be classified:
White House
NaUonal Securily Council De par tine nl ol Stale Department or Defense Atomic Energy Commission Pederal Bureau ol InvrstlgaUon
OUTLOOK FOR YUGOSLAVIA
THE PROBLEM
To review the domestic and international position and policies of Yugoslavia, and to estimate their probable course of development during the next several years.
CONCLUSIONS
Since its expulsion from the Blocugoslavia has emerged frombackwardness and hasolitically stable nation with an internal system which differs In importantfrom that of other Communist states. The least evolution has occurred in the sphere of political control, which continues to be exercisedisciplined Communist partyeadership that retains the cohesiveness it acquired during wartime partisan days. In recent years, increased powers have been granted to local government units, and attempts have been made to draw the population increasingly into thc execution of policy. However, the decentralization process has been carefully controlled, and has not altered the*party's dominant position. (Paras.)
he party leaders continue to facepersistent problems. They have been unable toeneral apathy toward communism, particularly among thc younger generation, which is strongly attracted by Western material standards and cultural influences. Ethnic and re-
ligious animosities remain, although they have been successfully contained.the regime has reduced popular discontent, and is evenertain measure of positive support as thcInternational prestige grows and, more important, as personal consumptionthe last few yearsate of aboutercent per year.
yumber of economic practices which characterized theperiod, the Yugoslav leaders have gradually and cautiously developed atype of mixed socialism which combines state ownership and planning with many of the characteristicsarket economy. This approach,by substantial and continuous Western assistance, has done much to bring the economy out of its formerstatus. Economic policy in recent years hasore balancedprogram, the revitalizalion of agriculture, and relaxed restrictions on imports of consumer goods.esult,lan wasear
t
ahead of schedule, and the annual growth in the GNP was overercent per year, one of the highest rates in the world.)
While cautious experimentation will continue, the distinctive internal system which the Yugoslavs have developed is unlikely lo undergo substantial change in the next several years. Tito's death mayerious problem for the party, but his successors, fearful of providing an opening to Soviet influence on one side or the presumably more liberalrepresented by Djuas on the other, will probably succeed in limiting their differences. Thus, even in thiswe do not foresee any fundamental alteration in the basic features of the presentsocialized economyingle-party monopoly of power.)
Yugoslavia has exploited withskill its unique positionommunist state outside thc Sino-Soviet Bloc. It has maintained itsagainst both threats andfrom thc Bloc, at the same timeertain amount of influence in Communist afTairs. It has obtained large amounts of economic and military assistance from Western countries while continuing to criticize and oppose its benefactors on numerous issues. And it has used tnese proven successes of "non-alignment" toosition ofamong the uncommitted counlries and to gain international prestige far out of proportion to its size and strategic (Paras.
e do not expect any substantial change in these policies. The question of whether Belgrade will voluntarilythe Bloc has, we believe, been settled in the negative. Instead, the Yugoslavs will seek discreetly to extend theirin the Communist parties, hoping that the Bloc will eventuallyooser grouping of genuinely autonomous states with which they can develop more intimate relations. Meanwhile, policy toward Yugoslavia has againotly disputed issue within the Bloc and. so long as Sino-Soviet differences remain unresolved, Yugoslavia's Importanceisruptive element in the Communist movement will continue or even increase.)
ugoslavia's frequent opposition to Western policies stems in part from its Communist ideology, but even more from its desire to associate itself with theof the underdevelopedhc emergence of these countries offers the promise of secure markets forgrowing industry and. even more important, an opportunity for Belgrade to become one of the leadersroup of slates whose collective influence on world affairs can in its view be very great. Yugoslavia's doctrines and achievements will commend il to many leaders of these states who seek rapid economic growth, wish to avoid entanglement in great-power blocs, and are already inclined toward authoritarianism and central planning. Its advocacy of its own 'methods in these areas will thus tend to work against the political influence of both the Eastern and Western camps.
J V
DISCUSSION
INTRODUCTION
ince its expulsion from the Soviet Blocugoslavia has changed graduallyackward country, plagued by Internaland external threats, into astable nation which has embarked upon the process of sustained economic growth In the process, the Yugoslavhave shaken off large portions of their Stalinist heritage and have developed asocialist system which sets them apart from Bloc Communists. On the world scene. Belgrade has skillfully exploited the East-West conflict and the emergence of new, uncommitted powers to bolster Itsand to acquire international influence far out of proportion to Its size and strategic importance.
