SINO-SOVIET AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES THROUGH MID-1966 (NIE 11-3-61)

Created: 7/11/1961

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER Supersedes)

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL

SINO-SOVIET AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES THROUGH

summed bv ihe

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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TABLE OF CONN-NTS

Page

THE

SUMMARY AND

Surface-to-Air

Antimissile

Fighters and Other Air Defense

Supporting

Civil

Warning

Current Capabilities and Future

I.

II.

III. AIR DEFENSE

Surface-to-Air

Antimissile*

Fighter

Alr-lo-Air

Antiaircraft

IV RADAR AND CONTROL

Early Warning

Ground-Control led Intercept

Future

Electronic

Detection of Missile

Communications and

V. CIVIL

VI. SOVIET AIR DEFENSE

Warning

Current Capabilities and Future

TOP onouB-p

ANNEX A; TABLES OF AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT

Page

TABLE 1: Probable Soviet Development Program for Surface- o-Air Missile Systems

TABLE 2: Estimated Performance of Soviet Interceptor Aircraft 19

TABLE 3: Estimated Performance of Soviet Airborne Intercept adars

TABLE 4: Probable Soviel Development Program for Air-to-Air issile Systems

TABLE 5: Estimated Performance and Characteristics of Soviet arly Warning and GCI Radars

TABLE 6: Estimated Characteristics of Bloc Antiaircraft Guns 23

TABLE 7: Estimated Actual Strength and Deployment of Sine- oviet Bloc Air Defense Equipment

TABLE 8; Composition of Bloc Jet Fighter Forces by Aircraft odel

ANNEX 8; MAPS OF AIR DEFENSE DEPLOYMENT

FIGURE 1: Estimated Deployment of Selected Bloc Air

FIGURE 2: Surface-to-Air MissUe Defenses of Soviet Urban-Industrial Areas

FIGURE 3: Surfnce to-Air Missile Sites In Germany. Mid-lSCl

FIGURE 4: Estimated Limits of Bloc Early Warning Capabilities.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE CIA HISTORICfiL-REVlEW PROGRAM

SINO-SOVIET AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES THROUGH

THE PROBLEM

To examine thc scale and nature of the Sino-Soviet Bloc air defensend probable trends in its capabilities through

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Thc scale of effort presently beingto the continuing improvement and modernization of the Soviet air defense system is indicative of the high priority assigned to this mission. During the past two to three years, the Soviet air defense establishment has been undergoing atransition which has significantlyits capabilities. The principalof this transition are: (a) Lhedeployment of surface-to-airsites; (b) the installation of aircommunications and controlwith semiautomatic features; (c) the deployment of new fighters and radars to Eastern Europe and areas near the borders of the USSR; and (d) aof air defense districts. Otherinclude the advent of radars with better detection and height-finding capabilities, and the equipment ofwith more advanced electronic gear and armament, including air-to-air missiles. )

' Includes defenses against inls&lles and satellites.

Surfoce-lo-Alr Mitliloi

The Soviets now have operational two types of surface-to-air missiles designed (or defense against medium and highair attacks, The first of thesehich has been operational for about five years. Is deployed only around Moscowassive complex ofites, each havingaunching positions. This system was apparently designed tothe massed air raid threat of thes ands )

Sincehe USSR has beenin the extensive deploymentecond-generation surface-to-air missile systemhich appears designed to cope with the threat posed by small numbers of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons ratherassed raid threat Considering thc pattern ofthc length of time the program has been under way. and the extent of our intelligence covcruge, wc estimateites (each with six launchers) are now operational at aboutefended areas in thc USSR. Byhe So-

-fen frH

2

probably will liave deployedites atareas in the USSR. There is little evidence on possible requirements forof field forces, but wc estimate that0 mobile missile units may be deployed by the end3 for theof such semifixed targets as major headquarters and logistics centers. We believe that the USSR intends to provideefenses for the fixed launching complexes of its long range ballisticforces, but we are unable to estimate thc level and extent of defenses planned.)

Deployment ofites in theSatellites has been under way for moreear. Thc heaviesthas occurred in East Germany where as many asites may beor under construction. Some of these, locateding around Berlin, arc manned by East German forces; others, which defend important Soviet military targets, are assigned to Soviet field forces. We believe that additionalites wiil be deployed In theduring the next year or two. and that some mobile units may be provided for Satellite ground forces. We have no reliable evidence indicating thcof surface-to-air missiles inChina, although some deployment may have taken place or be planned for the future. )

The Soviets have had undera surface-to-air systemhich we believe is specifically designed to engage targets at very low altitudes. Although no operational sites have been observed, we believe that this system will probably be available for operational use Considering the scale and pace

of thcrogram, wc believe thatill be extensively deployed within the next three or four years,existing missile defenses of fixed tar-gels and field forces. )

Antrmiuilo Program

o develop defenses against ballistic missiles, the Soviets have had under way for several years an extensive and high priority program which we believe to be directed primarily toward defense against IRBMs and ICBMs. We have no basisirm estimate on the date of initial operational deploymentoviet anti-ballistic missile system or its effectiveness against the various types of Westernmissiles. For political as well as military reasons, the Soviets probably would wish to deployew critical areas even if the available system provided only ainterim capability. Considering these factors and the present status of the Soviet research and developmentwe estimate that In thehe Soviets will begin at least limited deployment of an antimissileWe believe that for some years to come, the Soviets are likely to havearginal capability under mostconditions for interference with US satellites. )

