VL INTELLIGENCE AGEN
to ths Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
"Anti-Miss lie Defense of Troopsront" hy Lt. Oen. V. Mlkhaylov
Special Assistant to the President for Rational Security Affairs
Director for Intelligence The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Headquarters, U. S. Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Array
Director of Haval Intelligence Department of the Navy
Director, Rational Security Agency
The Director of Intelligence and Research Department of State
Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Asoistant Director for National Estimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
SUBJECT Anti-Miss lie Defense of Troop*y Lt. Gen. V. Mikhaylov
DATS OF INFO: 1 (Prior to May)
CONTENT : Documentary
SOURCE: Reliable Soviet eource (B) who baa access to this type of document.
Followingerbatim translation of an article entitled "Anti-Missile Defense of Troopsritten by Lt. Oen. V. Mlkhaylov.
This article appeared inI Second Editionpecial version of Voyenr-aya Mysl (Military Thought) vhlch is classified TOP SECRET and is issued irregularly^ According to the preface, this edition contains articles never before published and some speeches which have been delivered prior to being published .in this form. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Conmander.
Defense cf Trcoparont
Lt. Gen. V. Mikhaylov
It is known that at the present time our potential enemiesider missiles as the haste means of delivering nuclear charges to targets. In recent years appropriations in the USA for work la tbe field of missile technology have Increased by fivefold. The success of operations conducted by our front operational groupings (obedl-nenlye) will dependignificant degree on the number of available means for combating enemy nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, including ballistic missiles.
Combat against ballistic missiles is conducted on the ground and in the air. This article will not take up combat against missiles on the ground. The purpose of this article is to examine the charac^sllea as air targets and to indicate methods of creating appropriate armament and military equipment, and toumber of principles of organ!ie defense in front operations. In this regard, it is to be borne in mind that initially anti-missile weapons will supplement the existing PVO system of the front; subsequently, depending on the extent to which the potential enemy increases his use of ballistic miaslles^init will become necessary toystem of anti-missile defense which is supplemented by the weapons for combat agsdnsE piloted aircraft.
As la known, the term ballistic missile is givenlying object which is controlled only in the initial sector of the trajectory (up toercenthich has the appearanceallistic curve. Ballistic missiles possess supersonic speeds, various ranges, high trajectories, and different weights of(boyevaya cheat). This permits them to be used in strikes against objectives at tactical, operational, and strategic depths. Missiles can carry nuclear charges of different magnitudes (in TNT equivalents of from several thousand to several million tons).
It should be assumed thatactical designation ballistic misslleo can be used against troops and objectives in the front zone. The use of strategic-designation missiles in the front zone can be expected when objectivestrategic nature are deployed at operational depth or when the conditions of the situation compel the enemy to carry out strikes with these missile against front targets.
Combat against ballistic missiles can be carried out in tho areas of their launch, ln the flight trajectory, and also in the sector of their stabilization on entering the_ dense, layers of the atmosphere. Success in combatting ballistic missiles will depend on the tactical-technical data of the ant1-missile defense weapons, the system of anti-mis Bile-defense created, and the quality of the automated system of control of the anti-missile weapons.
It Is known that the employment of means of air attack by the enemy, including ballistic missiles, will be Influenced by: the 3tage_gf_the, war, the importance of the theater- of combatthe enemy capability to use missiles, and the nature of the operations being conducted by tbe frontiven theater of combat operations.
We shell try to examine,oncrete example, the quantity and types.of missiles the enemy can be expected to useront offensive operation in the Western TVD ^teatr voyennykh deystviy -theater of combat/.
Let us assume that opposing the frontroup of armies comprising two field armiesactical air army. Each field amy la reinforced with one group of the URS ^Ipravlyayemyy.reaktivnyyuided missile/wo to three battalions (divlzion) of the "URSnd six to nine battalions of "Honest John'*. In the interest of defensivefor the group of armies one squadron (eskadrilya) of "Thor" missiles carries out one launching by all its installations. (ustarfevka). Let us also assume that the missile weapons of neighboring field armies are not called upon in the strike against the troops and objectives In the: .'front which we are studying. In this situation the following quantity of ballistic missiles can be employed by the enemy in the front offensive zone
Rumbar of Sub-Units waaber of Launch Sites per Battery, per Battalion
Number of Missiles in One Launching
Time Required for Reload
mixed battalions from divisions of the first echelon
Ao can be seen from the table,issiles can be firedof vhicta up tore operational-tactical and up toissiles ere of strategic designation. The second firing of ballistic missiles is possibleours, taking intothe need to prepare the next firing, to define the targets better, and to change the launching sites (stertovaya pozltslya) for the operational-tactical missiles.