Yugoslav Communists have beensurvive as an Independent state outsideIn part because of Western aid,because they had developed sourcesstrength which made theiramong the Communist parties ofEurope. First of all. the party hadduring World War II Its ownmilitary base and attained controlcountry virtually without Sovietthc party leaders have preserveddegree of solidarity, based onof the wartime partisanthese leaders were able tosupport of varied elements of theby promoting the reunification ofwhich had been broken up Into Itsparts by thc Axis. Yugoslavgreatiy^stlmulated in thethe regime's defiance of Moscow, is stillrallying point.
II. DEVEIOPMENT OF THE YUGOSIAV SYSTEM
Marxists, the Yugoslavfound it necessary lo elaborate theirin order to justify their actionsown party members and to set them-
selves apart from their erstwhile comrades in the Bloc The Yugoslav version of Marxism-Leninism is of course represented by thcas In noeparture from the essentials of communism. Nevertheless, their doctrine is at almost every point f the pragmatic policies which lhe parly has adopted to meet urgent Yet thc new doctrines have come toroader significance of their own. The concept of their "'own road lo socialism" has provided the Yugoslav leaders with an extra measure of purposefulness. confidence, and even conceit. Further, this Ideology has been and continues tootent factor ofbetween Yugoslavia and the Sino-Soviet Bloc, andisturbing element within the Bloc itself. Lastly. In recent yearshas been belter able lo propagate its theories among young governments which are also seeking lo launch the process ofand Yugoslavia has gained some credit in these quarters as an ideological Innovator.
The Communis Porly
ugoslaviane-party slate, and the partyisciplined organ; il Is In this fundamental respect that the Yugoslav system has undergone the least evolution in thc lastears. In an early phase of ex-peri men la lion, lhe party flirted with the idea of reducing its role In favor of moreand broadly-based bodies. Thisof thc "withering away of the party" took an cxlrcme form in Djilas' proposals that party discipline be loosened and the party itself be transformed from an eliteassjilas' Ideas, and thcwhich they caused within the parly, prompted Tito to reassert firmly the party's dominating position. In recent years, its manner of functioning has been changed somewhat, though without any radicalin Its role, as Increased powers have been
'Diilaa sutaeqwenuy carried hU hereir much farther DyulUparty system
granted to local governmental units andenterprises. This hasontrolled decentralisatton. which leave- party influence less direct but stUl determining.
n its internal life, the Yugoslav Partyin important respects from the other Communist parties of Eastern Europe. It Is still led by the able core of partisan leaders who have commanded it since World War II. These men are all Tito's selections, and his pre-eminence has been unquestioneduarterentury. The leadership has avoided the purges which have racked thc other East European parties, and Tito has not sought to cow his colleagues ln the manner of Rakosi or Ulbricht. Independence and resistance to external interference have brought thc party nearer the people and made it appear as the defender of Yugoslav national Interests, rather than an alien regime Imposedostile population. These factors, plus the successes achieved in both domestic and foreign policies, have muted the Internal rivalries characteristic of Communist parties andonfident leadership whose members work reasonably well together.
onetheless, some potentially divisivedo exist within thc party. One is thc discontent of the younger generation which has joined the rankshis group does not shore the sense of dedication orof close camaraderie of the cadres who served in the Partisan war; It is, furthermore, resentful at being blocked from keyby lhe prewar group, who. now in their forties, occupy virtually all thc keyecond potential source of intrapartyis the tendency of parly members toalong regional lines. Those from the economically more advanced regionshe Catholic provinces of Croatia and Slovenia, which were formerly part of lhe Austro-Hungarian Empire) lend to lean toward Wesl-
ata in Uie party's Central Committee, all but four are currently held by persons who Joined thc party before World Warimilar monopoly of key positions In Uie party below the Central Com-miUee level Is enjoyed by those Who Joined the party bclore thc end of the war; this group numbersHI.COO. Party membership now totals almost one million
ern Socialist ideas and lo line up against those from the more retarded areas, whose views on the whole are more rigid and doctrinaire. This second divergence Is particularly reflected in opposition by the more advanced regions to continued subsidy at their expense of thc economic development of the backward areas.
ajor difference between Yugoslavia's communism and that of the Bloc parties is in the role of the Socialist Alliance of Working People nf Yugoslavia1hich in many respectsront for the party, but which the leadership Is nevertheless trying to infuse with somethingenuinelynature. The Intention Is not to abdicate to SAWPY the policymaking role, but to use it lo draw the population Into the execution of policy and at the same timeto theense of participation. This organization Is being grantedpowers in relation to the local political and economic units, functionsonopoly of the party.
