SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR LONG RANGE ATTACK (ANNEXES A&B) (NIE 11-8-61)

Created: 6/7/1961

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER Supersedes)

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR LONG RANGE ATTACK

Submitted by thc DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organisations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of Ihe Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, lhe Air Perce, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred la oy the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

uneConcurring were The Director of intelligence and Research. Department of State; the Assistant chief of Staff for intelligence. Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operationsepartment of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Atomic EnergyRepresentative to the USIB; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director ol the National Security Agency. The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the nbfeci being

oufside of his turisdictlon.

jb ThU elUnUbj IM1 DiBfMIItuUur action Or OBDJ WH-IUUill COOEUtUtlC WpfloeliaU (CWO KIM.oll WMron II Juna

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

THE*

I, ROLE OP THE LONG RANGE STRIKING

IL WEAPON SYSTEMS FOR LONG RANGE ATf ACK

Ballistic

Nature ol Evidence on

Soviet Programming

Probable Range of Soviet Force

Position on the ICBM Program of the Director ofand Research, Department of

Position on the ICBM Program of the Assistant Chief of StafT for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence),

Department of the

Position on the ICBM Program of the Assistant Chief of

StafT. Intelligence.

and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles

Range

Long Range

Medium Bombers of Other

Air-to-Surface

Long Range Aerodynamic

SUPPORTING

Bombs and

Long Range Reconnaissance

Electronic Warfare and Other Counte

OF SOVIET

Tf.g TVCRET

NNEXES

A OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIETSYSTEMS

Table I: Characteristics of Ground-Launched Ballistic

27

Tableharacteristics of Submarine-Launched Missiles

Tableharacteristics of Alr-lo-Surfscc Missiles

Tableissile Reliability

Tableissile Reaction and Reload

Tableomber Performance

Tableomber Serviceability and Abort

Tableisual and Radar Bombing

B DEPLOYMENT AND TARGET COVERAGE OF SOVIET WEAPON SYSTEMS

Figureissile Capabilities Against the NorthernBallistic Missiles

Figurereas Best Suited to Deployment of Ballistic Missiles

FigureissUe Capabilities Against North

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles Figureeployment of Medium and Heavy Bombers Figureedium Bomber Capabilities Against the Northern Hemisphere

FigureomberNorth

FigureomberNorlh

IT

APPROVED FOR RELEASE CW HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR LONG RANGE ATTACK

THE PROBLEM

To estimate probable trends in the strength and deployment of Soviet air and missile weapon systems suitable for long range attack, and in Soviet capabilities for such attack, projecting forward for about five years where possible.'

ASSUMPTION

For purposes of this estimate, it is assumed that during the period underno US-Sovict agreement on arms control or system of mutual inspection will be in effect.

CONCLUSIONS

Soviet leaders, particularlyhave been deeply Impressed by what they regardajor improvement of their strategic position resulting from theirwith long range missiles. Although they still hold that the Soviet militarymustalance of varied forces, long range weapon systems are nowallotted an Increased share of thc Soviet military effort. Within the long rangeforces, ballistic missiles are clearlyto become the dominant weapons.)

We Iiave reviewed the direct and Indirect evidence pertaining to the development and deployment of the Soviel ICBM system. We are still unable to confirm the location of any

'The weapon systems considered are heavy and medium bombers, related air-to-surface missiles, ground launched missiles with ranges. or more, and submarine-launched missiles.

ICBM launching facilities other than those at the test range. We are able, however, lo support on reasonably good evidence anumber of two to four operational ICBM site-complexes.5'J We also haveevidenceumber of other suspected deployment locations. Moreover, we believe lhat the direct and indirectsupports the view that: (a) the USSR has beenenerally successful

Assistant Chltf of SUA for intelllttnc*.of tht Army, and the Assistant Chiefntelepartment of the Navy, find thtsupporting the existence of such sites ur.uous rather than reasonably good Insofar as ICBM-associated deployment scUvIUe* are concerned.

"The Assistant Chief of Stair. Intelligence. USAF. believes there Is reasonably good evidence to support the existenceIS operaUonal ICBM site-torn pie xea.

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program, at ft deliberate rather lhan an extiemcly urgent pace; (b) lhc USSR Is buildingorce of several hundred operational ICBM launchers, to be acquired within the nexl few years. )

c estimate that the probable Soviet force level Ins In the range0 operational ICBM launchers, together with the necessary operational missile Inventories and trained crews. This would probablythe present existence ofCBM site-complexes. This estimate should be regardedeneralThe major bases for It are our sense of the tempo of the program and ouras to the relationship between what we have detected and what we are likely to have missed. We estimate that the program will continue to be deliberately paced and will result In force levels about asperational launchers Innnome of the launchers activated Ineriod will probably beew and improved ICBM" )

Soviet force goals for the periodill probably be affectedby such developments as USof numerous hardened and mobileand other Improved capabilities, bydevelopment of antimissile defenses, and also by Intervening political developments. We are unable to predict what the Sovietwill be as to the responses appropriate to these developments. Indeed, it Is likely that thc Soviet leaders themselves have not yet comeefinite decision as to force goals S)

Medium range ballistic0re presently deployed In mobile units locatedew bases, convenient to areas of likely operations In Eurasia and Its periphery, from which they would probably move to dispersed launch points in the event oforce ofrange mTssiles ready for launching,with additional missile reloads, will probably be available in the very near. missile employing fixed launch sites will probably be deployed initially within the next year. Force levels will probably be

Direclor of Intelligence and neseareh.oi Slate, does not concur In this rill mate. He believes (al lhalhould Include an estimate ol (h< largcit ICBM force which lhe USSR could ha ire In1 and thatorce could be as largeperational launchers, and (b) that the pfobaMe Soviet force level Ins In the ranee oloperational launchers and will Increasenndnull statement of his poslUon. see.

'The Asslitant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Navalepartment of the Mary, estimate no moreew operational launchers deployed Inhey believe that for succeeding years It Is prudent and reasonable to rigeei that lhe numbers of such ICUMt maygenerally at Ihe rale shown above. However. Uie actual rate of increase will be subjKl to many fluctuations and vtit be determined by manyparticularly the point In time whenew and less cumbersome ICHM lhat can be more easily deployed. Their projection of probable Soviet ICBM force levels through mid-IBM Is as follows::.ull statement ol their position, sec.

; 'The Assistant Chief of staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur In this estimate. In his Judgment the Soviet leaders recognise that the ultimateols the chief power blocking their aimommunist world.learIn military capablllUcs. He believes that this consideration la the major determining factor in the continuing development of Soviet military force goals. This factor snd the available evidence, considered In light ol the extreme Soviet security and the great lack of intelligence coverage Of large suspect deployment areas In the USSR, leads him to believe that there ate at. and cjulle possibly an even greater number of cperatlonal ICBM launchers In mtd-iMI. Considering extensive Soviet experience and capabilities In the missile fleld snd the fact that our evidence pointsrogram of widespread Introduction of simplified launchhe esUmntes aboul U0 operaUonal ICBM launchersM> andne agrees lhat thr Sovieis willew and Improved ICBM. Following theof Ihis new missile he ctllmalei that the Soviet force levels would beperational ICBM launchers Inndull statement of his position, see.

'Sec thc footnote ol Iht Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, to Conclusion I.

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over the next live years. missile strength as medium range missile strength Is phasedParas.

The USSK now hasubmarines which are probably capable of launching short range, though not3 the Soviets could probably Introduce nuclear-powered submarinesubmerged launch system employingrange ballistic. In thc meantime, It is possible that nuclcar-powercd submarines with short range,launched missiles could be operational this year. For attack on tlic US, submarine-launched missiles willoleto that of ICBMs. (Paras.)

Long Range Aviation now comprisesedium bombers and tankers andeavy bombers andaking intoomplex ol operational factors, but excluding combat attrition, we estimate that at present the Soviets could putombers over North America on two-way missions in an Initialediumof Long Range Avialion. together with several hundred such bombers In other Soviet air components, are suited primarily foragainst Eurasian and peripheralew medium bomber with supersonic "dash" capabilities is now entering service. Alr-lo-surface missiles are available for medium and heavy bombers. The large Soviet manned

Assistant Chief of Stan* for Intel life net.of the Army, does not believe thst this force goal will be attained In the near future, and believes thatesult of the expected absorption of Initial salvo missions by. missile In the future. Soviet planners may decide on lower force goals ratherhase down of. missile Inventories. Tor his estimate of current and future force levels for medium and Intermediate range missiles, see

"The Assistant Chief of Stall, Intelligence. USAF. estimates lhat as of mld-IMl. Soviet Lang Range Avia'.lcneavy bombers and laniers.

-Th. Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF. believes that the Soviets could putombers over North America on two-way missions In an Initial attack.uller statement of nil views on thli matter, see his footnote, to paragraphs

bomber forces will probably decline giaduaily in numerical strength, but five yean hence the Soviets will probably still supplement their missile forces with medium and heavyfor both weapon delivery and )

Soviet long range bombers and missilesto attacking major military targets and centers of national power fn US and Allied territory would employ high-yield nuclear bombs andide range ofequipment for electronic warfare Is also available. Reconnaissance capabilities will probably be strengthened In the coming years by the use of reconnaissance satellites and aircraft fitted for post-strikeandong range, supersonic aerodynamic vehicle could be availableear or two. and might be employed for weapon delivery or reconnaissance. (Faros.

The Soviet long range striking forces thusix of bombers, missiles, andbut their development In the next five years will be paced largely by the growth of ICBM and other missile forces. We believe that with the estimated current force0 operational IQBM launchers, the USSR would already be capable of bringing major US cities under attackingle ICBM salvo. Alternatively, the Soviets may now be able to bring all SAC operational air bases under attack by missiles alone; they almost certainly will be able to do so within thc next year,. they will probably be able to bring under ICBM attack those US retaliatory and defensive targets for which their ICBM system is suited. However, ihey would remain unable to target effective ICBM strikes against the increasing numbers of US hardened, mobile, and fast-reactionParas. Ill-US)

-The Assistant Chief of Staff for tnUlligenee. Deportment of the Army,hatiall Soviet capability to attack thc US with ICBMs Is al present extremely limited. His estimate of tht number of ICBMs now operationally deployed, when considered In Dght of theercent reliability, makes the number of missiles with whkh

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CAndnutS irom piitcSlnl

the SovieU arc believed capable of teaching the US inll very small. Manifestly, therefore,attacks on SAC bases would not at presentajor threat to our nuclear delivery capability. Wlille he believes lhat the Soviet capability toone or more US urban Industrial areaserious deterrent, he believes Soviet capability in this regard atould remain limiteditiesaximum.

"The Assistant Chief of Naval OperationsDepartment of (he Navy, does not believe that theurrently capable of bringing as many asajor US cities under attackingle ICBM salvo or of attacking all SAC operational alx bascs with missiles alone. Since he estimatesew deployed Soviel ICBMs fort Is his assessment lhat the Soviet overall capability to attack the US with ICBMs ts at present extremely limited.

