SNIE 53-2-61/BLOC SUPPORT OF THE COMMUNIST EFFORT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF VIE

Created: 10/5/1961

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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national intelligence estimate number

bloc support of the communist effort against theof vietnam

Submitted

. DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this esti/nate: The central intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred tn by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

ctober mi. Concurring were The Director ofand Research, Department of Slate; the AssistantStaff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; theChief of Naval OperationsepartmentNavy; the Assistant Chief of. Staff, Intelligence,Director for intelligence, Joint Staff; the Assistant toof Defense, Special Operations; and the DirectorNational Security Agency. The Atomic EnergyRepresentative to the VSIB, and the AssistantBureau of Investigation, abstained, the subjectof their jurisdiction.

N? 3G8

BLOC SUPPORT OF THE COMMUNIST EFFORT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM

the problem

to estimate the extent and nature of bloc support of the communist effort against south vietnam.1

the estimate

Communist subversive and guerrilla apparatus in South Vietnam, known as the Viet Cong, is an integral part of the North Vietnamese Communist Party and It looks to Hanoi for political and military guidance and various fonns of support. Hanoi is the Implementing agency for Bloc activity in South Vietnam, and the Hanoi authorities are allowed considerable local freedom inViet Cong guerrilla and subversiveThe Communist Bloc probably views the guerrilla and subversive campaigns in Laos and South Vietnam as two partsingle broad political-military strategy, and of the two, considers South Vietnam as the more significant prize.

The Viet Cong are using MaoLstarge part of the North Vietnam Army was trained in Communist China during thewar endingnd some of these troops are leading operations in Southnow. Kach Bloc country has supported the "struggle" in the South with propaganda, notably during Pliam Van Dong's trip to other Bloc areas in

roader treatment of tho situation and prospects In South Vietnam, see. "Prospects for North and Southated

Sinceeneral Hanoi-directed political and paramilitary Communistagainst President Diem and hisof Vietnam (GVN) has been underway, and during the past year this campaign has taken on increased tempo and scale. The Vict Cong apparatus has undergone rapidand the scope and area of operations of its guerrilla units have increased significantly. More recently, the Vict Cong has begun toIn larger sized0 men) and they have extended large-scale attacks to include, for the first time, the plateau area in the northern part of South Vietnam.

Apparently in response to this direction from Hanoi, cadre personnel and many special items, such as communications equipment, chemicals, medical supplies, and other items needed for guerrilla warfare not available in the countryside, arc being infiltrated into South Vietnam via long established land and sea routes. Thousands of junks which ply the coastal routes of the Indochina peninsulaeans of infiltration extremelyto control. Mountain trails in southern Laos have been used freely by the Communists for years for movement of men and supplies between North and South Vietnam. Other infiltration routes pass through Cambodia. Nevertheless, the Viet Cong eflort is still

elf-supporting operation in respect to recruitment and supplies. The Viet Cong live upon locally produced food which they either grow themselves or levy upon villages. They meet most of their currency needs by taxing areas under their control, by robbery, or by blackmail. Most of their arms and much of their ammunition have been locally acquired or captured from GVN Army and security forces.

We estimate present armed, full-time Viet Cong strength atn increase, despite substantial combat losses,0 since April0 andn the past three months.ercent of total Viet Cong strength consists of cadresfrom North Vietnam mostly viatrails through southern Laos. Most of theercent of the Viet Cong are local recruits, but they also includeof the0 stay-behind personnel who wont underground duringegroupment and evacuation of Vietnamese Communist Army units following the Indochina War.0 Vietnamese Communist troops were evacuated to North Vietnam during this period, most of whom were from south and central Vietnam. It is from this pool of experienced fighters that most of the guerrilla cadres nowin South Vietnam are drawn. These hard-core guerrillas are augmented bythousand supporters who, under the cover of normal civilian pursuits, join the organized insurgent bands to assist in intelligence, sabotage, propaganda, and terroristIn addition, local inhabitants in many areas provide the Viet Cong with recruits, food, refuge, and operational support, in some cases voluntarily and in others as the result of intimidation or coercion.

As part of the buildup for their current campaign, the Vict Cong have established an extensive communications network. Much of the communications equipment in use is probably quite primitive and some of it is assembled in the field. There is evidence, however, that in addition there arcquantities of sophisticatedequipment und well-trained technicians serving the Vict Cong. Such equipment and the necessary maintenance and operatingwere infiltrated into South Vietnam.

There has been no positive Identification of Bloc manufactured military equipment in South Vietnam. Most of Uie arms andnow in use by the Viet Cong is of US or French origin. Although weapons have beea infiltrated from North Vietnam, most Viet Cong equipment is probably from caches established al the end of the Indochina War or is equipment captured from GVN armed forces or security forces.mall arms were lost by GVN armed forces during combai, Some items, such as grenades, land mines, booby traps, and- small arms ammunition are locally manufactured by village level Viet Congrom materials procured locally or Imported from North Vietnam and Cambodia. Moreover, in view of the physical problems of infiltrating large amounts of arms and ammunition into South Vietnam, many Viet Cong operations are primarily for the purpose of capturing arms, ammunition, medical supplies, and otherajor buildup of Bloc equipment in South Vietnam is likely to await the improvement of lines of communication into and within South Vietnam.

Outlook. Vict Cong control of lhe Ca Mau peninsula at the southern tip of Southhas been virtually complete for several years. During the dry season beginning in November, the Vict Cong will probablythe exploitation of GVN weaknesses In the plateau areas of the north and central parts of the country, seeking to establish another "liberated area"ogistics base from which larger scale operations could be mounted. The creationecond "liberated area" in the plateau region adjacent to southern Laos would enable the Viet Cong to keep GVN forces split and prevent the concentration of effort against either.trong Viet Cong position in the plateau area wouldthreaten the rear of Diem's troops posted along the demilitarized zone,

onsiderable extent the ability of the Viet Cong to maintain this expanded effort will depend ixpon improved logistical support from the outside. It is probable that the Bloc intends to build up the eastern part of south Laos, improving the roads, mountain trails, and airfields,ajor supply channel totepped up Viet Cong campaign in north and central Vietnam. Thereonsiderable increase introop strength in south Laos, asupply buildup, particularly east of Thakhek, and an increase in the Communist airlift into the area.

Original document.

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