Governmental Decentralization
ne ol the basic Yugoslav criticisms of the Soviet system was that Stalin, Ignoring Marx's dictum lhat thc state should gradually "witherad created instead anbureaucratic state, removed every democratic feature from the party, and relied upon arbitrary personal interventions andto make the system work. The Yugoslav leaders have sought lo overcome these defects in elaborating their "separatene means which they devised has been theof government, ln which the powers formerly exercised solely by thegovernment have been progressivelyto the primary territorial unit, the opstina This body,radual buildup ol ils political and economic powers at^ the expense of those of the higherof government, Is eventually to become the basic administrative unit of theversion of communism. Progressumber or local functions andhave already been granted to
'At thr end8 SAWPY embracedercent Of lhe voting population
SEQttET
uptime These developments have in no way endangered ultimate control by theCommunist Tarty, but they have reduced the need to assert this control directly.
Relations with thehe regime has succeeded in containing traditional national and religious animosities within the country. It has accomplished this fay granting the six Republics "equal" status within the Federal Structure, byertain amount of local autonomy, nnd byoughly proportional rcpresen-taUon of thc various national groups In the leading bodies of party andhough contained, the old antagonismscontinue to exist beneath the surface. The regime's policy of building up thebackward Republics continues to stimulate resentments in the more developed areas. Separatist sentiments have notfrom Croatia and Macedonia, and fear of Serb domination remains in the other ethnic groups. Much of the .success achieved ln containing such antagonisms is owing to Tito himself, because of his non-Serb origin and his Insistence upon representing himselfugoslav naUonalist.'
hc regime continues loasically hostile attitude toward religion. It seeks to confine the churches as much asto strictly religious matters and. over the long run. to eliminate the influence of religion entirely. In thc meantime, the party is careful to avoid antagonizing the faithful unnecessarily, especially where religiousare coupled with local nationalism. Thus, cordial relations with the head of the
- The il* repoBHca are Serbia. Croatia. Slovenia.leneeovlna. Monier.cf.ro. and Macedonia. In addition, there Is an autonomous province (the Vojvodlnai and nn aulonomowt region (Kosovo-Methohljai Croatia. Slovenia, and Uie Vojvodina. which were part o! the Auslro-Hunearfan Empire, arc more advanced and mote hlehly developed Montenegro Macedonia, the Koimct. Bo&nla-Herze-govlnn and io me pnrU ot Scrbln uie the "backward areas"
'Tlloroat fatherlovenian mother. In Ihe inlrmireader of Ihe parly elements oppoUiig Serb domlnaUon
Muslim community are used to Influence the sentiments of the Bosniak and AlbanianMoreover, in. largelyesture to local feelings, the Orthodox church in Macedonia was freed from theof the Serbian Orthodox hierarchy and given virtually independent status. Themajor problem remains the Roman Catholic Church, particularly in Croatia. Inowever. Cardinal Stepinac's death was followed by conciliatory gestures both by thc regime andore receptive Pope. Although there have been preliminary moves toward negotiation, no concrete results have, appeared.
he Yugoslav populace remains generally unresponsive to communismoctrine. The peasants, who still comprise aboul half the population, retain some of theirsuspicions of communism and of those in authority, despite increased confidence in recent years that thc government will not Interfere with their land titles Nor has the regime, any more than the other Communist states in Eastern Europe, made much headway in enlisting broad support in the younger generation, which is strongly attracted by Western material standards and culturaland Is Indifferent to official programs and Communist ideology. Although the party Itself has had some success in recent years In drawing more young people Into membership. Its lack of appeal to the great majority of youtherious weakness.
evertheless, the Yugoslav regime has made substantial progress toward reducing popular discontent and has even succeeded inertain measure of support. The secret police are considerably less in evidence than formerly, and there hasecline In popular fear of them. The increased degree of civil freedom has been accompanied by aamount of free play allowed in drama and the creative arts. The Yugoslav leaders have succeeded in bringing many elements of the populace into more or less voluntaryin their programs, through SAWPY or organs uke the workers' councils. The Yugoslav people take considerable pride in the loreign policy achievements ol thc regime.
