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SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US ACTIONS LN SOUTH VIETNAM
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Central Intelligence Agency
Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of Ihis estimate: The Centra/ Inlelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joinl Staff
Concurred in by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD1 Concurring were the Director ofand Research, Department of Stale; TheDefense Inlelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operationsepartment of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence. Joint Staff; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commissionto the OSIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Imwtigation. abstained, the subject being outside of Iheir jurisdiction.
CLASSIFICATION OF TITLEIPFHTIAI WHEN USED SEPARATELY
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUBJECT: : PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO
CERTAIN US ACTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
SCOPE
The purpose of this estimate is to assess Communist (Soviet, Chinese, and North Vietnamese) reactions and, where significant, non-Communist reactions to certain US military actions Intended to assist the Government of Vietnam cope with the Communist threat.^'
1/ Other National Intelligence Estimates pertinent to this problem are, "Likelihood of Major Communist Military Intervention in Mainland Southeastated, "Probable Reactions to Certain Courses of Action ConcerningProspects for North and Southatednd, "Bloc Support of the Communist Effort Against the Government ofl;, "Probable Communist Reactions to Certain SEATO Undertakings In Southated
The courses of action here considered were given to the Intelligence community for the purposes of this estimate and were not Intended to represent the full range of possible courses of action. The given courses of action are:
introductionS airlift IntoSouth Vietnam, increased logistics support, andin MAAG strength to provide US advisers downlevel;
introduction into South Vietnam of aof0 troops, mostly engineerscombat support, in response to an appeal fromfor assistance in flood relief;
introduction into the area00 to engage with SouthIn ground, air, and naval operations against theand
announcement by the US of itshold South Vietnamarning, either private orthat North Vietnamese support of the Viet Congor the US would launch air attacks against This action would be taken in conjunction A, B, or C.
THE ESTIMATE
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The interests of the Soviet Union, Communist. China, and Communist North Vietnam overlap at many points but they vary considerably in intensity and urgency. To Hanoi, the ouster of President Diem and the reunification of Vietnam under Communist rule are baBlc objectives. Both objectives were accorded high priority at the North Vietnamese Communist Party Congress The announcement of these objectivesreparatory phase and marked the beginningharp increase in Viet Cong guerrilla, subversive, and political warfare. During the past year. North Vietnam has made ainvestment in the campaign against Diem, and Hanoi is probably determined to press for an early victory in South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese leaders are convinced that they defeated the French in the Indochina War but wereof the fruits of their victory at the conference table. Recent events in Laos have encouraged the North Vietnamese leaders and given them increased confidence In their "national liberation" tactics. They almost certainly believe that, by these tactics, they can in time upset the
Diem government and take over South Vietnam. They probably believe that they could, provided that the war would bewithin the boundaries of South Vietnam, rendera level of US military support to South Vietnam substantially in excess of that postulated In Course C.
Chinese Communist interests are more directlyin the Indochina states than are those of the USSR. Peiping's leaders appear Impatient for concrete Communist advances, particularly in areas of substantial US Interest. Moreover, Communist China would regard any Increase in the US commitment in South Vietnam, and In particular anyof US troops into the area,erious challenge. The USSR, while sharing the desire of North Vietnam and Communist China to bring South Vietnam into the Communist Bloc, almost certainly does not regard this as Justifying the assumption of serious risk.
Thus, we believe that the USSR would be Inclined to
a less militant response than Communist China or North Vietnam to any of the giver. US courses of action except possibly in the case of Course D. Moscow would seek to maintain control
of the situation and to restrain both Peiping and Hanoi from any responses likely, in Moscow's view, to run serious risk of expanded hostilities and the involvement of Soviet forces. The Soviet leaders would probably believe that, while the US commitment under Course A, B,ould temporarily strengthen South Vietnam, it would only slow down, not reverse, the trends favoring the Communists in that country. Thus they wouldseek to avoid substantial escalation of the fighting.
