APPBOyElD--FOB DATE':5
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
THE SITUATION AND SHORT-RUN
OUTLOOK IN LAOS
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE -
The folloiolng intelligence Organizations participated tn thepreparation ot this estimate: The Central intelligence Agency and the intelligence organisations of the Departments of State, the Army, thehe Air force, and The Jomt. .
y the
; . UNTTEI) STATES INTRXUG ENCE
OnSioncurring icere The Director of Jnttt. Ugenc+an* Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations 'inteBlgenee),of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, intelligence, OSAF; ihe Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Snergy .Commission Representative ta the.VSIB, and.the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of investigation, abstained, the sub-
t - feet bemg outside of their '
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his estimate was dLwminated by the ConLral Intelligence Agency. "This copy Is lor the information and use of the recipient end of persons under his jurisdictioneed to know basis- additional essential diaacminatfrm may ba authorized by the following officials within their reapecttve departments.
a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Departmentoffor Intelligence, Department of theChief Of "KaVal Operationsor tho DepartmentNavy > ,'.*
d_ Director ofF, for the Department of the Air Force
lor Intelligence, Joint Stall, for The Joint
of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission .
Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation .
to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, for the
- Mrectoror the National Security '
Jf'sAsalstantother Department
zT^rniajttpy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security reguHttenior returned to tlie Central Inlelligence Agency by arrangementthe OfficeL*.
. When an estimate la disscftrBwied ovrrscas. the overseas recipients may retaina period not In excess of one ycarT'TnHheend of this period, the eatimatebe destroyed, returned to Uie forwarding apena^orpermisslon should bethe forwarding agency toJune
he title of this mtlmaio when used separately from the tesTRrwUd be classified;
FOit firnrm, Tint-
Whtta BOosettlonal Security Council Department of Stata Department of Dttmtatomic Energy -ComnuUlon: Federal Bureau of InrflaUgatlon ';
THE SITUATION AND SHORT-RUN OUTLOOK IN LAOS
THE PROBLEM
To analyze recent developments In Laos and to estimate the political and military prospects in Laos over the next two or three months.
CONCLUSIONS
the next few weeks thewill probablyew phaseeitheroliticalsome sort, renewed efforts In Laostoolitical solutiontenuous cease-fire remains, or abreakdown of the cease-fire. (Para.
m
oliticalat Genera or in Laos, are onlyof the wide differencesbetween Western and Blocthe suspicions and conflictingamong the Laotians. Such anwould almost certainlybe basedoalitionSouvanna Phouma. AsSouvanna would acquireof independent strengthwould try to pursue aat least at the outset. Thehowever, would be able tostrong pressures against him,believe that his control over thewould becomeeriod of time Itincreasingly unlikely that hethe Communists fromor indirect control. )
In the absenceoliticalin the next few weeks, hostilities are likely to be resumed by either the Phoumi forces or the Pathet Lao side. Phoumi's relative political and military situation remains weak, and he probably believes that his only remaining hopeenewal of hostilities with outsideIn any event, the Communist Pathet Lao wul probably undertake limited operations designed to increase pressureolitical settlement and to further consolidate their control.)
We do not believe that the Lao Army canilitary solution In Laos or evenorth-south partition of the country without sizable and long-term outside military support. If the Lao Army were to take the initiative and were able to concentrate sufficient forcesajor attack on any keyposition, it probably could make some initial advance. It would not, however, be able toajorerious counterattack, or prevent Communist seizure of the principaltowns along the Mekong Riverery short time.
DISCUSSION
THE situation
At the time of the tenuous "cease-fire" In Laos and the opening of the Genevain May. the combined Souphanouvong Pathct Lao and Souvanna Phouma Kong Le armed forces dominated the military situation in Laos. At that time, the Laotian Army under General Phoumi waa disorganized and demoralized; if the Pathet Lao Kong Le forces had continued their attacks, they probably could have seized the Important towns along the Mekong River- Luang Prabang, Vientiane. Thakhet. Savannakhet, andstill remained In the hands of Prince Boun Oum's Royal Laotian Government.
Nevertheless, the Communist powerstoease-fire and international negotiations. That decision probablyconsiderable concern for USfor military intervention In Laos, awhich Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow probably all wish to avoid Moreover, the Communists hadtrong position from which to make further gains: the Pathet Lao already held moat of north and central Laos, and they held enough of southern Laos to facilitate Hanoi's Communist Viet Cong effort against President Diem and hisin South Vietnam. As for the rest of Laos, the Communists probably estimated that, in view of the military situation in Laos, they could negotiate an agreement which would interpose no serious obstacle to eventual Communist domination of the Laotianthrough political means.
Although there has boon no dramatic change in the situation In Laos since thethere hasteady improvement in the overall position of the Communist element. The Pathet Lao armed forces tiave undergone extensive reorganization and haveaugmented their equipment Through local recruitment and reinforcement from North Vietnam, Pathet Lao troop strength has been greatly increased They have made considerable progress toward consolidating their military positions In north and central
Laos and have increased their military strength in the south alone to atroops. They have made an extensiveand political eflort which has expanded the area of Communist grassroots control.
The position of the Souvanna.'Kong Le group has been seriously undermined.has no independent political apparatus of any significance at his disposal, and Kong Le's armed forces areomparison with either the Phoumi or Pathet Lao forces. Moreover, the Souvanna/Kong Le forces are almost completely dependent upon the Pathet Lao and the Bloc for communications,logistical, and financial support. Some of the group have become increasinglyof their Communist allies and haveto prevent the Communists fromominant military position and expanding their political influence in the countryside. However, they have not had the resources to match the Communist eflort.
During the cease-fire, Prince Boun Oum and General Phoumi have concentrated onthe Lao Army and redeploying it In the Mekong Valley.esult of USefforts and the continued influx ofand supplies, the offensive and defensive capabilities of the Lao Army have beenThe present number of troops inunits of the regular Lao Armynd there0 full-time Auto Defense (ADC) troops. These figures,reater military capability than isavailable. Although army units have demonstrated some effectiveness In limited clearing operations and the morale of the troops has apparently Improved, the Laotian Government's logistical support of its troops in the field continues to be poor and the field commanders are for the most part indecisive, weak, and poorly motivated. The major operational successes since the cease-fire have been scored by Meo guerrilla units which have effectively harassed Communist lines ofin the Plaine des Jarres area and forced the Communists toonsider-
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number of troops In an eflort tothe Mco bases.
On the basis of recent and incomplete evidence we believe that there hasharp increase in the strength of the forces opposing the government forces in Laos. Our best estimate at present is that they numbern addition to0 Pathet Lao, this figureorth Vietnamese cadre and specialist personnel who operate the logistics and communications systems, man the field and antiaircraft artillery, and provide technical and tactical guidance at all levels of the Pathet Lao/Kong Le effort; four North.Vietnameseen) serving as special assaultroops in Kongn Phong Saly under Kham Ouane who, like Kong Le, is responsive to Souvanna Phouma.
the prospects
Within the next few weeks the Laotian crisis will probablyew phaseeitherolitical arrangement of some sort, renewed efforts in Laos andtoolitical solution while tho tenuous cease-fire remains,eneralof the cease-fire. At present,olitical arrangement are only fair. There are wide differences between theand Bloc positionsumber of major points at issue at Geneva. Although the Communists have recently displayed aattitude and have shown someto compromise on minor issues, the Bloc powers, particularly Peiping and Hanoi, appear confident in their strong bargaining position, and have shown no inclination to make major compromises for the sake of reaching agreement.