T
SKflTRET
Its dcAancc of the USSR, and In this respect they regard Titoind of national hero. Perhaps the chief factor,In the gradual reduction of popularwith the regime has been its economic achievements in recent years, which haveubstantial improvement In living conditions.
improvements in theliving will tend to stimulate pressuresliberalization In the politicalfields. The leadership,have little difficulty In keepingunder control. Discontent mayfrom time toit has. forbecause of the rise in consumerto the exchange reform ln earlysuch difficulties seem likely to beSo long as present policies continueserious economic crisis occurs, noare foreseen in the regime'swith the populace.
considerable trial and error Inyears, and the chastening effectby the events in Eastern Europe inYugoslav leaders seem to be fullythe dangers of tooelaxationpolitical control. They are likely,consequence, to continue present effortsup the strength of thc party, whilesame time moving ahead gradually"self-management" principle In localand economicewwhich is scheduled for adoptionwill present an opportunity to codifyextend these Institutional
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ECONOMY The Economic SyHem
t Is in the economic sphere that the Yugoslavs have departed most notably from thc practices followed by the otherstales. In the past decade, thc regime has successively freed itselfhole series of obsessions inherited from the Stalinist period: that planning and administration must be completely centralised; that the peasants must be forced into collective farm-
ing; that heavy Industry must be developed at any cost, preferably via very largeprojects; that the economy must befrom the Influences of world markets. In giving up these dogmas. Belgrade hascautiously, gradually coming toistinctive type of mixed socialism which combines state ownership and planning with many of thc characteristicsarket economy. This approach, made possible In part by continuous Western assistance, has been singularly successful.
artly to Improve efficiency and partly to make the economy more responsive todesires, the Yugoslavs have undertaken an extensive decentralization of planning and administration. The government still retains direct control over the general features of planning, but detail has been delegated largely lo the local level. In Investment,control is retained for key projects, but nonpriorlty investment funds are now locally administered, though within centrallylimits. At present, only about one-third of gross capital investment is provided from federal funds, while the other two-thirds -come from republic, district, apstina, and local enterprise funds One of the chieffrom Soviet practice has beenarket mechanism In place of the former rigid schedule of administered prices. Central control is retained for prices ol strategic or scarce commodities, and for emergencies, but otherwise products havebeen allowed to seek their own price levels in thc market. In thc determination of wages, extensive decentralization has also occurred, bul the regime still keeps aeye, through the trade union organization, on lhe incentive wage systems administered by the enterprises.
evelopments al the level of the individualfactories, mines,and tradingbeen of key importance to the dynamismof the Yugoslav economy in recent years. First of all. the regime, in marked contrast to the Bloc states, hasood deal of latitude to enterprise management.
limits have been established byand other measures, and theupervisory eyelocal government bodies, the enterprisefairly free to decide what andto produce; to dismiss workersthis creates temporary unemployment;supplies freely on the market; toproduce either in Yugoslavia orto distribute its net profit lnwith the workers' council. Themust operaterofit and lossIt remains too long in the red tbcwill
hile the regime's propaganda has greatly exaggerated the independent role of Workers' Councils, their development over the lastears reflects a major difference between Yugoslavia's economic system and that of the Bloc countries They have been given certain limited powers In connection with decisions on planning, investment, and wages, though thc regime has maintained strong. If indirect, The plant director (chosen by localauthorities) makes most of anoperating decisions, and thecentralized trade union structure has been strengthened to improve Its watch-dog role Nevertheless, the Workers' Councils,with the SAWPY organization, have given the worker an increasing interest and sense of participation In the operation of his enterprise.
he Yugoslav leaders hare proceededwith economic experimentation. Nonetheless, the more basic reforms such as use of the market mechanism, latitude for thc economic enterprises, and decentralisation of controls over the economy lo the local level, have now proved their effectivenesseriod ot years and,ajor crisis occurs, are unlikely La be reversed. The process of trial and error will probablyand though recent actions Indicate that the central authorities intend toirm, il only indirect, hand on the economy, this may become increasingly difficult. Thetoward further experimentation will be strengthened because the regime's emphasis
-
on Increasing foreign trade will requireto adjust more and more to world market conditions.