The Chinese, in our view, would be much more sensitive than the Soviets to the arrival of US forces in South Vietnam. They alsoigher priority upon the early victory of the Communist cause in Southeast Asia, and would beless concerned about the possible Impact on Communist Interests in Europe. While they are almost certainly more sensitive to the consequences of general war than some of their more radical statements Indicate, their concern over this possibility does appear to be less acute than that of their Soviet partner. They would probably be more inclined than the Soviets to believe that the US would noturther escalation. Thus we believe that they would argueapid buildup of local Communist capabilities and the vigorous engagement of OS forces.
5- Communist China Is presently faced with seriousproblems: the aftermatheriod of gross economic mismanagement; three successive bad harvests; and adisruption of the economic development plan. tension in relations with the USSR hasew high. Nevertheless, these developments are not likely to substantially alter Communist China's attitudes towardcommitment in Southeast Asia.
6. If the Chinese and the Soviets reacted in these ways, some further strain would be placed upon Sino-Soviet relations already aggravated byindirect but strong attacks at the XXII Congress in Moscow. The Soviets would not wish to give Peiping additional reasons to charge them withmilitancy and boldness. Also they would be reluctant to back away from Khrushchev's oft-repeated promise of support for wars of "national liberation." At the same time the Soviet are deeply dubious of Chinese prudence and would be reluctant to giveree rein. These strains would be acutely felt by the North Vietnamese, who have thus far attempted to avoid aggravating either side and preserve foraximum freedom of maneuver.
II. PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS
In response to either Course A, B,he Bloc wouldajor political and propaganda campaign in the UN and worldwide to highlight and condemn the US action and to brand the US as an aggressor. The US would befor violating1 Geneva Agreements andthe present Geneva Conference on Laos. The intensity of this campaign would increase as the US involvement Its purpose would be to generate international pressure toS withdrawal. The Bloc, particularly the USSR, would consider that substantial political andgains could be made from exploiting non-Communist criticism of these actions.
It is likely thatn particular would lead to widespread demandsonferenceor "negotiations" to diminish the tensions and "settle" the crisis. The Communist powers, and particularly the USSR, would almost certainly promote this demand, and signify their willingness to negotiate. They would do so in the conviction thatrocedure woulderiod of time in which they could pursue their efforts in South Vietnam, perhapsomewhat diminished scale, but still
with fair success and lessened risk. Any they wouldalso calculate that, conditions being what they are in the area, almost any form of negotiated settlement would leave them with substantial opportunities to continue the "liberation" struggle.
Course A. The introductionS airlift into and within South Vietnam, increased logistics support, ond an increase In MAAG strength to provide US advisers down to battalion level.
9. We do not believe that this course of action wouldignificant military response by Moscow or Peiping. Hanoi would probably press forward with its Viet Conginfiltrating cadres and logistic support to South Vietnam through the mountain routes of eastern Laos, across the Cambodian-Vietnamese border, and by sea from North Vietnam. Additional regular North Vietnamese Army units probably would be infiltrated into South Vietnam andLaos. The Viet Cong would probably step up itsof South Vietnam's weaknesses in the plateau areas of South Vietnam seeking toogistics base from which larger scale (regimental level) operations could
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be mounted. The Communists probably would augment their efforts to build up the eastern part of south Laosajor supply channel for the Introduction of Bloc equipment into northern and central South Vietnam. US supply and communications lines would be harassed and the Communists would Increase terrorist and sabotage attacks against US personnel and Installations. In certain areas US aircraft would probably be subjected to antiaircraft fire. The Communist airlift would probably be expanded and extended to include airdrops and airlanding of supplies in South Vietnam as well as In southern Laos.
Course B. The Introduction into South VietnamS force of aboutOO troops, mostly engineers with some combat support, in response to an appeal Trom President Diem for assistance in flood relief.
10. The announcement that US troops were being sent to South Vietnam for purposes of flood relief would not be convincing to the Communist states or to non-Communist governments. This would be so even If the troops confined their activity strictly to flood relief work. Nevertheless, most governments would consider that the flood relief
announcement provided opportunities for disengagement. However, later disengagement by the OS would have serious adverse effects in Southeast Asia.
Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi would regard this US course of actionignificant new indication of OSto support the Diem government and to defend South Vietnam. However, they almost certainly would not respond by overtly committing regular North Vietnamese or Chinese Communist forcesilitary attack against South Vietnam or Laos.
They would, nevertheless, probably build up their readiness posture in the general Southeast Asia area. The Bloc capitals would issue strong threats against the OS to withdraw its forces. The Communists would probably accept increased risk of exposure and Introduce additional North Vietnamese forces, similar to those mentioned undernto South Vietnam and southern Laos to stiffen Communist forces there and to protect communications routes. Within South Vietnam, Communist-directed operations would probably be intensified throughout the countryside. The OS forces would probably be subjected to harassment and ambush, the
Intensity and scope of such action depending upon the extent to which the US forces were threatening Communist-controlled areas. The Chinese Communists would probably Increase their ground and air forces in south China and would possiblyair units into North Vietnam.
Course C. The introduction into the areaS combat forceen to engage with the South Vietnamese forces In ground, air, and naval operations against the Viet Cong.
13. The three Communist governments would probablythat the Viet Cong, with increased support, could successfully harass the US troops, avoid major defeats, and continue to hold the initiative and to score victories in many areas of South Vietnam. At the same time, however, all three would recognize that this commitment had greatlythe involvement of US prestige In the South Vietnamese cause ondtrong indication thatater stage the US might go further if necessary to prevent the defeat of that cause. The North Vietnamese and the Chinese Communists would view the US military forcehreat to theirin Southeast Asia and the reinforced US presenceotential threat to their security. The objective of all
three Communist powers would be to maintain Communist bases and strength In South Vietnam and, eventually, to terminate the US intervention. The Chinese and North Vietnamesewould probably be keener on the latter point since their interests are more directly involved; the Soviets would prefer to do itore gradual way, through attrition or US rorces in the area and diplomatic-political pressures
14. Although an extreme military response might rollow this US course or action, we believe it more likely that the Communist military reaction in South Vietnam wouldomewhat stronger than the Soviets would wish but still limited enough to keep the risks under tolerable The USSR would almost certainly try to take the lead In supplying whatever outBlde military assistance wasIn order to maximize its control over the situation. The North Vietnamese would support this effort in order to ward ofr an increase in Chinese inriuence within their country. In any event, we believe thatompromise would be unstable, that the three partners would continue to argue among themselves, and that the subsequentof the crisis might result In Peiping'sore independent role.
15- However, on balance we believe that the initial Communist reactions would be directedoldingin South Vietnam. In addition to an intensification of the types of Communist response we have estimated would ensue from the initiation of eitherr B, we believe thatould evoke the following actions: strong and specific Soviet and Chinese Communist declarations of their intention to maintain the security of North Vietnam andthe "revolutionary struggle" In South Vietnam; anin the scale of Viet Cong guerrilla efforts against the US forces; and possibly the introduction of Chinese Communist or Soviet air units into North Vietnam.
16. We believe that the Communists would haveconfidence that these measures would in the long term render ineffective US armed assistance to South Vietnam. If, however, the US action appeared to be seriously threatening the Communist movement in South Vietnam andtrong military position in the country, the Communists would seriously consider providing more direct armed support. In these circumstances, the Communists might commit major North Vietnamese regular units in South Vietnam and introduce Chinese Communist support units into North Vietnam, although
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they would recognize that this action would raise the risks of broadening the war. It Is possible on the other hand that they would lower the tempo of military activity in South Vietnamiew to raising It at another time or at another place in Southeast Asia.
Course D. An announcement by the US of its determination to hold South Vietnamarning, either private or public, that North Vietnamese support of the Viet Cong must cease or the US would launch air attacks against North Vietnam. This course would be taken In conjunction with Course A, B, or C.