In the event of mlsslls firing at irregularhich can take place in an operation conductedubsequent stage of the war, the number of missilesront zone that can be firedour period is. ofUO will be directed against objectives In tho tactical depth.
Considering the limited number of ballistic missiles at the disposalroup of armies, it Is possible to assume that the strikes of tbe operatlocal-tactlcal missiles will be directed against the main formations of front troops, assembly bases for nuclear and missile weapons, and missile large unit and unit positions, control centers, airfields where the frontal air support is based, main railroad junctions, and crossings; the strikes of strategic designation missiles will be directed against the most important rear-area objectives of the front. Strikes by ballistic missiles will be made in conjunction with sorties of pilotedthe launching of balloons, and strikes by winged missiles.
efensive operation, the front can repel an attackroup of armies made up of three field armiesactical air army, reinforcedarge quantity of missiles for use in offensive actions. In the zone of defenseront, aa an alternate, the enemy may employ the following number of ballistic: missiles
Type of Missile
Number of* Sub-Units
ser of Launch Sites per Battery (Eattalloa)
Number of Missiles ln One Launching
Time Required for Reload
ixed battalions from divisions of the first echelon
can see thatefensiveront canreater nuaber of olsslleB to be launched simultaneously by the enemy than in an offensive operation. The use of nuclear warheads (yadernyye boyeprlpasy) ln all missiles makes lt possible to knockbjectives in tho defense zone of the front ln one launching,f these being within the limits of the tactical zone. trike, naturally, can sharply reduce the defensive stability of the troops, especially in the tactical depth.
In the case of deliberate miasile firing,oissiles can be expectedU-hour period, of whichoirected against the most important objectives in the tactical depth of the defense.
The means for anti-missile warfare must be capable of destroying both ballistic missileselatively short range (up tom) and ballistic missilesange ofpm. It is necessary to take into consideration the fact that the short-range missiles will comprise up toercent of all the missiles the enemy will use in the frontal zone.
It Is known that the existing PVO meansront do not have the tactical-technical characteristics to cope with the ballistic miBSiles of the potential enemies. adical change is needed in these weapons, especially in the aurfaco-to-air (tenltnaya) guided mlaslles.
Combat against ballistic missiles in the sir requires: an Increase in the distance and altitude at which the missile can be detected and tracked by radar; tbe creationuidance system for antl-miaslles (sistema navedenlyaombinedystem of long-range .reconnaissance of enemy ballistic alasiles andyatea for automatically computing the required data, to insure the interception of enemy ballisticmissiles at specified distances and altitudes; the creation of anti-missiles which possess appropriate tactical-technical characteristics; the development of new radiotechnlcal sets (stantalya) to Jam the guidance and the homing systems (apparatura ssmonavedenlya) of the ballistic missiles of the enemy.
The combat employment of all these means will be more effective upon the creation of an automated guidance system
nterna upravleniya) vhlch ia "baaed on electrode computing machines (elektronno-vychlelitelnaya maahina) and which insures the continuous automatic evaluation of the air situation and the working out of the problem of committing appropriate forces and means of anti-missile combat.
Thus, we view anti-missile combatomplex system of measures which includes the reconnaissance and assured tracking of ballistic missiles in the air; the automatic computation of the necessary data which will insure the interception of ballistic missiles in the air at specified parametera of the objectives (areas) being covered; the launching of anti-mtsslles In order to destroy the enemy missiles in the air; radio countermeasures (radioprotivodeystviye) assuring the generation ofjanming of tbe missile guidance Bystea and their homing devices.
In order to effect the timely detection end tracking of ballistic missiles, radar reconnaissance mustetection range of not lessm in combat with missiles of operational-tactical designationa in combat with missiles of strategic designation.
From the point of view of anti-missile combat, the detection range for missiles should exceed, or at least be equal to, the missile range. However, lt is known tbat any radar station acts only in the limits of direct line of sight. The maximum range of interceptadar station located near an objective (group of objectives) being defended, with optimum trajectories, fcr ballistic missilesangemm, and for missilesangem lt0 km.
