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SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR LONG RANGE ATTACK
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL
Sub mil fed by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE The foBotetng intelligence organuatlons participated in the preparation ot this estimate: The Central InteUigence Agency and the intelligence organizations ol the Departments ol State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint staff.
Concurred in bySTATES INTELLIGENCE7' Concurring were The Director olResearch. Department ol Stale; the Assistant Chlellor Intelligence. Department ol the Army; theOl Naval Operations Untelugcncet, Department olthe Assistant Chlel ol Staff. Intelligence. USAF;lor Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Atomic EnergyBcpresentatioe to the USIB; the Assistant tool Delensc, Special Operations; and thcthe National Security Agency. The AuiitantBureau ol Investigation, abstained, the subjectol his jurisdiction.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
BACKGROUND ON THE ICBM
RECENT TEST RANGE.
Recent Test 3
Interpretations of Test Range Activity
ICBM PRODUCTION EVIDENCE
ICBM DEPLOYMENT EVIDENCE1.
Launchers Per Site
Site Activation Time
Interpretation ol Deployment Evidence . .
SOVIET PROGRAMMING .
Pertinent Soviet Statements
Strategic Planning Factors
Effects of Technological Change .
PROBABLE RANGE OF SOVIET FORCE LEVELS
following page 20
CEMF THE DIRECTOR OF IN TELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH. DEPARTMENT OF STATE .
ON THE ICBM PROGRAM OF THE ACSI DEPT OF THE ARMY, AND THE ACNO (INTELL) DEPT OF THE NAVY .
POSITION ON THE ICBM PROGRAM OF THE ACSI, USAF CHART AND
THE SOVIET ICBM PROGRAM-EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS
the course of the past year or more, US intelligence hasonsiderable body of additional information pertaining to Soviet programs for ICBMs and other ballistic missiles. This information, derivedide variety of intelligence sources, hasnew insights into the generaland performance of the Soviet ICBM, the facilities required for its deploymenteapon .system, and the timing of some of the Soviet activities critical to the progress of this weapon system through research andinto the deployment phasc of the
A major purpose of this Annex is to set forth the direct evidence bearing on Soviet ICBM development and deployment, together with the alternative interpretations which we believe can reasonably be assigned to various aspects of this evidence. From this we seek to arriveeneral estimate of the ICBM force likely to exist in thc USSR at present and to set forth clearly the uncertainties attached to any such estimate. The problem is more difficult than that of estimating currentstrength in many other forms ofpower. *Kstirr.ates of current bomber strengths, for example, arc based primarily on production and order-of-battle information Of good quantity and quality, which narrows the area of uncertainty. Indirect evidence and insights drawn from Soviet military thinking and weapon systems programming practicesuch larger role inof current Soviet missile strength.
Future estimates of many Soviet weapon programs are projectedeasonably firm current base; it is far more difficultase for Soviet ballistic missileMoreover, the trends are at best only dimly seen. The second major purpose of this Annex, therefore, is to set forth thefor making an estimate of the likely future range of Soviet ICBM capabilities, using the evidence as well as insights derived from general considerations.
There arc several reasons why considerable uncertainty should exist in present USof the Soviet ICBM program, and why there shouldumber of elements in the evidence which permit differing judgments. Large ballistic missile systems are new to both the US and the USSR, and it is natural that there should be uncertainty as to the precise problems and lead-times involved In quantity deployment. Ballistic missile systems require the development of new operational concepts, which are not necessarily the same in the two countries; this limits the direct applicability of analogies from US experience. Moreover, these weapon systems are being developed and deployederiod of vastly acceleratedchange.
Another factor in lhe estimative problem, worthy of special attention, is the effect of Soviet security measures. The USSR hasregarded secrecyajor militaryin itself, and there is evidence that ballistic missile programs have been cloakedery high degree Of security. This secrecy goes considerably beyond the dispersal and
of launchingractice which the Soviet leaders have statedart of their missile deployment concept. Even routine aspects of the missile and spacehave been assiduouslynames liker and Tyuratamto be withheld, despite the common use of these place names in the Western press Khrushchev once publicly apologize forthe names of Soviet missile and space experts who received awards, allegedly because such recognition would make them the targets of Western provocateurs There Ls muchthat the Soviets attempt to prevent the observation of missile equipment In transit, by moving it at night, harassing or rerouting Western observers, and other means. Finally, we have recentlypecial masking address system, apparently designed tothc disclosure in personal telegraphic communications of thr places where missile personnel are stationed.
BACKGROUND ON THEYSTEM
n' we summarized thecharacteristics of thc Soviet ICBMreviewed the pattern of test rangeill Tyuratain, concentrating onup untilhetime when thr majority of thecommunity estimates that theachieved an initial operationalwith an 1CIJM system or aboutmaximumn that estimate,full agreement, based on verydata, as to the following basicof thc Soviet ICBM system whichaffect its pioduction and
a. The missile itself Is of relatively heavyand ie extremely large. Depending
'Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Muslles and Space Vehicles. dated JS April 1MI. (TOP SECRET)
.ho Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. Department of the Army, and the AuUlant Chief of Naval Operation) (In tell) -Cer.cel. Department of th* Navy, be lion that the IOC daU did not occur Uila early. For theirsee.
upon its exact conllguration, it can best be described either as twice as bulkyS Atlas or half as largeS Saturn
employs radio-inertia! guidance,ground guidance equipment at the
uses nonstorable liquid propcllants.extensive transfer facilities atand storage capacity for theat least Ave large rail tank cars offor each missile
Is probably transportable over longonly by rail, although veryover well surfaced, wide radiusbe feasible.
certain amount of missile assemblymust be accomplished athich must also include
heavy equipment for handling and erecting the missile.
he most suitable deployment areas for the very heavy nosccone ICBMs which had been test fired prior to0 would be In northwestern USSR or thc Soviet Far East, the only areas from. missiles could achieve extensive coverage of the US.
Ihe foregoing, it is clear thatSoviet ICBM system is heavilyon the Soviet rail network, andsites would necessarily be servedspurs Thc system is extremely bulkybe fairly cumbersome to handle. Itreadily lend itseli to deploymentsites. Thc most suitable ICBMsitu wouldarge, fixedconsiderable ground support equipment.
