THE OUTLOOK FOR RETENTION OF US AZORES BASE RIGHTS IN THE EVENT OF CERTAIN COUR

Created: 6/27/1961

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATESupplemenfs)

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THE OUTLOOK FOR RETENTION OF US AZORES BASE RIGHTS IN THE EVENT OF CERTAIN COURSES OF US ACTION

Submitted by the DIBECTOB OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Thm following intelligence organisations participated fa tht preparation of this estimate: The Central intilllocnea Ajiency and the tntcBtgence organUationi of the Departments of State, the Army, tha Navy, the Atr Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred In by the NITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD on Concftrrfns were The Director ofand Research. Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for intelligence. Department of the Army; the Atsist-ant Chief of Naeai Operation*epartment of'aw; the AirUtoiU Chtsf o, Staff. Intelligence, VSAP; the Director for Intelligence. Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Speclai Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Snerpy Com* mission Representative to the OS IB, and the Assistantfederal Bureau of Investlyrtlon, abstained, the subject being outside of ther jurisdiction.

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THE OUTLOOK FOR RETENTION OF US AZORES BASE RIGHTS IN THE EVENT OF CERTAIN COURSES OF US ACTION

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the short-term outlook for Uf! base rights in the Azores If the USto exert pressure on Portugal to institute reforms leading towardsfor its African territories and to cooperate with the UN.

THE ESTIMATE

the time approaches for renegotiation of US military base rights In the Aiores, which expireortugal is beset by many difficulties and Is becoming increasingly Isolated Internationally. The rebellion incontinues unchecked, marked by unusual cruelty on both sides. Portuguese policies in Africa are under attack in the UN, and the US is applying pressureeluctant Salazar to implement reforms rapidly. Because Sala-zar appears unwilling to respondto these pressures the differences De-tween the US and Portugal could comeead at anyeven before the renegotiation question arises. Much willon the developing situation in Angola and on the stability of the other-Portuguese territories.

Saiaaar's reaction to two US votes In tho UN critical of Portugal and to several US demarches on the subject of his Africanhas been one of pained disapproval. He apparently feels not only that the US is gravely misguided in endorsing Africanfo:eterm'.-uv.cn, but that It has misbehaved as an ally by falling toactively the Portuguese position. His regima perrnHUd noisy anti-USto occur in Lisbon, Luanda, and other ritiea in March on the occasion of ogr first vote of disapproval In the,UN. Since then, however, and 'specially as the Angolcsehas worsened,nd popularof the VS has been somewhat muted.

Salaiax apparently now recognises more fulry than In the past the gra dty of thesituation, i'c has puaticly admitted thit social progress has not been advanced as fast as ft might have been In the overseas territories and has stated that some reforms might be forthcoming soon. He has taken pe/sona) command of the Defense Ministry and is sending to Angolaostcivilian and YnillUry officials.Salasar sincerely believes thatfor the Africans at this time or within tho foreseeable future would befor the West as well as for Portugal Moreover, his personal Indisposition toward taking vigorous action in any direction and the anachronistic character of his government probably preclude the Institution of any slg-nif.cant reforms in the near future.

During the dry season (June-October) therehance that the Portuguese couldeasonable degree of public order in the disturbed area of northern Angola. Should this happen, and If no furtherof rebellion occurred In Portuguese

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during this period, It might permit Salazar to announce revisions In his oversea* policies sufficient to relax tensions between Portugal and tho US ond to open the way for negotiations. However, Salazar would probably attempt to secure from the US at least an Implicit commitment to abstain from 'publicly criticizingcles In the African ^territories.

Is almost certain, however, that thein Portuguese Africa will worsen within

.the next year. We believe that Portugal will be faced with continuing and growing dls-

1 orders in Angola, the northern sector of which

1 Is now utmost completely under rebel control, and that revolt could erupt In Portuguese

( Guinea at any time. The Portuguese military establishment would be severely strained by any such combination of revolts, and might soon lose control of all but the principal towns and communication lines in Angola, and all but the port areas in Guinea.

this circumstance of continuingthe chances that the US couldsatisfactory renewal of the five-yearon the bases by negotiation, whileits position with respect towould be ponr. Salazar wouldattach political conditions requiringvision of US policy toward the AfricanIn the meantime, should USInterpreted by Salazar as giving active cn-

couragement to the rebels, thg chances would be about even that he would denounce the existing treaty and demand US evacuation before the present rights had expired.until ihe designated withdrawalwas reached, the Portuguese wouldnot significantly hamper US operations.

much more delicate situation wouldthe US should be facederiouscrisis,xacerbation of theproblem this fall. Salazar wouldconstrained from attempting to forceto frvicuata during the height of suchby his basic' pro-Western orientation.

by pressure from the UK, France, Westand other NVi'O allies, and bylest the US stay on after beingout, However, Suluzar would regard our Incroawd need fur the Azores facilities as strengthening his bargaining positionthe ua

Thus, he would probably seek toargain with the US whereby renewal of the Azores base agreement was made dependent on provision of some measure of US support for the Portuguese position in Africa. Should the US prove unresponsive.osition would harden. He might, depending on the seriousness of the breach that had developed between the two countries, require thv U8 to leave the Azores when the International ciisis had passed. However, he might temper such an expulsion order by a'.tempting.toa new arrangement for the bases with another ally, presumably the UK.

Although the Salazar regime appears In no serious danger at the moment ancLdictator appears to fcjfe good health, It Is possible. Waft he will be replaced in office oefove renegotiation of the Azores agreement Considerable oppos"-ion to the rigidlypolicies of his regime has developed in recent months and is bound to Increase If the situation In Africa deteriorates. Aa yet, tlia opposition Is loaderless and Salasar*spolice Is Hkely to keep It that way.there Is some slight chance thatmilitary officers, who are alreadyololonial war on morene front, may organize to removeand that they could succeed In so doing.

successor military regime would bennxioux than Salaxar's to retain theterritories, but would probably act onreforms with greater vigor andthis reason, and because of itsfor US and other Western-right prove more tractable inthe US over the retention of the

Original document.

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