Moreover, general agreement among the major Western and Bloc powers at Geneva would not necessarilyoliticalin Laos because of the mutual suspicions and conflicting objectives among the Laotian elements represented by the three princes, Souphanouvong, Souvanna Phouma, and Boun Oum Souphanouvong represents the Communist position. Souvanna Phouma lays claimeutralist position but he Isupon tlie Communist for support and could not agree to terms which were notto the Communists. He works with Souplianouvongasis of equality but is unwilling to accept equal status for Phoumi. Phoumi is still hopingilitary solution in Laos and probably would notolitical settlement which would beto Souvanna Phouma unless the US forced him to do so For these reasons. Boun Oum and General Phoumi almost certainly do not intend genuinely toegotiatedsettlement.
f the present crisis movesolitical phase as the result of arrangements made at Geneva and among the three Laotian Princes, it would almost certainly have Ui be on the basisoalition government underPhouma. Souvanna probably has aspirations forole as aleader in Iaos and In Southeast Asia. However. Souvanna Isree agent and it is unlikely that he would be able toruly neutral course. As Prime Minister, be would probably try at least at the outset toeutralist position and to reduce his near total dependence upon theHe indicated in his talks with Ambassador Harrtman an awareness ofstrength and intentions in Laosesire to avoid Communist domination. However, the Communists would still be able lo bring very strong pressures against him. Although control of the government would give Souvanna some sources of independent strength he does not now have, thewouldarge part of their armed forces and their political apparatus, either overtly or covertly, to Insure their continued dominance of major parts of the country, to influence any future elections, and toCommunist pressure against South Vietnam.
bility to resist Communist pressures on him and to offset Communistin the countryside would depend both upon the achievement of effectivecontrols to insure Laotian neutrality and upon the full support and cooperation of
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Boun Oum, Phouml element with Sou-vanna to provide firm resistance to Pathet Lao demands and pressure. We do not believe that the Communist powers, particularly Peiping and Hanoi, would agree to effective international controls. Although US pressure on Boun Oum and Phouml might force them tooalition government under Sou-vanna Phouma, they would not willinglySouvanna and probably would seek by every means they could to undermine him. Consequently,oalitionunder Souvanna might at first appear to beeutralist course, we believe that Souvanna's control over the Laotianwould becomeeriod of time it would beunlikely that he could prevent the Communists from acquiring direct orcontrol.
A continuation of the present tenuous cease-fire line, or any attempt to formalize or consolidate it, would probably not be tolerated by Peiping and Hanoi unless it were backed up by substantially Increased non-Communist militaryurable partition of tbe country would almost certainlyong-term commitment ol outside forces. Including US troops, to the defense of the Mekong Valley. Any effort by US or SEATO forces to expand the area under non-Communistwould run serious risk of intervention by North Vietnamese troops or volunteers.'
olitical arrangement Is not reached in the next lew weeks, we believe it likely that the cease-fire will break down. Hostilities
' See, "Likelihood of Major Comma-nlst Mililary Intervention in Mainland Southeastatedvm>might be renewed by either the Phouml forces or by the Pathet Lao/Kong Le side. Both have certain motivations. General Phouml's political and military situation remains weak and he probably believes that his onlyhopeenewal of hostilities In which he would have outside assistance. If he thought he could resume hostilities inanner as to bring the US into the conflict, he almost certainly would do so. Moreover, General Phoumi is sometimes disposed tothe extent of US commitment to him.
Wo do not believe it likely that within the next two or three months the Communists will undertake conventional operations to seize and hold key cities in the Mekong River Valley. Instead, they probably will Increase their limited operations to maintain pressureolitical settlement and to consolidate further their control. They probably will increase their efforts to eliminate Meo resistance in the Plaine des Jarres area and increase the scale of their own guerrilla activities in areas under nominal Lao Army control. The Communists thus will be able to further consolidate their control in northern Laos and, at the same time, prevent the Lao Army from preparing foron key Communlst-held areas.
We do not believe that the Lao Army canilitary solution in Laos or evenorth-south partition of the country without sizable and long-term outsidesupport. If the Lao Army were to take the initiative and were able to concentrate sufficient forcesajor attack on any key Communist position, it probably could make some initial advance. It would not, however, be able toajor effort,erious counterattack, or prevent Communist seizure of the principal Laotian towns along the Mekong Riverery short time.
Original document.
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