PROSPECTS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Created: 6/20/1961

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

LBJ LIBRARY Mandatory Revln,

NATIONAL ilN (Sup

Documtint.

PROSPECTS'FpJ^HES^pi^MENT OF THECHiNA .

TATES

onune Mi.

Wnoo and JlMMrcn,lsff /orant Chtel ol Havel Opel he Navy; the mutant Chill at Staff, the Director lor ftiMHgoiM, Joint Stat; Secretary ol Dilani; Special Overatlone;llonolXwnoy. The itemU ilon ntpritmtaUv to tha VBIB. andeSeral Sureau ol Invuttgation, aUtatnid, ovtttde ol their

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

4

I.

IX. INTERNATIONAL

QRC'i Threatened International

The batUa for the UN

Two

Concerning US

Uitfiniahed Civil

Chlneae Cornrnunlit Position! and

Chinese Nationalist Positions and

in. ORG REACTIONS TO ITS CHANQINO INTERNATIONAL

STATUS

IV. DOMESTIC

V.

Reaction* to Major Shift! in US

uclear Device by the Chinese Com-

munist*

Tha Death of Chiang Kai-shek

A: Military

B: Political Tables

PROSPECTS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the prospects for the Government of the Republic of China (QRC) over the next two or three years, with particular reference to its international position.

CONCLUSIONS

The ORG is likely to be faced this year with the abandonment or failure of the UN moratorium on discussion of theof Chinese representation. It does not necessarily follow, however, that Pei-ping would replace the ORG or achieve any representation in tho UN this year. Many countries are movingreference for a. two-Chinas formula. Both Taipei and Petping have rejectedormula and each has stated that it will not accept dual representation. If any Chinese Communist membership in the UN appeared imminent to the QRC, the latter would threaten to withdraw. If Communist China achievedin both the General Assembly and the Security Council, we believe the GRC would withdraw from the UN. In leu drastic cases however, the GRC might not carry out the threat to withdraw, if only to attempt to prevent Poiping's actuallyrofTered seat.

he GRC'b principal objective willto be to regain control of theThe GRC loaders believe that nowood time to agitate the question of taking probing actions against thein order to capitalize on the economic distress and other sources of discontent there. Although we doubt that they would commit forces toission In the face of specific US objections, thacannot be ruled out that they might, without consulting us, undertake airdrops or raids at any time.

Mast GRC leaders now believe that their best chance of regaining thewould come in the wakear between the UB and Communist China. We believe, however, that there isemote chance of their trying to provokear.

Politically conscious Taiwanese are generally opposed to GRC rule of Taiwan, but Inadequate leadership andrninirnlM their threat to the regime. GRC security forces are almost certainly more than adequate to cope with anytroubles. Malnlander-Taiwanese

relations will almost certainly come under increasing strain.)

ith the help of large-scale US aid, the QRC has made substantial economic progress, and economic development has acquired momentum. Some negative factors such as growing unemployment, an extremely rapid population growth,ecent decline in productivethreaten this trend. Whethereconomic growth can beover the long run depends largely on the course of US policy and aid and on the ability and willingness of theto adapt to the requirements ofexistence on Taiwan.St)

ver the next few years the QRC will probably suffer setbacks, particularly those growing out of the enhancedposition of Pelptng. The ability of the ORG to ride out these next few years will depend largely upon theand pace at which the setbacks oome and in considerable degree upon the role of the US. We believe that, as long as US economic support and militaryare assured, the QRC can survive these setbacks and can adjust, however reluctantly,radual series of changes.

{Para. 2B)

f the QRC leaders were facedajor change In US policy suchS decision to use the extreme pressures that would be necessary to force theof the of!shore islands, advocacy of the acceptancewo-Chinas formula, or formal recognition of Communist China, the bitterness and psychological shock would be profound, whateveror explanations the US might give. Some malnlanders on Taiwan would seek accommodation with the Communists, or advocatear withChina, or seek refuge elsewhere in the Free World; however, we believe that most would resign themselves to making the beatuture on Taiwan. The surviving government wouldbe less disciplined and more corrupt and less stable than the present one;subversion would probablyroblem. However, given continued US aid and protection, Taiwan wouldcontinueart of the Free World.)

DISCUSSION

INTRODUCTION

B The goal of the leaders ot the Government of Um Republic ot Chlnmstabllsh thalr ruleil China, aiIn thelogin "back to thaccording to the official rationale, tha ORC still represents the will of the people of all China and la atlll tha legal government ot all China. Tha ORG juatlflea tho existence of two government* on Taiwan, national and provincial, by the argiiment that tha QRC li but temporarily confined to the island and will eventually regain Its control of the mainland. The ORC leaders maintain that theseare lndlapenaable and that without them Free China would lose all hope and sense of purpose and would Inevitably collapie.

Belief In the missioneturn to the mainland Is the prune source and thoof tho ORCs major national policies: (a) the maintenanceery large militaryb) retention of the offshore Islands; and (c) opposition to any kind ot recognition of the Pelplng regime Including the two-Chinas formula. ORC leaden even rationalise the promotion of rapid Industrial development on Taiwan in terms of preparing for return to the mainland.

Theovernment of Chinese main-landers chosenational Aaaembly that was elected on the mainlandctually controls Taiwan, the Penghus, andhe Taiwanese, whooverercent of the people actually under ORC Jurisdiction, participate In the local and provincial governments but have practically no voice in national affairs because, according to ORC explanations, theyonly one of overrovinces of China.

' The QBO maintain! bythe world'i highest raUo of military forces to population.

' Its control alio extends to two minute Islands in the South China Sea: Prataailesof Hong Kong) and Itu Abuiles eait of SsJion, In the SpraUey group).

The Taiwanese, while regarding themselves as Chinese In language and culture, look upon the ORCerolallen rule not of their own choosing and Inadequately responsive to their Interests.

orecade the UB haa guaranteed the defense of Taiwan and supported the ORC's economy, military establishment, and international position. Thus sheltered, the ORC has made considerable progress on Taiwan. The political situation has been stable, and the leadership dedicated and energetic. The economy haa grown, living standards have risen, and corruption hasThe performance of the armed forces has been spirited and effective. Now, with changes In UN membership and in the attitude of many countries, the ORC must face more directly the realities of lisposition.

PROBLEMS

A. Tha GRC'i Threatened International Position

Tha battla Jar tha VH Seat. Tho ORC's retention of the China seat In the Generaland the Security Council has In recent years been due almost entirely to persistent US diplomatic pressures to maintain aon consideration of tho question of Chinese representation. Adverse worldto outbursts of Chinese Communist aggressiveness In Asia have facilitated this effort. However, thoeneral Assembly vote was close' and since that time the UK, Brazil,umber of other states have Indicated that they are not likely to continue supportN moratorium, Weoratorium motion In the next Oeneralwould probably fail even If strongly supported by the UB.

It does not necessarily follow, of course, that failure or abandonment of the morato-

' Bee Appendix a. Table 1.

4

would mean UN membership (or com--uniu China or the exclusion of theajority of members support the principle of UN membership for Communist China, there are many potential obstacles, both technical and substantive. Prominent among the latterood chance that peiplng would place unacceptable conditions on membership. Many UN members would favor continued ORC representation even If peiplng were admitted.

Tvo Chvnai For an Increasing number ofwo-Chinasof both an Independent non-Com-munlit China on Taiwanommunist China on the main land, appears to be the best way out of the present impasse If it could be rsallsed. The ORC remains bitterly opposed to any such Idea. Its leaders will almostcontinue to claim that the QRC Is tha legitimate government of China and that It will eventually return to power on tho mainland.

Communist China is also dead setwo-Chinas concept. Peiplng and Taipei have each stated thatatter of principle It will not appear where the other Is officially represented. If Communist China continues to refuse to send representatives to countries or Intsmatlonal organisations In which the ORC has representation, the ORC Is providedossible means of Impeding furtherof Pelplng's diplomatic relations and blocking its admission to the UN. The QRC needs only tacitly towo-Chinas situation to the extant of continuing to send Its representatives to nations andwhich are willing to deal with bothChina and the QRC. Some QRC officials have been cautiously advocating more flexibility in diplomatic competition with Peiplng, but. we believe the top ORC leaders will remain very strongly opposed to pursuing any course of action which they considered would prejudice their complete rejection of any two-Chinas situation.

Concerning US Support

ationalist leaders believe that the fate of tha ORC rests primarily on future USand policies, and that if full US support continues, the attitudes and actions of the rest ofworld will be of secondaryThe pervading fear and overriding concern of the QRC leaders Is that the US may now be driftingwo-Chinas policy and also weakening In Its resistance to the expansion of International communism. They have been particularly apprehensive concerning what they believe toS course of retreat in Laoa, and consider that US acceptanceegotiated settlement there would presage further UB retreats in the Fax East. They also Interpret the fall of Rhee and Menderea asSto take firm action to stand by Its true friends.

far the ORC's doubts about thenot grown to the point where theya serious impact on ORC policy orrelations. However, QRCthis score will almost certainly grow,can expect Increasing QRC pressures formilitant US attitude In Asia andsupport for the QRC and its policies.*

Unfinished Civil War

Communist Poiitions andt. The Chinese Communist regimemaintained that It Is thegovernment of China, and thatPenghus, and the offshore Islandsof Its territory. Consequently, tothe question of "liberating" Taiwanother islands is purely an InternalIt maintains that the Chiangno rightful claim to be the governmentthat continued recognition andof his government by any foreignan Invasion of China's sovereignty, andChinese People's Republic is free tomeans it sees fit to "liberate those parts

iscussion of probable orc rcacUone Incontingency that major changes In U8 policy aotually do occur appears In paragraphs 3D

of IU territory" occupied bybandit forces,"

If Communlit China's put tactics toward Taiwan and the offshore Islands havewidely from strong military pressures to peaceful overtures to the NationalistSince ita testing of US and QRC resolve in the IMS Taiwan Strait crisis, pdptng has not stressed force with respect to Taiwan and tha offshore islands, but hasto undermine QRC morale andposition. Ita propaganda andletter campaigns have bean designed to undermine ORC confidence in the US, sxploit in* main landers' fear of being foreverfrom ths motherland, and create an atmosphere In which Communist triumph md the absorption of Taiwan would bea* inevitable. Psiplng haatried to make accommodation withpalatable by auch geaturea a* offering to welcome Taiwan, under the nominal leader-ship of Chiang Kai-shek, into the fold of the people's Republic of China as an autonomous region.

elplng almost certainly has littlethat such campaign* will succeed In the near future but probably does have high hopes for them oyer the long run. IU leader* probably anticipate that trends in the Bloc-US power relationship and in UNand attitudes will in time enhance Pelplng'a stature and result in generalof Its claim to be the solsof China. Pelplng apparently beUevea that as thisorale on Taiwan and resistance to Chinese Communist pressure* and inducements will be effectivelyFurthermore, pelplng almostbelievesilitary assault on Taiwan and the Penghus would bring on major hostilities with ths US. For thesewe believe that Pelplng will relyon nonmllltary pressures to sllmlnats the ORG

owever, the Chinese Communists will simost certainly not give up all use of force In the Taiwan Strait. They will probably *tep up military pressures from time to time

In the offshore Island areas, to remind the world that they have not accepted the statu* quo, to probe ORC and US resolve, and to advance broader cold war objectives. Wehowever, that they are unlikely to launch an assault against the offshore la-lands so long as they believe that this would lead to major hostilities with ths US.RC withdrawal from ths offshore Island* be undertaken, however, Pelplng would almost certainly initiate Intensive propaganda action, probably accompanied by militaryto con vines the world that suchwaa the result of the pressure of Pslplng's military power and to take credit for pushing the ORC off the Islands despite US support of ths ORC.

Soviet Union will continue toobjective of occupying Taiwan,Is determined to prevent the Chineset* from drawing it Into war with thethe Far East Consequently, wsthe USSR will attempt to restrainChinese from actions whichbelieved to Involve serious risk ofthe US. Despite the serious strainsrelations over ths last year orInfluence is likely to be effective incase,

nationalist Poiitlom andThs QRC's principalcontinue to be to regain control ofMost ORC leaders believebut chance of returning to thewould be In the wakearUS and Communist China. They aiaothat the US, In the Interests of thestruggle against communism,no point yield to Communist pressuresto avoid war. They believe that ais inevitable and that to postpone itthe Peiping regime to strengthenpower and its controls overpeople, Itlmost certainORG leaders have, at times, thoughttoonflict withChina under conditions whichthe US. Although we do notthe ORC leaders are likely toa rash act, we cannot exclude It entirely

ecision of ultimate despair and

The ORC attaches great political andimportance to the offshore Islands. Nationalist leaders are convinced that themust be held not only to assist theof Taiwan, but more Importantly to maintain their claim toationaltoerious blow to morale, and to preclude any further decline In the prestige and International position of the ORC. Determination to hold'the Islands Is dramatised in the fact that the ORC has stationed there about one-third of its army combat troops--the elite of thesehe ORC could not Itself hold the offshoreagainst determined attack, and the army, navy, and sir force losses that would probably be entailed in an unsuccessful defense of tha Islands would seriously reduce the contribution the ORC could make to the defense of Taiwan ltsslf,

The hopes of ORC leaders have been buoyed up by the acute economic difficulties on the China mainland and by Indications that public discontent there is reachingproportions, in their view, nowood time to agitate tha question of taking probing actions to capitalise on mainlandThey are fearful that as time goes on Communist Chinees police powers will grow to tha point where no revolution will beThey have made extensive plans for the Initial use of special forces teams topublic dissatisfaction and to organise resistance efforts which, they hope, could ultimately lead to larger scale action and the collapse of the Communist regime. Wethat they would not commit such forces In the face of specific US objectionsthey might, without letting us know, undertake airdrop or raiding activities against the mainland at any time, particularly since the ORC claims that paramilitary operations are "political" and not subject to the US veto on military operations against the mainland,

'The Nationalist armyhe Ohlnmen (Cjuamoy) group number*roops, and In tha Matausea maps at the end of the eatlmste.

III. GRC REACTIONS TO ITS CHANGING INTERNATIONAL STATUS

As the Nationalist leaders see the ORC world position slipping and the prospects for continuance of the UN moratoriumand as they are plagued with Increasing doubt as to the degree of US support, Itmore difficult for them to maintain their hope and sense of purpose. If themotion in the UN falls or Is abandoned this year, the morale of the ORC leaders will suffer. They will view the disappearance of the mechanism which has preventedof the ORC's status as the first stepultimate representation of Communist China in the UN.

Depending upon the nature and timing of subsequent developments In the UN, the QRC might st some point withdraw from theWe believe that if the Chinese Communists achieved membership In both the General Assembly and the Security Council, the QRC would withdraw from the UN. It Is not possible to estimate with confidence QRC moves In situations where the threat to its UN position Is less immediate or less clear. The ORC will probably threaten to withdraw on occasions when it believes It can thereby Influence the US toevelopment derogatory to the ORC's present position. The likelihood of the ORC's carrying outhreat would depend not only on its view of the seriousness of the issue In terms of its prejudice to the ORC's basic policies, but also on whether the ORC leaders felt that pride and self respect called for such drastic action. The QRC, even In circumstances which seemed to threaten seriously its major policies, might back away from Its threats to withdraw In order to preserve the advantages which membership In the UN entails,If the QRC thought that remaining In the UN would cause Communist China to refuse toroffered seat.

2B. The end of the moratorium will probably be followed by other setbacks, Including those growing out of the enhanced Internationalof Peiplng. The ability of the QRC to ride out these next few years will depend

largely on the manner and pace at which the setbacks come and In considerable degree on the role of the US. We believe that, as long as US economic support and military protection are assured, the ORC can survive theseand can adjust, however reluctantly,radual series ofmore abrupt and concentrated, the greater will be theof adjustment and the more serious the consequences Internally and in foreign

|V. DOMESTIC PROBLEMS A. Political

Popular support. The population ofcan be divided Into four groups: (a) the several hundred mainlander leaders, who hold all ths principal positions In thethe armed forces, and the government-run Industries; (b) the onealfother malnlanders; (c) the more thanillion Taiwanese, who are of Chinese origin; and (d)borigines, who dwell in remote areas of the mountains and are of little political significance. Only the first of these groups, the malrtlanders who run the country, are motivated by the officialof return to the mainland. Most of the remaining malnlanders, while subscribing to this objective, have generally adjusted to the realities of their situation on Taiwan. They, have no political or economic alternative to supporting the ORC, but because of their limited economic prospects and their family ties to the mainland, this group la potentially the most susceptible o* the four groups to Communist blandishments for some sort of voluntary accommodation with Peiplng.

Earlier ORC misrule of Taiwan and the bloody suppression7 rebellion of the Taiwanese embittered many who mighthaveense of Identification with the malnlanders and the ORC. Their patriotic sentiments have beenarrow Taiwanese nationalism. They have no incentive to attempt toomeland that they do not consider theirs.

The ORC Is acutely aware of theseand haside range of mesnB to deal with Taiwanese discontent. The land reform program helped the mass of the fsTmers. Favorable economic conditionstandard of living which has Increased In real terms over the years have also served to alleviate popular dissatisfaction. On the other hand, measures such as givingmore voice in local affairs andthem to one or two lesser cabinet potts have helped little, andonsiderablethe ORC's control rests on the quietof force. Martial law and aof security organs operating under various degrees of secrecy enable the regime to prevent or to break up undesirableIn addition, the absence of leaders with widespread popular support and theof the present leaders to unite lessens the Taiwanese threat to ORC domination.

here Is little likelihood that thewill become susceptible to communism during the period of this estimate. They do not wish to share the wretched conditions ot life on the mainland, and certainly do not care to exchange ORC rule for another, and more ruthless, mainlander rule. Somesee, too. believe that the ORC. with all its faults, provides them their best defense against the Chinese Communists. Most of them, however, feel that If they could be left to their own devices, they couldodestly prosperous and happy life on their Island and avoid being dragged Into the travail of Chinese affairs.

alnlander-Talwanese relations willcertainly coma under Increasing strain during the period of this estimate. The twin necessities of replenishing ORC armed forces

'0 suppression ot the incipientargely Taiwanese group,ase in point When the Kuomlntang had decided uiat there was the possibilityeal oppoetUon partyt began to put pressure on the potential Jaders- Bribes or threats persuaded one to leave the country, two were beaten by "unknowneveral had their business Uceosea revoked orother economic pressures: and their most important leader. Leiainlander, was quietly convicted on questionable charges ofa Communist and sentenced to to years

a

and of maintaining malnlanderof these forces will grow increasingly incompatible. Already, overercent of the enlisted ranks are Taiwanese, but main lenders retain authority withercent of theandercent of the NCO'a Thawill probably increasingly resent the ORC* domination of Taiwan and willarger voice in their fate. Increased restive-ness on ths part of the Taiwaness willstimulate the ORC to Intensify Itswhich in turn will add to Taiwanese

B Economic Problems

ver the pastears tha economy of Taiwan, with massive American aaslatance' has expanded rapidly.ndustrial productionimes ths levaln spiteery high rate of population growth, the per capita ONP Increased at an average rate ofear. At present Taiwan la one of the moat prosperous areas In East Asia. Whether this rslatlvs prosperity can be sustained, even with present levels of U8 aid, depends upon the solution of several growing economic problems.

ne of the major problems facing the ORC is the rapid growth of population. Taiwan's annual rata ofercent, is one of the highest in the world. Food consumption haa outstripped food production, and0 Taiwan, for the first time,etof rice. The already Intensive land use on Taiwan limits the possibilities ofproduction at ths rats needed tothe trendrowing food deficit. The rapid growth of the labor force Isthe problems of unemployment andMaintenance of ahuge military establishmenteavy burden on the economy even after large UB military aid.

o meet these problems, industrialmust continue to grow rapidly.must provide Jobs for the growing labor force and provide exports to pay for the in-

' Since IMS the US has suDpMsd ths QRC morsillion In economic and military aid.

creasing food Imports. During the past two years the growth rate of Industrialhas been reassuring. It roseercent9 andercentndustrial exports in those two years more than made up for the decline In agricultural exports.exchange reserves rose by moreillionew highillion

ontinuation of auch rapid Industrial growthontinued high rate ofin industry. There is, therefore, some cause for concern In the fact thatthe past ysar or so there ha*harp drop In Investment in productiveocal investors seem to prefer to put their money Into other kinds of enterprises where quicker profit* can be found, and foreigntend to believe that area* other than Taiwan offer greater economic return and security. The tightening of credit which the government imposed as an anti-inflationary measure0 appears to have reducedinvestment and probably reduced the rate of expansion In Industrial output during the difficult period ahead.

here is aome economic unrest on Taiwan today resultingariety of causesunemployment and some increase in bankruptcy, but It is unlikely to becomeduring the period of this estimate. Taiwan has valuable economiche greatestapable and energetic labor force and, in many fields, an actual surplus of technical and managerial skills. Ahas been established, and It Isfor the economy of Taiwan to continue to growatisfactory rate. Whether it will do so over the long run cannot be estimated with any confidence, because the way the economy develops depends so heavily upon tho nature and size of US economic and military aid as well as upon ORC economic policy and internal and external political developments.

V. CONTINGENCIES

A. GRC Reactions to Ma|or Shifts In US Policy

he US has strong leverage with which to influence ORC policy. The QRC has no feasible alternative to continuing to depend

on the US for mamtenance of Its military strength, protection against attack, economic aid, and diplomatic support. Without US aid and support, its prospects would be darkFor their part. ORC leaders believe that there are strong inhibitions on the US use of Its leverage. They believe that the US would not take measures which might leadollapse or alienation of the ORC. sinceesult would face the UB with what wouldtangerously unstable condition on Taiwan and would gravely damage the anti-Communist position In Asia.

f ths US should seek to persuade the ORC to withdraw from the offshore Islands, the ORC would refuse, banking on UB reluctance to use Its leverage. Ws believe that the ORC leaders would eventually yield, but only when they were convinced that ths UB would in fact use whatever means were necessary to forcedrastic curtailment of economic, military and diplomatic support.

it US Insistence on forcing withdrawal from the offshore islands or other major shifts In US China policy which clearly rejected the ORC rationale (for example, advocacy of the representation of two Chinas In the UN or formal recognition of Communist China) would cause profound bitterness andshock among the Nationalist leaders, whatever guarantees or explanations ths UB might give.

The courses of action open to ORC leaders would all be highly repugnant to them. There wouldery Tew. not Including Chiang, who would become so completely disillusioned that they would seek to turn Taiwan over to the Communists on the best terms they could get. Whatever offers Peiplng might make, most Nationalist leaders would be hesitant to place themselves at the mercy of the Chinese Communists and would certainly be fearful of reprisals from other ORC leaders and from the Taiwanese If they attempted to handover to the Communists.

Some of the Nationalist leaders would be tempted to attack the mainland or to bomb major cities, seeking to embroil the US and

Communist Chinaar. This wouldesperate effort to achieve their objective of returning to power on the mainland, or go down fighting. Although we cannot rule outgo for broke" effort, we believe it highly unlikely thatuicidal course could b* undertaken. The return-to-the-malnland activists among the Nationalistsmall minority of tha malnlanders onand the Taiwanese would almostoppose any such policy which would risk their future chances for an Independent and non-Communlst existence.

A number of Nationalist leaders have at times threatened to "go ity this they presumably mean that they would seek to maintain their position as best they could by themselves without regard to the US. Although It is conceivable that the Org might adoptourse, we believe that tha threat to do so Isressure tactic.

Although we cannot exclude any of the above posslbllltlea as the QRC reaponse. we believe on balance that, evenasic change in US policy as posited above, most of the Nationalists would, with much reluctance and bitterness, conclude that they mustthemselvesuture onew would leaveow would aitempt to defect to tha mainland: and others would simply withdraw from public life, disillusioned and disgruntled. Chiang Kai-shek would probably resign, in admission of the failure of his life's effort, leaving the future to the younger men.

The government. Its purposes, and itswould in time evolve so as to bear little resemblance to those of the psst. Thewould have to adjustreatlyrole In the government for theand would have to pay mora attention to long-range problems of economic anddevelopment of Taiwan. The government would be less disciplined, more corrupt, and less stable; Communist subversionroblem. However, given US guarantees and continued aid and assistance, Taiwan would probably continue as part of the Free World.

i^iM^'TTirirL,

ucleor Device byCommunists

he immediate ORC reaction would be one of great concern at thla dramatic step toward Increase In the power of the Communist enemy. The QRC would suffer from the prob-abls increase in world pressures for theof Pelplng to tha UN, If that had not already come to pass, and for Pelplng'sIn disarmament negotiations.China's leaden might Insist upon the withdrawal of US protection of the ORC as their price for entry Into the UN andin disarmament talks. The QRC, meanwhile, would almost certainly urge the US to provide It with nuclear weapons.

Death of Chiang Kai-shek

4S. The death of Chiang Kai-shek wouldthe leader who has dominated andthe Chinese Nationalistshirdentury. The immediate result would be shock, uncertainty, and probably someof governmental stability andHowever, there would probably be an orderly succession by the Vice President (at present, Ch'en Ch'eng) as provided by the Constitution. It Is of course possible that Chiang Chlng-kuo, the Oenerallastmo's son, who controls most of the intelligence andforces of the ORC might challenge ths constitutional succession. Should his father be removed from the scene in the near future, he would probably be content not to contest ths Presidency but would work to Improve his already powerful position behind the scenes. Whoever the next President may be, he will probably attempt to continue Chiang Kal-ahek'a general policies, but he would not have the Generalissimo's prestige and authority. It Is likely that any successor regime would In time adjust somewhat more readily to the realities of the ORC's situation and probable future.

APPENDIX A

MILITARY

The ORCotal military force ofen whloh makes Ita ratio of armed force* to total population the hlghait In the world. Theaa force* are divided among five command*;

TaUa l

DUtrlbutlon or Personnel USD (Ministry ol National Derenst)

Army

' HAM

Air

car (Combined Service

in these command* all butND and0 army forces are MAP-aupported.

uantitatively the ORC combat force* are much smaller than those of Communist China. Qualitative comparison* are more difficult to make. One of the few casesirect comparison could be made occurred In theaiwan Strait crisis, in which ths ORC fighter pilots outperformed the Chinese Communist fightersarge margin. Naval and ground force* did not maet directly, but the troops on the Chlnmen Island group showed good stamina under prolonged heavy bombardment and,esitant start, tha navy showed up well In resupplylng the Islands under fire. At present the morale of the armed forces ranges from fair to good. The best morale Is found In the air force and among the troops on the offshore. Capabiltttef. The armed forces of the ORC are Inadequate to holdetermined Chinese Communist attack either the offshore

' Include* about IS,M0 merlnu.

islanda or Taiwan and the Penghus without large-scale US naval and air support. They are, howevsr, very much larger than are needed for Interna) security on the territory held by the ORC. The ORC has the capabli-Ity of droppingroop* on the mainland and resupplylng themimited extent. It can conduct an amphibious operationan force using ORC naval amphibious ships. With the addition of merchant and fishingarger force could be landed.

A. The Army

an regular army is organized intonfantryrmored divisions, an airbornepecial forces groups, and supporting elements. These forces are combat ready, well-trained and equipped, andubstantia: reserve and replacement manpower pool. Taiwan-born soldiersoverercent of the enlistednd itelieved that they can be relied upon to fight in defense of the offshore Islands and Taiwan. The army lacks the logisticto maintain Its armed forces or engage In extended military operation* without foreign assistance. Slap* are being taken to remedy equipment shortages and personneldeficiencies.

rincipal units of0 non-MAP-sup-ported army forces of the ORC consist of the

'Because nearly all of the NCO's and thefficer corps are malnlanders.ommute only about SS percent o( tne total armed forces personnel

an Anti-Communist NationalArmy (ACNSA)pecial force* group of; both tre under the directof army OHQ and ire Integra) parts of the ORC forces. They highly qualified troops ot mainland origin, with high esprit de corps but not always amenable to strictdiscipline. For the most part, these troops were former guerrilla* from the coastal province* of China, who have been trained and largely rs-equlpped to regular armyheir principal weakness is inadequatecapability for sustained operations. The ACNSA provides ths garrison for the minor offshore islands of Wuenlu and Tungyln, while the special forces groupapability for limited special operations on theIn addition to the above. non-MAP supported MND forces total.

a. The three Oarrlson Regiments of theGarrison Oeneral Headquarters (TGGKl not Included In army strength figuresaramilitary forceen, which also doe* not receive MAP support. These troops, generally of mainland origin, are physically disqualified and overage regular armyequipped with light weapons. They are used principally for security and garrison duties, and haveimited combatThe morerregular troops recently relumed from the Burma-Thailand-Laos triangle will probably be absorbed Into the ACNSA, the special forces group, and garrison regiments according to theirand technical quallflcaUons.

Qthart Islands In the Taiwan Strait area, the ORC haa0 troops on the Matsu Islands group and there arehinese Communist ground troops on the nearby mainland (the vicinity ofn the Chlnmen Wand group, there are0 ORC troops and the Communist* have an0 ground troop* nearby In the Amoy area. Ths ORC garrisons on the Chlnmens and the Matsus are at about maximum feasible strength; the Chinese Communists withinays could reinforce their troop strength In the Amoy-Foochow area with the additional forces already In the East Chinaroops,irborne divisions, which total0uch redeployment possibly could be accomplished without detection, but any slsabls concentration of amphibious craft could be detected.

Communist artilleryhlnmen areas totals aboutas comparedRC pieces.now on Chlnmen and Matsu includesnuclear-capable howltsers. RecentIn fortifications and coveredemplacement* have increased thecapability of both the Chlnmen andFood, ammunition, and otherIn abundance are stockpiled on theislands.

B The Navy

ORC Navymall fleetformer US ships, ths largest combatdestroyers. The total ship strengthfollows:

Table 1

Destroyer (DDI

8

Ship (DE)

5

Escort (PF)

2

(PCS!

1

Chaser (PC)

16

Qur.bost (POM)

2

Torpedo Boat (PT)

Minelayer IMMO)

a

Minesweeper (MSF)

Minesweeper

4

Vessels

The else and composition of the navyIt to carry out certain limited offensive assignments, such as lifting and supporting amphibious assault missions within aradius of Taiwan, shore bombardment, reconnsdsaance and interdiction of shipping in ths Taiwan Strait, and mine warfare. The navy la capable of providing logistical support to ths offshore islands and furnishing patrol surveillance and destroyer gun-fire support. The state of training of the navy is good. Maintenance and repair of ships andin the recent past have been generally substandard, but currently they are showing significant Improvement. Logistic practices and facilities are adequate but supplies are

dependent on continued US support. While its antisubmarine warfare and mlnesweeplng capabilities are still limited, they areimproving. Under US guidance and support further augmentation andof the navy Is taking place. The present capabilities of the ORC Navy are not adequate to meet the naval requirements for defenseetermined Chinese Communiston ORC-held territories.

0 man Marine Corps is organizedupportingand the Fleet Marine Force. Theforces consistrigade,VTVTA battalion, organised and equipped under modified US Marine Corps TOftE- The Marine Corps continues to have the capability to execute amphibiousInvolving the division and brigade against light to moderate resistance, assuming adequate naval and air support.

C. The Air Force

he Chinese Air Force (CAF) la ths strongest non-Communist Asian Air Force. Its primary mission Is the air defense of the Taiwan area. Its secondary missions are:of Communist Chinese installations capable of launching offensive actions sgainst Taiwan; defense of the offshore Islands;of ORC Army and Navy operations;of the Chinese Communist Navy; and aerial reconnaissance.

he CAF hasighter squadronsinto four tactical fighter groups. Thenterceptor squadron Is expected to be operational during the summerheighter squadrons areto become fully retrained and combat ready by the end of June. Crews forll-weather squadron are fully trained and were placed on active alert status Inersonnel strengthncludingrained pilots.

he CAF's capability to conduct tactical air operations Is fair to good, proficiency vary-lng from unit to unit. Tactical effectiveness is handicapped by the number ofighter aircraft that ars still in theCapability for deep penetrationover the Chinese mainland is limited to the single. Lessercan be performed by thes and by thes. The latter are presently In storage. The's are restricted to oblique photography along the coast because of their poor survival capability againstnterception. Visual reconnaissanceare flown twice dally over the Chlnmen areas's; every otherisual reconnaissance of the waters northeast of Taiwan. The CAF has andaylight air defense capabilityimited period of combat. With theof'a and's. the CAF nowimited all-weather defensive

IB. Radar coverage from Taiwan sites and from Makung In the Penghu Islands Is fairly good; radars on tha offshore Islands of .Matsus and Chlnmen haveimited range and helghtfindlng capability. The AAA battalions are well trained, but they are equipped withimited number of places that would be effective against Jet aircraft. 8tatlc airof the Taipei area Is bolstered by the Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missileissilesatteries) installed there. This unit is controlled and operated by the QRC Army.

Table 1

INVENTORY OF AIRCRAFT RV CONFIGURATION AND ASBIQNMINT CHIN uk AIR FORCI, ORC

CONFIGURATION

MODEL DESIGNATION

INVENTORY TOTAL

Prop

Jet

IN TACTICAL UNITS

Prop

ROLE AS8IONED

All weather

Day

ieonnaUttar.ce

Subtotal

ASW

Land

Subtotal

Transport

Subtotal Mlacellaneoui Subtotal

F-SST

F-IOOA

F-inOA

FB4Y

D

Q

H-1BB

8

4

434

1 17

4 _4

as

M 64

1

T

3 84

7 ia

a is

s

13fl 34

aT a

t

211

40T

46

48

3 83

7

ia _t

134

In Horaifl

VIP

Air Rescue

Air Reicua

TOTAL AS81QNED TO TACTICAL UNITS .

APPENDIX 8

POLITICAL TABLES

1

L'N VOTt ON MORATORIUM IBBLB

Tabla 1

ORC and PRC International Poalllon

UNOA Vole on Moratorium Issue

Por Agalnat Por Against For Against For Against

fghanistan

A i

Australia

Austria,

Belgium .

Bolivia

BraaU

Bulgaria

Burma

Byelorussian BsR .

fore Urn relatione outside UN

Cambodia

Cameroun .

Canada

Central African

-

Chad

Chile)

China <OROj

Colombia

razzaville)

Congo lUopoldvilla)

present

coiu Rioa

Cuba

Cyprus

CiechoalovaUa

X

Dahomay

Denmark

X

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

II Salvador

Ethiopia

be la innd

Finland

France

Oabota

Ghana -

Onset

Ouatamala

oulnea

Haiti

Honduras

Hungary

Iceland

India

Indonesia

Iran ..

ORC and PRC InternationalConllnnsd)

Country

If. Iraq

nland

48.

vory CoMt

taly

apan

M.

M. Laoa

ebanon

.

St. Libya,

oa. Luxembourg

Malaya, Fed. of

Mail

01

epal

Ofi. Netherlande

BO. New Zealand

icaragua .

fls. Niger

igeria

orway

ft Pakistan

7S..

hilippine Republl

oland

ortugal

7a. Romania

7B. Saudi Arabia

enegal

ai. Somalia

pain

weden

SO. Thailand

SO. Togo

Tunisia

Turkey

nion of BJoulh Africa 81 USSR

krainian sen

x

X

For aajawat x

1BBS

For Aialnat X

X X

X X

X X

or Afalnat X

X X

Abstained

X

X

X X

RefOfTUeea

RecogT.iied Neither14

UAR not yet created. Egypt and Syria voted leoarately against.

Table 8

Recognition by CaualrtM Outside foe UN

RecognUae

ORC PRC

Oermany

South Korea

Switzerland .

South Vietnam

Mauretanla

communist Reerunss

East Oermany

North Korea

North Vietnam

Outer Mongolia

Other

The "Provisional Government ol the Algerian RepublW"

X

X

X X

CENTRAL LNTELLIQENCB AGENCY

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

his estimate was disseminated by ths Central Intelligence Agency. Ttus copy Is for the Information and use of ths recipient and of parsons under his Jurisdictioneed to know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorised by the following officials within thslr respective departments

a Director of Intelligence and Research, for ths Department of State

Chief of Staff for intelligence, Department of the Army

Chief of Naval Operationsor the DepartmentNavy

of Intelligence, USAF, for ths Department of the Air Force

for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for Ths Joint Staff

of Intelligence, AXC, for tha Atomic Energy Commission

Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation

to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, for theDefense

l Director of NBA for the National Security Agency

J. Assistant Director for Central Reference, OTA, for any other Department or Agency

2 This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning In accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligent Agency by arrangement with ths Office of Central Reference, CIA

a. When an estimate Is ri tormina ted overseas, ths overseas recipients may retain Iteriod not in excess of one ysar. At tha and of this period, the estimate should elthsr be destroyed, returned to ths forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain It in aooordanoe witha.

he title of this estimate whan used separately from the text should be classified: FOR OFFICIAL DSE ONLY

xas yI NO

This material eon tains Information affecDni the National Defense of the United states within ths murine, of the espionage laws. Title II. TJSC, Sees. TBI and TM, the trons-nussicn or revelation of whlob in any manner to on unauthorisedrohibited by law,

DIBTBIBirnON:

White Rouse

National Seourlty Council

Deputmsnt of Stats

Department of Defense

Atomle mercy CemmUslon

Federal Bureau of

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA