NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 36-61-NASSER AND THE FUTURE OF ARA B NATI

Created: 6/27/1961

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NASSER AND THE FUTURE OF ARAB NATIONALISM

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the outlook for Arab nationalism generally and to assess theand prospects of Nasser and the UAR in particular.

CONCLUSIONS

nationalism will continue to be the most dynamic force in Arabaffairs, and Nasser is very likely to remain its foremost leader and symbol for the foreseeable future. The long-term outlook for the conservative and Western-aligned regimes is bleak.important differences betweenbrands of Arab nationalism, the significant ones all reflect desires forand neutralism, social and economic reform, and varying degrees of Arab unity.

We do not believe that the appeal of Arab unity, strong as lt is to most Arab nationalists, will overcome the host ofand particularist interests which work against the creationnion of Arab states. Nasser probably nowthe practical obstacles Involved in seeking to establishnion. He is likely to settle for more limited means of trying to assert paramountcy.)

The UAR will make strong efforts to achieve progress in economicbut neither the Egyptian nor

Syrian region is likely to attain significant economic growth without substantial and continued foreign aid- (Paras.)

Nasser will probably continue to work for consolidation of unity between the Egyptian and Syrian regionsairly pragmatic combination ofcontrol and tactical concessions to Syrian sensibilities. In most respects, such consolidationigh degree of Egyptian domination of Syria. We believe that Nasserood chance ofreakup of the union.striking successes are unlikely, and serious setbacks remain constantly )

Nasser's control of thewell as his position in the Arab worldbe helped by Arab fear and hatred or Israel. Israel's nuclearand Israeli plans to divert Jordan waters will intensify Arab apprehensions. The UAR has the only Arab armed forces with any significant potential against Israel, which givesnique claim to Arab leadership. )

This claim is further buttressed by Nasser's accepted position as the leading exponent of Arab reformism, and by his demonstrated readiness to assumein defending Arab nationalism against communism. Despite hison the Bloc, he is not neutral in the coriflict between Arab nationalism and communism.)

It is highly unlikely that Nasser will abandon his broad foreign policyeasic belief that either of the great power blocs, if given free rein, would move to dominate or destroy him; he believes that neither can get free rein because of theof the other to prevent it. He will thus seek to avoid both totalon, and total alienation from, the Bloc as well as the West. Although In practice this strategy leads him to side more often with the Bloc than with the West, he has shown himself ready to respond vigorously to Soviet attacks.)

It Is probable that with the passage of time the inherent incompatibility between ultimate Soviet ambitions in the Middle East and the aspirations of Nasser and the Arab nationalists to preserve and strengthen their independent position will become increasingly manifest. If the Soviets should decide to abandonof the Nasser regime in favor ofheavy-handed pressure and subversion, the result would probablyundamental breach between Nasser and the USSR. However,reach may not come for years.

Nasser's efforts toeading role among neutralists and Afro-Asiansrum with complex problems. Almost all African leaders, for example, are unwilling to see himominant role on that continent. Moreover,like the forthcoming conference of nonaligned states and the futureof the UN involve him inpressures from the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the neutralists.

DISCUSSION

e)

Nature and Present State of Arab Nationalism

Militant nationalism remains the most dynamic force in Arab political aJblra. There are of course different and competing types of Arab natiormlism, which spring fromregional and religious distinctions as well as Individual and governmental Interests. However, all significant brands of Arab nationalism have important qualities inThey rely on the modern secular state as the Instrument for achieving theirand place decreasing emphasis onIslamasis of nationalism. The main manifestations of Arab nationalism are strongest among the emerging urban middle classes. These manifestations reflect desires for Arab Independence and dignity,social and economic reform, and some degree of Arab unity. They providefor longstanding and widespreadin Arabof Inferiority to the great powers, extreme social andInequalities, hostility to the old elites, fear and hatred of Israel, and frustration over the obvious disharmony between traditional ways and the modem world.

In most of the Middle East, as indeed for most of the rest of the world, Nasser remains the prune leader and symbol of ArabNo other leader has so consistently and forcefully expressed Its essential sentiments, and no other leader has enjoyed such concrete successes In Its name. There Is no Arab leader now on the scene nor. so far as we can tell, waiting In the wings, capable of matching Nasser's appeal oromparable basis of power and authority.

Bourguiba commands but limited attention in the Arab statesNorth Africa. And Qassim has failed to capture popular Pagination outside Iraq or Indeed very much within his country.

Nasser's own prestige and Influence In the Arab world generally have been subject to fluctuations. In the last two or three years he has met with certain checks and reverses. The revolutionary regime in Iraq failed to join the Nasser camp, and In fact has frustrated more than one UAR effort to bring Iraq In by force of subversion and threat. The shining spirit of Arab unity which characterized the UAR's formation in8 has beenby exposure to the dally strains of actually implementing unification between Egypt and Syria. King Hussein has so far kept his throne despite strong blasts of vituperation from Nasser,or several years there has been no dramatic success against Israel or the Western Powers to match the heady triumphs of the Initial Soviet arms deal and the outcome of the Suez crisis.

Whether Nasser himself gains or loses strength In the coming years, the poUtlcal, social, and psychological conditions and needs which have given rise to Arab nationalism will persist. It Is unlikely, however, that any new leader could in the foreseeable future achieve the statureombination of political adroitness and substantial achievements have given Nasser.

he UAR

the first Instance. Nasser'swill depend heavily onthe UAR. The union of Syria anda signal triumph for thetrong testimonial to Nasser'sIt is alsoritical test ofto sustain his appeal and toand aspirations into realities. Sohas met the test somewhat morethan most observers consideredthe outset. Nonetheless, Syria presentsa situation In which spectacularno longer open to him, but in which hevulnerable to major losses andIn Egypt, we anticipate nochallenges to Nasser's authority. The

Egyptian military, the principal Instrument of power in the UAR, have achieved elite status under Nasser, and will almost certainlyto give him their support.

In general, Nasser has gone farthest and has met with the least trouble in consolidating centralized control ln the field of UAR foreign policy. He has proceeded most slowly and has encountered the most resistance in the area of economic integration. Progressfully unifying the poJltical and military structures of the two regions has been uneven. Nasser's unitary government does in factthe real authority, and Is buttressed hi theoryonolithic political organization, the National Union, which was organized in Egypt and then extended to Syria to replace the several Syrian political parties which are now officially disbanded.

In fact, however, the Syrian politicians of both left and right remain active,continues strong, and Nasser has been compelled to exercise his authority through an opportunistic system of playing factions off against eachrelying oncontrols exerted through his Syrian strong man, Sarraj, and the Egyptian Marshal Amer, UAR Commander in Chief. Unification of the military has in practice been Implemented by establishing overall Egyptian control and by placing Egyptian officers in key positions in most Syrian units down to the company level. The inevitable result has been considerable resentment among Syrian officers. Restrictions on the press and economic control measures have antagonized important elements of the civilian population as well

If anti-Egyptian sentiment among the Syrian military should ever be effectively joined with the discontent over the union prevalent among many Syrian civilians, Nasser's control of theitsritical test. So far, Nasser has been successful in forestalling any coalescence of active and potential dissidents. He has been helped by the fact that civilian opposition is seriously weakened byand disparate ideologies. The old-line leaders of the Populist and Nationalist parties have trouble getting together themselves, let alone cooperating with socialist groups like the Baath. The sharpening conflict between nationalism and communism has made nationalist cooperation with the Communists difficult. And unless one or more of the civilian factions can acquire significant army support, they will have only limited practical effectiveness ln the face of Nasser's prestige among the masses and his authoritarianover the instruments of government

One contingency which would quicklyrisis for Nasser In Syria wouldalling out with Sarraj and his supporters. Aided by Nasser's support, Sarraj hasover the years an efficient network of followers in the Syrian military and security services, and more recently ln the civilian ministries, which makes him the mostSyrian on the scene. At least at present his role Is central to Nasser's continuedinact no doubt appreciated fully in Cairo, and one which gives Sarrajleverage In the central government. There is no reliable basis for estimating the durability of the Naaser-Sarra] collaboration. So far, it has proven mutually beneficial, especially since Sarraj himself Is unpopular In Syria.

We considerotal disruption of the UAR Is highly unlikely. Nonetheless, the initial urge toward close unity on the part of many Arab nationalists will give wayooser association, and Nassermay make some concessions to theserather than try to keep controlby force. Moreover, threats such as communism,nd Israel will continue to serve as unifying factors and Nasser Is fully alive to their value as such. To the extent that progress Is made toward integration of the Institutions of the twothe union will benefit from familiarity and usage. The charismatic personality of Nasser himselfrime factor ln holding the union together, and If he should disappear from the scene the continuation of the union, at least in its present form, would be open to question. Nasser would probably beby one oi his longstanding military

leagues, who would continue his essential policies. But without Nasser, the difficulties of holding Syria would be greatly mcreased.

attainment of eflectlTe ecoriomicbetween the two regions oftubborn problem.from incompatibilities betweenlaissez-faire, comparativelyeconomy and that oflongigh degree of centralizedand which is hampered by scanty

So far, the UAR Government hasautious approach toward economicNonetheless, some steps towardhave been taken, such as Imposition of Egyptian type foreign exchange controls in Syria and increasing Egyptian control of Syrian economic development plans. To achieve real Integration, much more drastic measures would be required, notably theommon currency,ingle central bank, andof the customs systems. Such stepsare virtually certain to encounter Syrian resistance in one degree or another, and the central government may decide to go slowly lest this resistance aggravate existingand political problems.

Whatever Its success with respect tointegration, the UAR isrogram of economic development in both regions. During the current, UAR onlcials plan to invest nearlyillion in the Egyptian region and0 million in Syria. The planned Investment figure for Egypt includes0 million toward completion of the Aswan High Dam. The development plan for Egypt stresses industrial projects, while the plans for Syria primarily emphasizeprojects. The foreign exchangerequired for these overall plans amounts to2 billion, of0 iriiillon, has been pledged by the Bloc In addition,5 million In West Oerman credits Is available, as well as smaller sums from other free world countries. Thus, more than half the total foreign exchange required remains to be found.

addition to the difficulties ofexchange, the UAR will have toformidable problems mcluding thoseadequate domestic financing,of inflation, and inadequateresources and human skills. Ifsecures the required foreign aid andto make reasonable use of itsresources, it can probablybut steady rises in living standards,the rapid increase inpercent annually. Nevertheless,completion of their present plans, itthat neither region would be ablesignificant economic growthand substantial external aid.

Certain important generalizations can be made about the future patterns of economic development in tho UAR. For one thing, the regime willajor effort to bring itthough success win be far from certain. For another, the government will continue to place its principal reliance on state-initiated and state-supported schemes. There is little prospect that privatewill be allowed or encouraged to share to moreimited degree in the effort. Private domestic or foreign investment is identified, in the minds of the UAR leaders, with the kind of foreign domination andclass exploitation which they seek to eradicate. There is, indeed, likely torowing trend toward nationalization and state control of already existing privateintrend which is already far advanced in Egypt.

Nasser is fully aware of the need for foreign aid If he Is to have any chance of carrying out this program. Specialattaches to Soviet economic assistance because of Its long-term character. Yet, even if the West were willing to supply the aid Nasser gets from the Soviets. Nasser would be constrained to seek aid from both sides in order to avoid exclusive dependence on either one. Nasser therefore will seek to avoid any disruption of relations that threatens to shut off his assistance from either side.omplete cutting-off of aid by the Soviets is

not likely, dellberale Soviet foot-draggingeans of pressureource of worry to

In the Important sphere of militaryNasser Is critically dependent on the Bloc, and he would regard the loss of such aid as catastrophic. He can have little hope that the West would replace lt if the Bloc cut it off. Moreover, no Western guarantee of UARwould serve Nasser's purpose ofsuperiority over Israel. In addition, the armed forces are the keystone of Nasser'sin the UAR and of his prestigeis bis Arab neighbors.

Whatever Nasser's differences with the West, he is not likely to engage in interference with Suez Canal snipping, except In the case of Israelrisis like the Suez warasser will continue to run the canal efficiently, He will, however, almost certainly persist in denying transit to Israeli vessels, though in certain circumstances he might go along with some form of discreetfor Israeli cargoes in other flag vessels. It would, however, be extremely difficult to find any such arrangement acceptable to both Nasser and Israel.

C. Nasser and the Rest of the Arab World

Arab unityajor theme of Nasser's nationalism, but hia chances ofthe ideal into the kind of politicalrepresentedingle state are not bright. He probably realizes this. Certainly theof Arab political union under his aegis appears farther from realization today than lt did, for example,8 when the formation of the UAR, the Iraqi nationalist revolution, the pro-Nasser Insurrection in Lebanon, and King Hussein's request for Britishin Jordan all combined to dramatize the strength of Nasser's appeal and the degree to which his opponents were on the defensive.

We believe that the basic trends which brought on the events8 will shape the future of the Arab world.

this means neutralism in world affairs and efforts, or at least gestures, toward domestic modernization and reform throughand authoritarian means,

ut it is highly unlikely that the Arab states will one by one be absorbed by the UAR. Arab particularismtrong obstacle to unityesult of rivalry for leadership of the movement, fear by certain elements that they will be dominated by others, and economic self-interests- Any regime in Saudi Arabia or Libya, for example, would beto share oil revenues with the UAR simply to prove its dedication to the cause of Arab unity. And while Nasser is of course capable of supporting and Influencing revolutionary movements in these states, it is quite another thing for him to consolidate controlevolutionary regime once it has gained power. Arab nationalism in other countries, even if inspired by Nasser, will not necessarily lead to submission to centralized UAR control.it may provide new challenges to him. Nasser's experience with Iraq demonstrated this.

raqi nationalismtrength andof its own, derived not only from the historic rivalry between Cairo and Baghdad and Iraq's unwillingness to share its oil wealth, but also from the reluctance of Iraq's influential Shla and Kurdish minorities to submit to Sunni Arab domination under Nasser. The nationalists of Iraq willto pay their respects to Arab unity,inority probably hopes for actual merger with the UAR, but separatist tendencies are likely to prove stronger for years to come. Probably the strongest stimulus for aof pro-Nasser Pan-Arab sentiment in Iraq wouldenewed threat of atakeover.

he Iraqis have for years periodicallya legal claim to Kuwait, based on questionable interpretations of long-dead Ottoman rights over Kuwait Qassim's most recent assertion of this claim was probably

motivated by fear that, aa Kuwait gains full recognition of Its Independence following the recent termination of Its special treaty with the UK, Iraq's claim would be given even shorter shrift in Arab League circles than it has hitherto. Iraq's claims are opposed by the Kuwaiti regime and by most otherin Kuwait. They will also be resisted by most other Arab states, probably led by Saudi Arabia and the UAR. In addition, the UK retains the obligation to defend Kuwait against aggression If the Ruler requests it. We believe that any serious Iraqi attempt to take over Kuwait would fail. Nasser and the Saudis would mobilize the Arab League against It, and probably succeed ln isolating Iraq politically. The UK would almosttake the necessary steps, mcludlng use of force if required, to forestall or defeat any such Iraqi effort.

The poverty-stricken and highly artificial state of Jordan, dependent for its existence on Western support,arge element which favors some form of association with the UAR. Even so. there would be strong obstacles to any merger even if King Hussein were removed. These Include the risk that Israel would take military action toasser-controlled government in Jordan, the fact that some influential elements inmost oferger, and Nasser's own probable reluctance to take on the unrewarding and risky burden of responsibility for this unliable state.

Yemen has been associated with the UAR through the United Arab States, an almost meaningless association. Having made the gesture, the Imam has successfully blocked any significant growth in Nasser's Influence in this primitive state. When the Imam leaves the scene, the prospectsgyptian influence will increase, especially If Crown PrinceIs supported by thehis father.

Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeriaeparate status In the Arab world and are much less susceptible to Nasser's influence and to the pull of Pan-

Arabism than the eastern Arab states. The same may be saidesser degree of Libya and the Sudan, both of which have reason to fear Egyptian subversion. While Nasser willodel for radicalsossible source of support for dissidents in all of these areas, tt Is not likely that he will be able to influence events decisively in former French North Africa during the next few years.his Influence there might decline should the Algerian problem be settled.

It Is probable that Nasser himself Isto the prospect that Arab unity will take more time to achieve and willess organized form than he once hoped. Theof governing Syria has almostImpressed him with the practicalof consolidating and exerting formal control over areas beyond Egypt, as has his failure to bring Iraq Into line. He almostbelieves that Arab unity will eventually come and that the "logic of history" and the passage of time will bring it. He will remain ready to facilitate the process by his efforts touccess of the UAR and byand support of sympathetic elements in other states. He will he quick to defend against all comers his role as chief spokesman and symbol of the movement.

Nasser's efforts to preserve and enhance this position are likely to be along several, reasonably predictable lines. His voice will continue to be the strongest one ln Arab League councils. Indeed, it Is primarilytrengthened Arab League that Nasser and his colleagues probably now hope to assert poramountcy in Arab affairs. Fear of and hostility toward Israel are still the strongest cohesive elements in the Arab League. In such circumstances. Nasser's control of the UAR armedonly Arab force with any potential againstsupports his role as the prime champion of Arab interests. No Arab leader outside the UAR has any prospect of enjoying this

he UAR is currently striving through the Arab League tonified Arabcommand, which it would naturally dominate. Most other Arab states have

agreed in principle to this command, since for them Itesture with little practicalJordan will continue to resist it, lest it give the UAR control of Jordanian forces. Similarly, Nasser's concept of forming aentity representing all Palestinians has received general agreement except from the government of Jordan, where most of them live. Nasser may Indeed comealling out with Qassim over tactics on the Palestine issue, but it is unlikely to mean moreuspension of Iraq's participation in League activities. All In all, Nasser will continue to use the Arab Leagueeady-madeto Influence the rest of the Arab world.

Potent as the Israeli issue is in drawing the Arabs together and underlining theof Nasser and the UAR, lt confronts nun with increasingly critical problems. Bis belief that Israel mayuclearcapability raises for him the specter of clear and decisive Israeli military superiority over the Arabs for the indefinite future. If the Israelis go ahead with present plans to divert Jordan waters In the next two years or so. there will be the strongest pressures on Nasser to lead the Arabs in preventive action. Yet It remains likely that Israel would defeat the Arabs in any new round of hostilities, and Nasser probably appreciates this.

Though we cannot rule out the possibility that Nasser might initiate hostilities out of desperation or oveioptimism concerning UAR capabilities, we think it more likely that he will fall back on political moves to forestall such dangers from Israel. In addition to making the mostnited Arab front on these questions, he will continue efforts to marshal Afro-Asian and neutralist sentiment against Israel, to keep the issues alive in tho UN, and to elicit assurances of support and protection from both the USSR and the US. He has an ingrained suspicion of Zionistover the US. and at the same time, quite likely exaggerates the extent to which Israel Is responsive to US influence. However, he will continue to press the US for support In curbing Israeli threats to the UAR.

D. Nasser and the Afro-Asian World

Beginning with his successful appearance at the Bandung Conferenceasser has devoted much effort to establishingeader among the Afro-Asian states generally, making particular use of hisot "positive neutralism" to appeal to the nonallgncd or uncommitted states. His most recent foray into this arena, the conference of nonallgned states scheduled for1 and sponsored primarily by the UAR and Yugoslavia, underlines his achievementeading role in this respect. His chances of sustaining and developing his influence along these lines are greatest among certain ot the new states of Africa,egree ofaffinity with African Moslems. Nasser's own record of militant resistance to the West-em colonial powers, and his successfulof the neutralist strategy all give him advantages.

Nevertheless, we do not believe that he willecisive or dominating influence on the African scene. Nasser has neither the political nor the material leverage with the African states to enable him to play this role. He will encounter some competition from Israel in certain African states. Morehe will find that almost all of the Africanthe new states as well as the olderunwilling to see htmominant role in Africa. Moreover, he will find himself Involved In rivalries amongAfrican groups.

Nasser himself Is not unaware of those limitations, and of the difficulties ofeventsolatile situation like the Congo. For this reason, he is likely to avoid the kind of total commitment which would jeopardize CAR prestige If the side he favors should lose. Nevertheless, Nasser willan active Interest in identifying himself with nationalist and anticolonialistMore specifically, In cases where thereonflict or choice between moderate and extremist nationalist leadersasavubuizenga) Nasser will beinclined to side with the extremist.

esult of his still-lively suspicions that the Western Powers remain bent on halting or reversing the trend of events In Africa, hetrong tendency to judge the credentials of African leaders by the degree of hostility they show toward the Westernasser's African policies will inevitablyhim in continuing clashes with theand policies of the Western Powers. There will thus almost certainly continue toonsiderable parallelism between Soviet and UAR policies In Africa. As In the Arab world, however, when and If Nasser comes to believe that Soviet supportiven African regime clearly threatens to develop into Soviet domination, he would oppose it. In both areas, the more obvious and Imminent the Soviet bid for power appears to Nasser the more likely lt Is to bring forth his opposition. The uncertain factor lies In what lt takes to convince Nasser of the existence of an urgent Soviet threat in any givenasser's efforts toeading role in neutralist and Afro-Asian circles involve him In some competition and conflict with other neutralist powers. Nehru, for example, has disapproved of several Nasser moves In recentUAR opposition to the UN In the Congo operation, and the efforts totrong neutralist or "thlrd_ force" bloc implicit to Nasser's sponsorship of the projected conference of nonaligned states. The latter project has for different reasons also incurred Sino-Sovietsince Tito is cosponsor.

E. Nasser, Arab Nationalism, and me Great Powers

othing has contributed more to Nasser's stature among the Arabs than his militantof independence against external forces believed by the Arabs to he hostile. Arab feeling Is rooted deeply in resentment over decades of Western domination of the Arab world. It was Intensified by the humiliating Arab defeat at Israel's hands It is the stronger because It provides anthe wickedness of the greata host of deficiencies and inadequacies in Arab

society. Defiance of the once dominantofbecame virtually indispensable to the program of any Arableader desirous of proving his bona fides, and successful defiance was bound to bring commensurate prestige In the Arab world. It was not until very recently that Arab fear of foreign domination even began to encompass the Soviet Union as well as the West.

n asserting his militant Independence, Nasser has been aided immeasurably by two trends to the policies of the great world powers. On the one hand, the Westernwhich once dominated the region have become to recent years increasingly resigned to abandoning special positions andin areas once treated as colonial or semi-colonial states. He has been equally helpedoncurrent development In Soviet policy: the willingness of the USSR, to the post-Stalin period, to espouse the cause of nationalist movements to the Afro-Asian worldeans of weakening Western influence to the hope of enhancing Soviet prospects for control in these areas. Much more than any other Arab leader, Nasser has successfully exploited these two trends.

asser's policy toward the two great power blocs Is derivedasic belief that either side, if given free rein, would move to dominate him or destroy both his Independence and that of the Arab world. What prevents this from happening, in his view, is that neither side has nor can get free rein because of theof the other to prevent it. With the giants thus standing each other off and (ideally) competing positively for his favor, Nasser has, to his own view, the best chance both of Insuring his own freedom from their domination and being the recipient ofmaterial support.

owever, although Nasser's practice of "positive neutralism" has gained for himmaneuverability, it has not givenree field in the Middlo East. Theof Arab particularism, described above, is itself an obstacle. In addition, both power blocs, partly by rapportlng thisareosition to hinder Nasser's

pension. Bo, too, is tho State ol Israel. Even at the height of Nasser's successes in

elements worker) to inhibittriumph on his part.

espite his dependence on the Bloc, it is significant that Nasser has shown himself ready to respond vigorously when he felt that the USSR threatened his position. Thechallenge to nationalism in Iraq in

eriod of estrangementUAR and the Bloc, and there has beendispute occasioned by Soviet attacks"socialist" philosophy of the UAR andsuppression of local Communists.characteristically responded to theseby seeking friendlier relations withand by loud defiance of Soviet attemptsin the UAR's internal affairs.

It is highly unlikely that Nasser win abandon the broad foreign policy oi "positivee will seek to avoid both total dependence on. and total alienation from, either of the great powerat the same time trying to derive maximumpower and maneuverability through his position of leadership in the Arab world and his influence among the neutralists. Clearly, however, this strategy will work only so long as both the West and the Blocwilling to support Nasser's Independent role.

It is probable that with the passage of time the Inherent incompatibility between ultimate Soviet ambitions in the Middle East and the aspirations of Nasser and the Arab nationalists to preserve and strengthen their independent position will become Increasingly manifest. In time, the Soviets may conclude that support for bourgeois nationalist regimes like that of the UAR should be replaced byheavy-handed pressurehange wouldundamental breach in USSR-UAR relations. The Soviets probably already feel that Nasser's heavy dependence on Blocand economic assistance givesonsiderable leverage overecisive breach may not come for years. However, the Communist push for power in Iraq9 and Khrushchev's recent, brief flurry ofattacks on the UAR suggest that the Soviets may be willing toreachsooner than appeared likely three yearsoviet decision to makeadical change in approach would depend onoutside the scope of this estimate on Nasser and Arab nationalism.

In this connection, the Soviet attack on the UN structure, growing out of the Congo affair, has alreadyilemma for Nasser. He is, on the one hand, subject to strong Soviet pressures to support what amountsrastic weakening of the organization. At the same time, he Is sensitive to the fact that an effective UN is important to the security of the UAR and other weaker states which he hopes to cultivate, and that Itajor hope of mailing their influence felt in the world.

In any case, the lessons of recent Soviet behavior have not been lost on Nasser. His innate suspicions and distrust of the West will remain, but he has probably been compelled to take a" somewhat more sober view of the risks and uncertainties Involved' in dependence on the Bloc. His response will probably be an increased willingness to take out reinsurance In the form of better relations with the West, principally the US. But such moves will stop well short of any lasting or clear alignment. Any such adjustment in Nasser's policythe great powers will be supplemented by continuing and earnest efforts to cultivate mfluence and leadership among the non-aligned states. These efforts, however, will not end his dependence on the great powers for military and economic aid and markets.

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