1
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN THE FAR EAST
Submitted by We DDffc'OrOS OF CTMTRAL 1WTXLLIQKNCE
The foUoutnff tnteiUgtne* orflanlwHwu participated ta the preparationhU itttmate: Tat Central Intelligence Agency and the tnttOtgenct ortfanUattoni of Iht Department! of Slate, Detente, On Array, the Haim, tht Air Force, and The
Joint Staff.
Contmrrtd moy tht UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on Wxera The Director ol Intel-
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE
I.
H. PSIPINQB ESTIMATE OF THE
UJ. CAPABILITIES FOR MILITARY ACTION AND
OREIGN
V. LIKELY COURSES OF
VI. THE CONTTNQEHCYINOSOV1ET
MILITARY
I. THE
IL THE ATR
IIL THE
IV. ADVANCED
TABLE
TABLE
I
CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN THE FAR EAST
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Communist China's objective* In the Far Bast, Its assessment of Its own position, and Its capabilities and likely courses of action over the next two years or ao; and to consider how these might be affected by the contingency of an open break In relations between the Chinese and SoticI Communist Parties.
CONCLUSIONS
Communist China almost certainly does not intend to attempt the openconquest of any other Far Eastern country during the period of thisCommunist China's leaders believe that they can eventually achieve theirIn the area at far leas cost and risk through the techniques ofpolitical warfare. When Peipingthe circumstances are right. It will endeavor to supplement the moreforms of political warfare with guerrilla and terrorist action byforces, supported and guided by
1 In any case, the Cornmuniat Chinese will seize every opportunity to undermine US standing and to generate antl-Amerl-oan feeling In the Far East. They will strive to promote discontent andIn the pro-Western countries of the area.
eiping has no compuncaons about openly using its military forces to extend its control when it can do so with little or no risk, It will continue its refusal to renounce the use of force for the seizure of Taiwan and the offshore Islands, but we believe that concern over retaliation by the US will deter it fromilitary conquest of Taiwan or the offshore islands during at least the period of this estimate. However, the Chinese might undertake limited military action In the Strait area to test Nationalistccfenses and to probe USor to call world attention to what it terms "the olanger to peace caused by the US occupationart of China's territory." (Paras.
eiping's reluctance to launch ainvasion in the Far East will almost certainly not prevent it from reacting vigorously to any US or SBATO action which Peiping believed threatened ItaFor example, if SBATO (or US armed forces alone) came to the defense of Laos or South Vietnam, peiping'swould probably be to increase Ita
fw**nfismbar of to-amMau cootbk c:ouUi ruouun ar* conaWsred la sunt ItttM, Trobsal* Conuou. nisi ReaoUona to Cartaln US AcUoru in floisUtoram&oriUT|
aid to tho Pathet Lao and the North Vlet-nameae while deploying subs tan lialregular forces along Its own southern border. In the more extreme situationEATO or US actionhreat to North Vietnam which the North Vietnamese forces could notthe Chinese Communists wouldcertainly In terrene overtly with their ownhould such actionto threaten tbe Communist position In northern Laos, the Chinese Comrnu-ista would probably Intervene overtly with their own frjrces. (Para.ZS)
f Slno-Sovlet relations were tofor example to the present level of Albanian-Soviet relations, Communist China's military capabilities would be somewhat reduced and Pelping would have much less confidence that It could count on the Soviet nuckir umbrella Perhaps most important, such an open Sino-Soviet break would also reduceChina's capabilities lor political warfr-e, atbe short run, The very foundations of communism would be shaken and Slno-Sovlet rivalry for dominant influence In the otherparties of Asia would have aeffect on these parties and would substantially weaken them as lnstru--jnents of subversion (or tho time being.)
discussion
Objectives
1hina's long-range goal to the Par East is the complete communlsauon cf the area under the hegemony of Pirping. Short of this thereumber of Interim objectives which lepresent stages oflowsrd this goal. These include: th*of Ocepmurust China's positionreat power, tbe reduction and eventualof the US military presence and the elimination of US Influence from the Far Bast In general and Taiwan In particular; Iheor subversion of governmentalIn the non-Commiir.lst countries of Asia; and the developmeot of communism tnnations of the area as the opportunityt Is these interim objectives which will most directly shape Communist China's policy during the period of this estimate.