Figfitci ond Other Air Defense Weapon*lthough the Soviets are clearlyheavy reliance on surface-to-airthey continue to maintain large numbers of fighter aircraft andguns in service. We estimate that there arc0 fighters inunits throughout the Bloc, withn Soviet units. The Soviet

eioon&T-

iightcr force has been considerablyinthe order ofy thc phasing out ofequipment. The force has beenby the introductionewof radar-equipped interceptorand the wider deployment of air-to-air missiles. However, its all-weatherremains quite limited.ground-to-air voiceImpose severe limitations on much of thc Soviet fighter force; but thoseare not so severe in those more modern fighter units deployed for the most part on the Western approaches to thc USSR. Considering the widespread deployment of surface-to-air missiles, we believe that over the next year or so most of the remaining medium and heavy guns will be phased out of the defenses of static targets in the USSR. Light AAA probably will be phased out in areas wheres deployed, but will be retained for low altitude defense of other targets)

quipment

eavy prime radarsuxiliary radars areatites in the Sino-Soviet Bloc Radar coverage now extends over thc entire USSR and virtually all the remainder of the Bloc. Under optimum conditions this system now has theto detect and track aircraft at medium and high altitudes. of Bloc territory; under virtually all cdnditions, thc system could detect and track such aircraft within. Soviet efforts to reduce theof their air defense radars tocounter measures have included use of greater frequency diversity andpower. In developing new radars,

the Soviets probably will concentrate on improving present limited capabilities against low altitude targets and against air-to-surface missiles, )

most important advance indefense communications andthe last few years has been theand deployment ofsystems with data-handlingfor rapid processing of airand data link equipmentinterceptors. Similarare used with surface-to-airunits. These new systems willmarked effect in reducing reactionvulnerability to saturation,Information handling capacity,coordination within the airsystem. )

Deployment

defense weapons andmost heavily concentrated inof the USSR westinethe Kola Peninsula lo thein Bast Germany, Poland, andand in the southern portionSoviet Far East Concentrationsat some specific locationsareas, especially in the Urals andChina. The approaches toare by far the most heavilyof the Bloc.

Civil Delen&e

illion Soviet citizensage ofave received somein civil defense and aboutthese have probably received goodin elementary civilThe bulk of thelacks adequate shelters,ubstantial lead over any of

D BO BET-

4

Western Powers in the construction of urban shelters which could provide some protection against fall-out, debris, and fire. In the past two years, thehave given increasing attention to prcatlack evacuation of nonessentialin thc eventhreateningbut this program appears to be still in the planning stage. Even with limited warning, the existenceisciplined organization, the use of shelter, and the widespread knowledge of simplesuch as first aid would probably reduce casualties considerably, especially among key personnel. However, Soviet civil defense Is not prepared to cope with the effects of large-scale nuclear attack Moreover, it would function extremely poorly under conditions of short warning time. )

Warning Timo

he amount of warning timesignificantly affects thc capabilities of air defense in various areas of the Bloc. Early warning radar could now giveand many other targets in themore than one hour's warning of medium and high altitude attacks made with Western bombers of2 typo. Soviet assurance of such detection would be greatly reduced by extremely low level penetrations. The supersonic bombers and atr-to-surfacc missiles now being added to Western inventories couldthis warning time by as much asercent. Moreover, the more limited early warning time available in Blocareas would reduce the effectiveness of the defenses of even heavily defended targets in such areas. As the speeds of Western aerodynamic vehicles increase, and as Western ballistic missiles become

greater threat, the problem of warning

time will become more critical.

Cuircnl Capabilities and Fufuf* Trends

present capabilities of thedefense system would bepenetrations by subsonicdaylight and clear weathernduch conditions, virtually allBloc air defense weapons couldto bear against attackingMost Soviet fighters canaltitudes up to0 feet,up to0 feet, but theof thc fighter force would beconsiderably during periodsor poor visibility. In thewidespread areas defendedmissiles, air defensewould be virtually unimpairedconditions and wouldeet, with someto0 feet.

its recent andhowever, the Soviet airsystem would still have greatIn copingarge-scaleariety of weaponstactics, even withinaltitudes. Ateet, the capabilities ofwould beeet, the systemmost of its effectiveness. AtUSSR has little capability foragainst very low

Soviets are making vigorousto counter Western weaponthe next five years, they will prob-

eve-R

ably introduce improved radars and ail-weatherurface-to-air missile system designed to counter low altitude air attack, and antimissileHowever, they probably will still notigh degree of assurance in copingarge-scale sophisticated attack by manned bombers. They would probably expect toignificant number of the attackers, but given the increasing complexity of the air defense

problem, we doubt they will be confident of the extent to which they can reduce the weight of such an attack. The air defense problem has been radically altered by the advent of long-range ballistic missiles. Barring an unforeseen technological breakthrough, the USSR's air defenseand uncertainties will sharply increase as ballistic missilesarger proportion of tho West's totaldelivery capability. )

DISCUSSION

GENERAL

The Soviet leaders recognize that anair defense system is an essentialof the strong military posture which they wish to maintain, both to contribute to the security oi the Bloc and to support their foreign policies. The scale of effort presently being applied to the continuing improvement and modernization of the Soviet air defense system is Indicative, of the high priorityto this mission.

The air defenses of the Sino-Soviet Bloc are being adjusted toore efficient combination of lighter and missile defenses for thc protection of major population, Industrial, and military centers, especially those in the USSR. The alt defense forces of theSatellites, andesser extent those of thc Asiatic Communist nations, arcwith the Soviet system.

During the past two to three years, the Suvici air defense system has beenajor transition which has significantlyits capabilities against medium and high altitude air attack. The principalof this transition are: (a) the extensive deployment of surface-to-air missile sites; (b) the installations of air defense control systems with semiautomatic features; (c) thcof new fighters in significant numbers to Eastern Europe and areas near the borders of thc USSR; andonsolidation of air de-

fense districts. Other developments include the advent of radars with better detection and height-finding capabilities and theof more advanced electronic gear and armament, including air-to-air missiles, into interceptor aircraft. It is probable lhatSoviet defenses will soon begin toweapons and control systems designed to cope more effectively with low altitude air attack.

These trends and developments arc lhc fruit of intensive Soviet research andin defense systems to counter expected Western air attack capabilities. At present, thc highest Soviet priority in air defenseand development is almost certainly being accorded to defense against ballistic missiles.

In recent years, thc USSR has allocated lo air defense forces an estimated one-fourth of the total military expenditures that can be attributed to broad military missions.expenditures for air defense probably will grow over the next five years even if noof antimissile defenses isProduction and construction for an operational antimissile system wouldincrease these expenditures,loward thc end of the period. Because of thc high priority assigned lo the airmission and the rapid growth of the Soviet economy, we believe that economic con-

jlderations will not hinder the substantial programs estimated for Soviet air defense.

H. ORGANIZATION

Soviet forces deployed for the airof Uie USSR arc underingle major headquarters,Strany (Air Defense of thecombines ground, air. and navalThe Commander in Chief of thcis exeputy Minister ofand thc chief advisor to thc Ministeruf the General Stuff on air defenseAdministratively, he ranks withIn chief of the ground, air,rocket forces.

chief components assigned to theare the Air Observation.Communication (VNOS) service,Aviation of Air Defensethe Antiaircraft Artillery of Airthe latter componentantiaircraft guns and surface-to-airIn addition to forces directlySoviet forces whleh can contributeair defense mission are alsoto this command.

ver the past year, the conlrol structure of the Soviel ulr defense system husumber of changes, which In the main have affected the size and responsibility of the air defense districturing thisumber of these were combined withdistricts, reducing their number from an estimatedhe greater areagiven to thc ADD commanders reflects the impact of more advanced weapons anddefensive andwhich probably will bring further reductions in the number of air defense districts.

hc ADD headquarters is charged with the coordination and control of forces In the district actively contributing to air defense It is also responsible for identification and

' Tbc term "air defense district" ls used to describe the organizational elements of the airhough only the Moscow and liakii Air Dc-fense District* have been Identified by name.

filtering of tracks and passing air situation data to regional centers in Moscow and Khabarovsk, lo adjacent ADD. to subordinate elements, and to other agencies within the district. The district Is dividedumber of air defense sectors which perform duties similar to tliose of the ADD but within their more limited oreas. The air defense systems of the European Satellites are organized on the Soviel pattern, and each Satellitein much the same manner as another Soviet ADD. The air defense systems of East Germany and Hungary, where Soviet forces ore deployed, appear to be under direct Soviet control.

IR DEFENSE WEAPONS Surfoce-fo-Air Missiles

he SovieU now have operational two types of rurface-to-air missile systemsfor defense against medium and high altitudehc first of these) is deployed only around Moscowense and costly complex ofites, which wehas been fully operational sinceach site hasaunching positions. The chief advantages of theystem are lis ability to handlearge number of targets and to direct an extremely high rate of fire against them. However, the limited azimuth coverage of each site) makes the system rather inflexible, and in its present configuration it is completely Immobile.

heystem was apparently designed primarily to counter tho massed air raid threat to thendvencompletion of the deployment around Moscow, it is probable that concepts of the threat had changed. Moreover, theof effort involved In deployment of therobably also argued against Its use in less critical areas.

'For operational characterlsUcs of surface-to-air missiles sec Annex A, Table I. These and othermissile systems are discussed In greater detail In NIBT, "Sonet Technical capabilities In Guided Missiles 3nd Spaceated (TOP SECRET)

ince latehc USSK has beenajor operational capability with ansurface-to-air miulle systemhich appears suitable for the defense of both fixed targets and fieldypical fixed site consists of six revelled launchingdeployeduidance radar and linked by service roads to facilitate loading. Although many of the observed sites clearly repiesent permanent installations, allcomponents of the system are mounted on wheeled vehicles and are capable ofmovement by road or rail.

he missile employed in this systemarge, boosted two-stage missile (designated GUIDELINE by US Intelligence) with avelocity of about. Maximum Intercept range Is estimatedut will vary depending upon type of target,angle, and other operational factors. Maximum altitude capabilily Iseet, with some effectiveness up0 feet, especially If equippeduclear warhead. Based on the manner in whichaunchers arc sited, it seems clear that the system is not intended for employment against low altitude targets. Against subsonic targets lowcapability probably will averageeet, but variations In such factors as siting conditions and target speeds couldin low altitude limits as loweet or as higheet. Against supersonic targets, low altitude limits would be higher. There Is some evidence that the Sovietsconsider that the minimum SA-2altitude would be0 feet, but wc do not know the circumstancesIn the Soviet calculations.

hesystem appears designed to cope with the threal posed by small numbers ofcarrying nuclear weapons ratherassed raid threat. Flexibility andare Its chief advantages over then contrast to the massiveites, each of which Is capable of defendingimited sector around the target area, eachite appears capable' coverage. Theystem can, at relatively low cost, be deployed widely for defense of large cities, of small but important fixed facilities, and of

forces In the field. Thc flexibility is obtained at the expense of target handling and rate of

fire relative to lhcheuidance system can probably handle only one targetime, but apparently Is designed to control as many as three missiles simultaneously. However, lhe shorter time of flight of the boosted GUIDELINE missile gives theetter capability againstand high-speed targets and againstwith small radar cross sec lions. Severalites have been deployed aroundsupplementing theystem.

oviet urban-industrial areas. Thes now the basic missile defense system for critical urban-industrial areas in the USSR, other than Moscow.* Sinceoreites have been Identified in the USSR at neatlyuchthe most part, population centers and industrial complexes. Missile defenses have beenfor more than half of theoviet cities with populations greater. and we believe lhat all such population centers will be defended.ites have been cmplaced at some smaller urban areas, probablythey contain Installations of criticaland they have been deployed for defense of naval and port facilities andproduction and weapons alorage They have also been identified atIndustrial facilities (Including pi unary electric power stations, metallurgical plants, and major oil refineries). Considering the pattern of deployment observed to date, the length of time the program has been under way. and the extent of our intelligencewc estimateites are nowat aboulrban-Industrial areas in the USSa.

dentification of additional sites andareas since the publication of, "Sino-Soviet Air Defense Capablli-ties Throughated0 (TOPonfirms that the SA-2program Is massive in scale. The accumulating evidence has led to an Increase in our estimate of the number ofites

'See Annex B. Figure 2.

e provided, and to modifications tn our estimate of thc timing of the program. On the basis of current information, we nowthat the Sovicis will deployites atrban-Industrial areas in the USSR, rather than Lheites at0 areas.1 of sites underand tho apparently incomplete defense In certain target areas lead us to estimate that thc program to provide missile defenses for areas of the foregoing types is still under way. We believe that It will be completed by

Soviet military installations and field forces. The Soviets have provided SA-2for nuclear weapons storage(as Indicatednd there isthat certain missile developmentare also defended byites. Wethat the USSR Intends to provideefenses for the fixed launching complexes of its long-range ballistic missile forces, but we are unable lo estimate the level and extent of defenses planned.

Somenits have been deployed In support of Soviet ground forces ln East Oermany and possibly in tbe USSR. Theis Insufficient to determine thc level of defense planned for the Soviet ground forces. Some of thesenits have been observed thus far at fixed installations. However, this missile system is suitable for use with mobile units, all equipment is mounted on wheeled vehicles, and there is some evidence that thc Sovietnits in Germany have conducted training In mobility. We believe the Soviets will seek to provide the field forces withmissile defenses for the protection of such semifixed targets as major headquarters and logistic centers. We estimate that suchcould be provided bynd that this program could be completed by the endome may also be allocated to other Bloc ground forces.

Ofher defended areas in the Bloc.ofites for defense ofSatellite targets has been under way for moreear. Missile defenses have been observed in East Germany, Hungary, and Bul-

garia, and evidence indicates their deployment In Czechoslovakia and Poland. At least oneite has been observed in Albania, but there Is no evidence as to Its operational status. The heaviest deployment hasin East Germany where evidenceas many aslles, about half of which are probably operational. Eight sites, locateding around Derlin, arc manned by East German forces. Thc remainder, which are assigned to Soviet field forces, appear to defend Important Soviet military installations such as major headquarters and airfields.*

e believe thai such defenses will have been provided lo all the European Satellites by the endbserved deploymenl patterns Indicate that missile defenses areprovided for capita! cities and for certain other major targets. On this basis, wethatites will bein the European Satellites and manned by their troops.

oviet military relations with Communist China are not as close as those with itsPact partners in Eastern Europe, we have no reliable evidence indicating theof surface-to-air missiles In China, although some deployment may have taken place or be planned for the fuiure. If missiles were deployed according to the ciiteriabeing followed in the Satellites, this would call for aboutites for defense of important fixed targets In Communist China.

ow altitude defense. To reduce their vulnerability to low-level attack, the Soviets have had underissile systemhich we believe Is specificallyto engage targets at very low altitudes. down lo abouto operational sites have been observed, but photography at Kapustin Yar In9ite which consisted of four launch pads deployedemicircularauncher on one of the pads held two missile-llkc objects abouteet long. Then its operational configuration at fixedprobably will resemble Ibis site.

Annex B, Figure 3.

r'F

Jll-

We have no evidence on any operational deploymenl olissile defenses, and hence have lltllc basis for estimating thedeployment pattern or tlic magnitudeeployment program However, we believe that thc Soviets will seek to provideinst low-altitude attack for most of those areas defended by thendhe Soviets will take into account the relative vulnerability of these areas to low-leveland their ability to bring other defensive weapons to bear. Areas immediatelyto coastal waters would probubly beas especially vulnerable to low-altitude attack. Judging by the scale and pace of therograms, we believe thul extensiveefenses could be deployed for the protection of fixed installations In the USSR In aof some three or four years'. by The extent of SA-3with the field forces probably will exceed lhat of the SA-2.

uture developments. Thc Sovietswill attempt to Improve their defenses against more advanced aircraft and cruise-type missiles al high altitudes, but weit very unlikely that they will develop an entirely new system for this purpose Rather, we estimate that they will seek tothey increasing its range IO, increasing its effectiveenhancing its capabilities to overcome electronic counter measures, and generallyits ability to engage small, fast tar-gels at high altitudes. Research andwork for this purpose may be under way at Sary Shagan or Kapustin Yar, and wethat significant Improvements to the system could begin to appear this year.

Antimissile Program

lthough tho Soviels have no presentcapability against ballistic missiles, they have had under way for several years an exltnslve and high priority program for the development of such defenses. Photography hasarge, elaborate facility at Sary Shagan which wc believe to be engagedin antimissile work,uch smaller but similar facility near the ICBM

impact area on the Kamchatka Peninsula. The Sary Shagan complex Is one of the major Soviel missile research and development test areas, second only lo Kapustin Yar/Valdi-mirovka in magnitude.

lie Soviet effort is apparently directed loward developmenterminal intercept system employing an antimissile missile which will probably be equipped with awarhead. It Is possible that theand diverse activities which we have observed represent developmental programs on more than one type of antimissile system. Research and testing at Sary Shagan has been concerned with re-entry of short and medium-range ballistic missiles. However, the fixed nature of the Installations ond the genera! progression of activities towards work with longer runge missiles leads us to believe that the main effort is dlrectej toward defense against IRBMs and ICBMs.

lthough there is no firm evidence, we assume thai the Soviets are investigating various techniques for discriminating against decoys. It is unlikelyystem deployed In this time period wouldapabilily against sophisticated decoys. However, the USSR may beystem designed to exploit the vulnerability of nuclear warheads to nuclear weapons effects. In this case, the requirement for sophisticated discrimination techniques would be reduced.*

c have no basisirm estimate for the date of first operational deploymentoviet antiballistic missile system or of Itsagainst the various types ofballistic missiles. The initial operational capability date will be determined by theof the system under development, the stains of the testing program, its future progress, and the timing of the Sovietto deploy. Considering these factors and the intensive Soviet research and development activities, we estimate that in the, the Soviets will begin at least limited deployment of an antimissile system designed

urther discussion of these circcl* see the forthcoming NIK"Soviet Atomic Energy Program." (LIMITED DJOTKIBUTIONl

L

for use against both ICBMs and IRBM:.of these dates is contingent uponassume the high risks of

starting production and deployment prior to full system tests, and therefore is considered thc earliest possible date. If deployed early in the period the capability of the system against IRBMs piobably would be the more thoroughly tested. It should be noted that continuing success in research andwill be necessary if the USSR Is to achicvu any operational antlballistic missile capabilities.

believe that for political as well asreasons, the Soviets would wish todefense for Uie protection ofcritical areas, even if the availableonly an interim, limitedthis, wc cannot estimate the scopeof Soviel nntlmlssilc deploymentOn the other hand, the highto Improving Soviet defensesnuclear strikes leads us tothc USSR will eventually seek toleast some antimissile defense forcenters.

present. Soviet planning forprobably is preliminaryin nature. It will be affectednext few years by developing Westerncapabilities and by Soviet antimissileand development, which mayof unconventionalSoviets almost certainly will designantimissile system inay thatcomponents can be incorporatedbecome available. Improvementsintroductionetter interceptor better discriminationof nn antimissile system willrequirementsew order Torlong-rangescope and pace of the deploymentfollowing IOC will be stronglythe system's potential for growth andsuccess In realizing this potential.

n Uie course of Its program to develop an antimissile system, Uie USSR couldimited capability lo destroy satellites nfler they haveumber of orbits. How-

ever, wc believe that for some years lo come, the Soviets are likely to havearginal capability under most favorable conditions for interference with US satellites.

Fighter Aircraft

As ofe estimate thai there were0 fighters In activeunits throughout Uie Bloc, withn Soviet units.f thefighters are directly subordinate to Fighter Aviation of Air Defense (IA-PVO) with air defense as their exclusive mission. The remainder, which are In Tacticalappear lo have an air defenseIn addition to their ground support role.

With the widespread deployment of thehe Sovieis have developed aof fighter and missile defenses. They apparently now rely primarily upon missiles for point defense of important targets, and upon fighters for area defense to coverroutes as well as gaps between missile-defended areas. The Soviets appear to be moving away from the mass employmentof the postwar years. Developments in communications and control have madeImprovements in Soviet InterceptAnother factor Influencing the trend toward fewer fighters is the increased kill capability of thc new aircraft.

These developments have allowed areduction in Soviet fighter strength. In the past two years there have been large-scale reductions in Soviet tactical fighter units, and the naval fighter force has been completely eliminated. Reductions In Uie IA-PVO. resulting primarily from phasing out of older aircraft, have been largely offset by transfers from the naval and lacticaland by the Introduction of newReductions in Soviet fighterboth tactical andwillover the next five years. We estimate that Uie number of operaUonal Soviet fighters will be reduced on the order ofercent during this period.

Soviet fighter force stillof day fighters. TheT5 FAGOT (now almost phasedversions of the subsonic MIGA, U,nd threethe transonicFARMERake up about BO percent of thefighters appear to have beenfor the interceptor role andhare good climb and altitudePerformance characteristics vary,all employ similar gun armamentcontrol systems, and arc generallyto lead-pursuit attack under

he Soviets haveto Improve the all-weathertheir fighter force. Then that year, is the first Sovietas an ull-weather Interceptor Itan extremely large airborne(AI) radar (SCAN III) with aconsiderably in excess of otherAI radars However, the Axedresultedoor scanningthe potential of tills radar was notThis, together with the lowercapabilities of the FLASHLIGHT,led the Soviets to limit Itsits characteristics and thenow available, theto be suitable for use inof border areas and for0eet).

everal Soviel day fighters have been modified by the addition of thc SCAN ODD airborne intercept (AI) radar, whichearch range of about. and arange of about. These aircraft, thend theequipped with an Improved SCANre considered to have some all-weatherHowever, the limited range of the radar, the continued reliance on gun armament, and thc restrictionursuit attack, seriously limit the effectiveness of these aircraft under nonviaual conditions. The most recent day-flghtcr modification, first observeds thc FARMER E. This aircrafL has beam rider

missilesompatible AI radar (SCANearch range.racking range. FARMER E. thus equipped,onsiderable advance over the earlier FRESCO and FARMER

During thc pastew generation of Soviet fighters has appeared in peripheral areas of the USSR and Eastern Europe. At least three new aircraft appear to be Involved: FISHikoyan-designed, delta-wing interceptor, and two Sukholthe swept-wlngnd theHPOT B. We estimate thatew generation fighters have been produced, of whichre now in units.

In armament, fire control equipment, and speednots0hese aircraft represent significant advances over the bulk of Soviet interceptors now in service. However, during the past year, we haveadditional intelligence on thc weight, size, and engine performance of these newAccordingly their estimated altitude capabilities have been markedly reduced. We now estimate their combat ceilings00 feet as compared00 feet last year. Considering theof most Western bomber aircraft, the Soviets probably regard these altitudeas adequate. They appear to betechniques for Interception of Western aircraft which can operate at higher altitudes. There is evidence that some Soviet fighters have auxiliary rocket engines.

nd FISHPOT B. are estimated toead-pursuit fire conlrol systemew AI radar (SPIN SCAN)earch range of.racking range. They probablyevolver guns and In addition canir-to-air missiles. The other new Soviet interceptor, FISHBED C, is probably Intended for day or night use in clear weather. It Is believed to have Infrared sighting equipment In addition to an optical fire control system, and carries both gun and missile or rocket armament. It is probably equippedadar which provides range data only. The assignment ofo

R-KAP-

P

Avi.illon unitslosefunction in addition lo on Intercept role,

ll o( tlte new fighters now enteringare based on prototypes flral displayedince that time, new fighter designs have been tested in the course of continuing Soviet research and development onfighters, their armament, and firesystems. One and possibly two new fighter prototypes, as well as modifications of existing types, were displayed In1 Aviation Day show. Although there is no evidence of their current production,ew generation of Sovietwill be introduced Into operational units within the next few years. The most pressing Soviet requirement appears to be an all-weather interceptor with Improvedand fire control system.Soviet technical capability, such ancouldaximum speed well inof Machombat celling of0 feel. Allhough research andin Ihls field will continue through the period of this estimate, thc Introduction of new Soviet fighters and thc extent of their deployment during thes andwill be strongly influenced by Soviet progress In surface-to-air missiles and by changes in the nature of the threat posed by Western delivery systems.

ighter production. Soviet production of jel fighter aircraft has dropped sharply in recent years.0G,production ranged fromo.7hereteep decline fromo. Our estimateslight increase to0 and somewhat moreowever, there are no Indications that new generation fighters will be built inapproaching thc production rates of theroduction difficulties with the newer models and the high coat andof modem fighters may have played some part In this decline. However, thecauses have been the emergence ofsurfHCC-to-alr missile capabilities and changing techniques in the employment of interceptor aircraft.

Ai'-to-Air Missiles

have firm evidence on the.ur to-air missiles In thc Soviet fighterIn several of the satellite forces asbelieve that at least two types area beam-riderndhoming missilensemiactive radar homing missile

i aa ji could also be available, but we have no evidence of Its deployment. There is good evidence that the beam-rldcr missile isby AI radar equipped FARMERS, and probably by FITTER B, and FISHPOT B. This missile could also be used by the other Soviet fighters equipped withnd E, and FLASHLIGHT. Tlie infrared homing missile could be adapted (or use by all Soviet Interceptors now operational. It probably will be employed by the FISHHED and possibly by the FITTER and FISHPOT. However, we believe that equipping of FKESCOs and FARMERS withill be limited. Thehen operational, may replace thcn thc FARMERS. FITTERS, and FISHPOTs. Soviet development ofair-to-air missiles over the next few years depends primarily upon theof new Interceptors equipped withAl radar and fire control systems.

Antiaircraft Gum

Soviets continue to employ largeof antiaircraft guns for defense ofand fixed targets These guns rangefrommargeemploy fire control radars.probably are used In some AAAEuropean Satellite forces have aboutantlahcraft guns and there arein Communist China. North Korea,Vietnam. The number ofIn the Soviet forces has declined overtwo years and Ihere Ls evidence thatis continuing. Considering thedeployment of surface-to-airthe announced Soviet force reductions,that most of the remainingheavy guns will be phased out of theof static targets in thc USSR overyear or so. arge number of

P

these will probably be held in reserve status near major target areas. Transfer of some of this equipment to other Bloc countries is probable.Light AAA probably will be phased out In ureas where thcs deployed, but will be retained for low-altitude defense of other targets.

IV. RADAR AND CONTROte believe thateavy prime radars, primarily of the TOKEN and BAR LOCK types, andradars are deployed atites in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Radar coverage now extends over the entire USSR and European Satellite area, with apparent gaps remaining only In southwestern and western China. Arctic area coverage, which has been sparse. Is being expanded by deployment ofradars including the newer types, to existing radar sites, and by activation of newew patrol vessels fitted with radars of the early warning type are available in each of the four Soviet fleet areas, and some of them are employed as picket ships to extend radar coverage seawards.

GL The very large number of radars employed in the Soviet systemigh density of coverage, particularly in border nrras and around Important targets. In deployuiggenerations of radars, ihe Soviets have tended to retain much of the older equipment in service, resultingteady growth In Uie operational Inventory. However, In the past year or so, the deployment of new and better radars and the introduction of automatedsystems appears to have led to aIn the number of radar sites in some areas. We believe that this trend willleading eventuallyignificantin the operational Inventory.

Early Warning Radari*

he Soviet aircraft warning system Is based uj>on large numbers of early warning (EW) radars closely spaced throughout the USSR. These radars are of two general classes: the heavy or prime radars (such as

'Por estimated characteristics of Sovlrt EW and GCI radari, wend Table 5.

TOKEN and BAR LOCK) winch provide long-range tracking Information, mid the auxiliary radars (such as KNWEREST and SPOON-REST) which can track out to medium ranges Under opUmum conditions this system now has lhe capability lo deteel and trackat medium and high nltttudes. of Bloc territory, under virtually all conditions the system could detect and track such aircraft withinew. more powerful. EW radar, TALL KINO, has been deployed at several sites, Improving detection capabilities against small,targets.

aximum altitude capabilities of Soviet EW radars range0 feet for thc TOKEN lo welleet for some of the newer radars (TALLeight coverage of Soviet radars wtll continue to exceed Uie operational altitudes of Western aircraft during Uie period oftnate Low-altitude detection and trackinghave been quite limited, but in the past two years, the Soviets have effected someby Uie extensive deployment of SPOONREST and FLAT FACE radars.

Ground Controlled Intercept Rodan

TOKEN and other heavy radarsused for ground-controlledusually In combination withradars such as ROCK CAKE orMaximum altitude coverage ofradars used In Uie OCI role isto that esUmated for early warning,are somewhat less. These. for thc TOKEN to moren.m. for the newer radars. Severalradars now employ moving targetor other antklutter techniques, butcapabilities of Soviet GCI radarsquite limited.

Future Development*

assist In countering the Westernmissile threat, the Sovieisdevelop long-range tracking radars capabilities against small, fast

targets at high altitudes. TALL KING may havetep in this direction. Improved medium-range radars may be developed to meet Ihe threat ol low altitude supersonic targets. All new Soviet EW and GCI radars probably will incorporate moving target In-dtcntors

Electronic Warfare

t present, the USSR has an appreciable capability lor Jamming Western bombing and navigational radars at frequencies up0 megacycles per second and possibly higher, and especially for jamming at lowernormally used in Western long-range radio communications. Shipboard and ground jamming equipment for useand blind bombing radar is known to exist. The Soviets are also known to have employed electronic deception, including simulation of Western navigational aids, against Western aircraft. Presentprobably will be Increased by the use of improved techniques and higher power.the end of the period of this estimate thc USSR will probably have In operationcapable of jamming at all frequencies likely to be used try Western communications, radar, and navigation equipment

umber of years, thc Soviets have sought to strengthen their air warningagainst enemy counter measures. They have engaged In widespread ECM exercises for training of radar operators. Tn thc last few years, evidence has Indicated the use of greater frequency diversification, increased power, and other antijamming techniques. These trends probably will continue, but we believe thatoviet electronic systems will still be subject to disruption by properly employed techniques.

assive detection. Wc believe that the Soviet .air defense system uses passiveto supplement and extend EW radaragainst targets outside Itsariety of specialized equipment Ls used for detection and direction-findinghis equipment can cover most frequencies used by Western communications and radar with good accuracy as to bearing. um-

ber of new passive detection sites wereand established sites received additional electronic equipment. The Soviets probably will continue to extend and improve thisSnvletnstallations may also contribute to passive detection.

D o- of Missile Louiichingt

development of high frequencybackscatter radars for detectionmissile launchlngs has beenSoviet capabilities for the last fiveSoviets haveigh degreeboth In thc theoretical aspectsresearch and In practicalMuch Soviet work in this fieldto development of newtechniques, but the Soviets probablyused this method for detection ofdetonations and possibly USIts use againstimited amount oftime, which could be used to

Communkotions ond Control

ground communications in supportdefense operations, the Soviets willcontinue to use and Improve landmicrowave links. Use of highwill decrease, but It will be availablepurposes and backup-Ionosphericscatter communicationsbe developed for use in the airThe old four-channel, very highcommunications equipment isby most Soviet fighters.ix-channel set in thefighters, but they have undertakenreplacement program.voice communicationslimitations on much of theforce, but these limitations are notIn these more modern fighter unitsfor the most part on the westernto the USSR. There ts nothe employment of ultrahighfor air-to-air and air-to-ground Thc old Soviet IFF system,

15

has been In use lor more thanears is being replaced.

he mosi Important advance in Soviet nir defense communications over the last few years has been the development andof an air defense control system with some semiautomatic features, including data-handling equipment for rapid processing ol air defense information and data linkfor vectoring interceptors. Beginningoviet system, similar In concept to the US SAOE system but leas complex, was widely deployed ln the western USSR. Wclhat thc ground element of this system has been replacedecondand that an improved semiautomatic fighter control system is being introduced. These new systems will probably be widelyin the USSR and jxisslbly Eastern Europe within the next few years.

ideo data link system has beenwhich ts used to transmit the radarfrom the radar site to the filter control center for visual presentation. This system Is apparently used to supplement the existing semiautomatic system In the dense target areas of thc western USSR. It is alsoin East Germany. Poland. Hungary. Czechoslovakia, and Rumania We believe that eventually It will be deployedthe Soviet Bloc.

V. ClVIl DEFENSE

ivil defense preparations in "the USSR arc supervised by the Local Antiair Defense of thc Country (MPVOentral agency subordinate to the Ministry of Defense with staff representatives at regional and local levels. Training the Soviel population in civil defense is the responsibility of themass organization Voluntary Society for Cooperation with thc Army, Aviation, and the Fleetivil defense training has been, at least in throry, bothand obligatory. Aboutillion Soviet citizens over the ago ofavesome instruction in civil defense, and someillion of thesedult inave probably received good basic grounding in ele-

mentary civil defense techniques such as use of shelters, gas masks, protective clothing, and radiation monitoring equipment. On the other hand, the training program has suffered in many amis from poor instruction, .shortage of training aids, and public apathy.

he most important deficiency is the lack of adequate shelter for the bulk of thcalthough the USSRubstantial lead over any of the Western Powers. shelters of the World War II type are probably capable of providing some protection to perhapsillion city dwellers against radiation and fire. Anillion persons in Moscow. Leningrnd, Baku, and Kiev can take refuge in subways, which are probably capable of resisting some We presume that the USSR hasfor the evacuation and protection of key party and government personnel, but we have no evidence on relocation centers. We estimate that detached and tunnel-type shelters and underground bunkers are forillion key personnel. Thus, some kind of shelter Is available for about one-fifth of the urban population. Virtually nothing has been done to provide shelter for the rural population.

The shelter program appears to have been under reconsideration in thc past few years. Some evidence indicates that the program for basement shelters may have been sharply curtailed or abandonedndthere have been increased sightings of detached shelters. In the past two years, civil defense manuals have given increasingto evacuation, especially to prcattack evacuation of "noneffectives" from likely target areas and their resettlement elsewhere for the durationar. However, there Is no firm evidence of evacuation drills for the general public, and this program appears to bo still In thc planning stage.

In terms of shelters built and personnel trained, the USSR has made greater progress than any other major power. Even with limited warning these measures would prob-

BECHUT

abiy reduce casualtiesignificant margin. The existenceisciplined civil defense organization, the use of shelter, and theknowledge of simple techniques such as first aid would probably reduce casualties considerably, especially among key personnel. However. Soviet civil defense Is not prepared to cope with thc effects of large-scale nuclear attack- Moreover, it would functionpoorly under conditions of shorttime.

VI. SOVIET AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES Deployment

defense weapons and equipmentheavily concentrated In that portionUSSR westino drawn from theto the Caspian Sea; In EastPoland, and Czechoslovakia; and inportion of the Soviet Farare found at aomeoutside these areas, especially Inand in eastern China- TheMoscow are by far the most heavilyarea of the Bloc*

Warning Time

amount o( warning timeaffects the capabilities of airin various areas of tho Bloc.radar could now give Moscowother targets In the interior morehour's warning of medium and highattacks made with Westernype. Soviet assurance of suchwould be greatly reduced bylevel penetrations. The supersonicand ASMs now being added tocould reduce this warning timemuch as SO percent. Moreover, theearly warning time available inareas would reduce thethe defenses of even heavily defendedIn such areas. As the speeds ofvehicles Increase, and asballistic missilesreater partthreat, the problem of warning tuncmore critical."

'Sec Annex B, FigureSee Annex B. Figure 4.

Current Capabilities and Fuiure Trends

lie extensive deployment of surface-to-air missiles over the past two years hasimproved Soviet air defenseThe present capabilities of the Soviet air defense syslein would be greatest ngalnst penetrations by subsonic bombers In daylight and clear weather at altitudes betweennd0 feet. Under suchvirtually all types of Bloc air defense weapons could be brought lo bear againstaircraft. Most Soviet fighters can operate at altitudes up to0 feet, and some up to0 feet, but the capabilities of the fighter force would beconsiderably during periods ofor poor visibility. In the increasingly widespread areas defended by surface-to-air missiles, air defense capabilities would be virtually unimpaired by weather conditions and would extend lo0 feel, wiih some capabilities up to0 feet.

R0 Despite Its recent and considerablehowever, the Soviet air defense system would still have great difficulty in copingarge-scale air attackvaried and sophisticated tactics, even wllhin the foregoing altitudes. In addition, thc Soviet defense problem would beby the variety of delivery systems which might be employed. Including cruise-typefighter-bombers, and supersonic bombers

Al altitudes beloweel, lhe eapablliUes of the system would bereduced; beloweet, lhcwould lose most of Its effectiveness. Thus, at present, the USSR has littlefor active defense against very lowattacks. Nor does the present airsystem have any capability Against ballistic missiles.

Wc believe that the Soviets will continue to improve the overall capabilities of their large and complex air defense establishment. They are making vigorous efforts to counter more advanced Western weapon systems. Forthcoming major developments willinclude: (a) the Initial deploymentlhe next yearurface-to-air missile

systom designed to Intercept aircraft at very low altitudes: and (bj at least limitedwithin the next five years of an j. nil missile system wiih an undetermined capability against ballistic missiles

S3 Nevertheless, the Soviets probably will still notigh degree of assurancearge-scale sophisticated attack by manned bombers armed with high-yield nuclear weapons. They would probablyloignificant number of the at-

tackers, but given the increasing complexity of the air defense problem, we doubt they will be confident of Uie extent U> which they can reduce the weight of such an altaek. Thc air defense problem has bern radically altered by the advent of lung-range ballistic missiles. Barring an unforeseen technologicalthe USSIt's air defense deficiencies and uncertainties will sharply Increase as ballistic missilesarger proportion of the West's total nuclear delivery capability.

i*it

'P-

ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET AIROOIINR INTERCEPT RADARS

* Bit

Takuit

CompailbHIly with Alr-Ic-Air Miuilet

Itnngo

(NM)

(NM)

ODD

1UI

3

ow

a *|

ODD

B

A

AA-3

KIX Only)

SCAN CAN

C. D

FARMER E.

AA-J

A

None obaet'cd 7

A-3

A-3

FIX

*

3

10

SCAN

FITTER B

B.

TOP BEG-RE-tp-

CUE

iT

TOP GI5-

TOP

SSS

. g

IIIIHI

II

s 5

5

2

I

3 8 5

WBT

TOP CKG-tt&'l

Tabic 7

ESTIMATED ACTUAL STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT OP SINO-SOVIET BLOC AIR DEFENSE

EQUIPMENT

I1

area

FIGHTERS

RADAR SITES

GUNS

Weather

Model *

Model *

Heavy

USSR. .

USSR

i

Central USSR...

Alt Dc-

*

USSR

ii

Central USSR

GO

East USSR

Europe, Soviel

SovitI)

Europe, Satel-

Forces

sO

> i

|

nils, deluding Iraiix-rt.FITTEH/FtSHPOT.

D. FARMERi.ISH11KD.

COT, FRESCO, FARMER.

1 The number) of surlnM-tonir in feslECfitce shown within lhe USSR include only luoseMU* deployed at urban-industrialitthat.oliteiiimopei*liOivi1 at aboutrbin-indiolrialhe USSR. Numbers given represent an average between thcower limit* of thin estimate.

and fcW and CCI rurlnram of Moscow. SAM site- withinm. and AA gun* withinnn, all of which are included above In the figuics for Western. Norl)iwestern, mid Weil Central USSR.

TraiwbiiiMI Military District.

is evidence thai nwiy of lite medium and he-.ivy AA guns in lhc L'SSR arc being placed in reserve statu* al the locution* to which they arc ji'igned.

Table 8

COMPOSITION OP BLOC JET FIC! HTIvH FORCES UY AIRCRAFT MODEL

1 July mi

Model

E Saul-liiei

in ii.

A. B, C

ISO

A, C. D

FARMER B. E

107

12

119

LIGHT

POT

f1

XftA

i

TOTALS

Except train*ra.

COPY

ESTIfnATED DEPLOYMENT OF SELECTED BLOC AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT,

SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SITES IN EAST GERMANY,

CAST GERMAN SITESi*FIELD FORCE SITES

(at or n'jr important militaryConfl'ined SA-2Con ft madir*

O PiobiU*'t* undwtrueite

O POSSIBLEITE (Unknown utxydmilno)

--Canal

-SECRET-

Original document.

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