Trend* in Production
6 the Yugoslav economy has made impressive achievements, considering the problems that beset the economy at that time. During thc period ofive-yearery intensive rate of Investment (aboutercent of gross national product) was maintained, and ONP grew at an average annual rate of overercent, one of the highest rates of growth in the world, and higher than any of the Soviet Bloc states. The plan wasear ahead of One of Its main achievementsigh and steady growth In per capitaconsumption, averaginger year (the planned rate of growth was only fivehich reflected the revltali-zatlon of agriculture, higher priorities for light Industry,elaxation of tradeagainst foreign consumer goods.
Agikulture
ugoslavia has achieved considerablein agriculture since It3 and subsequently dispensed with compulsory deliveries. Although the regime still pays lip service to the ultimate goal of socialization, the peasant's confidence In thc security of his land tenure has been At lhe same time, through financial inducements and other means, the regime urges the peasants to participate Informs of marketing. Underlan, the state doubled thc share of total investment devoted to agriculture andintroduced new varieties of Italian wheat and US hybrid corn. esult of these measures, gross agricultural output increased during the plan years by aboutercent overeriod, and Yugoslavia9 freed itself from dependence upon wheat(or the first time since World War II.0 harvest was less successful, andhad to turn again to the US for wheat. But the measures of recent years have reduced Yugoslavia's vulnerability to bad weather, and
i
ET
ood chance In the next few years to become self-sufficient in wheat and toto expand its exports of com and meat.
Industry
Industry, thc most ImportantofWe-year plan waschangeover from the stress onInvestment in heavy Industry to anpolicy directedoreof theumberIndustrial projects continued to bebut the main effort was placedan immediate Increase In outputidle industrial capacity intoand by stressing quick-yield projectsIndustry. The new approach wasand the index of6
Gcnerol Economic ProipecU
new five-yearigh rale of economicthe order ofercent perlo be pressed during the nextInvestment will be held at therate, and to help sustain lt thccontinue lo seek substantialIncreases in industrialnot be so spectacular asince, for thc most part,capacity is fully utilized.must now invest more In basicconcentrate on improving the qualitylabor force and on obtaining foreignassistance If present trendsagriculture will probably5 in production of majorBelgrade will Increase its exports ofproducts* and certain grains.
Foreign Trade
esult of lhe giowth of Yugoslavthe pattern of foreign traderaditionally backward economy which relied entirely upon the export of raw materials and the import of industrialnow the country has begun to export semifinished and finished goods from Ils own
growing industry. These exports findIn the Bloc and. increasingly. In tbe underdeveloped countries, where rawarc obtained in return. Yugoslaviato import Industrial products from Western Europe, and about half its total trade is with the industrialized West. At thetime, fearing exclusion from themarkets being formed in WesternYugoslavia isoreignreform which will permit Its accession to GATT and otherwise integrate It more fully into the world market. Western aid, which hasajor role in Yugoslavia's development since it was expelled from the Bloc, is5 million to underwrite this reform and Isumber ofindustrial projects as well.*
he most serious economic problemto be the balance of paymentswhich will be especially precariousthe next few years because of interest and principal payments on foreign debts which will fall due. The regime seeks to reduce the deficit by expanding exports, and bywith Western financial help, itsetback to the exportcould easily result In Inability to meet its foreign debt commitments. Such an eventuality would probably force the regime to decide between lowering the rate ofor lowering planned goals to increase consumption, either one of which wouldan important setback to economic progress.
emembering Slalin's economic reprisalselgrade, makesatter of policy to keep the Bloc's share of its total trade alhird. Bilateral long-term trade agreements have recently beenwith most Bloc slates, but not with Communist China or Albania, Yugoslavia's chief political foes ecent agree-
'9 andnearlyillion ol foreign economic aid was made available lo Belgrade, more Lhan half of It by the US. Yugoslavia aho had access to credit* Irom lhe Bloe totaling0 million inddition, the US grantedapproximately SI billion worth ol military equipment.
ii K
with the USSR provides for aincrease in trade over the nexl fire years. IL is unlikely lhat substantial flloc credits for industrial developmenl of the kindinill be given in the near future.