he Soviet Union ts probably in general agreement with Communist China on these Interim objectives, although there are and wiH continue to be duTerences on tactics and timing Chinese Corrunonlst interests are more directlybe Par Baat than are those of the USSR, and Peiping appears to be men Impatient for concretetist advances, particularly ln areas ofUS Interest Chinese efforts tohegemony over Asia Intensify the trend toward division of the communist world into two major blocs with Moscow and Pelping as compeUUve centers. We believe that Moscow win strive to rttaun leadership ef themovement In tbe Far East as In the rest of then those areas where the strength of Pelplng's influence makes this Impossible. North Korea and North, Moscow will endeavor to maintain atarity of influence.
'Sections UV of*aBs*at*hat Stoo-Sonei neaUcnao UMobM dartrai th* acstts or as. The coe-tUigeoey ofpen break In partr rttauons Is ccralderad Id faction vi, below.
II. PEIPING'S ESTIMATE Or" THE SITUATION
Communist Chinas lciidciabelieve that tbe world situation Is ripe for the widespread pressing of enUeolonlal. Communist-guided revolutions. They are convinced that theand politic al strength of the Bloc has grown to the point where the West can no longer be sum of victoryilitaryThey probably estimate that, although the Western Powers will support localto leftist revolutions In thenon-Comminust countries, the fear ofajor war will prevent the Western Powers from taking effective, direct action against such rerolutlons. They point to Cuba as proof that they are right. They may also believe that even In the unlikely eventajor war should develop, the hazards would be far greater for the principal Western Powers and even for the USSR than for Communist China. While they are sJrnost certainly more sensitive to the consequences of general war than some of their morestatements uvucate, their concern over this possibility appears to be leas acute than that of their Soviet partner.
The Chinese Communists teller* that their own experience is more relevant than theexperience for guiding otherstates in Africa, Latin America, and especially in Asia. In addition, the Chinese Communists inherit traditional Chineseof superiority over other Asian peoples and believe that China Is the naturaland economic center of the area.
Chinese Communist leadersUS as the greatest barrier to theof their Ideological and naUonalthey see the US as thepre venting them from bringingto tba raolherland" andrevolution. Peiping almost certainlythat once the US military presencefrom Asia, the proximity ofChinese power will leadthe rise of Far Easternwill be Increasingly susceptible toCommunist Influence and the appeal
believe that the extent ofenthusiasm of the Chinesemay determine Its choiceand cautious policies. Domesticthus far do not seem to have hadeffect on Peiping's foreign policy.to the eatent that prolonged.economic setbacks may shakeof Peiping's leaders in theirand preoccupy their attention, wethat the scope and range ofpolicy Initiatives may be reduced.dlfaculUea. however, are not likelyPeiping from pursuingappear attainable without highfrom taking direct action If It believessecurity Is threatened.
FOR MILITARY ACTION
he Chinese Communist armed services constitute the most powerful Indigenous ground, air, and naval forces In Asia.'only the armyeafied capability tor prolonged, large-scale offensive action. The capabilities of the air forces are primarily oriented toward air defense snd to tactical aad logistical support of ground foreea The navy Isefensive arm, designed for relatively short-range operations.nuclear arms, intermediate orguided missiles, and most otherweapons, the armed services And their plans for military growth and modernization tied to the uncertain course of Sino-Soviet relations. We do not anticipate thatChina willilitarilydomestic capability for the production of nuclear weapons and missiles during the period of this estimate-
IS. The Chinese Comm unlets with theirforces are capable of excepting large-scale ground campaigns on the mainland.
opposed by very substantialIncludingtbey could si mostseise most of Southeast Asia, thepef'nmlf. and Tarxan. During theof this estimate, the Chinese Communists will posateainim ma capability for long-range attacks beyond the periphery of China, and they will possessimited capability to defend themselves against alr sttackodern and well-trained force.