Increasing the height of the antenna does not result in an increase in the detection range. In order to attain an increase in the detection range, it is necessary to move the radar stations away from the objectives (groups of objectives) being defended toward the directions from which strikes by strategic missiles are expected to come. In addition, in order to Insure the timely detection of ballistic missiles it is advisable to exploit the new principle ofoherent integration (kegerentnoye lntegrlrovanlye) (random summation) (vyborochnoyehich consists of amplifying the strength of the useful signal (polesnyy signal)
tbe background of fluctuating (local) noises. adar station, working on this principle, can quickly and correctly determine tbe distance, speed, and angular coordinatesoving target within the limits of the line of sight.
According to our calculations. In order to insure the effective use of appropriate weaponshe minimum distance of the boundary of detection of ballistic missiles of operational-tactical designation, with tho exception of missiles of the type of Honest John, Corporal, Sergeant, and Blue Water, must behe limitsm, and for missiles of strategic designation, within the limitsm.
Taking into consideration the range of ballistic missiles of the Honest John, Corporal, Sergeant, and Blue Water types, as well aa the distance of their launching positions from the main line of resistance, it can be assumed that existing radar stations for reconnaissance and target indication will detect these missiles In good time after they are launched. This pertains to missileseight of flight trajectory of not less. It is imperative that tho data obtained be processed automatically and transmitted to the anti-missile weapons in no laterec. for missiles of the Booest John type, and one to two min. for missiles of the Corporal, Sergeant, and Blue Water type.
The necessity for receiving data on the flight of ballistic missiles of operational-tactical designation (such as Pershing and Redstone) with rangesm and on missiles of strategic designation with rangesm requires that radar stations for reconnaissanceetection range of upm, and an altitude capability/nipm. In connection with this, the system of anti-missile combat must have two types of radar stations for reconnaissance In order to assure the system's effectiveness ln combating both the operational-tactical and the strategic missiles of the potential enemies.
Prom the radar stations for reconnaissance of operational-tactical missiles there should be formed: detection centers (uiel obnaruihenlya) consisting of four to six stations with ranges upm and altitude capabilities upm; and Interception centers (uzel perekhvata) consisting of three to four stations
withanges upm and altitude capabilities upm. The number of centers will dependtbe number of Important objectives (groups of objectives) to be defended. The missile detection centers should be connected with the interception centersanner which will insure the automatic computation of data necessary for interception and the synchronous transmission of these data to the anti-missile launching sub-units (podrazdeleniye)
The detoction and tracking of ballistic missiles ofesignation should be carried out by special long-range detection centers, having radar stations with an operational range of upm, an altitude capability upm, and synchronous connections with missile -Interception centers which have stations with an operational range of upm and an altitude capability of upm.
It must be noted tbat early warning (dalneye ^obnaruzheniye) of enemy ballistic missiles can bs carried out not. only during the trajectory of their flight by radar stationsreat range, but also by picking up and amplifying tbe radio signals which are emitted by ths powerful missile engines at the time of their firing. However, this method should only be supplementary (dubllruyushchiy) In the snti-mlssile combat system organizedront*
For the detection end Interception of strategic missiles the Americans are developing two interconnectedystem of early warning (raneye obnaruzheniye)ystem of interception. Tbe mission of the early warning system Is the detection and identification of enemy ball'iotic missiles, the determination of the approximate trajectory data, and the transmittal of these data to the anti-missile combat means. The mission of the intercept ays Sea is the interception and destruction of enemy ballistic missilesafe distance from the objectives being defended.
Under simultaneous development are several systems for the interception and destruction of ballistic missiles (Hike-Zeus, Plato, and Wizard). The main system Is Hike-Zeus. This system has three types of radar stations: scanning, determination of trajectory, and tracking; the system also Includesactical control center of the defense area, cosasunicatlon lines, and launching installations (startovaya ustanovka) with Hike-Zeus anti-alsslles. The operational procedure of the system Is ap
follow-,: after receiving the eigne! from the early warningtheradar atation goes into action first; havingrangeC0 km, lt continuously scans (swings) lnof the expected attack within asector. Afteris detected, the station which determines theinto operation; this station picks up the target atm and tracks it until it obtains precise trajectory(batereya) has two radar tracking
stations with an operating range upm; these stations go into operationommand from .the radar station which determines trajectory. Both stationseed target and anti-mlaaile location dataomputer which, by means of radio contends, guides the anti-missile to the target. During the final phase (uchastok) of the anti-mlasile flight, tbe homing system goes into operation and insures the interception of the target.