ugoslavia attaches great importance to trade with the underdeveloped countries. Belgrade hopes that in five toears these countries will account for aboul one-fourth of its total trade, as againstercent at present. Belgrade has engagedforeign-aid" program of sorts. In which credits are granted on favorable terms for the purchase of Yugoslav industrial products (principally heavy equipment) and technical assistance Is also supplied. This program has Involved the Yugoslavs in such varied activities as theand equipping of ports, the design and equipping of industrial plants, and the design and construction or river control In the Sudan and In Ethiopia, ason economic development, they have attained positions of some influence.objectives are involved in this program, but at the some time II is aimed at building up markets for the output of Yugoslavia'sbut relatively unsophisticatedIndustry, and also at providing sort-currency sources of raw materials. olal of about $ivo million in credits has beento date, and an0 million Is projected under lhe new five-year plan.'
IV. DEVEIOPMENTS IN FOREIGNhough the Yugoslav leaders remainMarxists determined to retainidentityommunist state, they are equally resolute in their intention lolhe independence and Irccdom ofacquired as ^result of separation from thc Blochus Belgrade inveighs against the concept of "blocs" of any kind, whether Communist or non-Communist, and seeks to
'The coon inn mainly Involved in Ihu proeram aie India, the UAR. Indonesia, Burma. Ceylon. Klhlopia, thebanon. Argentina, and Bra-all. Yugoslavia islay U> establish iiii'li in the new Aliwan nations, and attore broadly In Latin Ameitca tn addition. II Is extending limited military training and assistance to Indonesia nnd the Sudan.
develop bilateral ties with all countries,of political orientation. TheSlavs, in accordance with this policy, accepl Western economic assistance but keep thetr distance from association with Westernpolicy, particularly those aspects they regard as "colonialist" or anU-Communtsl Similarly, they attempt to get economic help also from lhe Communist countries, butto be drawnormal politicalwith the Communist Bloc. on most inlernational issues theyclale themselves with Soviet rather than Wesl-err. positions
his policy of nonalignment. which has successfully maintained Yugoslavia's polilieal and economic independence and enlarged It* international influence. Increases Yugoslavia'* appeal to the other "uncommitted" counting Belgrade exploits this appeal to therder to increase Its prestige in the world, lo provide markets for its developing industry, and lo guard against Bloc attempts to isolale Yugoslavia. Thc Yugoslavs hope toeadership role in lhe Afro-Asian groupiew to increasing thc collective influcnee of thc uncommitted states on Internalionni developments They will continue theirto develop economic relationships with these areas, including the extension of expi'ii credits and economic and technical excliaiipw and to expand thc influence of theolilical and economic system
Relations with lhe Communis! Stoles
ince the publication of ils party ptognuu inhe Yugoslav Parly has been condemned as heretical by the Bloc stale* The doctrinal gap between the Yugoslav Pnrty and lhe other Communist parties, which made virtually impossible the maintenance of party ties, is now so great that It is unlikely tobridged in the absence of fundamental eon-cessions by either side. Nevertheless, mlo developments after the breakII. neither Moscow nor Belgrade has allowed their latest dispute to disturb relations on the sImIi-level Systematic atlacks are made byBloc against lhe doctrinalssued from lime to time by Belgrade, bul at
SE
same time, trade agreements have been signed, and cultural, scientific, and othercontinue.
he question of the proper attitudeYugoslavia has, however,otly contended Issue in recent years within the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The SovieU. after theofttempt to enticeback into the Bloc, have avoidedto Stalin's counterproductive policy of open assault againsi Belgrade. olicy, they apparently felt, would only pushinto closer alignment with the West. Instead, Khrushchev has tried to retain aof Influence over Yugoslav foreign policy, and has hoped to moveosition from which, at some point. Yugoslavia could again be associated wiih the Bloc. More recently. Tito's growing Influence among thenations, which arerime target of Soviet policy, probably further limits the extent to which Moscow feels It can afford to apply pressure on Yugoslavia.