he preponderance of Chinesepower Is .ilatter of growingto other countries of the Far Eastf Communist Chinaesultingto Irritate or offend Peiping hasthe vulnerability of certain of these nations to Pelplng's poll ties! and military pressures.
oriununist China has considerablefor propaganda and political warfare among ihe nations of the Far East. Pelping rnakea much of Its "understanding andfor peoples who believe they arefrom the effects of colonialism orand social backwardness from which, according to Petplng. the Chinees have sofreed themselves. Economic oldhaveeans of penetrsUon that Is so valued by Petplng that It has made aid commltmenta of1 million to non-Bloc Asian countries during the past yearIts own severe economict Is possible, however, that the Chinese may have overestimated their ability to meet these commltmenta.
eiping can employ several approaches in Its efforts to develop subversive capabilities within r. on-Communist coon trie* it can offer Its agrarian-based revolutionodel for peoples who wish to "literate" andtheir countries. The Chinese are oble to provide guidance and aid to Communist parlies, legal or Illegal, In other AsianIn certain areas of Southeast Asia, the Chinese minorityotent source of support for Pelpingocus for local revolutionary activities. The Chinese can provide mterna-tlonal political support for local revolutionary movements and propaganda againstgovernments. They can provideand supplies for antlregime guerrilla forces. Mao Tse-tung's doctrineseady handbook for the conduct of "wars of national liberation."
net capabilities forin the non-Communist Far Eastby the vulnerability of theIt Is relatively easy in thesedisguise externally supported guerrillaas indigenous uprisings againstregimes (which to some degreeThe local regimes are in mostof effectively containing theseforces without outsMc help.
IV. FOREIGN POtlCY
Pelplng's foreign policy is Influenced both by Communist objectives and ChineseInterests. Generally, but not always, these move in the same direction, and It Is possible that the Chinese Communist leaders are unconscious of any conflict between them. They probably hold tbat what Is good for Communist China Is good for the worldmovement. Since theheir general line of foreign policy bas aimed at creating tbe Imageower of vigor and rapidly Increasing strengthesult of having adopteda power leading the way for those countries which are still retarded and weak.
At the same time, Chinese nationalhave had considerable weight, even In some Instances when they required at least temporary sacrifice of Communist goals. The policy towardt least In partbecause Pelping asserts that the acquisition of Taiwanomestic matter,the completion of the civil war in China. Pelplng's relatively -lerce reaction topersecution of Overseasemporary victory ofover the Communist line. The most striking example of the sacrifice ofto national Interests is Pelplng'spursuit of border claims against India
SECH
the Himalaya region. Not only does this action conflict with the internationalpolley of srootng India's favor and support, but Itajor source of weakness and dV. ttkm- in the Communist Party of Ind la
hird factor, which le In the background of roost Chinese Communist foreign policy decisions, is the attitude of the USSR.Pelplng's policies [or the Far East probably involve higher risks than those of Moscow, thereiable area of overlapthem. This |tvea Pelping considerable flexibility, although Its dependence upon the protection of the Soviet nuclear deterrent gives Moscow some capability for restraining what It considers excessively risky Chinese policies. On the other hand, the Chinese probably still estimate that. In the lastthe Soviets could not afford to seedefeated ln China and wouldintervene despite disapproval of Pelplng's policies.
oreign policy differentiate*pro-Western regimes and benevolent neutrals. Thus it carries on varying degrees of overt propaganda warfare and subversion against South Korea, Japan, South Vietnam, Thailand, Malaya, and the Philippines while giving economic aid to such neutrals as Burma, Indonesia, and Cambodia. Even In these neutral countries there are significant Communist or pro-Communist elements which Peiping would attempt to use against the governments should they drift too far toward tlie West
In moving toward Its objectives ofUS Influence from the Far East and establishing Itself as the dominant power in the area, Ptiping'* strategy probably has made tbe acquisition of Taiwan and tbe com-munixlng of Japan and India Its mostgoals. On the basis of opportunity, however, Soulh Vietnam and Laos areprimary targets To the extent its domestic strength allows, Communist China will pursue and expand Its penetration efforts In Southeast Asia and elsewhere
V. LIKELY COURSES OF ACTION
the period of this estimate.China will almost certainlypursue Its interim objectives In theprimarily through the techniquespolitical warfare. Pelping willto capitalize on its power image,that it is dangerous to be anCommunist China and that communismInevitable wave of the future. AtUme, It will strive to convincepeoples that Communist China isgiant which poses no threatthat are not In league with thethat it le willing to provide generoussuch countries.