RECENT IESI RANGE ACTIVITIES
we lack conclusive evidence ondeployment, an estimate of the sizeSoviet ICBM force depends heavilycan be learned concerning thcmust precede or accompanyand testing of theassociated equipment, its production,training of troops to use it. Our bestrelates to activities at the test
major developments arc knownoccurred at the test range In themonths First. In January and JulySoviets test-fired ICBMs withnosecones to rangesufficient lo reach targetsIn the US from launching pointsanywhere in the USSR. Second, inbetweenndthc construction of al leastlaunch pads at thc Tyuratamthe first major expansion infacilities since construction of thepad which was used for all ICBMshots priorhird, inthe Sovietsery intensiveof ICBM and space launchings atwhichigher rate ofthan ever before. The chronologylion activities and ICBM andat Tyuratam is summarized onchart. (See Chart)
New launch Facilities
the new facilities at Tyuratam, onea duplicate of the originaland pit. (See, Figureoriginal pad and Itsas laimch areas "A" anddesigned for both actualstatic firings of ICBM and spacedestined for these launch areasby rail to nearby rati drivewhere extensive checkout andassembly operations arethe missileorizontal position.are then transported directly to the
launch pad by rail. Some of the groundequipment, Including instrumentation and control facilities, is permanently located in the launching area, but propellants and much ground support equipment are brought to thc site on one of the several rail lines leading directly onto It. Construction times for launch areas "A" and "B" were about two years"B" was begun8 and was probably ready for use tn about
IL In the second halfhe Soviets began workair of simplified padspits, known as launch areaSee.) This launch area was photographed while under construction and its final configuration is not definitely known. Like "A" andt has rail-served missile checkout and assembly buildingsingle rail spur enters the pad area and some ground support equipment Is apparently to be located permanently In that area, but missiles and some of the necessary ground equipment are probably to be transported from checkout buildings to the pads by road. At least some of the ground equipment serving launch area "C" is therefore significantly different from lhat designed for use at the oilier two launchprobablyumber of units which can fairly readily be transported, checked out. and replaced when necessary. Area "C" probably represents thc approximate configuration of an operational launch facility. The lime required to construct this morelaunch area was probably aboutas probably ready for use in0 or
Recent Test Firings
he number and pattern of test firings indicates that the USSK has beenareful and generally successful ICBMprogram,eliberate pace rather thancrash"ajor phase ot Soviel ICBM testing was apparently completed in0 when the. missile was proof-tested to its approximate full range Into the Pacific. Up until that time, tho firing program wasfor the high rate of reliability achieved
thc missiles once they were launched:reliabUity averaged aboutercententire three-year period from ml
ICBM firings resumed ineriod of nearly six months during which only space vehicles were launched from Tyuratam The current series ofCBM shots in thc first four months of thc year, in addition to five space launch-ings. This rate of activity coincides with the availability of additional launching facilities. Itigher rate than the Soviets hodattempted in either the ICBM or the space category. For ICBMs. the total number of launchlngs in the flrst four months1 was greater than that of the entire preceding year.
Thc intensive new phase of ICBM firings has been markedharp drop In thereliability of the missiles- Only six of theissiles launched in the first four months1 succeeded in reaching thePeninsula.
t is almost certain that the currentcomprises more than one type ofsharp drop in
test ranee performanceT
jsuggests the introduction ofcomponents in the missile system, or training firings by inexperienced personnel, or both. There isossibility that the
activity Included Initial firingsew. liquid-fueled ICBM.
Interpretations of Test Ronge Activity
From the evidence relating to test range activities wc have developed three alternative hypotheses concerning the Soviet program for deploymentomplete ICBM weaponSubsequently, wc consider theseIn conjunction with the information available on production and deployment, as well as what we have learned of thc strategic concepts underlying the Soviet progrnm.
One hypothesis Is that thc activity at Tyuratamrogram In which, broadly speaking, the development of theitself, and the development of theand procedure for operationalwere phased sequentially. In thislaunch area "A" would be designedn missiles and space boosters, and the ICBM firings up untilould have represented development of only theitself. Launch area "C" would be thc prototype of the first operational deployment concept
Jattern resembles the sequence followed In Soviet development of second generation surface-to-air missiles and of short range ballistic missiles. On thc basis of this hypothesis, little if any operationalwould have occurredlthough construction of deployment sites could have been concurrent with theof launch areaairly steady bulld-up In operational capabilities would not have begun before
econd hypothesis is that the basic ICBM vehicle and the associated equipment necessaryully rail-served operationalsite were developed concurrently, at Tyurfftam launch areaith InitialIn0 This would havethe construction of initial deployment sites during the HADractice which the Soviets followed in the high prioritylo deploy their first surface-to-air missile system around Moscow. It would have per-
a fairly steady buildup in operational capabilities, first. and later. missiles. Consistent with this hypothesis, the simplified ground supportat launch area "C" would beasecond type of deployment configuration for the current systemite to be usedew missile system. Q
On this basis,
1 firings at Tyuratam would represent testing of modifications to the current systemew missile system.
hird hypothesis is that thc activities at Tyuratam indicate two deploymentsuccessively phased but using thc same basic missile. On this basis, an initialcapability would have been achieved in0. missileully rail-served deployment site.
^The resulting deployment would have been fairly limited. The second phase of the operational buildup would have been begun inased on the simplified area "C" deployment concept^
3attern bears some resemblance to the Soviet program. ballistic missiles, which appears to have resulted in some early capabilitiesear or so laterarger, second phase buildup. This hypothesis allows for the deployment of. ICBMs In fully rail-served sites, and docs not rule out the interpretation that some of1 firings arc for further^RAD.
he first of the foregoing interpretations is consistent with the viewomplete weapon system. Including deployedlaunchers and trained crews, wasnot available untilhe second and third of these interpretations are consistent with thc view that thc USSR has had at least some operational ICBM capability at deployment sites sinceanuary
nterpretation of the test range data itself does not resolve the problem ol the scale and pace of deployment. It docs indicate, however, that at least until very recently the Soviets were experiencing no particularor serious setbacks in their ICBMwork.