hc Chinese Communists have no such Inhibitions, and are not concerned aboutBelgrade still closer to the West. Rather, they regard Soviet moderation toward Tito as an integral parteneral tendency in Soviet foreign policy to compromise the purity of Marxism-Leninism and the cause of world revolution for the sake of detente tacticslhe non-Communlst powers. They openly demand that the Yugoslavs be branded as having deserted lo the enemy and become "agents ofhis approachympathetic chord among moreelementsumber of Communist parties
he leaders of Albania, whose party was onceatellite of the Yugoslav Party, felt themselves* gravely threatened byefforts toward rapprochement with Tito, whkh began5evival of this policy, they have found common cause with the Chineae. During the Sino-Soviet dispute0 Ihey openly sided with Peiping against Moscow and relations with the latter have steadily deteriorated Tirana's rela lions with Belgrade, normally bad. have re-
sec/Jet
contacts now occur with theSocialist parties, especially withLabour Party, whose influencea factor in the recent releasefrom prison. The Yugoslav altitudethese groups and toward thelabor movemeni is considerablythan that of the Bloc statesconsiders that "socialism" isonly where the Communist partiespower, the Yugoslav view Is thatan Inevitable process of institutional"socialism" generally In theworld
Yugoslavs, however, haveformal relations of alliance withPowers, and lhe Balkan Pactond Turkey, negotiated ina threat from the Bloc still seemedhas become virtually moribund.nevertheless does not altogetherwith the connection because itadvantages in relations wllhcountries, and because the pacta form of insuranceutureof strong Bloc measures againstIt Isorm of indirectthe Western defense system whichday be useful to Yugoslavia, evenpolitical line now condemns NATO.
their generally good relationsWestern Powers, the Yugoslavs standopposition to themreatissues of foreign policy They dowith apparent confidence thatwith the Western governments willseriously harmed thereby Thisstems in part from theiroutlook. The latter obligesJudge the basic aims of "capitalist"Statesoctrinairealso makes them prone to believeother Communist states, despiteIdeologicalresound objectives In addition,to the Wesl springsesirethe influence of thc Weslown country, especially amongpeople ajor consideia-
lion In Yugoslav foreign policy is lhc desire to associate Yugoslavia with the interests of the underdeveloped and uncommittedWe believe that these factors willU> shape Yugoslav foreign policy, and that In particular the attempt to alignwith lhc underdeveloped countries will become increasingly important.
Reiolioni wiih Uncommitted Countriet
Tito has built up close personal ties in receni years with the most importantleaders such as Nehru, Nasser, andMore recently, he has beento cultivate the leaders of the new African nations, and has hopes of doing the same with the new forces emerging in Latin America. These efforts to develop ties with manyof varied political hue in the Middle East, Africa. Asia, and Latin Americaound economic rationale, which is to acquire new markets and sources of raw material supply. Belgrade, however, also has an importantmotive in engaging in these activities. They reflect Tito's aspirations to ploy arole on the world stageeader of the "non-Bloc" states, and to achieve aof cooperation among the latter which would maximize their collective influence on important world developments.
In pursuing the development of political ties with the underdeveloped countries, the Yugoslavs are, of course, advocates of their own political and economic methods. They encourage socialization of the means ofand central conlrol of economicand discourage emulation offorms of government, such asmethods and the multiparty system. At the same lime, the Yugoslavs advise these countries to resist external encroachment and to avoid committing themselves to either the SOvicl or Western models of internalThe tendency of Yugoslav policy in these areas is not only to be critical of thealso works against Soviet political Influence and diminishes thc appeal of thc Soviet pattern of economic development.
seems to have little difficulty Ingoad relations witli thc leaders ofThc latter, for Lhe most part,inclined, and do nottheir countries are ready for Westernforms. The appeal ofthese countries arises from the facta small country which Is vigorouslyitself, ilodel ofin some respects adaptableown needs, that it has followed anonalignment while obtaining economicbolh East and West, and thattechnical aid from Yugoslaviato minimize entanglement with theblocs.
UN ts looked upon by Belgrade asuseful arena (or the "neutralist"to concert their efforts to arrestbetween the opposing "blocs."therefore actively support theand consider tbat it shouldat least by the big powers, as theof economic and other aid tocountries. They do notthe Soviet plan for reorganizing tliethough they have beenof actions of the Secretary-Genera ICongo. Yugoslavia's increasinglywith the uncommitted countries havein the UN, where it hasnumber of "nonbloc" resolutionsand has unfailingly supported theirfrequently in opposition lo thesometimes in opposition to Moscow.
Miliiary Implications of Yugoslav Foreign Policy
over the last several years Inview of the world situation andmilitary dangers posed to themaboot important changes Inpolicy. In the yearsbelieved that the principalossible military aggressiontroops from Satellite territory, theyextensive US military aid andadvice concerning the organizationof their forces. In thatagreed lo station lhcir besl-equlppedin the Ljubljana Gap area in llie north-
west where Ihese troopservice to NATO by helping lo guard the approaches toItaly.
he death of Stalin, the Soviet withdrawal from Austria and troop reductions elsewhere In the Satellites, and above all theirof the changes wrought in Soviet policy by Khrushchev, evidently persuaded thelhat the danger of open military altack from the East had substantially declined. Thus they were glad to be able to terminate US military aidspecially since the military connection with the US wu anto their claim of nonalignment and to their desire lo cultivate the neutralist states. They have since reorganized andtheir forcesanner which owes something to their experience of partisanIn World War II. The reorganization is also designed to put their forcesetter position, should they not succeed In staying outajor war between the great powers, lo survive nuclear attack and to counter enemy forces organized for nuclear warfare. They have formedlf-sufficient military area commands and are converting divisions into smaller units of brigade or reinforced regiment size. These are'being trained to live off the land as self-sufficient, dispersed unitspecial effort Is made to develop close and cooperative relations with the population. These activities point to an intention to use the Yugoslav forces, stillhe largest armed force In the Balkans, mainly In well-organized partisan warfarearge scale, should their conventional defenses not suffice.
V. TME OUTIOOK
n view of the relative success ofinternal and external policies lnyears and thc absence of serious Internal opposition, there is little prospect of early change in the main outlines of those policies. The question of whether Belgrade willrejoin the Bloc has, we believe, been settled In lhe negative. Similarly, whileexperimentation will continue in the' economic and polilical system, there Is little likelihood lhat liberalization will proceed so far as to alterundamental way the Com-
S
characteristics of thcsingle-party monopoly of political power and aeconomy.
he death of Tito mayeriousproblem, but we think it Is unlikely to bringajor crisis of the regime or any fundamental alteration of its policies. At the outset, power would probably pass to his two chief lieutenants. Rankovic and Kar-delj, who presently act as leaders of party and state respectively in Tito's absence.truggle at thc top might ensue if personal ambitions were reinforced by nationaland debates within the party overpolicy Issues But neither intraparty rivalries nor popular discontent appear serious enough to lead to extreme solutions. Instead, fears of providing an opening to Sovieton one side, or the presumably more liberal alternative represented by Djilas on the other, would probably have the effect of limiting differences among Tito's successors lest they risk the loss of national Independence or party control.
The armed forces are unlikely to play an important political roleuccession struggle or in resolving other internal Issues. The military leaders are themselves members of thc closely-knit partisan group which leads the party, and are unlikely to take sidesroup in an intraparty struggle.
Yugoslavia during the next several years will probably continue to play an active role among the underdeveloped countries. Tito, on whose great personal prestige this policy has largely rested, will attempt to gain forosition of leadership among the principal neutralists, and to enlarge theof this grouping In world affairs. Yugoslavia's distinctive Marxist ideology is attractive toeaders of emergingwho have been strongly influenced by Marxism and arcormula to guide them through their numerous problems of
developmenl These leaders are inclined to be impressed by lhe economic achievements of Yugoslavia. Mostugoslavia stands as an example ofmall country can play off the two great power blocs against each other, obtaining assistance while freely criticizing and remaining fully independent.
the long run, Yugoslavia'smay well have an IncreasinglyImpact upon the Slno-Sovlet BlocCommunist movement generally.successes, in foreign as well asaffairs, will probably continue topressures within the Europeanto adopt similar policies. Itseffective primarily among partywant to give more emphasis toaspirations and often see Inan alternative to themore doctrinaire policies which theyin their own countries.
after the upheavals6 InEurope, Moscow was able withoutto maintain its power andthe Communist movement.Communist China's serious challengedoctrinal authority,ew clement to thc scene whichmake it Increasingly difficultlo impose its own interpretationsupon the InternationalMoreover, shorlullof Sino-Sovicl differences, which wcunlikely, the question of theshould be adopted toward Belgradetoajor irritant in thcbetween Moscow and Peiping.erious crisisin an Eastern European party,serious differences emerge in themovement generally. II will be lessin the past for the Soviets to containinfluence which Yugoslavmethods represent.
SE/UKT
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: