MEMO FROM RICHARD HELMS TO ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (SPECIAL OPERA

Created: 8/25/1961

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. C.

1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)

Area Support of Miseile Troops in Front Offensiveol. Gen. of Artillery G. F. Odintsov

erbatim translation of an article entitled "Rear Area Support of Missile Troops In Front Offensive Operations" by Col. Gen. of Artillery. Odintsov which appeared In aTOP SECRET issue of the SovietJournal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought).

This article was acquiredoviet official who has provided reliable information In the past.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

32

ce; Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affaire

Director for Intelligence The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research Department of State

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

SOURCE: Reliable Soviet eource (B) who haa access to this type of document*

Fellowlogerbatim translation of an article entitled "Rear Area Support of Missile Troops ln Front Offensiveritten by Col. Oen. of Artillery Ceorgiy F. Odintsov, Chief of tho Military Engineering-Artilleryserihinskiy.

The article appeared in1 Second Editionpecial vers loo of Voyer.rj.ys Hysl (Military Thought) which Is classified TOP SECRET and is issued irregularly. According to the preface, this edition containa articles never before published and some speeches which have been delivered prior to being published in this form. It la distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the levsl of Army Coiaaander.

FRONT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

by Colonel General of Artillery

dlnteov

Aa la known, timely end thorough rear area aupply of missile troops la the ooat ImporlTent condition for achieving aucceea in an operation. But the recently adopted syatem for supplying niasiles and Dlasile fuel to troops does not yet completely fit the nature of modem operations. It requires further Improvement. From this point of viev the article by Lieutenant General M. Novikov is of great and practical Interest, and the questions upon which it touched required the moat serloua attention. .

It is difficult, however, to agree with the author'sunder present-day conditions the principal organiser ofof troops with mlssllea sod

^one-half page misaiturj

The experience of having service of artillery armsaentto the deputy commander of -troops for the rear erea did not prove itself during Vorld War II when the conditions and volume of rear area work were conaiderably simpler. And it la doubtful that euch subordination will be acceptable under pressnt-day conditions. The resubordination (perepodchlnenlye) of theof mleeile and artillery armament not only Increases tha volume of work of the rear area chief, but also requires tba rear area staff to spend considerable time coordinating both the very important and the routine problems with the directorate orof missile and artillery armament, the HQ of alssila troops and artillery, and also with the departments of the PVO troops of the front (army). It la difficult at this time to state whether it is expedient to have the service of missile and artillery

* slushbaierlyakogo yogrutheniya

armament subordinate to the chief of missile troops andven though such subordination vas completely Justified in tbe years of World War II. At that time all of the field andartillery vas under the cocmander of artillery. Be organized the combat activity of all artillery, and only he vas able to direct the work of the service of artillery armament.

At the present time only units (chest) and large units (soyedineniye) of tactical and operational-tactical missiles, aa well as units and large units of field artillery, are subordinate -to the chief of missile troops and artillery. Antiaircraftantiaircraft artillery, troop and army missiles of the claashave gone over to the control of the chief of PVO -troops of the front (army). The dual control of the combat activity of missile troops and artillery leaves its mark on the conditions of work of the service of missile end artillery arma-ment. It is compelled to execute the instructions and requirements of two chiefs: the chief of missile troops and artillery and the chief of PVO troops. Besides this, the further equipping of com-

wlih tanks Increased significantly ths need for tank ammunition, the expenditure of vhlch Is planned and determined to some extent by the staff of the front (army). Consequently, the serviceissile armament also baa to coordinate its activities with tbe staff of the front (army). In essence, therefore, three senior officers have an influence on the work of the aervice of missile and artillery armament in the resolution of basic problems. This is obviously an abnormal situation. In order to eliminate it, lt is advisable to transfer the subordination of the serviceissile and artillery armament directly to the cocmander of troopsront (army).

To some extent this proposal evolves from the realof the chief of service with the staff andof troopsront, since he very frequently issdvisor to the commend on questions of supplyingnuclear weapons and missiles of all types. Also,resubordlnatlon of service brings it nearer toof control where the basic questions of theof missile troops and other arms of service

)

Let us examine some of the author's personal proposals.

The complex utilization of rail, road, and air transport in the operational rear area undoubtedly is necessary, but the possibilities of using them for missile troops are extremely limited. As can be seen in Diagram 'l, missiles, component parts, (komplektuyushcheye imushchestvo) and nose sections (golovnaya chast) are delivered from tha zone of interior (tyl .strany) to the rear area missile bases of the front principally by rail and air. Tbe principal organizer of the loading and dispatch of this freight is the Chief Artillery Directorate andh Chief Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. The responsibilities of the front rear area are limited to dispatching these transports, upon arrival, to the various front rear area missile bases or their sections (otdeleniye). It is unlikely that missiles will be transported within the front area by rail under the existing system of supply because of the extremely limited number of rear area missile installations (uchrezhdeniye) capable of handling missile components and because of ths comparatively slow pace of reconstruction of rail lines behind the advancing troops. Besides this, transportation within the front area is also limited,ertain extent, by the lack of an adequate number of temperature-controlled (izotermicheskly) railroad cars, specially equipped railroad cars, and gondola cars (poluvagon) at the front.

In the operational rear area the basic method ofmoat of the missiles which have undergonepreparation la by special cross-countrytelezhka) end not Just automotive transport. Itimpossible to use them for other purposes, Just asnot possible in practice to use truck motor pools for transporting That is why the author's proposal of giving thethe rear area the responsibility of transporting missiles toby complex utilization of the transport in the frontis impractical; for it does not reflect true capabilitiesnot supported from the materiel viewpoint. The only otherthe chief of the rear area will be able to use foris helicopters. But up to the present time they are stillas resources of the commander of troopsrontan

We come to the same conclusions when we analyze the conditions for transporting special fuel and for fueling missiles. It is known that the fueling of missiles is carried out in preliminary preparation areas by forces of the front rear area alssile bases. At these preliminary preparation areas the fueling facilities are used both for the transporting of missile fuel and for the fueling of missiles. These name fueling facilities are Incorporated in the' plan of service of missile and artillery armament for transporting miselle fuel elements from the depots of the front. Therefore the principal of function of the service of supply of fuel must be the /one word Biasing/ development of depots.

^ftie-half page missing.J

rmament, and no other should be responsible for tbeof the delivery of missiles.

The correctarea cisaile

units of the front and army depend not only on the preparedf railroad lines and military roads, but also on tbe groupings of missile troops and on their combat operations. The timely movement of troops is determined by the front troop cceanander with the active participation of tbe chief of missile troops, and artillery, as well as by tbe chief of PVO troops. It Is evident that these chiefs will not be inactive regarding the deployment and movement"of tbe missile bases of_^he-front rear area. Their thoughts" Off this subject will be mere sound than the proposals of the chief of the rear area. We do not deny the needlose working relationship among all the above-mentioned senior officers, but we do not see the need to levy this responsibility on the cj)jcf of-the rear area. The last word concerning this setter will obviously belong to tbe cccrcander. jjf. There is even less need to'include the rear area apparatus in the planning of supplying the troops with missiles, when the matters being decided relate not only to the work of rear area missile installations but also to the feasibility of using the transport equipment of units for delivery of missiles. Tbe latter depends, basically, on the nisslons of the missile units. In other words, the feasibility of usingransport_for delivery of missiles depends" on the times of their launching. It appears to us that it is In the interests of this matter to have constant contact between the chief of the, rear, area

and the chief qf missile and artillery armament. Regardingthe directorate of missile and artillery armament lao coordinate with the rear area staff and with the fuel supply service: tbe areas where front rear area missile bases and mlaslle fuel depots are to be set up; the distribution of the missile fuel received to its destinations; and, the time required to3 depots and the road network at the front. Under the circum-Stances the _cfeief olVtfieltEougb not responsible for supplying the troops with missiles, must give all poealble assistance to the service of missile and artillery armament.

Ve fully share Lt. Oen. H. Novikov'e opinion that the new system of supplying troops with missilesumber of ssrlous. In our opinion, to these shortcomings should be added: the narrow specialization of tbe rear area missile bases ofront and their" inadequate ability to withstandjepemy. action; ths difficulty inuriva.he com-paratively great distances over which ready (gotcvaya) missiles have to be transported; and-tbe difficulty of relocating bases.

According to the data from the troop exercise "Don" theystem provides that each front have one front technical missile base and one front technical ZUR base The front technical wi tmi Lt faaae. which is intended for tbe preparation of tactical and operational-tactical missiles, includesransport: battalion, (parkovyyne technical, and several mobileepair bases. Tbe front technical ZUR base is Intended for tbe preparation of antiaircraft missiles and may be composed of one orransport^ battalions and three or four technical battalions. From the front missile bases it is possible to detach two.nose section crewsery small personnel force (from theone mobile technical repair baseransportechnical battery; from the FTB ZURechnical battalion and severalatteries (batareya).) Because of this, eveneriod of preparation for an operation, all mlsaile. troops operatingonem are obliged to depend on each nose_section crew of the rear area base: during theratron "all mTsslIo" troopsront must depend on each nose section crew of the rear area base. The distances that ready missiles must be transported during different periods ofossibly^oMelenlye Bpetslslnogg goryi pecial

operation naym, or more. Tbe tran*portinglBsllee over auch greet distances adversely affects While-retainiiig" the concept of centralized preparation of missiles, lt is more advantageous to have two basesroad profile but capable of preparing all types of-adjsllss (seanstead of two specialized bases. In this way the distances, of transport are reduced by two. times. snd,.the stability of work at the bases is Increased. By organising" the" rear area missile bases in this manner, if one directorate of the base is put out of commission lt will not affect the work of all sections. In order to reduce the distances that ready missiles are transported and in order to increase the maneuverability of the bases, it is advisable that each base. Instead of having specialized sub-unitsave small complex rear area installations designed to receive, to relocate, to carry out the preliminary preparation of missiles, and to bring ths nose section components (golovnaya chast) to the final stage of readiness* Ue* propose that each rear 'area missile base have at least two installations for theof operational-tactical missiles and the nose sections of tactical missiles, and also two or three installations for thepreparation of army antiaircraft missiles. In our opinion, theorganizational structure of the rear area missile bases removes,ertain extent, the short cooing* of existing bases andide dispersal of missile resources at all levels of supply. Besides this, lt sharply reduces transportation distances. Increases maneuverability, simplifies the organization of redeployment, and also increases the stability of the entire system of supplying troops with missiles.

In our opinion, an oC&naive-nneratlon can be started when tbe cissiJLe resources of the front reach0 percent of its requirements. Tbe remaining missiles can be on their way to the rear area of the front. Also, it is definitely more advantageous that the troops have in theironsiderable portion of the missile resources. However, Lt. Gen. M. Koytkov'sthat at leastercent of the missiles required for en operation be delivered to the troops before initiating an operation is apparently not altogether correct. This proposal is applicableertain extent for tactical and operational-tactical missiles, when the transport capabilities of troop units are fullywith the existing rates of expenditure. Antiaircraft nlsslles,

those of the array, are expended in much largermissiles of the surfsce-to-surface class. Therefore lttbat it will be possible to supply ths antiaircraftvithercent of ths missiles required for the operationof the operation, because the transport facilities ofare not calculated to handle soolume ofthink that lt would be best to create supplies in tbefor two days' needs. Such supplies will become thethe mobile reserves of the missile units. The

calculated for one launching installation (puskovaya

may be:

actical and operational-tacticalthree missiles;

Troop antiaircraft (voyskovaya tenltnaya)six missiles;

Troop army (voyakovaya armeyskaya)eight missiles.

Lt. Oen. M. Novlkov proposes that small mobile sub-units for storing and transporting missiles be added to the rear of raotorlied rifle and tank divisions. But any burden the rearivision if the division will get not more than four to six tactical missiles for the entire operation. The rate of use will be somewhat higher In an antiaircraft missile battalion, but through the Joint efforts of the missile and army 'transport: battalions If will be possible

to supplement the supply successfully. The addition%

missile, .delivery- and storage sub-unit to the division rear at onceaddition of at least one lifting crane for trans-loading missiles, and teams to make adjustments (reglsnentnaya rabota) on the'mljlTle and nuclear nose section. It is clear that this will not increaseatollity-Of"tne division rear.

Having stated our proposals, we would like to note that the questions mentioned in the article by Lt. Oen. H. Novikov need further serious study, consideration, and testing in troop field exercises.

tyla stranyro* the zone of Interior

Parkovyy divisionTransport battalion

FBTBrontovaya raketnaya tekhnlcheskaya baza Front

miasile technical hase

ekhnlcheskiy divlzion it- Technical battalionobile repairtechnical batteries (podvlzhnaya remontnaya tekhnlcheskaya batareya)

rontovoy sklsd raketnogo toplivaront atorage area for miasile fuel

Tekhnicheakiye diviaionyechnical battalions

FTB ZURrontovaya tekhnlcheskaya baza Zenitnykh

upravlyaycmykh raketront technical base for aurface-to-alr missiles

Puskovyye divizionyaunching battalione

Otdeleniye FRTBection of the FRTB

ection of the FSRT

Otdeleniye FTB ZUR Section of the FTB ZUR

frbr*frontovaya brigaderont brigade

Armeyskiy parkovyy divlzion Army transport battalion

Ik. fzenrap*rontovoy zenltnyyrtilleriyskiy polk Front antiaircraft missile and artillery regiment

15. arbr*armeyekaya brigadaArmy brigade

madrotostrelkovaya diviziyaMotorized rifle division

tdtenkovaya divlzlyaank division

Armlya army

* Abbreviations which are marked above with an asterisk were not expanded in tbe text of the article.

Diagram 2*

Sign*

2.

.

J. 6.

7-

e.

9.

10.

ii.

12.

13.

rontovoy sklad rakatront ntissileWarehouse

AH)rmeyskly parkovyy divisionrmy transport battalion

Oolovnoyo otdeleniye APDRose cone section of the AH)

NR Sborochn. tsentr nazemnykh raketssembly center for surface-to-surface missiles

ZP.borochn. tsentr zanitnykh rakst Assembly center for surface-to-air missiles

1st FTRBrontovays tylovayaazaront rear area missile base

2nd FTRB

PBF*eremeshchennaya baza fronta',renaloedlng base of the front

tantsiya snabzheniyaRailhead

AK*rmeyskiy korpusrmy corps

AK rezervK reserve

ekhotnaya diviziya (rezerv)Infantry division, reserve

brtd*ronetankovaya diviziyaxoored divieion

Abbreviations which are followed by an asterisk were not expanded ln the text of the article.

Original document.

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