In order to destroy enemy baUiatic missiles in the air, both during the trajectory and aa it begins to aero In on the target, anti-missiles are needed which have the tactical-technical characteristics for the reliable interception and destruction of enemy missiles at specified distances in relation to the objectives (troops) being defended. The system of anti-missile launching devices must assure the necessary acceleration before the BUBtainer: engines (marshevyy dvigatel) are ignited, the timely Ignition of the sustainer engines, and the accurate guidance and homing of the antl-misslles on the ballistic missiles of the enemy.
It is imperative to have such antl-mlseiles as vould assure the destruction of enemy ballietic miasiles regardless of their range, altitude, or speed of flight.
It seems to us that in order to destroy ballistic aisellea of the Honest John type it la advisable to employ the troop surface-to-air (zenitnaya) mlssllea which have been developed. The effectiveness of such missiles has been shown by their range teats (pollgonnoye iapytaniye) abroad, particularly in the USA. The deployment of an automated system of Interception and Its synchronisation with the launching system of the troop surface-to-air missiles will provide the combat system needed against mlBBilea of the Honest John type.
For tho destruction of operational-tactical mlaolles of tho Corporal and Pershing type, it is necessary to have an anti-missileangepeed of not lessec, and an altitude capability ofkm. It is advisableaunching sub-unit for such anti-missiles0 launchinguration of firing cycle (tslkl strelby) of three to five minutes,reparation timeepeat firing of not morein. The systems of reconnaissance, of interception, and of tho launching of the anti-missiles should be interconnected by means of an automated system based on electronic computers.
To combat enemy ballistic missiles of strategic designation, it is necessary to have anti-missilesange on .the orderm, an altitude capability ofessm,peedec and more. It is desirable that aunching sub-unit of such antl-mlsslles have not lessaunchinguration of firing cycle of not morereparation timeepeat firinginutes. In order to increase the mobility of anti-missile launchinglt is desirable to install them on railroad mounts, barges, ships, and prima moversigh degree of readability.
For anti-missile warheads it is desirable to have both a explosive type to destroy enemy ballistic missiles ln a" vacuum (while in free flighta wellype capable ofuclear charge in order to Insure the destruction of missiles during their flight through the dense layers or at tbe time of entry Into the dense layers of tbe atmosphere (during the phase of stabilization).
Combat against enemy ballistic missiles can be made more effective by creating radio-Jamming directed against the missile guidance systems in the initial phase of the trajectory and against the homing device during the final phase of the trajectory. Radio-Jamming of the guidance systems of ballistic miBslles in the Initial phase should prevent the missile from entering its specified trajectory; theiming of the homing device should deflect the missile from its specified target, but with sufficient deflection to insure the safety of the objective being defended from tbe explosionigh-yield nuclear charge. Radio-Jamming can be created by special radio-technical Jamming sets operating in the same frequency ranges as the guidance aodihoming systems of ballistic mlaoiloB.
Objectives may also be protected from strikes by enemy ballistic missiles by concealing them with radar camouflage (protivo-radiolokatalcnnaya maaklrovka).
Under present-dayront,ule, will carry out operationsheater of combat operations In coordination with operational groupings (obedinenlys) of other branches of the armed forces. We have already pointed out above that in the front zone of operations we must be ready to combat ballistic missiles of operational-tactical and strategic designation, which will ba used by the enemy against objectives in the front zone and against objectives in the deep interior of the country. Within the boundaries of the TVD (teatr voyennykhheater of military operations) there shouldingle system for the destruction of missiles in the air by the troops in that theater. It appears that the anti-missile defense systemVD will consist of thenti-missile defense) systems of the front and of operational groupings of other branches of tbe armed forces (the navy, long-rangeA) which are deployed within the boundariesiven TVD. The anti-missile defense of the zone of interior (tyl strany) will most likely operate in coordination with this system of anti-missile defense.
The anti-missile defenseront can represent the first of anti-missile defense organizediven TVD, which, "turn, will be the first echelon of snti-mlssile defense of the .as a
The task of the front anti-missile defense ia to prevent strikes by enemy ballistic missiles against the troops and rear area objectives. As we have indicated above, the front anti-missile defense must include an operational system of special forces and means, intended specifically for combatting enemy ballistic missiles In the air.
Anti-missile defense must be continuous, active, and capable of repelling strikes by enemy ballistic missiles under alland at any season of the year or time of day.
Anti-missile defense in front operations can be set up according to the principle of defending the most important objectives. This is explained by the fact that at the present time the relatively small amount of ballistic missiles In the enemy's possession limit his use of them to particular objectives, (formations of troops). In
addition, the process of working out the necessary date, forlauncblngs is relatively stapler when lt is related to separate sub-units.defending specific objectives. Hence lt is possible to set up suitable equipmentonsiderable expenditure, of materiel*
At the same time, the antt-miasils systems being formed on the basis of range for the defense of Individual objectives will permit, as ve see it, the defense of groups of important objectives(individual zones) in the front zone of action, if the distances between the targets do not exceed the operational range of thenti-mlasils defense can be formed accordingonal principle.
A front anti-missile defense Is organized in close coordination with the anti-missile defense of adjacent fronts (fleets) and of the zone of interior. Inront anti-missile defense, consideration should be given to tbe character of the operation being tarried cut by the front; and it should be in conformance with the concept of the operation and with the operational deployment of the troops.
Anti-missile defense can reach its goal when ita forces and resources aro combined with the measures for the direct protection of troop formations and objectives in ths rear area of the front from striaes by ballistic missiles.
In the interests of PRO, all types of reconnaissance should be used to carry out continuous reconnaissance against enemy military Industrial plants, supply depots, missile bases, and site locations for missile weapons. This reconnaissance should be organized in the theater of combat operations as well as tb the fron%both during the planning and the execution of the operation,
During the execution of an operation, the front radar centers for the detection and tracking of enemy ballistic missiles can be located outside the tactical zone,istance of not lessm from the main line of resistance. Frequently the location of these radar centers may be designated by directives of the High Coinnand (Verkhovnoye glavnokomnndovanlye) for the purpose of using the data of these centers for the anti-missile defense of adjacent fronts and the zone of interioriven theater of combat operations, and. In coastal areas, for the anti-missile defense of the fleet.
The radar posts for control and assurance of Intercept hy anti-missiles areconnected with the anti-missile launching systcn and should be located in the areas of the launching sites of the latter.
To protect the more important objectives ln the front zone, lt will be necessary to detach several anti-missile launching sub-units. The number of these sub-units will bo determined by the importance of the objective, its nature and size, and tbe possible density and duration of tba enemy missile strikes.
In defending an objective the anti-missile sub-unite can be deployedector (whence the missile attack is expected) inanner that their zones of fire will overlap in order to lnnuro the concentration of fire of several anti-missile aub-units ln repelling strikes cf greater density. The distances between the anti-missile launching sub-units must not exceed the optimum distance needed for the firing of, let us say, hree or four anti-miss ilea on the border of the zones of fire of adjacent sub-units (assuming that the enemy ballistic missile will be destroyed by this number of anti-missiles).
It Is advisable to deploy the detached anti-missile sub-units around an objectiveistance which insures the effective interception of ballistic missiles aad the control of thosub-units by the control points of the anti-missile defense. It cannot be excluded that the anti-missile launching sub-units can be deployedistance ofm and more from the objective-being defended, which may be determined by the distance of the approach of the missile to the objective, by the dimensions of the internal borders of the zone of fire of the anti-missile sub-unit, and the feasible distance from the control point of anti-missile defense (depending on "the "range *of Tadlosynchronoua transmission).
If several Important objectives within tbe limitsheater of combat operations are in close proximity to eachonal defense can be created for their protection.
It would be advisable to deploy those anti-missile launching sub-units detached for zonal defense purposesector from which the enemy ballistic missile strike is most likely to come; and they should be deployed in several rows (two or three) in such
aat the zones of fire of these aub-unitB will overZap. The denee overlapping of the zones of fire or these anti-missile sub-units creates conditions foroncentrated missile attack from the most likely direction, and it allows for the destruction of enemy missiles in the dead zones of adjacentaub-units.
The total number of anti-missile launching sub-units neededront will depend, on the one hand, on the number of ballistic-missiles which the enemy is able to use against objectives within the front zone and, on the other hand, on the probability of destruction of each missile by the weapons of the PRO. We must also take into consideration the maximum' number of missiles the enemy can fireimultaneous launching. There shouldufficient number of anti-missile launching sub-unitsront to insure the certain destruction of all ballistic missiles launched simultaneously by the enemy against front objectives or those flying over the front zone in the direction of the zone of interior.
If we calculate that four or five anti-missiles are needed to destroy one ballistic missile (according to American0 anti-missiles are needed to destroy one ballisticront, according to our previously stated examples (seeay have to launch the followingU-hour period:
n an offensive operation, upnti-missiles (combat against ballistic missiles of tbe Honest John type will be conducted principally by carrying out strikes against enemy site locations and assembly bases; in the air it will be conducted by surface-to-air missile units of the PVO system).
in defensive operations, up0 anti-missilea.
The Indicated number of anti-missiles used in rapid fire by anti-missileaunchlugshour period, can be launched by four to seven launching sub-units in an offensive operation and by four or fiveefensive operation. This number ofl so lie launching sub-units thereby makes up the necessary strengthront.
view of the factront system ofie defense will be coordinated with the anti-missile defenseof adjacent fronts and of the zone of interior, the number of anti-missile launching sub-unitsront can be decreased
In the event that tbe missile strikes against objectivesfront zone are carried out in greater density, it willto increase the number of anti-missile
The system of anti-missile defense ln front operations initially can consist of several formations of the means ofcombati
ormations of the means of combat against missiles of operational-tactical designationange ofm and speeds upec; ln our opinion, this formation can consist of PVO surface-to-air missile units which have new missile systems capable of destroying the above -mentioned missiles of the enemy;
formations of means of combat against missiles of operational-tactical designationangem and speedsec and above;
formations of means of combat against missiles of strategic designation.
The development and refinement of missile and electronicwill, evidently, increase the possibilities for the creationniversal defense system which will insure effective combat against missiles of the most varied designations. Furthermore, this system will actually encompass combat against all enemy means of air attack, including piloted aircraft.
The successful combat against ballistic missilesront requires tbe organisation of close communication between the of reconnaissance and tracking of enemy missiles and the systems of anti-missile launching. The beat way to achieve this close communication is to combine themingle troop entity.
In our opinion, it would be desirableront to have an anti-missile brigade or regiment comprising several sub-units (three or four) for the detection and tracking of ballistic missiles, several anti-missile sub-units (five ornd several aub-units for radlo-countermeasures /radloprotivodeystviye/ll of these sub-units would bs Interconnected during combat by sn automated system bsjed on electronic This brigade or regiment should be subordinate to the ccemsander of front air defense troops.
Aa we have already Indicated above, as the number ofunitsront Increases, the existing PVO system will gradually growystem of PRO, headed by the chief of PRO troops.
Inasmuch as it la too difficultront to organize reconnaissance of the guidance systems of ballistic missiles cf strategic designation during the initial phase of their trajectory, it would be advantageous, during front operations, to set up Jamming principally directed against the homing devices of enemyn order to prevent-them from homing in on their programmed objectives. It is advisable to locate the Jamming sub-units in the directions of the probable flight of enemy ballistic missiles, on the approaches to the more important targets of the front zona, at distances which would assure reliable detection and the subsequent neutralization of the homing devices of the ballistic missiles.
The anti-missile defense system in front operations can be effective only if there is developed an expedient control system for the means which participate in combating enemy ballistic missiles. We believe that tbe control of the means ofdefense can be centralized on the scaleheater of combat operations for the destruction of missiles of strategic designation, on the scaleront for the destruction of missiles of operational-tactical designation with ranges upm, and on the scale of an army for the destruction of missiles with ranges up tokm. .
Thus, in order to insure success in combatting enemy ballistic missiles, it is necessary:
-to work out the following technical moans of combatbort period of time: radar atatlona for tho early warning and tracking of ballisticlea in the air; radar stations for controlling theystem of automated control of all the means ofcombat; various typea of anti-missilea and stations for Jamming the guidance systems and homing devices of ballistic missiles.
o supplement the present PVO system with means of combating enemy ballistic missiles and subordinating those means to tbe chief of front PVO troops; subsequently, to worknified systemombating; -the air enemy, which would include combating ballistic and cruise missiles (krylataya) and piloted aircraft on the scaleront and which would operate in coordination with similar systems in adjacent fronts and in the zone cf Interior; considering that tha principal means of air attack in the future will bo missiles of various designations,ystem of combat con be called an anti-missile defense system;
to control the means of anti-missile combatontrol point of front PVO whenever these means areront PVO system; upon ths creation of an anti-missile defense system, it will be possible to control the means of this system from special control points organizedfront end, sometimes,heater of combat operations.Original document.