ICBM PRODUCTION EVIDENCE
nc indicated that in9 the USSR probably began toproductionis, complete missiles of an operational type which could also be modified for use as space boosters. The information available on factory activities is sufficient only lo pointesearchnear Moscow as the probable developer of ICBM prototypes, to identify the city of Kuybyshev as the most likely site forof production ICBMs, and to provide some notion of the way in which normal Soviet practices would affect the manufactureilitary item with the size and bulk of thc current missile.
have concluded thatICBMsand space vehiclesesearch institute andplant.n Kaliningrad near Moscow. This facility has done thc principal design and development work on all Soviet ballistic missiles and continues to do so. In thc past the practice has been, once thehad decided to initiateissile, for Plant No.o assist some other facility in undertaking production and lo limit its own manufacturing activities to the further productiontems. Plant No.as been considerably expanded in the past several years, and we believe that the additional capacity is probably being usedariety of missiles, in keeping with previous practice. Wc cannot rule oul the possibility, however, that someICBMs are being manufactured at Plant
in tlie program shortly beforeannouncement, inhat "scries production" of ICBMs had begun. Dc ^splte intensive efforts, we have been unable
pinpoint the plant or plantsproduction ICBMs. although we have succeeded in narrowing the possibilities downew large factories.
onsidering the size and possibleof the Soviet ICBM and the relatively smnll amount of subcontracting normal topractice. ICBMs could beingle, large factoryeak rale ofer month.ate could probably have been achieveduildup period of abouly aboutf major Interruptions were avoided thereafter,actory would have turned outroduction ICBMs byome of these would presumably have been used for static testing and for ICBM and space launchings. Considering the number of launchings to date, and probable allocations to other nonoperational purposes, such afacility would have providedCBMs for operational Inventory by
ctual monthly peak production rates at any single facility could be somewhat higher or lower than this, and more lhan onecould be engaged in ICBM production. Our evidence on production is Insufficient loirm estimate on these questions. However, total Soviet capabilities to producededuced from availablefacilities, materials, andvery large. Therefore, the actual number of ICBMs available at present could be larger or smaller than the figures in the foregoing example, depending upon Uie peak rateachievedingle plant and the possible involvement of more than oneThus, we believe that once aline has been set up and the learning period has passed, the manufacture of missiles ceases loace-setting factor in aprogram. This has probably been true of the Soviet ICBM program for atear.
We are still unable to identify positively any ICBM launching facilities other than those at the test range. Nevertheless, over the past year or so wc have acquiredknowledge of the basic require menu for operational sites Moreover, someeginning to emerge from thc examination of fragmentary data on suspected ICBMareas. In general, the availableconfirms that in the USSR as in the US, the major pace-setting factor in thcof an ICBM weapon system ls the establishment of operational launching sites with their associated ground support facilities, communications and control, and logistic sup port.
Through intensive collection efforts by all available means. US intelligence has achieved partial coverage of the regions best suited to the deployment of Soviet ICBMs. However, there are large portions of Soviet territory where launching sites could have beenwithout detection. The inadequacy of confirming evidence regarding deployment may be attributable cither to the limitations of our coverage, combined with the success of Soviet security measures, or to the fact that deployment has beenelatively small scale lo date. At present, we cannot be sure which is the case, but certain deductions can be drawn from lhe pattern of the available evidence and the way it relates to ourcapabilities.
n planning for ICBM deployment, the Soviets have had to take into account aof logistical, geographic, and other factors As we have already noted, the physicalof the current ICBM system require that deployment sites be near rail lines,m missiles would probably have been dep'luyed in northwestern USSR or the Soviet Far East. These areas, however, have certain disadvantages in that (a) they are relatively vulnerable to attack by Western deliveryand (b) climatic conditions In thewould probably create severe construe-
maintenance, and operational problems. For deploymentum. missiles, the Soviets would probably seek rail-servedin interior regions with moderate climate and terrain, low population density, and high security from Western observation and attack.
attached map shows that thesuited to deploymentery large (seet includes muchUSSR from Moscow to Lake Baikal.for major cities, wc cannot excludelocations in this region frombut thc most favorable areasof the Urals and the Caspian andLake Baikal. We believe that inSoviets would greatly prefer tosome distance from their borders,to obtain maximum security fromobservation and attack.
Intelligence community hasavailable evidence on approximatelyareas where the possibility ofwas suggested byesult of this analysis,determined that most of thesedo not contain ICBM sites.there areozen areasconsideration by US intelligenceor more ICBM complexes may now beor underoneareas has been confirmed or finally
"The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur In this sentence. He believes that there are six areas on which there ts reasonably food evidence or ICBM operational deplojment. He has under actfv consideration morereas where the evidence Indicates thethat construction of ICBM launch sites Is underway.
etailed description of the evidenceareas, sec tbc report by the DeploymentGroup of the Guided Missiles andCommittee.0 The re-evaluation and up-
dating or evidence contained In that reportontinuing project, and changes will be Incorporated Into thc basic, loosclcaf document.
There have alsoew reliable repor of unusual installations, occasionalof suspicious rolling stock, andother fragmentary data of varying degrees of credibility.
ome of the suspected areas are in regions besl suited to thc deployment. ICBMs. Two of these are at Plesetsk and Polyarnyy Ural in northwestern USSR.lT
There is considerably more information on these two locations than on any of the other suspected sites. It includes, among othereliable reportarge rail-served Installation at Plesetsk, consisting of several groups of buildings and rail spurs. While there is some evidence to suggest alternative explanations for thc construction at Plesetsk and Polyarnyy Ural, its timing waswith the development of. missile. We believe that these activitiesmutual cross-confirmation, andestimate that Plesetsk and Polyarnyy Ural are ICBM sites which were operational as of8
n the basis of much less information, thereossibility that sites wereduring the same time period in the Kola Peninsula area of the northwest and, on the basis of even more tenuous evidence, at Suobodny on the Trans-Siberian railroad in the Far East. Finally, thc evidence regarding
' Thc Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operationsepartment of Ihe Navy, would point out that thc majority opinion of the Deployment Working Group of the Guided Missiles and Astronautics intelligence Committee Is that Plesetsk and Polyarnyy Ural can be classed as possible ICBM sites. In their view of thc whole Soviet ICBM effort, however, they estimate that these two sites were probably not operational Inull statement of thetrseeBO.
range missiles in the Carpathian area includes aome information which can beas pointing to thc deployment in that area of ICBMs as well. We believe that ICBM deployment in the Carpathian isbut we cannot entirely exclude it.*
ther suspected areas are In regions best suited to the deploymentCBM. and our evidence on them is more receni.
the southis also some
"Wur'ya, farther tohere
Information pointing to Ufa, Saratov, Kirensk, Kandagach, and the regions around Akmotinsk, Dolon, and Alma Ata in Kazakhstan as places where ICBM-relatedmight be under way, but the indications arc extremely tenuous. Furthermore, we can nnd no consistent pattern of timing orin the information on these and other various locations which we have examined for evidence. missile deployment sites.
Masking Addresves 3lf
his syslem is used hy personnel at missile test ranges and at Other places which may be associated with lhcof long range ballistic missiles.f
'The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF. does not concur In the Judgment that ICBMIn the Carpathiannlikely or that the indications of ICBM related activity in the areas'* cited in paragraphrt "extremely tenuous" Moreover. In addition to Um II ICBM suspectareas cited in paragraphsnclusive, he has under active consideration the followingreas for which avldenc* Is available Indicating tbe possibility of ICBM site construction: Kamyshin. Ust Ukhla. Kiev. Taurngr. Tashkent,hkalov. Makat, Nlshnyaya Tura, Vologda, and Novosibirsk
Launchers Per Site
ey factor in assessing the significanceuspected deployment location is the number of Launching pads likely to be grouped together. On thc basis of test range site configurations for large ballistic missiles at both Tyuratam and Kapustin Yar. we believe that operational launchers arc paired. Each launcher probably has Its own fuel transfer and handling equipment, bul fuel storage, guidance, and checkout facilities are probably shared by the two launchers in each pair. More than one pair of launchers probablyaunching complexa base providing central support, maintenance, and communications andfacilities.ite-complex isthe basic ICBM iir.it capable of operating independently. Thc individual pairs areseparated by several miles and an entire site-complex may thus cover many square miles.
he grouping of pairs of launchers into such complexes Is consistent with theof the current Soviel ICBM system and 3lso with evidence available on Soviet de-^jjoyment of medium range ballistic missiles.
""Jour to six launchers are assigned to the basic operating units equipped with medium range ballisticof theseunits is apparently capable ofindependently. The greater sire andof thc Soviet ICBM Impose additional problems of logistics and maintenance, which could argue for the groupingargerof ICBM launchersomplex. Intheir deployment sites, however, thewould have had to weigh convenience of logistics and maintenance against the for maximum security, which
dictate considerable dispersal of pairs of ICBM launchers, and probably ofas well, particularly in view of their Axed configuration
these factors into account, weit unlikely that the typical numberper ICBM site differs greatlynumber for medium range missiles.the number of launchers at eachis likely to vary, depending onto existing supply andand other factors. On this basis,number of four or sixumber even twice asbe feasible. We believe that aof four or six Is more probablenumber between eightut there isevidence on this question and wcto resolve it until deployment sitesidentified and theirestablished.
Site Activation Time
have examined the tasks andin the construction andICBM launching complexes. Whenthese complexes must include the(a) the launchers themselves:guidance and missile handling(C> test, checkout, and(d) fueling and storagecommunications; (f) logistic support;housing and general purposethe available evidence, weoft, rull-supportcdcould probably be brought toreadiness In someoonths.
uring this period, the site would be laid out and constructed, components would beand checked out. operating personnel would be assigned, and. finally, missiles would be brought to the site to complete thcweapon system. The period itself could vary depending on local weather and construction conditions, the distance from existing rail lines and supply centers, the exact number of launchers and their dispersal, and the details of the deployment concept. During much of the period, special military
and railroad construction teams, Involving hundreds of men and considerable specialized equipment, would be at work on each complex. Normal Soviet practice Is to employ such teams rather than workers from the local labormove from place to place as new assignments are given them.
Inter pre la lion of Deployment Evidence
review of other major Sovietand deployment programsconstruction and surface-to-airshows that there is oftenear and sometimes as much asbetween the startrogram andof sufficient Information toIts scale and pace. Somefor this time lag Is provided by thethat work must begin at Sovietsomeonths to two years beforean operational threat.
thc available evidence,collection capabilities, and the timebeinimum of two tosites were probablyn areas suitable. missiles (see paragraphsbelieve that such sites are operationalpresentncan reach targets In the US fromrangehead. and it must bethat in the event of war the USSRthe launchers thererespect to the other suspectedareas suitable to deploymentsome or all of these locationsbe ICBM sites; on the other hand,be such sites at locations which areat present. There has beentime toattern, the areas
"The Assistant chief of StaJT for Intelligence,ol the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operationsepartment of the Navy, do not believeinimum number of two lo four ICBM sites were probably under eonalrue-Uonn areas ml tabic to deploymentm missiles, nor do they believe that auch sites are operational at Uie present Ume.uU statement of their poslUon, ace
poorly covered, and the security likely to be Imposed by the Soviets is stringent.
the foregoing examination ofevidence, it is possible to derive anumber of operational ICBMcan be supported on reasonablyIn addition, the results offor operational deployment sites,with the other elements of directcontribute to sense of theof the Soviet program. Thenumber of suspected areas andofew maskingmight be associated with ICBMare consistent with the deliberateactivities at Lhe lest range.reater capacity to produceICBMs than we believe it hassum, while the direct evidence remainsto establish with certainty theSoviet ICBM strength, it leads us lothat thc deployment program thusproceededeliberate rather thanurgent pace.
SOVIET PROGRAMMING DECISIONS
9 wasimeSoviet decisions on miliiary policy.private conversations within thc summer and fallreferred to studies to determinewould cost the USSR to buildforces sufficient to destroy theof the US andiswere ambiguous and are notprecise numericalthat Khrushchev had recentlyin the planning of productionprograms. This was almostrelated to the planning for majorof the Soviet militaryannounced in9 would haveexpectation of deployment with amissileimplified deployment con-
' The figure quoted by Khrushchev wasillion rubles. This amount Is not Inconsistent withfor several hundred long range ballistic missile launchers and associated missiles.
cept, for which Tyuratam launch area "C" may have been the prototype.
operational deploymentwe believe is now under way willcontinue over the next two or threescale and pace of this program winbe determined largely by: (a) thethe Soviet leaders regarding the ICBMrequire in this time period;fficiency in the scheduling andresources on the present weaponrelation to other military andand (c) the Soviet judgmenttrends tn their own and Westernand defensive weapon systems. Givenof technological change and theon research and developmentthe missile and antimissile fields init is likely that Soviet ICBMprogramming beyond theis highly tentative.
Perlinenl Soviel Stotcments
persuading their own followers tothe military reorganizationnd In debating thcon strategy and policy, theleaders have in the past year or somuch of their thinking aboutsystems. Thc most pertinent ofhave been of three types.have been Soviet statements thatseeks to achieve and maintain aover the West in weaponthe Soviets appear lo beualitative superiority insystems as much as to aSecond, there have been aof public and private references toemployment of ballisticwhat are termed "strategic""vitaln contexts which seemboth military bases and othernational strength such as industry,and population. KhrushchevSoviet leaders have spoken of theof achieving sufficientlo attack thesehrushchev privately toldBloc officialsissiles were
sufllclonl lo "destroy" the US,ere suMctcnt for Europe.
foregoing statements aboutare quite general, but they parallelSoviet commentary on the needan enemy's power base as well asforces in war. Military,population targets in Japan and theincluded in mock exercises byand bomber units In the Farhrushchev's referencemissiles is open to variousfigure may refer to operationalInventory or ready missiles In theto missiles detonating in the vicinity ofUS targets. Nevertheless. IIprevious assumption that thehad explored the question offor ICBMs. and It indicateshimself speaksCBMsformidable capability.*
SfaloQic Planning Factors
Soviets appear Lo have decided, forand short-term future atixed long range aLtack forceto rely exclusively on the ICBM forstriking power. Bomberof delivering large megatonnagesmaintained, and the USSR ismissile capabilities.combined striking force hasin providing greater flexibilitytactics and in complicating Westernproblems. In the light of thesewe consider it probable thatwill for yic foreseeable future retain
"According lo* intormatUm recently received< channel* which have provided reliable military inlorrnatloo in the past, several senior Soviet officers associated with missile acuvity have commented on the ICBM program along the folio wine lines: The Soviets are spending "millions'* of rubles on Ihe programne aueeoij Is achieved,agnified loretense that the USSR haa "hundreds" of ICBMs, in order to irapreu Uie West The ImpllcaUon thai Ihere are hundreds is only "Idle talk" at present, butorce will be achieved since the USSR's economy and policy ore "geared" for developingorce.
other Mtl<'i i'i im* mental weapon systems Lotheir ICBM forces.
n planning the present and future size of their ICBM force, the Soviet leaders have to weigh the advantages of an ICBM weaponas compared with bombers, missilesubmarines, and other advanced weapon systems. They have to consider Lhe superior capabilities of tlie ICBM forarge-scale atiack, In particular its suitability for surprise attack on US strategic bomber bases, fixed missile sites, communication centers, and other fixed installations related to thc UScapability. They have to weigh these advantages against such considerations as thc ability of thc heavy bomber to deliver very heavy mcgatonnages against difficult tar-gcls and targets of uncertain location, and the ability of the missile submarine to survive an initial Western strike and dclivor aretaliatory attack. Finally, they have to consider the entire target system which their planners have developed for attacking the US under the whole range of possibleand determine* what role ought to be allocated to the ICBM
s our own approach to an appreciation ot Lhe military capabilities that thr Soviets might" jitliicve by building up theirICBM capabilities, wc have computed the number of ICBM launchers thc Soviets would theoretically requireingle salvo designed lo inflict severe damage on various US targets. We have considered the following target systems: fixed bomber and missile bases of the US nuclear striking forces; com man i: centers associated with conlrol andfor these and other elements of US military strength; air defense busw; whoseby missile attack would Improve the chances of successful Soviet bomber missions; urban areasarge proportion of US industry, population, and other resources of national strength. We believe these are thc sorts of target systems the SovieU would have considered in evaluating their own ICBM requlremenU for potential useroad variety ol circumstances and kinds of attack.
Theoretical computations of this sort are extremely sensitive lo varying assumptionsthe Soviet view of the precise targets worth attacking, thc necessary or desirable amounts of damage to be tnliicted, and thc degree of assurance of Inflicting such damage to be sought. We have had to use US criteria for these factors. Such compulations are also sensitive to variations In the accuracy andof the Soviet ICBM system, about which thereargin of uncertainty in our estimates In addition, computationsan assumed attack against fast-reaction retaliatory systemshe bomber and missile bases) apply only to hypotheticalin which the Soviet force has achieved near-perfect surprise andof attack The Soviets are capable ofmore valid compulations about their own weapon system than we, but they too must be cautious about assessing in advance the results ol the first ICBM salvo in human history.
While computations of theoreticalrequirements do not provide any firm basis for estimating Soviet ICBM force goals, they doense of proportion with respect to the suitability of current andSoviet ICBMs for attacking various target systems In very general terms, we find that Soviet ICBMs ure well suited tbcities and relatively unprotectedtargets, including air and naval bases, soft and semi hardened ICBM sites, and soft and semlhardened command centers. Even with the improved performance projected. however. Soviet ICBMs do not appear to be well suited to attacking an ICBM force deployed in very hard siles.
Applying these same computations to various hypothetical Soviet force levels, we find-though with considerably lessunder favorable circumstances from their point of view, Soviet planners might expect to achieve Iho following theoretical capabilitiesingle ICBM salvo:
a- With roughly IiO launchers1 or any time thereafter, high assurance of being able
to detonate an ICBM warhead over each of therincipal US metropolitan areas.
aunchers,1 and Increasingof being able to inflicton the operational air bases of thcAir Command (SAC).
aunchers lnassurance of being able todamage on SAC air bases and onsemihardened ICBM sites as well.
aunchersmoderate to high assuranceable to Inflict severe damage, notSAC air bases and soft andsites, but also on other fixed softtargets associated withand defensive capabilities.
As the period advances, the Soviets could expect to achieve higher levels of assurance against the foregoing types of targets with fewer missiles, because Soviet ICBMwill probably Improve while the number of such targets will remain relativelyFor example,nd possibly as earlyhebove might be achieved with as fewaunchers. However, studies show that several thousand ICBM launchers would be required to provide the Soviets with reasonable assurance of an ability tn engage in eounterbaltery fire againsi the combined total of hard ICBM sites planned by the US for the period beginning
In evaluating the significance of various hypothetical numbers of ICBMs. Sovietwould take into account the likelihood that, for at least the next few years, the great preponderance of US megatonnage would be bomber-borne They would almost certainly seek an ICBM force large enough to blunt or at least disrupt the US bomber capabilily be-
a'fore launch so thai their air defenses wouldeasonable chance of preventing large-scale penetrations to Soviet target areas. However, they would also know that the US is rapidly acquiring significant capabilities with mobile and hardened missile forces, and
even at present the SAC airborne alert and dispersal capability tends tooviet ability to destroy air bases. Thus, thein US techniques tor thc protection and security of its own striking torces obliges thc Soviets to recognizeshould theyery largerowing segment of USpower which could not be eliminatedirst strike by ICBMs, even under the most favorable circumstances.
foregoing considerations do not,define any particular ICBMwhich the Soviets think appropriateneeds. They do, however, supportthat the USSR has strongbuildubstantial ICBM force,at least for present planningSoviets would probably look uponoperational ICBM launchers as aforce.
Effecls of Technological Change
Soviels probably desireigh salvo capability andin order to have ato launch an initital attack orestern attack. Thcbe approached by maintaining aof launchers to missiles, althoughnot fully overcome the problems ofand missile hold-times inherent inSoviet ICBM system. The latterbe achieved for the present system byand concealing operationalwith their very tight securitythe Soviets probably view theafforded by concealment andsusceptible to deterioration with time,in view of the reconnaissancethey would expect the USin the next few years.
ST. Many of the developments referred to in our other estimates, especially the missileprojected in, point to the period beginning34ime of major technological change in Soviet weapon systems. Principal among thewhich we can now foresee are initial
operational capabilitiesew ICBMin3 or after, and at least Umited deployment of an antimissile system designed for use against IRBMs and ICBMs, in the. Thereossibility that test firingsew ICBM have already begun at Tyuratam.n antimissile defenses has been under way in the USSR for several years.
The new ICBM system will probably beto overcome disadvantages in thesystem. It will probably use either slor-able liquid or solid fuels and Includeelements to increase flexibility and decrease vulnerability In deployment. It will probably be easier to deploy than the present system. Moreover, at that time thc oldest of the current Soviet heavy bombers will be approachingears In operational service. Although the USSR has developed alr-to-sur-face missiles for heavy bombers and could be developing new bombers for intercontinental use to supplement Its missile capabilities, there is little evidence that the Soviets have made the amount of progress necessary to avert obsolescence in this field. We estimate that3 the Soviets cquld also achieve acapability with ballistic missiles in nuclear powered submarines. In thc same time period, the USSR could alsoong range, ground-launchedaerodynamic vehicle foror weapon delivery. These and other developments could effectively supplement the ICBM force.
, however, US forces willto include numerous hard ICBM sites. Wc cannot exclude the possibilityew Soviet ICBM could achieve accuracies and rcliabililies excellent enough to permit the USSR to contemplate counterbattery fire, but it is extremely unlikely that such improved performance could be attained before late in the decade. Even so, the fast reaction times of US systems and increasing US strength in mobile missiles would probably preclude effective counterbattery fire. The Soviets would probably decide that, in these circumstances, it would be desirable to adopt
measures such as hardening lor the protection ol their own ICBM forces, and also to develop more advanced offensive techniques. Moreover, they would probably regard the achievement of effective antimissile defenses as an important element in solving their problem.
potential effectiveness of Sovietdefenses will therefore be anfactor ln theirs receiving verybut we do not know with anywhen ineriod theydeploy antimissile defenses, nor dohow effective the initial capabilityIf thc initial system has only acapability, its significance wouldpolitical and psychological.if thc Soviets conclude that theirsystem could provide reasonableof coping with some substantialthe Western ballistic missile capability,be strongly motivated to commitresources to its deployment, even, weto the extent of divertingwould otherwise be allocated tosystems. This conclusion rests partlyhigh priority accorded to militarythe USSR over the years, but also onthat in Soviet eyes the earlyantimissile defenses would constitute atechnological victory over the US
PROBABLE RANGE OF SOVIET FORCE LEVELS1*
this concluding section of thepresent an estimate of probable currentsoviet ICBM strength, based oninterpretations we believe candrawnjrom the evidence and from an ap-
"The Director of Intelligence and Research.of State, the Assistant Chief of StaO for nteUigenee. Department of the Army,ff of Naval Operations (Intelligence),of the Navy, and the Assistant Chief of Staff,USAF. do not concur in the range of ttrreal and future ICBM force .levels estimated icrein For their positions, see their statementsrespectively atnd Bl.
preciation of our own ability to acquire such evidence. We again emphasize that theevidence Ls insufficient to establish with certainty thc scale and pace of the present Soviet ICBM deployment program. Ourtherefore also rests on the Indirectand other considerations discussed in preceding sections, including the strategic ideas which we believe govern Soviet military policy, the approximate levels of ICBM strength which the Soviet leadership appears to be seeking, our general knowledge of Soviet military programming practices, and our sense of the tempo at which the presentis being conducted. For these reasons, our estimates of current and future Soviet ICBM capabilities are expressed as ranges.
From the direct and indirect evidence at hand, we judge that the USSR Is buildingseveral hundred operational ICBM launchers, to be acquired as soon aswithin the next few years. Theof resources is probably quite large, bul Lhus far thc programming has apparently been deliberate in pace. It Isesire for efficiency in scheduling the construction and activationumber of launching complexes dispersedide geographic area. The production of missiles and training of troops could be scheduled to fit into whatever site activation schedule was deemed practicable.
In order to achieveoal, aand well-coordinated program of launcher activation would be requirederiod of several years. In determining the activation rales which the USSR could achieveuildupear or two. wc have taken into account the grouping of several pairs of launchers into complexes, thc tasks andinvolved in the preparation ol theseand the lime required to construct and activate them We believe that launcherrates ofer.year would be consistent with the sense of the current tempo of the ICBM program which we have derived from tbe direct and Indirect evidence avail-
" Because it ts impossible to pinpoint the threshold of activity which ourcollection resources would detect, we cannotresent rate somewhat higherer year.
ince it would requireoonths ror launching complexes to be brought toreadiness, our judgment regardingactivation rates bears most directly on ICBM deployment at present and through the next year or two. Such activation rates are not likely to remain constant; they arc likely to vary considerably within this approximate range from year to year, depending on the configuration of the ICBM sites and areas of their deployment. Although we believe that the Soviets have substantially passed through the learning period of thc activation program, as they gain additional experience it will be easier for them to Increase the rate. At the same time, other considerations suchew ICBM. developments in their antimissile program, and alternative uses of Uie resources involved will influence their decisions as to the rate of ICBM activaUon. Taking these factors into account, we believe it reasonable to project an average launcher activaUon rate of approximatelyer year during thc period
Force lovels In
e believe that the probable Soviet force level ins in the range0 operational ICBM launchers, together with the necessary operaUonal missile inventories and trained crews. This would probablythe present existent ofCBM site-complexes. This estimate ihould be regardedeneralThe major bases for It are our sense
Assistant Chlel ol Slaff for Intelligence, De-Piirtincnl of the Army, and Ihe Assistant Chief of "aval Operationepartment of thc .
oncutau,tthcr acUvalion rateyear can be supported "by the sense "tne current tempo of the icnMhey in the light of Uie direct and indirect evi-"ne. available, be able to aay only lhatIUU, MUw*Uonlln BtMet gross cap.
of the tempo of the program and our judg' ment as to Uie relationship between what our evidence supports and what our coverage is likely lo have missed.orce level could have been acquired through either the smooth or phased deployment programs which can be derived from interpretation of the test range data.
Force Levelshile deployment to date has probably been deliberate in scale and pace, we believe that the USSR is nowubstanUal ICBM capability. Soviet planning for Uie next few years probably anticipates the advent in3 or afterew ICBM syslem, and deployment of the present system will probably taper off and then ceaseuildup with the new syslem begins. This Lransi-tion might affect the overall rate at which deployment occurs, for example, thc Soviets might decrease this rate for the presentbefore the new one comes in. and then accelerate It thereafter when the new system becomes ready for deployment. Over the next few years, however, we believe that the launcher activation rate will probably average0 per year, which would result in force levels about aslaunchers innn
"The Inventory of operaUonal missiles associated with these numbers of launchers would of course be higher, and the cumulative producUon total higher .mi We have little evidence on theactually obtaining in the Soviet procram. In general, however, we believe that Ihe following assumptions are reasonable: (a) toigh salvo capability, lo simplify maintenance andand toodest reserve of missiles for possible subsequent use, Ihe Soviet operofionol ICSM inventory would include some threeor each pair ot operational launchers; (b) the operaUonal ICBM inventory would also Include missiles allocated lo operational unils but not yet Integrated Into Uie complete weapon system at deployment sites,ipeline equivalent to about two months*(c) the cumulaUve total of produeflari miuites would be about SO percent larger than-thai required for the foregoing operaUonal purposes, with ihe remaining producUon missiles allocated to suchaaining. static. spaceetc.
planning tor this periodthe attainment inew ICBM system which willflexibility and less vulnerability inDeployment of the presentwill probably taper off and then ceasebuildup with thc new system begins.for the new ICBM system mayinrear later. If so,for the present system would almosthave begun to phasc down beforetherefore consider thatlaunchers remains the best presentof the Soviet force In
deployment program for thisbe significantly affected by suchas US acquisition ofand mobile missiles and othercapabilities, and by Sovietantimissile defenses. Sovietould be enlargedover4 level in view ofdevelopments. On thethese anticipated changes in therelationship may appear to thcto warrant no increase in forcemore likely,oderate increase.unable lo predict what the Sovietwill be regarding, the Interplay offactors, and thereoodthe Soviet leaders themselves havecomeefinite decision.
POSITION ON THE ICBM PROGRAM OF THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE ANDDEPARTMENT OF STATE
Director of Intelligence andState, does not concur inHe believes (a) that NIEinclude an estimale of theforce which the USSR could haveand thatorce couldperational launchers, andthe probable Soviet force level inis in the range5 operational
launchers and will increasenndn
force levels. In his opinion,on Soviet long range attackprovide policymakers with anthe largest ICBM force which thehave deployed to date, based on an10 andigorousprogram. He regards such anof the possibleorce level asimportant as thc estimate of theforce level. Indeed, by making nojudgment about thc possiblelevel, the Estimateisservicepolicymaker by encouraging him toonly force levels within the probableat the same time, advisinghat "the USSRreaterto produce and deploy ICBMs thanit hashenot know, on thc basis of thehe can exclude all force levelsbeyond those slightly above therange or whether he cannot excludelevel substantially higher than therange. Yet it is precisely thisICBM strength which he needs toaccount in making decisions bearingon US national security.
Director of Intelligence andof State, realizes that anpossible Soviet strength in any weaponis less essential when there isto narrow the range of ourjudgments. However, in the caseICBM, the available evidence is notto establish current Sovietreasonably narrow limits. Theand annexes acknowledge thatrelating to ICBM deploymentariety of ways, that thereuncertainties in the analyses of suchas Soviet force goals andand that vast areas of the USSRcovered or only poorly covered by USefforts. Under such circumstances, it
is essential to estimate the highest force level that can be reconciled with the evidence and thereby indicate thc range of possibilities which cannot be excluded.
The view of thc Director of Intelligence and Research. Department of State, is that thc USSR could have as manylaunchers Ine emphasizes that an ICBM force of this size is definitely less likely than one half as large, but he believes that the chances arc sufficiently good tothis estimate of possible current strength in an NIE on Soviet long range attackBy thc same token, heorce levelslaunchers. He bases his estimate on the following considerations:
available evidence on the Sovietprogram can beteady buildup of operationalwith ICBM testingthe inferred tempo of the Sovietsuggests that the probable size ofICBM force is substantially lessoperational launchers, it does notpossible force level ofaunchers.
production IsimitingSite activation rates in excess ofper year are within Sovieteconomic capabilities. In order looperational launchers bytnecessary to begin construction ofsites for,r construction of sites withlaunch pads before earlyconstruction times needonths and siterates in excessaunchers pernot have to be achieved in leas thanallowed for the initialeployment program resultingoperational launchers inanout within the limits set by theto t* most critical
of thc limitations of ourcoverage, together wiih the highSoviet securily. substantial ICBMcould have occurred without beingby US collection efforts. In anychances of detecting Soviet deploymentdepend on the number of sites under
construction or completed. There isuncertainty in the number of launchers per site to allowonsiderable Increase in aggregate ICBM strength without aincrease in the number of sites.
d. On the other hand, It is very unlikely that construction of the first operational sites began before initiation of test firing or that high rates of site activation were achieved early in the deploymentate of site construction in excess of that required toorce level ofaunchers inrobably would have created severe organizational problems and possibly would have strained Soviet resources.an ICBM force oflaunchers is believed to be thepracticable level which the USSR could have achieved by
uring the next year or so the USSR could increase Its ICBM force much more rapidly than in the past, since more simplified launch pads would be constructed at new sites. Wiih several years experience behind them, the Soviets could achieve an activation rate ofaunchers per year by2 and an operational force ofCBMs might be deployed byhereafter deployment could be accelerated if Soviet planners decideigh ICBM force goal
robable force levels. The Director of Intelligence and Research. Department of Stale, believes that the probable size of the current Soviet ICBM force is in5 range and that this force is likely toperational launchers innhe higher figures for current strength reflect his judgment that thc pace of the Soviet ICBM program Is in fact more rapid than the NIE implies: theigher figures for future strength arc based on his Judgmentite activation rateaunchers per year should be used in projecting the upper limit of the probable program Underlying both judgments is his
that Soviel leaders seek toorce of several hundred operational ICBM launchers before Uie USarge number of hardened sites and mobile long range missiles. The Soviet deployment program, consequently. Ls likely to be pursuedairly rapid pace In the next year or two.
It is recognized that the additional ICBMs estimated forould not materially increase current Soviet long range attack capabilities.orce OfCBMs aroundould enable thc USSR to bring all SAC operational air bases and soft ICBM sites under attack by missiles alone or, alternatively, lo have moderateof inflicting severe damage tocenters, air defense bases, and missile-launching submarine bases, as well as SAC operational Installations. Thiswould be achieved approximately one year sooner than is possible with theICBM force as estimated in lhe NIE text. In particular, it would be achieved before the number of hard ICBM sites planned by the US begins to increase sharply.
Whether deployment thereafterapid rale or level off depends on such factors as Soviet success inew ICBM system and antimissile defenses, Ihcir assessment of US retaliatory capabilities in theeriod, and the extent to which Soviet leaders become convinced thai very high ICBM force gouls arc necessary or desirable. If Soviet leaders decide to build loward an effective ICBM capability against large numbers of US missiles in hardened sites or toubstantial ICBM retaliatory capability by the middle of the decade, then the Soviet deployment program would beHowever, there is at least an equal chance that ICBM deployment will taper oft sometime3 since Soviet planners might consider it more advantageous to accelerate their antimissile defense program. In that case, an ICBM forceperational launchers would be maintained Ineriod.
POSITION ON THE ICBM PROGRAM OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FORDEPARTMENT OF THEND THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OFEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
he Assistant Chief of Staff forDepartment of the Army, and theChief of Noval Operations, Department of the Navy, have entered several specific footnotes in the body of this estimate expressing their differing opinion. The basis for these footnotes, and the only fundamental difference with judgments in the estimate, is their estimate of current force levels of Soviet operational ICBMasic difference affecting current force levels is their judgment concerning thc date when thc Soviets first achieved an operationalwith deployed ICBMs. They do notthat this occurred Ln Januaryhe following factors, well supported byweigh heavily in their judgment against the Soviets having attained or eveneployed operational capability by that time with their existing ICBM:
a. The size of the existing Soviet0 pounds and about twice the size ofhc difficulties involved In the use of nonslnrablc liquid fuel, andail network are factors which combine to make launcherajor undertaking which they believe would have been detected by US Intelligence if any substantial program had been undertaken.
Despite large and representative collections of evidence, our intensive search has failed to Identify even probable operational ICBM si te-com pi exes.
d. It has been characteristic of other Soviet missile programs that prototype or trial launch sites were constructed at the test range before or. at Lhc latest, concurrently
the construction of an operationalIndications of construction ofrototype site for the ICBM did not appear at the test range0 and it wasnot completed until0 or
e. Recent test firings of ICBMs, in whichhas dropped sharply
3 suggest the
introduction of redesigned systemor both.
I analysis of which Indicates that the Soviets did notarge scaleeffort under way beforeonsideringonths construction time, this would indicate no large operationalprior to
he Assistant Chief of Staff forDepartment o( the Army, and theChief of Naval OperationsDepartment of lhe Navy, believeappearance of the probablesite, the increased pace of
the view lhat tho Soviets may now be about to deploy some ICBMs ol the existingtype and clearly strengthen theirthat the Soviets did noteployed ICBM capabilityhis judgment. In turn, influences their view of thcf ICBM deployment in thenorlhwest portion of the USSR. While information is not yet firm enough to rule out the possibility ot ICBM deployment at Plesetsk and Polyarnyy Ural, as well as at two other locations, they believe it unlikely that sites for ICBMs of the type described above were constructed in those areas in the time, which would have re-
quired site design and decision to deploy prior to the first Soviet firing of an ICBM.
The Assistant Chief of Staff forDepartment of the Army and theChief of Naval OperationsDepartment of the Navy, believe that the evidence available on thc Soviet ICBMprogram is sufficiently complete and valid to support the conclusion that little, if any, ICBM deployment has occurred, and that the near absence of evidence ofstrengthens that conclusion.
On the basis of all thc evidence and the reasoning outlined above, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief ofepartment of the Navy, estimateew" operaUonal Soviet ICBM launchers torlthough they do not consider the evidence sufficient torecise estimate of the Soviet planning for future ICBM strength, they accept thcin thc textenerally valid measure of the scale and paceuild-up. Therefore, on the basis ofrudent andprojection of Soviet deployed ICBM launcher strength Ihey estimate as follows-
POSiriON ON THE ICBM PROGRAM OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF,USAF
he Assistant Chief of Stan, Intelligence. USAF. does not concur with the judgments reached herein on the nature of the current and future Soviet lorcc goals or the strategic considerations which determine theirIn his view the estimate of current force levels does not accurately represent the scope of deployment indicated by the nature and quality of the evidence thus farbut reflects instead the impact of thc extreme security measures which havethe broad scope of the Soviet ICBMfrom Its inception. In addition, hethat proper allowance has not been made in the estimate for the lack of IntelH-
gence coverage of the many areas in the USSR in which ICBM deployment may have been carried out,
The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF. believes that the Sovietto achieve world domination has fostered recognition of thc fact that the ultimate elimination of the US. as the chief obstacle to the achievement of their objective,be accomplishedlearof military capability. Moreover. Soviet doctrine and deeds suggest to him that the Soviet hierarchy are mindful of the fact that few, if any, lasting major politicalIn history have been achieved without the supporting bulwark of superior military power.
The history of their ballistic missiletestifies to an early recognition by the Soviets of the unprecedented potential offered by such weapons and reflects theirto exploit that potential by makingmissiles the dominant system in their strategic strike force. Their highly successful ICBM testing record reflects thc qualitative achievement of their well-planned,program which would facilitate theof predetermined force goals of any reasonable magnitude Soviet efforts to mask their program in secrecy indicate thewhich they attach to their growingcapability Moreover, evidence developed in spite of their security measures revealsdeployment concurrent with the testing phase of their program. This concurrency is aindication of Soviet determination to maximize their operational capability at the earliest practicable time. In this connection, the evidence on deployment Is consistent with the cslimateMhat the Soviets achieved their initial operational capabilitynd in the intervening periodear
alf, torought toreadiness atnd possibly an even greater number of operational ICBM launchers.
onsidering the emphasis which theplace on secrecy, and the absence of other than partial intelligence coverage on most of the areas most suitable for ICBM deployment, we could not expect lo identify moremall portion of the Soviet ICBM deployment program. Nevertheless the Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAF. has identified at least six areas on which there is reasonably good evidence of ICBM deployment. Within these areas he believes there are betweennd perational ICBM site-complexes. Further, he has aboutdditional areas under active consideration on which evidence indicates the possibility of ICBM launch site construction. Considering thc economics of logistic support and specialized maintenance and control problems, Lhc siting of several site complexeseployment area is highlyand should be expected. Therefore,actual orby thcdditionalthc existence ofrogram of magnitude. Even though idenlificatlon of some of tlie suspect areas should later prove erroneous, undoubtedly others will beto replace them as lhe delay inreporting catches up with the actual
n view of the above, the Assistant Chief of Slaff. Intelligence. USAF. estimates UieICBM launcher availability as
BEST tStlf*Original document.