17- pecific warning of air attacks against North Vietnam, whether conveyed privately or publicly, would evoke very serious concern among all three Communistarning of air attacks on North Vietnam would be taken particularly seriously if It were issued in conjunction with the commitment of substantial US troop strength, as under Course C. Moscow and Peiping would regard the defense of North Vietnam against such an attack as Imperative. They would seek to forestall such an attack to prevent military damage to North Vietnam and also to avoid the risk of expanded
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hostilities. If the US warning were given privately, the Communist powers would probably feel that their Interests could best be served by making public the warning andithreat to world peace. They would probably see considerable advantage In this course and in bringing the case before the UN even if they did not believe that the US was prepared to make good on its threat.
lb. Moscow and Peiping would probably announce their determination to defend North Vietnam against attack and stress that any such action would carry the risk of general war. The Communist powers would probably also take certain military measures not only to make credible their position but also to provide for Improved air defense of North Vietnam. These measures would probably Include the stationing of Soviet and/or Chinese Communist aircraft and antiaircraft units in North Vietnam. It Is also possibleNorth Vietnamese" Air Force, complete with Jet fighters, might suddenly be unveiled. The Soviet leaders would probably calculate that they could, by such political and military measures, generate sufficient worldwide pressures tothe US from its threat, particularly If it could be depictedhreat to use nuclear weapons. While not
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desiring toajor military incident, the ussr and communist china would be determined to avoid conducting themselves inanner as to let the us conclude that it haday to stop communist support of "national liberation" movements.
if the us did subject north vietnam to air attacks, the ussr and communist china would commit air power to defend north vietnam. they would probably undertake retaliatory attacks against targets in south vietnam and against the bases or carriers from which the attacks on north vietnam had been launched. these retaliatory attacks would probably be madenorth vietnamese" air force which would, in fact,ixed force. uclear attack by the us would probably elicit some nuclear response.
the postulated courses of us action in south vietnam would have an impact upon communist tactics in laos. the communists would probably interpret the us action {except possibly course a) as evidencetiffening us attitude in southeast asia. they would probably drag their feet in the negotiations at geneva and step up their efforts toand expand their military and political position in laos.
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III. NON-COMMUNIST REACTIONS
21. South Vietnam. Most South Vietnamese would strongly welcomer B. In view of theof the security situation and Its adverse impact on national morale, we do not believeubstantialin the number of Americans in Vietnam would generate any appreciable concern that the country was coming under US domination. While supporting the Introduction of larger numbers of troops such as envisaged under Course C, the South Vietnamese Government would probably desire that they be used, at least Initially,tatic defense force freeing South Vietnamese military units for combat operations. The introduction ofS force might precipitate some unfavorable reaction within middle and lower echelons of the government and within certain intellectual elements in Saigon.
22. The people of South Vietnam would also stronglyS announcement of determination to defend South Vietnam, but would be apprehensive of Communist retaliation against South Vietnamese cities should the US attack the cities of North Vietnam.
Laos. Phouml and Boun Oum would probablyCourses B, C,S decision to harden its position in Southeast Asia and as raising the likelihood of US support of their position in Laos, especially Ifwere resumed In that country. Souvanna Phouma would probably feel that his position had become Impossible to maintain and he would probably either swing fully to the side of Hanoi or abandon the field to the Pathet Lao.
Cambodia. Sihanouk would be highly concerned by any Increase in US military activity in South Vietnam,that It might lead to an expansion of hostilities in which Cambodia would become involved. His traditional fear and suspicion of Thailand and South Vietnam would color his views as to US intentions. He would continue to beto Soviet or Chinese Communist pressures toCambodian policy to Bloc purposes in Southeast Asia. Sihanouk would, however, seek to keep the North Vietnamese regime at arms length.
SHATO. With the exception of the UK and Prance, the SEATO members would welcome Courses A, B,sof US determination to defend Its allies in Southeast
asia. the seato members would be in varying degreesof any us threat to carry the war to north vietnam. prance would almost certainly refuse to take part in any military activity in south vietnam and would probablysuch us action.
26. neutrals. burma, india, and indonesia would allery alarmed view of course b, c, or d. burma in particular is acutely conscious of chinese communist power and would be particularly susceptible to pressures from peiping. india's criticism would center primarily upon the violations ofeneva accords which would be involved in any of the given courses of us action. the icc would file reports of the us violations and its members (particularly poland and india) would seek an international conference to resolve the conflict.
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