DISCUSSION

OF THE LONG RANGE

he USSR's success Inong range striking capability has wrought achange in thc Soviet leaders' thinking about the strategic position of their country. Even after World Wax II had left them the strongest conventional military power Ina psychology of encirclementtrong and hostile opponentominant element In their assessments. This sense of Inferiority arose from thc fact that the Soviet Union's bomber forces and air defense neither matched nor offset the strategic nuclearpower of the US.

the advent of their long rangemissiles, however, the Sovietthemselves as overcoming this vitaland reaching high groundlo them. For thc first timehistory, they are able to bring toNorth America the threat of ImmenseKhrushchev now speaks ofstrategic equality with the West,of its superiority. At the samehas taken pains to deny thatdraw from this the conclusion thatnuclear war hasationalachTeving their aims. Instead, hecombated those In theprimarily the Chinese, who haveto reach this conclusion or at leastassuming great risks ofIn private discussion as well asthe Soviet leaders havethey regardar as disastrous to

their cause, and moreover, as follyime when political and economic forces are movingorld triumph for communism.

It is only ln^thetr heightened awareness of the calamitous consequences of nuclear war that the attainment of their new long range capability has sobered the Soviets; in all other respects it has exhilarated them. They see their own security, and that of the entire Bloc, as enormously enhanced. They see new opportunities to project Soviet power into areas long denied to them, and to Inhibit the West from reacting forcefullyariety of peripheral confrontations. They see many other political uses to which their newcan be put, not thc least of which are the attraction to their side of newer nations and the underminliig of confidence In USamong America's allies.

Thc political potency of Its long range striking forces ls thus one of the factorsthe USSR's decisions on tho size and structure of these forces. The Soviet leaders are highly alert to the opportunities forand Intimidation opened up to them by their development of an ICBM capability. They began to exploit these opportunities even before any operational capability was achieved and succeeded In Impressing many In the world on the basis of an anticipated strength.

As long as thc Soviets seek to avoid serious risks of general nuclear war,there are limits on the degree of Intimidation they can achieve. Inlearly demonstrated prepondex-

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ancc of offensive and defensive power, they probably regard their ability to Intimidate as dependent more on political andconsiderations thanreciseby either side, of the degree ofwhich could be Inflicted or absorbed. Consequently,redible threat of ability to destroy millions of people has beenin this the Soviets havearge extent alreadyIsfor the Soviets to establish ICBM force levels on the basis of their political utility without also relating them to potentialuse.

The Soviet leaders evidently regard both sides as unable deliberately to initiatenuclear war without at the same time gravely menacing their own societies. They have probably longremeditated US surprise attack as unlikely. Since their defensive and retaliatory capability has grown, they almost certainly now believe that this possibility has become very slight. They may be concerned over the possibility of the US eventually unleashing an attack In desperation over the Imminent collapse of the capitalist system, but such an eventuality must appear to them to be remote.

We believe that the Soviet leaders willthroughout thc period of this estimate to seek to avoid general nuclear war, and that they are not planning to build up their long range striking forceseak for theof general war at any specific time. At the same time, they recognize that theirtactics in foreign policy Involve risks, and they must consider the possibility of war arising from miscalculation,ocal crisis In which each side became progressivelyor from sheer accident. The Soviets consider that while the probability of general war is low, the likeliest way in which It might occur would beime of crisis when both sides wereeightened state of alert.

Recognizing these possibilities, the Soviet leaders will wish to provide the.ir long range striking forces with capabilities not only for

purposes of deterrence and Intimidation but also for actuallyar which might beginariety of circumstances. For these conllnEcncIes they would wish toong range force which could cither: (a) seize the initiative if war appearedln order to blunt an anticipatedUS attack; or (b) survive an initial attack and go on to retaliate with great strength. These considerations, together with their desire to pursue an assertivestrategy, almost certainly cause thetoong range striking capability greater than the minimum necessary to threaten the massive destruction of

At the sameariety oftend to limit tlie efiort devoted toa tong range force. Other military forces with essehtial missions compete forand funds, and so do numerous non-military programs. Moreover, the pace of technological change pertaining to weapons ls great, and, any decision to putarticular weapon, or mix of weapons, could rapidly be overtaken byFor example, the advantages possessed by the ICBM for surprise combined with heavy weight of attack offer thc Soviets an opportunity to Improve their Initial strike capability, but the Increase ln US alert,and hardened forces ls already beginning to offset this potential advantage.

In sum. we believe that the Soviet leaders will continue to accord the long range forces an extremely Important place In Sovietand military strategy. For the reasons outlined above, they wish totrong and modern striking force. At the same lime, we believe they recognize that there are limits to the role whichorce can play In furthering their primarily political objectives.

t These considerations are probably broadly controlling In shaping the role, size, andof the long range force,14

ee tbe footnote ol the AuiiUnt Chief of Staff, Intelligence. USAP, to ConcJuiton S.

EAPON SYSTEMS FOR lONG RANGE ATTACK

Tlie USSR continues to maintain aestablishhichalance of varied fotccs designed toumber of possible military contingencies, ranging from limited and local actions to generalwar. Soviet military doctrine,continues to envisageeneral nuclear war would extend beyond thc first nuclear exchange. Long range striking forces are becoming Increasingly Important within the total Soviet force structure and It ls clear that the Soviet leaders regard their rolo and the role of air defenses as crucial to the outcome ofar. Nevertheless, tho Soviets hold that the operations of other components are still essential to theof final victory.

In accordance with this Soviet view of the proper military balance, the mission of long range attack against Eurasia and North America has come to claim an Increasedof Soviet military expendituresew years ago, the share ofdevoted to the long range attack forces was about one-tenth of the totalthat can be attributed to broad military missions. It now appears to have risen to abouthare approaching thai devoted to air defense. Expenditures on olher forces, particularly those on theater forces, are estimated to be declining.

Within thc long range striking forces, ballistic missiles are clearly Intended tothe dominant weapon. Historically, the Soviets have devoted more resources to weapons primarily suited for attack against the Eurasian land mass and haveore limited Investment ln heavy bombers. However, their appreciation of theof trie ICBM and of the USSR'sposition Is leading them to give greater emphasis to long range missilesfor intercontinental attack. In add!-'* tion, the Soviets appear toias In favor of missiles which may be owing to their successes in developingo theirreliance on artillery, and possibly to

a personal penchant for them on thc part ol Khrushchev.

A. InlcKonlinenlal Ballistic Missiles

e have relatively firm evidence on the Soviet ICBM test range at Tyuratam and lhe test firing program. In the three and one-half year period since the first successful flight test Inhe Soviets have launched about 35 generally successful ICBMs on the test range. On the basis of the data collected from this activity we have been able to establish the bask characteristics of the ICBM system and to estimate, withless confidence, Its probableunder operational conditions. by relating the observable patterns In test firing lo other Soviet missile programs and to the space program which has shared ICBM boos ten, facilities, and experience, we have made'tlie judgment that the USSR has been conducting,eliberate pace, aand generally successful ICBMprogram.

he Soviet ICBM and space boosterery large vehicle which burns nonstorable liquid fuel Its gross takeoff weight Isounds and its total thrust at takeoff Isounds. Guidance for the missile Is radio-inert fcil. and wc estimate that under operational conditions Int wouldEP of aboutlthough the actual CEP could begreater or somewhat less.Its current operational reliability, wethatercent of the total number of ICBMs on launchers would get offinutes of scheduled times and arrive In the vicinity of assigned targets. would vary within this approximate range, depending upon how much time the Soviets had to peak their force prior to an

For estimated performance characteristics of the Soviet ICBM and other ballistic missiles, see Annex A. Tables I, i, andor further details and aof lhc evidence and analysis supporting our tsUrnale* on performance ehaiacterfsUes, see NIKSoviet Technical CapablllUei In Oulded Missile, and Spaceatedpril IM! (TOP BBCWJT).

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maximum range of ICBMs tested prior0 Is estimated to be. By aboutowever, the Soviets had. missile. This unprovemcnt In range Is attributableeduction In nosccone weight made possible by advances in Soviet nuclear and missileThc basic configuration, propulsion, guidance, and other characteristics areIn Order to achieve extensive coverage of USm. ICBMs would have to be deployed at launch sites In northwestern USSR or the Soviet Far East. missile can achieve full coverage of tho US from deployment areas virtually anywhere in thc USSR."

The present Soviet ICBM system Isbulky and must be fairly cumbersome to handle. It is heavily dependent on therail network, and launch sites wouldbe served by rail spurs, lt does not lend Itself to deployment In hardened sites. Tlie most suitable deployment site wouldarge. Axed facility with considerable ground support equipment. Although the system will probably continue to be modified and Improved over the next few years. It has the Inherent disadvantagesary large noostorable liquid-fueled system, Including the problems Involved in achieving fast reaction and long hold limes.

It is probable, therefore, that the Soviets aroew ICBM system, using either storable liquid or solid fuels andIncreased flexibility and decreasedtn deployment. We believe thatystem could become operational In3 or after.

Nature of Evidence on Deployment

he evidence at hand Is not sufficient to establish with certainty even the present strength of the Soviet ICBM force. Withtb the fulure, we not onlyirm current base from which to project but the problem Is further complicated by the rapidity of technological change. As the periodthe choices open to the Sovietwill Increase and present programs will

' See Annex B, Figure L

become Increasingly subject to modification or drastic change. In the followingwe summarize tbe factors contributing to an estimate of the scale and pace of Soviet ICDM deployment.

range data continue to provideInformation relating to the entireThe principal activities at Tyurathe past year have been an expansion inof launching facilities, from one to

-at least four, and the Initiation in1 of the most intensive series of ICBM testto date. The new launching facilitiesimplified pair of pads whichrepresent tlie approximate conflgu ration of an operaUonal launclung facility. The recent test firings. In which reliability has dropped sharply^

itho Introduction

of redesigned system components, training firings by" inexperienced personnel, or both. Some of them are possibly the Initial firingsew, liquid-fueled ICBM.

test range activity Itself can beas supporting either thelit the Intelligence community, thatachieved an Initial operational(IOC) withCBMOfromplete weapon syslem wasnot deployed during the yearthe majority view, it can bemean either that the USSR has engagedsteady buildup of extensive operationalsince IOC date, or thatbeen unevenly phased or otherwisethese uncertainties, the test rangeIndicates that at least until recentlywas experiencing no particularin ICBM development

"See, -Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Spaceated IS April,nd the footnotesThe Assistant Chief Ol Slaff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence).of the Navy, do not believe that the Soviet ICBM had achieved an IOCfii views on this question as It pertains lo the deployment program, aceS0.

-TOP SE-GWE^P-

available on productionIs Inconclusive. It Is sufficientIndicate that:esearch Instituteplant near Moscowproduced ICBM prototypes; (b) thcKuybyshcv Is the most likely site forof production ICBMs.ingle, large plant couldoutut the actual number ofproduced could be larger or smaller,upon the peak rate achieved atplant and the possible Involvementthan one facility. In any event, bythe Soviets had had adequatebuild up to planned production rates;manufacture of missUes has ceased topace-setting factor In the deployment

respect to operationalwe have concluded from the evidencethat operational launchers arcpaired, with the launchers in eachfuel storage, guidance, andfacilities. It ls probable thatone pair of launchers are groupedaunching complex whichbase providing central support,communications and commandIndividual pairs of launchersseparated by several miles, and ansite-complex may thus cover manyTaking Into account our limitedon the organizational structureSoviet missile units and theICBM operations, we believe that alaunchers between four andsa typical alle-complex, but that fourIs the more probable number.

have again reviewed all evidenceto deployment sites, and we areidentify positively any ICBMfacilities olher lhan those at the testIntensive collection efforts bymeans, US intelligence hascoverage of the regions best suiteddeployment of Sovietut there

" Sea Annex B, Figure 1.

are large regions where launching sites could have been established without detection. The Inadequacy of confirming evidence regarding deployment is attributable either lo (a) the limitations of our coverage, combined with the success of Soviet security measures, or (b) the fact that deployment has beenelatively small scale to date- At present, we cannot be sure which Is the case.

uch of our evidence relates to suspected areas In the regions best suited to deploymentm. missiles, where constructionwas underway. Of these' areas, there Is considerably more Information on Plesetsk and Polyarnyy Ural InUSSR than on any others, and we estimate that sites were operational in these areas as of Considering our total collection capabilities and the time lags U> be expected, wc believeinimum of two to four ICBM site-complexes Ate nowIn regions best suited to deployment.ther suspected areas are in regions best suited to the deployment. missiles and our evidence on them Is more recent. We can find no consistent pattern in this latter evidence, but It Lstoo soon for one to appear.

rom the foregoing examination of tbeevidence it Is possible to derive anumber of operational ICBM complexes which can be supported on reasonably good evidence. In addition, the results of our search for operational deployment sites, taken together with the other elements of directcontributeense of the current tempo of the Soviet program. The relatively small number of suspected locations iswith the deliberate pace of activities

-Tbe Assistant Chief ot Staff for Intelligence.of thc Army, and lhe Assistant Chief of Naval OperaUonsepartment of the Navy, believe that tha existence of operaUonal ICBM site-cocopiexes at Flesclsk and Polyamyy Oralanuary IHO wu unlikely. They further believe that the existenceinimum of two to four ICBM site-complexes now operaUonal In regions beat sidled to deploymentOO nm missiles ll also onHkely. Fen their view regarding current ICDM deployment seeSI,

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the USSRiraler capacity lo produce and deploy ICBMs than we believe It has exercised. In sum, while the direct evidence remains Insufficient towith certainty the present Soviet ICBM strength, It leads us to believe that the pro-grain thus far has proceededeliberate rather than an extremely urgent pace.

Soviet Programming Deciiioni

n determining tlie scale and pace of ICBM deployment, the Soviet leaders must take Into account such factors as: (a) the force structure they need to support their total strategy; (b) considerations of efficiency In the scheduling and expenditure of resources on this and other programs; and (c) likely trends In their own and Western offensive and defensive weapon systems. Given the rapidity of technological change and thc heavy emphasis on research and development In both the missile and tuitlinissUe fields In the USSR, it is likely that ICBM programming for thc period4 is hlgldy

n planning their ICBM deploymentlhe Soviets would have considered what combinations of ICBMs and other offensive and defensive forces would be adequate for deterrence and for support of their policy in any possible international crisis, as well as for military use In the various circumstances In which general war might arise. Thesehave almost certainly not enabled thero lo determine with confidence what force levels would be appropriate to these purposes In all circumstances, but we believe they have explored thc question of numericalfor ICBM forces, and in so doing they have probably considered the suitability of ICBMs for performing various military tasks. The Soviets probablyigh salvofor their ICBM force. In order loapabilily either to launch an initial attack or to retaliateestern attack. Thus

- The Assislant Chief of Stair. Inleingerxe. USAT. floes not concur In the Judgment that there iselatively small- number ol suspected areas of ICBM deployment.ull statement of his poal-Mon, seai.

lhe number of operational launchers they possess wouldrIUcal factor.

n making our own studies of theoretical Soviet numerical requirements, we havethe groat uncertainties attending them because of their sensitivity to varyingabout the performance of the weapon system, thc targets to bo attacked, and the way ba which war might begin. In veryterms, however, these studies indicate that Soviet ICBMs ore suitable primarily for attacking cities and relatively unprotected, Qxcd military targets such as air and naval bases, soft and semlhardened ICBM sites, and soft and semihardened centers of command, control, and communications associated with US striking and defensive capabilities. With less certainty, they show that with ICBM launchers numbering In the low hundreds the USSR wouldapability, not only to devastate major US cities, but also to Inflict severe damage on SAC air bases and those other military targets for which the Soviet ICHM Is primarily suited. Khrushchevhas spokenew hundred ICBMsormidable capability.

These studies also Indicate, however, that several thousand ICBM launchers would be required to provide the Soviets wtthassurance of being able to Inflict severe damage on the total number of hard ICBM sites planned by the US for theespite tbe uncertainties In such studies, theyudgment that Soviet ICBMs are not well suited forfire against large numbers of hard ICBM sites. They arc, of course, not suitable for attacking mobile forces or targets of"location.

In order toapability to retaliateestern attack, the Sovietsdesire an ICBM force which has high survivability. For the present system, this can best be achieved by dispersing andoperaUonal launchers. Even with their very tight security practices, however, the Soviets probably view the protectionby dispersal and concealment asto deterioration with time, especially In view of the reconnaissance satellite cap*

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tliey would expect the US to achieve in the next few years.

period beginning In aboutwill probably being majorThc new Soviet ICBM systemhe more flexible and lessthe present system, and easierowever, the US willImproved reaction times,alert capabilities, as well as largehard sites and mobile systems. Thewould probably decide that. In theseIt would be desirable tomeasures such as hardening forof their own ICBM forces, anddevelop more advanced offensivethc USSR Ls pushing harddefenses, which we haveprobably be deployed to at least. In Soviet eyes, theof antimissile defenses woulda major victory over the US,Justifying the diversion ofwould otherwise be allocated tosystems.

Probable Ronge of Soviet forco level*"

the direct and Indirect evidencewe Judge that at present, thebuildingorce of severalICBM launchers, to be acquiredas practicable within the next fewcommitment of resources is probablybut thus far the programming hasbeen deliberate In tempo. Thefactor Is probably theof construction and activation ofof launching sites dispersed overgeographic area. The productionand training of troops could beto fit Into whatever site activationwas deemed practicable.

"The Director of Intelligence and Research,of Slate, the Aialitant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department of the Army, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operatlona {Intelligence).of the Navy, Bnd the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. USAK, do not concur Inrang* of current and future ICBM force levels estimated herein. For theirea their statement* beginning- respectively at paragraphs

order to achieveoal, aand well-coord mated program ofwould be requirederiodyears. In determining thewhich the USSR could achieveear or two, we have takenthe grouping of several pairsInto complexes, the tasks andInvolved In the preparation of theseand the time required loactivate them. We believe lhatrales ofer yearconsistent with the sense of theof deployment activity which wefrom the direct and IndirectBecause It is Impossible tothc threshold of activity which ourcollection resources wouldcannotresenter year."

il would requireaunching complexes to be brought toreadiness, our Judgmentactivation rates bears mostICBM deployment at present andnext year or two. Such activationnot likely to remain constant; theyto vary considerably within thisrange from, year to year, dependingconfiguration of thc ICBM sites andtheir deployment. Although we believehave substantially passed throughlearning period, as they gainit may be easier for them totho rates. However, othersuchew ICBM, developmentsantimissile program, andof the resources involved willdecisions as to the rate of ICBM Taking these factors inlo account, we

"The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operationsepartment of the Navy, do not concurauncher aellvaUon iste of SOear can be supported "by the sense ol the current tempo of deploymentand therefore Utey believeresent rate somewhat higherar year can be excluded. They would. In the light of evidence, be able to say onlyauncher activation rate ofer year Is within Sovkt gross capablUUca.

-TO

ll reasonable to project an average launcher activation rate of approximatelyer year during the period.

>*orce levels ine estimate lhat the probable Soviet force level ins in the range0 operational ICDM launchers, together with the necessary operational missile Inventories and trained crews, nils would probably Involve thcexistence ofoperational ICBM site-complexes. This estimate shouldeneral approximation. Thebases for It are our sense of the tempo of the program and our Judgment as to thebetween what we have detected and what we arc likely to have missed,orce level could have been acquired through either the smooth or phased deploymentwhich can be derived fromof the test range data.

Force levels. Whileto date has probably been deliberate In scale and pace, we believe that thc USSR Is nowubstantial ICBM capability. Soviet planning for the next few yearsanticipates the advent In3 or afterew ICBM system, ond deployment of the present system will probably taper off and then ceaseuildup with the new system begins. This transition might affect thc overall rate at which deployment occurs; for example, the Soviets might decrease the rate for the present system before tbe new one comes In, and then accelerate It thereafter when the new system becomes ready forOver the next few years, however, we believe that the launcher activation rate will probably average0 per year, which would result in force levels about asperational launchers innn

. Thcfor this period will probably beaffected by such developmentsacquisition of numerous hardened and

mobile missiles and other Improvedand by Soviet development of antimissile

defenses. Soviet ICBM force goals

ould be enlarged considerably over4 level In view of these anticipatedOn the other hand, thesechanges In the attack-defensemay appear to the Soviet leaders tono Increase In force goals or, more likely,oderate Increase. We arc unable to predict what the Soviet Judgment will bethe interplay of these military factors, and thereood chance that the Soviet leaders themselves have not yet comeefinite decision.

Poiilion on the ICBM Program ol Ihe Director ol Intelligence and Reiearch, De-podment of State)

he Director of Intelligence and Research. Department of State, does not concur in this estimate. He believes (a) thathould Include an estimate of the largest ICBM force which the USSR could have Innd thatorce could be as largepeiational launchers, and (b) that theSoviet force level ins in the range5 operational launchers and will increasenndn

ossible force levels. In his opinion, an NIB on Soviet long range attack capabilities should provide policymakers with an estimate of the largest ICBM force which the USSR could have deployed to date, base on an IOC0 andigorousprogram. He regards such anof the possibleorce level as Just as Important as the estimate of thecurrent force level. Indeed, by making no explicit Judgment aboul the possibleforce level, the Estimate renders ato the policymaker by encouraging him to consider only force levels within the probable range and, at the same time,himhat "the USSRreater capacity to produce and deploy ICBMs than we believe It has exercised." Thcwould not know, on the basis of the NIE, whether he can exclude all force levels foreyond those slightly above therange or whether he cannotorce level substantially higher than therange: Yet It ls precisely this possible

ICDM strength which he needs to lake Into account in making decisions Dealingon US national security.

he Direclor of Intelligence and Research realizes that an estimate of possible Soviet strength in any weapon system Is lesswhen there Is sufficient evidence to narrow the range of our quantitative However, In the case of tho ICBM, the available evidence Is not sufficient to establish current Soviet strength within reasonably narrow limits. The NIBand annexes acknowledge that therelating to ICBM deployment can be IntcrpvcLccariety of ways, that there are many uncertainties In the analyses of such factors as Soviet force goals and pro-grammUig decisions, and that vast areas of the USSR are not covered or only poorly covered by US collection efforts. Under such circumstances, it is essential to estimate the highest force level that can be reconciled with the evidence and thereby Indicate thc range of possibilities which cannot be excluded.

he view ol the Director of InteUigence and Research is that the USSR could have as manyperational launchers ine emphasises that on ICBM force of this size Is definitely less likely than one half as large, but he believes that the chances are sufficiently good to include this estimate of possible current strength In an pTTE on Soviel long range attack capabilities. By thc same token, he would excludeorce levels'perational launchers. He bases his estimate on the following

available evidence on thedevelopment program can beto allowteady buildup ofsites concurrent with ICBMWhile thc Inferred tempo ofprogram suggests that theof theCBM force islessperational launchers,notossible force level oflaunchers.

production Isimitingactivation rates Inyear are within Soviet technical and eco-

nomic capabilities. In order tolaunchers byt Is not necessary to begin construction of operational sites for. missile before7 or construction of sites with morelaunch pads before construction limes need not be shorteronths and site activation rates In excessaunchers per year do not have to be achieved In less than the tunefor the initial buildup period. Ineployment program resultinglaunchers Inan be carried out within the limits set by the factors judged to be most critical.

of the limitations of ourcoverage, together with the highSoviet security, substantial ICBMcould have occurred without beingby US collection efforts. In anychances of detecting Sovietdepend on the number of sitesor completed. There Lsuncertainty in the number ofsite to allowonsiderableaggregate ICBM strength without aincrease In the number of sites.

the other hand. It Is verythat construction of the first operational sites

began before Initiation of test firing or that high rates of site activation were achieved early In lhe deploymentate of site construction In excess of thai required toorce level ofaunchers Inrobably would have created severe organizational problems and possibly would have strained Soviet resources.an ICBM force oflaunchers ts believed to be thepracticable level which the USSR could have achieved by

uring the next year or so the USSR could increase Its ICBM force much more rapidly than In the past, since more simplified launch pads would be constructed at new sites. With several years experience behind them, the Soviets could achieve an activation rale ofaunchers per year by2 and an operational force ofCBMs might be deployed by

it-Bf-

deployment could be accelerated If Soviet planners decideigh ICBM force goal.

probable force letrele. The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that the probable slie of the current Soviet ICBM force Is Ln5 range and that this force Is likely toperational launchers Irlnhe higher figures for current strength reflects his Judgment that the pace of the Soviet ICBM program Ls In fact more rapid than the NIK Implies; the higher figures for future strength are based on his Judgmentite activation rateaunchers per year should be used In projecting the upper limit of the probable program. Underlying both Judgments Ls his estimate lhat Soviet leaders seek loorce of several hundred operational ICBM launchers before the USarge number of hardened sites and mobile long range missiles. The Soviet deployment program, consequently, Is likely to be pursuedairly rapid pace in the next year or two.

It Is recoenlxed that the additional ICBMs estimated forould not materially Increase current Soviet long range attack capabilities.orce ofCBMs aroundould enable the USSR to bring all SAC operational Air bases and soft ICBM sites under attack by missiles alone or, alternatively, to have moderateof Inflicting severe damage tocenters, air defense bases, and missile-launchIng submarine bases, as well as SAC operational Installations. Thiswould be achieved approximately one year sooner than Is possible with theICBM force as estimated In the NIK text. Tn particular, it would be achieved before the number of bard ICBM sites planned by the US begins to Increase sharply.

hether deployment thereafterapid rate or level off depends on such factors as Soviet success Inew ICBM system and antimissile defenses, their assessment of US retaliatory capabilities in lheeriod, and the extent to which Soviet leaders become* convinced lhat

very high ICBM force goals are necessary or desirable. If Soviet leaders deckle to bulk! toward an effective ICBM capability against large numbers of US missiles In hardened sites or toubstantial ICBM retaliatory capability by the middle of the decade, then the Soviet deployment program would beHowever, there Is at least an equal chance that ICBM deployment will taper off sometime3 since Soviet planners might conslder it more advantageous to accelerate their antimissile defense program. In that case, an ICBM forceperational launchers would be maintained Lneriod.

Position on fherogram of Iht Aiiirfont ChW of Sfoff for Inlelligtnee, Department ol lhe Army, and lhe Auitlonl Chief of Novo' Operationseportment of Ine Novy

lie Assislant Chief of Staff forDepartment of the Army, and theChief of Naval OperationsDepartment of the Navy, have entered several specific footnotes In the body of this estimate expressing their differing opinion. The basis for these footnotes, and the only fundamental difference with Judgments In the estimate, is their estimate of current force levels of Soviet operational ICBMasic difference affecting current force levels Is their Judgment concerning the dale when the Soviets Qrst achieved an operationalwith deployed ICBMs. They do not believe lhat this occurred ln Januarylie following factors, well supported byweigh heavily In their Judgment against the Soviets having attained or eveneployed operational capability by lhat time with their existing ICBM:

a. Thc size of the existing Sovietounds and about twice the size ofhe difficulties involved In the use of nonstorable liquid fuel, andail network are factors which combine to make launcher construction aundertaking which they believe would have been detected by US Intelligence if anyprogram had been undertaken.

b. Despite large and representativeof evidence, our Intensive search has failed to Identify even probable operational ICDM site-complexes.

3

has been characteristic of otherprograms that prototype orsites were constructed at thc testor, at the latest, concurrently withof an operational facility.of construction of such afor the ICBM did not appear at0 and It was probably notuntil0 or

test firings of ICBMs, Inhas dropped sharply^

"^suggest

the Introduction of redesigned systemtraining firings by Inexperiencedor both.

he Assistant Chief of StafT forDepartment of the Army, and theChief of Naval OperationsDepartment of thc Navy, believe that the appearance of the probableaunching site, thc Increased pace of Brings, and the recent changes In telemetry support the view that thc SovieU may now be about to deploy some ICBMs of the existingtype and clearly strengthen theirthat the Soviets did noteployed ICBM capability This judgment. In turn. Influences their view of the possibility of ICBM deployment In the inhospitable northwest portion of the USSR.nfwmatlon Is not yet Arm enough to rule out the possibility of ICBM deployment at Plesetsk and Polyamyy Ural, as well as at two other locations, they believe It unlikelythat sites for ICBMs of the type described above were constructed In those areas In the time, which would havesite design and decision to deploy prior to the first Soviet firing of an ICBM.

bc Assistant Chief of Slaff forDepartment of the Army, and theChief of Naval OperationsDepartment of the Navy, believe that the evidence available on the Soviet ICBM development program Is sufficiently complete and valid to support the conclusion that little. If any, ICBM deployment has occurred, and lhat Uie near absence of evidence ofstrengthens that conclusion.

n the basis of all the evidence and the reasoning outlined above, the Assistant Chief of Stuff for Intelligence, Department of tho Army, and tlie Assistant Chief ofepartment of the Navy, estimateew" operational Soviet ICBM launchers for Although they do not consider the evidence sufficient torecise cstlmate'of the Soviet planning for future ICBM strength, they accept theIn thc textenerally valid measure of the scale and paceulld-up. Therefore, on the basis ofrudent andprojection of Soviet deployed ICBM launcher strength they estimate as follows:

0

0

Position on ffte fCBM Program of lhc Asiisfonf

Chief of Stoff, Intalligcnco,he Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAP. does not concur with tho judgments reached herein on the nature of the current and future Soviet force goals or the strategic considerations which determine theirIn his view the estimate of current force levels does not accurately represent the scope of deployment indicated by the nature and quality of the evidence thus far accumulated, but reflects Instead the Impact of thc extreme security measures which have obscured the broad scope of the Soviet ICBM program from Its Inception. In addition, he believes that proper allowance has not been made In the estimate for the lack of Intelligence coverage of the many areas In the USSR In which ICBM deployment may have been carried out.

ECRBT

Assistant Chief olntelligence, USAF, believes that Soviet determination to achieve world domination has fosteredof thc fact that the ultimateof thc US, as the chief obstacle to the achievement of their objective, cannoi be accomplishedlear preponderance of military capability. Moreover, Sovietand deeds suggest to him that thehierarchy are mindful of the fact lhat few, if any, lasting major political victories In history have been achieved without the supporting bulwark of superior military power.

Thc history of their ballistic missiletestifies to an early recognition by the Soviets of the unprecedented potential offered by such weapons and reflects theirto exploit that potential by makingmissiles the dominant system in their strategic strike force. Their highly successful ICBM testing record reflects the qualitative achievement of their well-planned,program which would facilitate thcof predetermined force goals of any reasonable magnitude. Soviet efforts to mask their program in secrecy indicate thewhich they attach to their growingcapability. Moreover, evidence developed in spite of their security measures revealsfor troop training, production and deployment concurrent with the testing phase of their piogram. This concurrency ls aIndication of Soviet determination to maximize their operational capability at the earliest practicable time. In this connection, the evidence on deployment is consistent with the estimate that the Soviets achieved their initial operational capabilitynd in the Intervening periodearalf, torought to operational readiness alnd possibly an even greater" number of operational ICBM

Considering the emphasis which the Soviets place on secrecy, and the absence of other than partial Intelligence coverage on most of the areas most suitable for ICBMwe could not expect to Identify more

mall portion of lhe Soviet ICBMprogiam. Nevertheless theChief of Slaff, Intelligence. USAF, has Identified at least six areas on which there Is reasonably good evidence of ICBM Within these areas he believes there are between nd perational ICBM site-complexes. Further, he has aboutdditional areas under active consideration on which evidence Indicates the possibility of ICBM launch site construction. Considering thc economics of logistic support andmaintenance and control problems, the siting of several site complexes In aarea ls highly probable and should be expected. Therefore,actual orby thedditionaleflects thc existencerogram..of considerable magnitude. Even though identification of some of the suspect areas should later prove erroneous,others will be identified lo replace tbem as the delay In Intelligence reporting catches up with the actual situation.

view of the above, the Assistant ChiefInteUigence. USAF, estimates theICBM launcher availability as follows:

at least

BS0

B. Medium ond Inlefmedioto Kongo Ballistic Missiles "

Sovieis have ballistic missiles. ranges, capable ofpound nuclear payloads with.. respectively.are operationally deployed. Overyear or so we have acquired muchon thc method of deployment anddeployment areas.

"Tlie USSR's medium range ballistichose with maximum rangesntermediate range ballistic missiles are thoseaximum range ofjn.

. missile (SHYSTER) and. missile (SANDAL) are about the same In diameter and similar In appearance, except that the latter Is somewhat longer. The airframes for these two missiles could easily be produced with the same tooling.volume producllon. missiles began as long ago6 and because. missile system provides bettercoverage, we believe that production ofm. missile has probably ceased. Alarger program for production

njn. missiles has probably been underway

_

e believe that these two missiles systemsommon deployment concept, that much of the ground support equipment isif not identical for the two systems, and that theyigh degree of flexibility in launch site selection because all equipment Is mounted on wheeled vehicles. The missiles, together with the associated supportand operational personnel, arestationed at bases convenient to areas of likely operations. These bases probably provide administrative, command, and logistic support to the launching units, which are deployed to actual launch sites only forpurposes or for actual hostilities. The launch positions may consist only of prc-surveyed launch points, accessible by good roads.

n IRBM ofm. range, now under development, will increase Sovietof more distant peripheral targets and "illider area for deployment within the USSR- This IRBM, which wewill be operationally deployed beginning In1 orill probably be capable ofound nuclear--payloadEP of. or better. The system will probably employ fixed launch On the basis of Soviet developmental Progress with. 'missile, derived

largely from evidence on lest firings. It Is probable lhat the manufacture of production missiles is now beginning.

ccumulating evidence. Including observa-lions of missiles, missile equipment, andof liquid oxygen, together with. firing In the Soviet Far East, leads us to believe that medium range missiles are now deployedew bases located near the Soviet borders in Europe, the Far East, and the Transcaucasia. There are also indicationsm. and shorter range missiles have been deployed to East Germany, possibly for several years, On the basis of this evidence, thc potential target coverage of the missiles, and the areas most suitable for theirwe believe thatm.. systems provide overlapping coverage of targets. . system probably will. be assigned the limited number of targetsthe range ofm. missile and will provide additional coverage of nearer targets from more secure launching areas within the USSR.

actors of tuning and security, as well as progiammed improvement in Western air defenses, make it Increasingly desirable that an initial Soviet attack against the bases of Western nuclear striking forces near Soviet borders be delivered primarily with ballistic missiles. Even from within the,m. missiles have sufficient range to reach such bases In Eurasia and its periphery. Numerous missiles with maximum rangesm. will also be available duringeriod. Although these shorter range missiles are not considered in detail In this estimate, it should be notedortion of them may be equipped withwarheads and. if deployed forward, could contribute to an Inltital attack on critical Western targets. ubstantia! butforce of manned bombers will be available throughout the period for follow-on attack and other related missions.

n order to estimate the probable Soviet force goals for these weapon systems, we have considered the major targets within their range, the evidence on development andthe availability of nuclear war-

heads, and the availability of other Soviet delivery systems. On the basis ot all theseontinuing total force ofeady missiles of medium and intermediate ranges seems lo be aand attainable goal for Soviet strategic planning.

s in the case of the ICBM. the provision of ground support facilities for medium and Intermediate range missilesriticalin the deployment program. For the. missiles, the Soviets are believed to employ firing units with more than one missile- butingle set of ground supportfiring unit,with Its equipment and crew. Istlic equivalent of an operational launcher. On the basis of fragmentary evidence andSoviet requirements for an initial salvo as well as for subsequent useeneral war, we estimate Soviet operational missile inventories for medium range missiles at three times the number of operational launchers. Wc have no evidence on the plannedof intermediate range missile units.thc greater size and complexity of the IRBM and the probability that It will be deployed in fixed sites for use primarily against strategic targets, it is probable lhat

ciilf?tl*S

IRBM units will have fewer missile reloads than medium range units. We believe that. missiles In operationalfor each operational launcher Is aassumption, but It Is possible that the ratio of missiles to launchers will be lower, as with thc ICBM units.

Itikely that the Soviet force goal forn. missile, which was ready fordeployment as long as five years ago. has already been attained.m. missile has been operational for more than two years, and we believe that the force goal for this missile system will probably be attained within the next year. As to futureof missiles and launchers, we believe that In the absence of continued productionjn. missiles will beto phase down through normalafter'five to seven years of service use. but thai the USSR's capability againstareas will be maintained and Improveduildup. missiles.1'

Our estimate of Soviet medium andmissiles and launchers, based on the available evidence and general considerations summarised In the.preceding paragraphs, is shown In the table below:"

0 it ml

Launcher*

Mlullea

Launcher*

Missiles

0 nm.)

Launchers

Approximate Total Launchers .

ioa

IS

The itesistanl Chief of Staff for Intelligence.of the Army, believe* that although the production goals form. missile* may have already been met or will be met within the near future, evidence of training and deployment doe* notonclusion that force goal* for aUonal units have been met. He believe* that

easonable firm bails for estimating current force level* ofmissile and launchers. On this basis, and hi* belief thatesult of the expected absorption of Initial salvo mission* by. missile In the future, Soviet planner* may decide on lower force goals ratherhase down ofjn. missile Inventories, he estimates operaUonal Inventories on following page-

- S

the foregoing missiles, thosefor an Initial salvo would probablywith high-yield nuclearthe remainder of tho mediumwould probably have variousorder to provide Soviet forces withflexibility. Should the USSRnumbers of missiles or launchers,and deployment over the nextwould not present serious difficulties.

C. Submarine-launched Missiles

planners almost certainlyto assign land targets to missilesubmarines In any contemplatedthc US. Thc number of submarinesbe deployed in launching positionscompromising surprise wouldthe pattern of operations previouslyAt present, the numberbe so deployed is probably veryan increase in out-of-area operationsrange submarines over the comingserve to raise thc warningsuch preparations wouldhc Soviets planned to usesubmarines In an initial surpriseIs possible lhat they would prefer tosubmarines In reserve as part of astrike or retaliatory force. In anyplanning does not appear todelivery of thc main weight of anmeans of submarine-launched missiles.

e believe that the USSR nowbn-Ited capability to launch mlssjles from long

range, conventionally-powered submarines. Operating directly from home bases, these submarines can conduct operations within missile range of US targets, but we believe that few have engaged in extended out-of-area training. As ofe estimate that the Soviets have aboutissile submarines in operational units. Six of these are long range "Z" class submarines, whichy enlarging the sail and installing two hatches and vertical tubes, probably to accommodate ballistic missiles. The remainder are long range submarines of the "G" class, thc first of which was sighted Although the possibility of cruise-type missiles cannot be excluded, wethat tlie "O" class is armed with three ballistic missiles of the type cairlcd by the converted "Z" class. Considering the size and configuration of the submarines and evidence from the Soviet missile development program, we believe that this missileaximum range ofjn.** For missile launching, both the converted "Z" and the "G" class submarines would need lo beor more likely in sail awash condition,

ew "W" class submarines probably were converted to topside stowage of cruise-type missiles, but we no longerthem operational. We believe, however, that the Soviets areupersonic cruise missileange of.

" Tor estimated performance characteristics ofaubmarine-taonched missiles, see. Tables. andot polenUal coverage or US target areas, sec Annex S. Figure S.

G-RifT-

launching from surfaced submarines. The submarine for which this missile washas not yet been identified, nor are we yet able to determine Lhe ultimate use ofeapon system. However, we believe that this system could be operational this year.

e estimate that the USS It willystem capable of delivering: ballisticagainst land targetsubmerged nuclear-powered submarine. ystem of this type,issile range of atould substantially Improve the Soviet naval contribution to the long range attack capability against US or other distant targets. Operating from homo bases, aportion of the total number of suchas much ascould be maintained on station off US coasts, provided that the Soviets developed proper operating procedures and trained alternate crews.

uclear-powered submarines have been under development in the USSRumber of years, and about five to seven arcnow in service. There Is no firmon their armament, but we believe that the first Soviet nuclear-powered class Is likely to have been of the torpedo attack type. Current production of nuclear submarines is estimated at four to six per year. On the basis of general progress to date, we believe that the nuclear-powered submarine program is sufficiently far advanced so that by this time the Soviets could hare developed such submarines for missile-launching use.

c do not as yet have evidence of the developmentissile designed for alaunch ballistic missile system. We would expect thatissile would first

be tested at Kapustin Yar, that we would be able to identifyew missile, and that approximatelyonths would be required before It could become operational. However, taking into account the contributionystem could make to thc Soviet long range attack capabUlly and thc Soviet state-of-the-art, we have estimated that the USSR could have available for operaUonal useubmerged launch missUe system capable ofound payloadangeEPoviet nuclear-powered submarine might2 such missiles. It Is possible that the Soviets have elected to equip nuclearwith surfaced-launched ballisticof the type attributed to the converted "Z" and the "Q'> classes. If this is theew Soviet nuclear-powered missilecould be operational thishe "Z" class conversion was probably an early developmental effort, and we believe lhat additional conversions are unlikely. The "O" class program will probably continue for another year or so, until the Soviets haveore effective mlsslle-launchlng type. Soviet capacity lo build nuclear-powered submarines. In programs with high but not overriding priority, is estimated at About eight per year. In the absence ofevidence, we believe it reasonable lo assume that about hah* of the nuclearconstructed will be missile launching types. On the basis of the foregoingwe estimate as follows thenumbers of missile submarines, and their missiles, in Soviet operational units through

Nuclear-Towered Missile Submarines

m. missiles

"Q" Class 16

ISOon. 45

ConvertedClass

m.

ia

64

Mid-

it BT-

long Range Bombers

Tlie current reduction andot the Soviet aimed forces has brought drastic cuts In naval and tactical air units, probably reflecting In part the growing Soviet missile capabilities. By comparison, theIn long range bomber forces has been much less. We believe that even after the Soviets haveormidable capability with ICBMs and other ballistic missiles, they will continue to require manned bombers, though in lesser numbers,ariety of purposes. Including attacks on small ortargets, damage nsscssment,and attacks on targets of uncertain location. Operating In conjunctionowerful missile force, bombers will provide the Soviets with diversification and flexibility In their offensive capabilities.

Thc employment of the Soviet long range bomber force in the event of general war would dependariety of factors,the Circumstances under whichcommenced. Moreover, Soviet plans for the use of this force will be modified as Soviet missile strength Increases and as the target system to be attacked changes.Soviet attacks early In the periodwould rely heavily on bomber operations, with the missile launchlngs timed so as to niinunlze advance warning of thc SovietLater in the period, manned weapon systems would be used primarily In aand reattack role.

long Rangm Aviolion

has been comparativelyin the strength, status, andof Long Range Aviation InWe estlmaU that as ofcompriseseavyfjet and BEAR turboprop types,of them BISONs, and aboutjet medium bombers. ew super-

; "The Assistant Chief of Slaff. Intelligence. USAF. estimates that as ofoviet Long Range Aviationeavy bombers and tankers.

sonic "dash" medium bombers, nicknamed BUNDER, probably have now entered service. The USSR has not developed an aircraftspecificallyanker; instead, BISONs and BADGERs are converted for use as tankers with their bomber counterparts. We have no evidence regarding refueling for the BUNDER"

wo of these bomber types, BISON and BLINDER, are In current production.of the BLINDER probably has been underway for moreear. Wethat aboutave been produced to date and that this aircraft ls now beingat the rate of about two per month. BISON production has been underway for about six years,otal ofroduced to date, BISON0ate of about two pernd there has been evidenceecline In recent months. The BISON was designed aboutears ago, and has since been considerably modified. Thehowever, have not overcome the range and altitude limitations which probably make it, from thc Soviet point ofarginal system for Intercontinental attack. We doubt that further attempts at Improvement will be made and believe that BISON producllon wm terminate in the relatively near future.

e have no firm evidence that any more advanced Soviet heavy bomber Is now under development or Inarge bomber prototype, nicknamed BOUNDER, was observed In Moscownd anothersimilar In appearance to BOUNDER, was observed at the some plant this year. These bombers are comparable to the BISON in size and weight, but they appear to have considerably less range. It Is unlUcely that either will be produced for operational use without major changes In configuration, the

"For estimated performance characteristic* of Soviet medium and heavy bombers, and factors which would affect their operational employment, see Annex A,. For current deployment and potential target coverage or North America and other portion* of the Northern Hemisphere, seeB,.

* tMr-

of Improved power plants, or bolh. Nevertheless, their continuingleads us lo believe that themay see ft requirement for an advanced alrcralt of intercontinental ranee, lo be used for weapon delivery nnd reconnaissanceIn conjunction with ballistic missileDespite the absence of confirmingwe therefore regard It as possibleew heavy bomber will enter operational service within the next few yean.

here are indications that the Soviets have been engaged In an effort to produce some sort of aircraft nuclear propulsion (ANP) system. We estimate that0 the Soviets were capable ofuclear testbed wtth at least one nuclear power unit providing useful thrusthase of the flight, but there is no evidence that test-beds or protypes have actually been built,,rogram could lead to an ANP systemubsonic aircraft ofperformance; an alternate program could result in the developmentubsonic nuclear-powered aircraft with considerably belter performance. Thus. Ifdevelopment is pursued and the foregoing dates are met. the Soviets couldew operational nuclear-powered aircraft late In the period of thisubsonicaircraft might be used for weapons delivery or long range

e estimate that Long Range Aviation will decline in strength over the next five years as the Soviets place Increasing reliance on missiles. Whether orew type of heavy bomber is introduced, the heavy bomber force probably will decline gradually from Itstrength ofON production ceases and BEARs arein view of the force reductionsinc haveharper cut in thc medium bomber force for thc near term, andelatively stable force for the remainder of the period. Thebuildup toupersonic "dash" BLINDERS byould tendoffset normal attrition of BADGKRs. In

sum. we estimate as follows the probable strength of Long Range Aviation during the next five years;

Ik.nib.is and Mid- Mid- Mid- Mid- Mid- Mld-Tanker*" lvfll 2 3 * 5

Heavy IM lao" "fiT "lOO*

TM>

predominantly BADGER forceev ULlHDfcRiuilding up to.

Thus, we believe that Soviet Long Range Aviation will continue to consist largely of medium bombers, best suited for operations In Eurasia and capable of attacking targets In the continental US only through extensive use of one-way missions. With aerialBADOKRs would be able to reach targets In the extreme northwestern portion ofUS on two-way missions from Arctic bases, but they would be operating at extreme ranges and would have little flexibility of routing and tactics. However, BADGERs on two-way missions could provide extensiveof many targets In Alaska, Canada, and Greenland, which have been assumingiinpoitance to defense of theUS. The existence of Cuban airfields offers theossible option of sending BADGKRs on refueled missions over most of the USigh expectancy of recovery.

Thc BISON would require bolh Arctic staging and inflight refueling for extensive coverage of US targets on two-way missions, and missions against many such targets would be at extreme ranges. Prom Arctic bases, BEARs could cover virtually all US targets on two-way missions, and they could reach many targets In the northeastern US directly from their home bases.

* The Assistant Chief of Staff.SAT. cslimate* the probable strength of Long Rangeduilng the nexl Ave year* a* follows:

Bombers

Heavy

Medium'

predomlnanUy BADGER forceew nUNDKRi Inbuilding op to somey IKS.

necessity for Inflight refueling and use of Arctic staging bases Imposes serious limitations on the number* of Soviet bombers which can be employed ln an attack on the US. All Soviet BISON regiments probably have been trained In Arctic operations andrefueling. We believe that somein about half of the BADGER regiments have an inflight refueling capability, and that some aircraft from about an equal number of regiments, although not in all cases the same units, have engaged ln Arctic trainingWe estimate thatf the BADGER crews In long Range Aviation have received trainingortto attack on the US."

On this basis, wo believe that the Soviets have conducted the operational trainingto commit up loombers and tankers on two-way missions in an initial attack againsi thc US at present, usingand Arctic staging as required.the requirement for tankers,rates, and operational attrition, butcombat attrition, we thereforethat at present the Soviets couldputombers over Northon two-way missions In an initial attack, of which aboutould be heavy bombers. The Sovietsonsiderably larger grossTor attacking the US llsclf, but toit they would need to employ BADGERs on one-way missions and to use less well-trained crews. With the advent of missilewc regard this use of the medium bomber force as an increasingly unlikely course of Soviet action."

There are four to five Arctic airfields which the Soviets probably would consider suitable for heavy bomber staging andincluding Ice strips) which appear suitable for staging BADGERs. However, the facUitics available at these airfields, together with the adverse operational conditions in the Arctic, Impose limitations on the number of aircraft which can be launched forattack."

"The Assistant chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAP. does not concur Ins theyto the limitations of the Soviet Long Range

Medium flomben of Olher Components

ADGERs are assigned toother than Long Rangere assigned to Navaland abouto Tactical Aviation. Itthat supersonic "dash"will be Introduced Into thesethe next few years. Naval BADGERspecially trained and equipped totargets as carrier task forces at sea,units are Intended primarily toground force operations, These units,to the Long Rango Aviationnot assigned lo operations againstwould presumably be employedon Eurasian and peripheral targets.

AfV-fo-Surface Missiles

first Soviet air-to-surfacebecame operationalow standard equipment In aboutof the naval BADGER units. ThoRange Aviation BADGER unitsequipped with this missile havetransferred to Naval Aviation. Thea maximum range of aboutjn.,designed primarily for antlshippingit probably has some limitedagainst coastal targets. Tbein range and launchingIt imposes on the launching aircraft

Avialion In training, refueling, and the availability of staging bases.

He believes that the available evidenceigh percentage of tbe crewsto Long Range AvlaUon have receivedwhich qualifies them to conduct attacks against the US. Further, this evidence Indicates that at leastercent of the long range BADGSR force Is equipped and trained for Inflight refueling.

In addlUon lo the airfields mentioned, he haa Identifiedlher airfields which are capable of supporting long range staging opera Lions.

In view of the above and considering tankerIn commission rates and operationalbut excluding combat attrition, he estimate* that the Soviet* Long Range AvlaUon couldomber* over Horth America on two-way missions In an Initial attack.aximumemploying one and two-way missions, hethaioviet long range bombers could reach targets In Horth Am*rtea.

Keirfif-

probably led thc Soviets to develop asystem. This new missilehichange ofm. probably became operational In0 orM We estimate that thc combined Sovietof these two antiship weapons will remain fairly stable at around SCO missiles over the next few years. Some portion of thewill probably be equipped with nuclear warheads of low and medium yields, thcemploying HE.

believe that improvements Indefenses have led the USSR toore extendedonger range system (ASprobably now operational. TTieissileaximumrobably was designedfor use against land targets. Wethat this missile is compatible withheavy bomber; It may also bewith the BISON, but we have noit is Intended for use with thisthis missile is designed solely for use byan operational Inventory of aboutmissiles is likely to be achieved withinyear or two. Because of then.m. CEP of these missiles and theiragainst land targets, they probablyarmed with high-yield nuclear warheads.

long Ronge Aetodynamic Venk'es

are Indications of currentIn long range, cruise-typebelieve that the Soviets arecould have available for operationala ground-launched, ramjetunmanned vehicle,peedMachlight altitude offeet, and range In excesssystem could be employed In ato investigate) structures andin theegion. Ifweapon delivery or reconnaissance,complicate Western air defense prob-

" For estimated performance characteristics of Soviet air-to-sur face missiles, see Annex A, Tables For potential coverage Of maritime areas by medium bombers equipped with antiship missiles. *ee Annex B. Flfura 5.

lems, but it Is Impossible at present tothe degree of reliance the USSR would place uponystem.

E. Spoce Sytlems

Soviet space experiments providethat the USSR has the technicalto develop space systems for military purposes and has acquired Information useful torogram. Systems developed in the near term would probably be designed for military support roles, such as reconnaissance, communications, electronic countcrmeasuresavigation, and warning. Based on our knowledge of recent earth satellites and the Venus probes, we believe it would befeasible for the Soviets to launch weapons of limited capability Into orbit during the next five years. Considerablein.accuracy and reliability would beto direct such weapons against specific targets in the West.

Soviet programming decUlonsspace weapons will depend In part on their success in solving problems relating toaccuracy, and comparativeHowever, Soviet assessment of the psychological Impact "Of such weapons may lead them toew vehicles during the period of this estimate, even though theirutility would be considerably less than their political effectiveness. These weapons could constitute the prototypes necessary for the development of Improved space weapon systems laler In the decade.

III. MAJOR SUPPORTING ELEMENTS Bombs and Worncods

long range bombers nndto attacking major militarycenters of nalional power In US andwould employ high-yieldand warheads. These weaponscompatible with the accuraciesground-launched ballistic missilesranges. and more, andmissiles of all ranges.

The Soviets have developed high-yield nuclear weapons sutlcd lo employment tn warheads for these missiles, and there Is extensiveon Lhe provision of nuclear weapons storage and handling facilities at or near medium and heavy bomber bases."'

USSH could adapt BW and CWto Its long range bombers andlt Is possible that RW munitionsemployed In missile warheads. Theand especially the operationalwould be severe, however.planners would probably consideras useful primarily for certaintasks, and best suited formissiles where rapid exploitationacliieved after employment of the weapon.

long Range Reconnotlionce Capabilities

Ill addition to Information obtained through open sourimary Soviet means of prcattack reconnaissance IsIntercept, from which the USSR almost certainly can obtain some Infoimatlon on the posture and movement of Western forces. These capabilities can be supported by the large Soviet direction-finding effort, which permits rapid search and location of Weslern communications circuits. Preattackcould be further Improved by the use of the satellites employing electronic and optical sensors, thc Soviets are probablyof launching such satellites at any lime.