particular, Pelping will seise everyto undermine US standing inEast and to diminish the US presencein the area. The issue of USbe pressed, particularly in Okinawaand economic difficulties anywheroFar East will be attributed to thethe US. Peiping will continue itscapitalize upon anti-US feeling In theany group or class of people andthe fear of nuclear war In Itsimpel Western-oriented countries
he Chinese Communists almost certainly believe that If US support were denied to non-Communist Southeast Asia, any country tn this area could be subvertedery few years by poUUcal-guerrllla means. On this basts, Peiping will continue to work tothe effectiveness of US support of these countries. When Communist China's leaders estimate that the situationro-Western nation has become sufficiently soft, they will supplement political action with guerrilla-terrorist tactics against the IncumbentSuch actions will be conducted by local forces (often Chinese trained) aided bytechnicians and advisers. The Chinese Communists almost certainly feel thateriod of tune they can achieve theirby these means at little cost andairly low degree of risk.
n general, the Chinese Communists feel little need to resort to overt military invasion
order to enlarge their Influence or cororau-nlie other countries. On the other hand, they Dare no compunctions about openly using their military lorcea to aitend their control when it can do so with little or no risk-Thus, they ruthlessly overran Tibet; they hare Bred upon Tnitipn troops in the Himalayas; and they refuse to renounce the right to use force for the setture of Taiwan and tbe off* iho re islands
We do nethat Peiping willajor military effort against India during the next two yean or to. In the case of Taiwan and the offshore islands, concern over retaliation by the US will almost certainly deter them fromilitaryPeiping will probably bo fully aware of the dangers ofimited action In the Taiwan Strait from which it cannot disengage without appearing to suffer aIt remains possible, however, thatmight undertakection tn the Strait area daring the period of this estimate seeking thereby to test Nationalist defenses and to probe US determination or to call world attention to what It terms "the danger to peace caused by the US occupationart ot China's territory,"
Peiping's unwillingness to launch ainvasion In the Par Bast will aim oat certainly not prevent It from reactingto any USATO action whichbelieved threatened Its security. KorIf SBATO (or US armed forces alone) came toLaos or South Vietnam, Peiping) reaction would probably be toIts aid to the Patbet Lao and the Viethile deploying substantial Chineseforces along Its own southern border, in the more extreme situationBATO or US actionhreat to North Vietnam which the North Vietnamese forces could not counter, the Chinese Communists would almost certainly Intervene overtly with their ownhould such action appear
'Polpfns'* probata'* reactionsumber otcourses of US action In Booth Vietnam are considered In, "ProbableReactions to Certain OS Aclicns In SoothovemberTOPo threaten the Communist position InLaos, the Chinese Communists would probably intervene overtly with their own forees.
VI. THE CONTINGENCYINO-SOVIET
spur
n the preceding sections of the estimate It has been assumed that the Sino-Sovietis likely to proceed withoutInto an open break in party relations. However, sincereak is at leastwe beHeve It useful to consider some of Its consequences.
f sino Soviet relations were tofor example to the present level of Albanian-Soviet relations, Communist China would be deprived of even the low levels of military supplies, technical aid, and economic cooperation it now receives from the USSR The replacement of Soviet sources with free world sources, particularly for POL. wouldCUfocult economic readjustments and would slow the rate ot economic growth. Moreover. Communist China would have to rely on relatively vulnerable sea lines rather than secure overland supply mates. InPeiping's prosjrress In the development of nuclear weapons and missiles would be retarded. This reduction of capabilities would in itself limit somewhat the range ofPeiping could actively pursue In the Far Bast,uch greater inhibiting factor probably would bo Peiping's greatly Increased uncertainty that It could count on the Soviet nuclear support.
erhaps most Important, an open Slno-Sovlet break would also weaken Communist China's capabilities for political warfare, at least in tbe short run. Tbe very foundations of communism would be shaken and Sino-Soviet rivalry for dominant Influence In tha oUk Communist parties of Asia wouldpbve affect on these parties and would sutotanttally weaken them as instruments ot subversion for the time being. In those parties where Peiping ultimately succeeds in establishing its predominance, policies would
SEC
MILITARY ANNEX
THE ARMY
' Chinese Communist ground forces numberillionthe seme as in toe past several years. Theirelement*ombat divisionsnfantry divisions that aretorm Sea. About two-thirds of these forces are currently deployed in criticalareas or strategic tones. Ofrmiesndependent divisions are In tbe Mukden Military Keglon which borders onrmiesndependent divisions are In the coastal provinces opposite Taiwan; and therermiesndependentalong tbe border with Southeast Asia from Burma to Hainan Island. (These totals do not include Irsdspertdent AA and cavalry
1 The remaining ground combativisions)trategic reserve which would be available forto any other areas in the event ofrie Chinese Communistshave the capability toround force of one or two divisions along the border with Laos-North Vietnam without Irrunediate VS detection. It Is also probable that5 days tba Chinese Communists could deploy, from their strategic reserve, about at) divisions Into Korea, aboutivisions tnto the area opposite Taiwan, and about 8Into Southeast Asia. Oiven maximum capability. Ideal conditions, and notbe entire strategic reserveould be moved to the assembly area adjacent to North Korea withinays, to Use area facing the Taiwan Strait withinays, and to the Southeast Asia border region withinays. In each case the buildup of forces would be far In excess of the number which could be effectively employed (especially to the event of Joint action wtth North Korean or North Vietnamese troops) Furthermore, they would also probably exceed tbe total
'Am map as end of Annus for use aad drplor-stent ot frontier and reserve foreea which the Chinese Communists couldand support forward of the assembly
area.
technological and logisticalChinese Communistigh capability forresourceful, and effective action.extremely adverse condlUoni ofandas would bein SoutheastRedfoot soldier has proved to be adetermined campaigner
IL THE Alt FORCES
The Chinese Communist Air Pore* and Naval Air Poresombined strength ofircraft of all types, have almost as many aircraft as all the non-Bloc countries of the Far East combined. Inhey are expected to have asmaller total number of aircraft.there will be an mcreated number ottypes, IncludingARMERSndew FISHBFDsf the Soviet Union should decide to transfer BADOBRs to China or assist the Chinese to produceew >etbombers (probably feweright be assigned to Ihe air force.'
During the period of this estimate,China's principal ground defense in depth against air attack will be her anuair-craft artillery, which probably now Mais0 lighthree-fourths of these weapons are the older ST mm andm types, the remainder Including the more modernmm guns, andm guru. Bye anticipate that nearly half the AA guns will be of the more advancedmm types. This steady improvement Is not expected to be
'Seeor estimated currentof th" air forces and probableby mid-IWB and mJd-lgei.
accompanied by any increase in the totulof guns.
ed Chinese elrroeri have almost cartalnly taken measures to improve combat capabtli-Uesilielf embarrassing encounter wttb the Chinese NaUonalistsB, although the extent of qualitative improvementbe estimated precisely. On tho other hand, POL shortages continue to limitUme and would make protractedImpossible. Furthermore, tha air forces can operateimited number ot aircraft In Inclement weather anduclear-weapons capability.
HE NAVY
he Chinese Communist Navy laefensive force, with very limited ability to engage In offensivets primary mission ii coastal defense and control ofwaters. We consider IU overall strength and eftecUveriess adequate only for defense against to rationinor naval powtr. Itroved capability for hit-and-run motor torpedo boat operations to its own coastal watersignificantfor offensive and defensive mlnelaylng. In the event of major hostlllUes. It would alsoimited capability for aubmaitneagainst Hues of communication to the Western Paclflc
8 The navy could launch amphl&fous assaults with little warning against the offshoreTba troop lift capacity of thelanding ships currently under direct naval control is estimated to bo00 infantry troopsby an armored division and an artillery division {the Utter divisions being limited to betweenercent of their organic motormployed for troop transport only, the DA eapebOty would be Increased
'BMor Chinese ContmunlaS Xavyship and personnel itrenith.
to0 lighUy equippedtroops.
d. Several serious wsakn esses limit tbe overall capabilities of thehortage of major surface and mlnesweeplngack of auxiliary forces capable ot supportingoperations, and the absence of anconstruction program to replace aging amphibious craft. Construction or minor patrol types is likely to continueodest rate, aiming primarily at replacement of older units. Future naval development willcontinue to be extremely sensitive to the trends of the Slno-Sovlet dispute. Theof four "W" class submarines was eerkrasly delayed because of the withdrawal olechnical and material assistance. Although we believe that work on these units has been resumed, triors Is no evidence that the Soviets have provided assistance.
IV. ADVANCED WEAPONS'*
rasers* osl re analyst* of CceamsnkA Cblnai advanced Tepee* (stabilities andor-renUy andsrwar for. "Chinese com-moDiat Advanced Weapo-ia PrrarraflU."
t present Communist Chinaery srnail capability to advanced weapons: ll has no nuclear weapons and only Use beginningissile capability. It has received help from the USSR to both ths missile and nuclear fklds. but the departure of moat Sovietto0 raises questions as to the subsequent rate of progress to these fklds. Certainly Pelping must regardatter of highest priority tho development of Itsand missile capabilities as rapidly as possible, and it will continue to build on the foundations which tho Soviets have helped establish. Furthermore the Chinese cana great amount of open literature in these fields and can copy systems that have already been made available to them by the USSR
THE CUIN'KSB COMWUSIffT GROUND FORCES
ettbor mod
HtoTTft ESTIMATED UNm STRENGTH
Total*
*
0
'y 1
) IfcfoiuyWpOOO
I Artillery Rcgin*rrtfH ivrtrt medroio (WW
I AA TiitUilwB
rJWa AAnfevai
IS AATfeiUlta
ATttk-amLfU Gun fUtf mailt b
dliire iniik*
BOc*
t .cco liiil'Ii
eavy Unlet
Alrtornu
cueli
H *nulUpte rocket
. .
1 ftftlt tad ttwJlDM8
ight rmt
PuWk ' e*oh
taclod**odnot atom la thb iaWc. To tULt, DO oliUy AvWoW tft believed to hovo the tank-MMult pin rt$(Inthe ground form fcttudcteiiU (nriiKBi-t
wv^ took,puMto ewrhyj
* Coulcd foroititiorlm or pncaaurtrrmiM of line dlvbtou itrec^Oi,OftiittU, that Chiitaa CorntttuabCo biive ill adnata) toUl of lift Uric division*.
TOTAL number OF COMBAT
CHINESE COMMUNIST NAVY EST!MATHD SHIP AND PERSONNEL STRENGTH
(Figure Own uC4 ladiutg Nuvnl Air, Copixc, or Nnvnl Riwrvu Pcrawiucl)
NORTH SEA Fl-KKT
TOTAL
SOUTH SEA
PLEET
CombiiWnU:
DeMroren (DD)
Dcatrojw EtoorU (DID
)
Patrol;
Patrol Eicon*
Snbmnriiic
Fart Fatrol bou*
Motor Torprdo Bonis (PTI
MoW UhiiboaM
Miitcwvepcvs
Antphlbtoxn:
Taak Landing Skip (LSD
Medium Lnndlax Ship)
Landing SlilpLSIL)
UtURy Landtag Craft
Numbtn in porentaowa ore ndulUonnl iiwlla lu mordantight HUed lor nlwlarlng.
Flvu to rli flUcd na aanainoptca; flrt lofluxd wlUi racfcot Uuuehtr*.
such
OUiiit Lauding Croft
Original document.
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