In conducting any long range attack, the Soviets would desire to leam as rapidly as possible which targets had survived their initial strikes. We have no direct evidence on the Soviet approach to this problem. One means available to them Is the high-frequency backscatter technique, employing equipment with which they have long experience In other uses. ir> theory, existing antennas located

"For an estimate of current and future .Soviet nuclear weaponi capabilities, see the forthcoming HIS' Bl, "The Soviet Atomic Energy Program" (Umitedor details on the nuclear "'apons suited lo employment In specific Soviet mls-*Ues. seeSoviet Technical Capabilities to Ouided MLsilles and SpaceatedprilLimited Distribution).

within the USSR could rapidly determine the approximate locations and general yields of large nuclear explosions In the US. However, the Soviets could probably not be sure Inwhether this remote detectionwould be able to distinguish thc exact location and yieldsarge number ofwarheads detonating over the UShort period of time. In any event, theobtained would probably not be precise enough to be used for retargeting ICBMs, but it might assist In programming postal tack reconnaissance more effectively,

comprehensive damagepotentially be achieved bysatellites, the developmentof which arc now within SovietFor more precise postaltackthe USSR would probablyaircraft, which' would have theof being able to seek out andtargets missed in the first phase, oruncertain location, without having toto other attackaie no Indications that the Sovietsspecial vehicles for this role,of their bombers could be soreconnaissance might beby the long range,vehicle which we estimateoperational. Towardol the period of this estimate,and effectivenessombination ofreconnaissance bombers, andcommunications satellites as well.

frlecfronie Warfare and Olher Countcrmeomres

wide range of active and passivefor ECM use Is now operational Inand naval units. The devices, designedWestern electronic systems at allused frequencies. Includeradar, and communicationsvarious deception devices. Sovietcapabilities are complemented bySoviet experience In extensive,controlled, selective Jamming ofAt present, the USSR has ancapability for Jamming Westernat most of the commonly-used frequencies

TOP CliCUnT

0nd possiblynd especially for jamming at those frequencies normally used in Western long range radio communications. Within the period of this estimate, we believe that it will have inuse equipment capable of jamming all frequencies likely to be employed by Western communications, radar, and navigation

Airborne systems. All units of Long Range Aviation are probably equipped and trained in the use of both mechanical and electronic ECM. Although the Soviets might employ some bombers purely In an ECM role, all Soviet bombers can be equipped to carry chaff, and they have demonstratedfor its employmentide variety of operational conditions. Air-to-surfacedesigned to home on radar transmitters, air-launched decoys to simulate bomberreturns, and infrared decoy flares to counter heat-seeking alr-to-alr missiles may also be available. Soviet aircraft can be equipped with electronic jammers for use against early warning and GCI radars,control radars, airborne intercept radars, and air defense communications. Future improvements in Soviet airborne electronic jamming could include broader band jammers, higher powered equipment, more automatic operation, increased use of deceptionand advances In miniaturization.

Countermeasures lor naval use. Inyears, the Soviets have given increased emphasis to development of shipboard ECM equipment, but such equipment is of only limited value to thc long range striking forces. Because of the security risk, we doubt that Soviet submarines would employ activebut passive intercept gear might be used to provide warning of enemy radar search activity. Soviet missile submarines are equipped lo* delect active sonars operated against them.

Missile and satellite applications. The Soviets probably are continuing research on the reduction of radar cross-sections ofnoseconcs, and may achieve significant results within the next fivehey have probably experimented with various tech-

niques for confusing radar, such as tankage vectoring and decoys to simulate missile nose-cones. They may also develop active ECM for inclusion in ballistic missUe nosccones.

disruption capabilities.to disrupt Western strategiccommunications at the time ofappear formidable. The Soviets haveground-based jammingis most effective withinSoviet territory. In addition, thetrans-Atlantic cables by Soviet trawlersthe vulnerability of thissystem. The Soviets probablyof the operational effects ofnuclear bursts on radar andbut we believe that they wouldtoelatively low priorityhigh-yield weapons.

IV. IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET CAPABILITIES

The Soviet long range striking forces presentlyix of bombers, missiles, and submarines, and wc believe that they will continue to include several types of weapon systems, though in changing proportions. At the present time, there is not so far as wcnified command for thoseRange Aviationajor air command,submarines and some medium bombers are assigned to the Soviet Fleet, and the newly-developed Rocket Forces have beeneparate main component of thc armed forces. For operational purposes,these elements, like all Soviet combat forces, are probably very closely controlled by the headquarters of the Minister of

Certain advantages and disadvantages arise from the existence of mixedixed force permits flexibility in tactics and complicates the defensive problems of the US and its Allies. However,orce poses problems of coordinating the operations of .delivery systems with disparate characteristics against varied and widely disperseduclear delivery forces. The acquisition of large ballistic missile forces would tend to alleviate some of these problems but does not eliminate them.

further development of Sovietstriking capabilities will be placedthe growth of ICBM and otherWithin the next few yearsbombers will come to havespecialized roles, includingrealtack, and attack on veryReconnaissance functions couldperformed by satellites, and longaerodynamic vehicles couldfor special purpose use.submarine forces will graduallyand willupplementary roleforces for attack on the US.

Initial attacks at present, thedirect combined missile and bomberagainst tin- fixed bases associatedretaliatory capabilities. Depending onsize of their ICBM forces atmay already be able to bring all SACair bases under attack byand they almost certainly will bedo so within the next year. With aseveral hundred ICBMsrobably be able to reserve bombersstrikes and thus maximizeof surprise In their Initial However, they would remaintarget effective strikes against USand fast-reaction forces. Finally.long range striking forces areof devastating major USby direct atiack or by fallout fromagainst retaliatory forces. The extentinitial Soviet attacks wouldUS retaliatory capabilities, and theto which the Soviet defenses couldremaining US strengths, depend onwhich are outside the purview of anestimate.*1

oviet capabilities to retaliate against the US have been greatly Improved by thc growth of missile forces, and we believe that the USSR

"The Assistant Chief ot start for Intelligence,of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operalionsepartment of the "ivy. do not concur Innd US. They do not believe that the SovieU currentlyinability to bilng all SAC operational air"Oder attack by mlunes alone or to deliver massive attacks on US populaUon centers. For their eaU-ol current Sorlet ICBM strength, see

Is already capable of delivering massive ICBM attacks on US population centers. Missile forces have much faster reaction times than Soviet bomber forces have had, ond Soviet ICBM sites are afforded protection by conceal-mcnt and seciecy. The Soviets will seekto maintain this protection for thclr ICBMs, and will probablyew system whose survivability does not rest so heavily on successfulorce of several hundred ICBMs, protected by concealment, dispersal, and later perhaps by hardening, would give the Soviets high assuranceassive retaliatory capability."

or operations against US and Allied forces in the Eurasian periphery, the growth of ballistic missile forces Improves the Soviet capability to attack bases and fixed facilities with little if any tactical warning. Medium bombers equipped'with antishlp missiles are capable of sicking out and attacking UStask forces at sea within their range, but they would have difficulty intimely and coordinated attacks against these targets of uncertain location. The long range striking forces would remain unable to target strikes against Polaris submarines at sea.

Thus, from thc Soviet point of view, the achievement of ballistic missile forces has given rise lo radically Improved capabilities to allack the US and more efficientagainst peilpheial areas. While there Is no Indication that the Soviets expect their long range striking forces to be able toa decisive blow at the outsetar. they clearly regard these forces, together with their other capabilities, as providing anunder which they canighly assertive foreign policy.

For both poliiical and military purposes.

the Soviets probably believe that their best chance lo acquire capabilities which would further alter the military equation sharply In their favor would arise from theirof new weapon systems. Specifically, such an opportunity could arise fiom the achievement of antimissile defenses Ineriod. They may also look to thc development of even more advanced offensive weapon systems later In the decade.

OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS SOVIET WEAPON SYSTEMS

TABLE li CHARACTERISTICS Or GROUND-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC 'MISSILES BASED ON

Summary Tabic IV

PROBABLE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR GROUND-LAUNCH LPSURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 5YSTEM5

Arbitrary Reference Designation

Optra* ilonnl Capability Dsn *

Rang*"

Accnrncy

(CBK)J

(IU. niirt type)

(SHYSTER)

0

CO

n.m

ueltar...

OO Nuclear...

mobile. Road inoblk.

Probably Sxed sites.

Heavy oceecooe version. Uahler rcaeeoae vcr*o-

SS-o

IMS

. Lsiee IM half IM1.

1 Ha IW

. or

better..

NutHar...

for SummaryV.

We balMva thai tie So-deta era defloptag aad could have available for operatkea! useam-Jet propelledit* aof about alsthight altitude of0 feel,ange in fees*.

Ip ih* timebe Soviet! nil probably have under development foSow-on ball-lit mlss-i*eairabia efiaracterls'Jts for s.ysUms might Include fast reactionstorable liquid or solidf. provesad greater Aaalbiliiy. We would expecttoListed development patterns by depending oe proven components. simplicity, and high rellanlllly.

evaluate tkbi program as "probsblt" wllh voiying degree* cf ccnedenee, concrfmng detailed chalaeh miasDe listed will probably go through various stages of development *hlch in not nettsstrliy rr'ccted in this table.

dste when ihe Aral operational unil Is trained and equippedew niWilea and launcher*.

a ballistic missile can be fired to ranges as anon as approsimateiy one-third the muxinium operational range without serious Increase io CEP and lo even shorter ranges with degraded accuracy.

isircle within which, atat laiically. one-half of lhc Impuela will occur. Inherentare somewhat better tain lhaspecifled In tba table which uke Inlo consideration average degradationn. The iiccuraclctpreload are approximate figures which we applyrange* to which tha ralullea are likely to be fired.

typo of warhead employed alth Soviet bal lielaeilta will vary with Ihc apeelhc mission of Iht mlsaile. Id general, however, we believe thai lor missiles wiih ma.vlmum range*. origh tiploilveT. nuclear, or chemical warfare (CW) warheads will I* am ploy ad In accordance with Soviet military doctrine, depending upon nucleartlaailc accuracy, character of target, and results desired. Wa eatlmate that for mUsilea with rangea ofs. and over, only oucltar warheads will ba employed, allhough wa do not exclude the possibility of CW useja. mltsUta for certain UmlUd purpose*.belie va that the USSR is eapsbi* of developing technique* roeose mint lion ofarfare (BW) agents, allhough wa havevidence re^tlagand missCe rtseareh aad development. Ia view of opersitooal consideration* wa consider BW use la the ballistickaly. although possible for certain special purposes

' ShooJd tbe Soviet* so desire. ICBM security could bo Improveda as early s*ul w* regard IMSore likely date for even an ac-Vcvtiatei.

kt poiotcd oat last the rotauoe of theho latitude* of tbe launch point and target affect lb* maximum rang* oftniaaKe, wliaInfiu-

OBee becoming eJgnl Scant al tbc longer rangre For tbendaximum range Indicated Is nominal,oorolaUag earthaid

ba adjusted.

I Pee tb* views of ihe Aatlaiant CWef of Suff forf lb* Army.hehief of Navalepart, asaai of ta* Navy.ihetr fooinotea ioho'

TABLEHARACTERISTICS OF SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES BASED ON

Tabic V

PROBABLE BOYIKT DEVELOPMENT PROCRAM FOR NAVaL-LAUXCHGD SURFaCE-TO-SURFACR MISSILES SYSTEMS

Referee* Designation

Initial Optapability Date*

Minimum Operational

Operational Accuracy (CKl'J

MuliDomnd type)

Con !1

1M1

daai

.Mb.

.

MO

IJO Of ISC.

Intrlla

A supersonic ertilat masCe deafened farrom turfs0 Ho-

uclear

launched aubraefged.

ModtScda ear-

r.ei 2. "O" class CAB

carry 3. mUaOea per iub.

Launched lubmccjid or

evaluate thti pi or/am"probable" with varyingof confidence concerning dcuiled characteristics. Each mtwlla listed will probably go through various stages of davalopmtnt ohlah ar* not atecasarlly rafUcltd In iMi table.

data whan theperational unit la iralaad and equippedew mlaillra and launcher*.

fa tbe ndlrala In which, ataUitleaUy. one-half of UM Impact* will occur. Inherent missile accuracies areer lhan the accuraclaala the uble whkh uke tows coaalderatloodefradaifoand fornebida Use error la tha location of Uu lauseaiag ship.

tadwdea th* eipleelv* device and Ita aasoelsud .'uaiag aad Snag rneeaaolwn.

TA8LEHARACTERISTICS OF AiR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES BASED ON

Summary Table III

PROBABLE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM TOR AlR-TO-SURPACK MISSILE SYSTEMS

AroltiaryDaiignatlon

Operational Captbfiltv Dale'

Range

Accuracy (CEP)

mum Warhead(lbs. nnd type)

Speed (Mneh No.)

feet againit ahlpi

HE or Nueienr

E or Nutkar

riding with teml-actltra horning.

Radar lerslaal booing

areahlpi at Ma wtth limliefi application with degraded accuracy agalait eouul urgtta.by BADGER.

Same target* a* abo-t- lafiw poaea llltie If any mtrktloo on launch aircraft

Probably carried by heavy[BCaU and BISON:

arly INI.

. agalait eaaaUl tar-gru.

i

nm. agtlrj: lmxt.t aaipa.

HE or Nuclear

.

Inertia! againat land. Terminal homing'ralihjp*.

It ii poulbte that the Soviet* may develop ASM of. range and hlghrr survival potenUal than thc AS-3.

' We evaluate this program at "probable" wtth varying degree* of coiifldtnc* concerning detailed eharaeterliUct. Each mlatila lifted will probtbly go through vartoui atagaa of development which ara not redacted jn thla table.

Tha data whin theoperaUonal unitrained and equippedaw mini In mid launehcr*.

Wunaad Include* th* *iplcaiv*nd It*ruling and firing maahanUm.

rutrleu lb* alrerift duringboutt iKItuda with greatly reduced apaad. Tb* BADQEA't radlua.--ith two. This radlua *aa b. Incrcued by aboutercentingle aerial rafuellag.

'The AatUtantlaff InUlllgeoce.ie BADGER'* radlua. when carryingto-aurface mlaWU..

Withiu.

' Therobably0 pound*;ceuld be earned by the BEAR or theange degradation ofpercent* haa carrylBg ooe ralaaCe,ercent whan carrying two la eaCmatad,

TABLEISSILE RELIABILITY FACTORS BASED ON

e Utileallo. oe which It. Uee aa oa Ornate ofol Soviel mlnllea. The faita-in,

conaidfred potaible reJIabtLUes. Fo* several jnn after ia IOC. the reliabilityiulkend lhe* level of. Esc.pl whereollowing relUttlitlee ore forand reflect Im-

REMARKS

.

lOOn.uv

UOa.aa.

(IVU).

i.m

m.

)

Aa of

"X- andn. Launched fiom

ub.

provemenU from the IOC date. In those caaea wbeie the IOC hsa been recent, or Ii In lhe future, Improvements are generally

US Designation

CAPABILITY

Ralo

Launcher*

Flight

Syile-fu: '*

ftn

)

ro

M

wjav

0

n'

aF^"V a> * aj

ea

oe

y

0

u

V vmr

wtlh sub-SCO, ucnt

-

naenl

That peicentege ol mlsUles on launcher which aia "readyendy mlaajlc la an in-com mission missile -lih warhead maUd. mounted on an In-eom in talon laugherrained unit which i. eonsidered ready to be committed to launch.

in Ihe

The pereeiilna* ol ready missile* which -ill euccea-fully complete Uie couoltf-jwn and ith; required lima limlu.

The pereenUge ol mleule, launched. Ibe warhead, of .hieh actuallye aa planned ioeelli. within thiee CKFaof the timing point).

thosey those missile, coi.aidoed good enough to try to1 be loaded oa ships and illIIlit

naaumplions made foe .ir-lo-surface miaailea do not Include looses to aircraft abort* which arenot related lo

1 Reliabilityate not available (or Uie. eniue-iype mk.lt*.

For lhef lhe Aartlanl Chief of SlotT for Inlelllga.ice. Deparlnieni ol lhe Array, and Ihc Assistant Chic! of Naval Operationsepartment ol Uie Navy, are Iheir footnotes lo the DiocuWon.

31

TABLEISSILE REACTION AND RELOAD TIMES BASED ONcl

Miviile*

Wc have no food evidence on tne reaction timet of Soviet surface-to-surface missile units. However, based on our analysis of the cliaraclerlstics of these systems and general Soviet capabilities, we estimate the following reaction times as of

andlthough thesecapable of varyuij degrees of mcbilltythat tbcy would be deployed losites when hostilities becomeThe reaction times for unitswill vary with the degree of alertbe approximately the samendICBM) belowIn transit al the time ofbe required to launch thc firstthe unit has arrived at theprepared site.

ande estimateand probably the SSill utiliseThe Soviet design philosophy,In tbe respect to the fuelingal operational launch sites, willafTect ICBM reaction times.rapid reaction time has been awe estimate the following minimum

reaction times for ready missiles under the three alert conditions Indicated:

Condition I: Crews on routine standby, electrical equipment coid. missiles not fueled. Reactionours.

Condition II: Crews on alert, electrical equipment warmedis lies not fueled. Reactioninutes

Condition UI: Crews on alert, electrical equipment wanned up. missiles fueled and occasionally topped. Thisprobably could not be maintained for more than an hour or so. Reaction0 minutes

Aii-lo-Surface Missilei

ASMshort enough reaction andtime that they are not the delaying factor in the takeoff of the altera ft.

Navole Systemi"

The reaction times In minutes for naval systems are estimated us follows:

Ron- Kooas

Auar mnt

10 Class Sub

S Sub

No esUmates of reaction and reload times are available loroo ojtu supersonic cruise missile designed to be firedurfaced

TABLE 6

SOVIET LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE UNDER AN

OPTIMUM MISSION PROFILE

(Calculated In accordance with OSA Spec exceot lhat

BUNDER

Combat Radlm/Ranee (KM)'

lb. boaUead

lb.

one refuel*

b. bombload

one refuel*

Speed Altitude (ktsVft.I

ilm urn's peed aT optimum altitude

(kuyiu-

Speed/Target altitude

(kts./lt.)'

Combat Celling

Terminal Target Altitude (ft.l*

lb. bombload

lb.

b. bornbtoAd

0

o.oco

reduced toa rn^mumottnules loiter .rSc.^Py^anV^altitudes permitting; maximum

BISON

range and radius figures given In this Uble are maximum figures. They are applicable to the moat up-to-date models ot these aircraft, Cylng Optimum mission profiles on direct routes. The use of older model aircraft, standard mission profiles, indirect routes, low-level penetrations or other Ucllea designed lo delay or evade detection and Interception would reduce the effective range. The calculation of degradation In range and radius resulting from sophisticated penetration tacticsomplex process which can best be accomplished for Individual missions.

ule-of-thumh measure however, for low-level operation! by heavy bombers, the radius at optimum altitude will be decreasediles for every mile flown at sea level.

For missions with air-to-tar/ace missiles carried externally, rule-of-thumb figures for combat radius are given Inf this Annex.

' Refueling: estimates based upon use of compatible tankers which provide approximatelyercent Increase In radius/range.

'0 lb. bombload.

'Service celling at maximum power with one hour fuel reserves plus bombload aboard. Ho ranje figure Is associated wltTr this altitude.

medium bomber wllh supersonic "dash" capability of aboulstimates of range and radiusdash"m. at Ihis speed.

' We have no evidence regarding refueling for the BLIHDER.

top

TABLE 7

DOMBER SERVICEABILITY AND OPERATIONAL ATTRITION RATES (Excluding Combo! Atlrilion)

Aiicrofl in Commission

The following table Is applicable lo current types of Soviet bombers In operational units at home bases. Advanced types of aircraft or unusually complex airborne equipment would Increase servicing and maintenanceand would probably result In lower In-eoinmlssion rates for at least six monthsear after introduction. The higher In-commlssion rates shown in the table0 day maintenance standdown prior to Initial operations, as well as Intensiveduring operations. It should be noted, however, lhat in those geographic areas where climatic conditions arc adverse, anays of maintenance standdown might be required to achieve the percentages listed.

Percentage Percentage Wiih Wllhoul Prior Prior Standdown Standdown

ays 2nd 7bombers .

Heavy

B. Aircroll Abort Roles

Attrition factors which should be appliedotal force In order to determine theof aircraft lhat would arrive In the target area, exclusive of combat attrition, are based on Soviet maintenance practices, supply and operational activities, as well as US experience in comparable aircraft. The factors currently believed to be valid for planning purposes are as follows:

(a)ercent, of aircraft at home bases would be In commission after standdown (See Table ?A. above).

lb)ercent of those aircraft inat home bases would be launched from staging bases (includes attrition enroute to and while at staging bases).

ercent of those launched from staging bases and conducting unrefueledwould arrive In target areas.

ercent of those launched from staging bases and conducting refueledwould arrive in target areas.

TABLE 8

VISUAL AND RADAR BOMBING ACCURACIES

consider that the proficiency of Long Range Aviation crews is such that they can, in training but under adverse conditions,to an assigned target and bomb with the accuracies shown in the table below. The fig-Altitude Visual Bombing

ft.

CEP

M00

given would be degraded under combat conditions, and would also be degraded by the use of certain techniques for delivery of high-yield nuclear weapons, such as parachute drops.

Radar Bombing

Well-defined Poorly.defined

ft,CEP

2.4

en

ANNEX E

DEPLOYMENT AND TARGET COVERAGE OF SOVIET WEAPON SYSTEMS

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