FOREIGN POLICY AIMS OF STRAUSS, SCHROEDER, AND SOME FDP LEADERS

Created: 11/20/1961

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CENTRAL intelligence agincy

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CLASSIFICATIONDISSEMINATION CONTROLS

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sutm-ci ICY AIMSCHHOECER, AND SONE FDP LEACER5

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y. decisive power could be held in ths hew cabinet by am alliance of

strauss, schroeder, and the fdp "young turks." the latter groupery STROPrn FACTION wttfin the fdp, does hot wjiude mends, but does include all THEpfAFirRY mtmj.ster although this group is prepared to encourage the rivalry between strauss and schroeder Di order TO enhance ITS own importance, it is willing TO offer soke political supportstrauss, short OF supporting him fcr the chancellorship, and the views OF this group are close to the views both of strauss and OF schroeder.

2. "new realism" is the slogan characterizing strauss, schroeder, and the yousg turks. all agree that west germany's position in nato must be further strengthened, with west germany becoming the key european nation in the alliance. this condition is considered the most important oneolicy based ON "enliuhtensd national interests. " TO this end, TEE german connection with TEE west, particularly with the u.hould become closer, oO that the vest WILL be KILLING TO make MORE CONCESSIONS TO west germany.n mind, schroeder and strains are wilisig to minimize berlin's importance, so teat the soviets cannot USE this lever to unhinge nato or to force CONCESSIONS from the west likely to limit west germany's power. efforts SHOULD hot now be made to reduce tensions, since this would detract from west germany's importance in the main battle like, once west germany's military buildup hasaturation point, tensions can safely be

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reduced without limiting west german power.

2. trauss and the young turks acres that west germany should have the riget to make decisions about atomic warheads but disagree oh the way to achieve this right. strauss thdjks that unless. agreeshare atomic weapons and the right to use them with the europeans, the germans and french should cooperate to produce atomic weaponsheir own. sckroeder thinks the three western powers should be played against each other and that the germans should retract their pledge not to produce abc weapons. erman atomic deterrent could impress soviets sore wan. deterrent can since neither the soviets nor the europeans believe the americans would really use their bombs. if facederman atomic capability, tee soviets would be prepared to make major concessions in negotiations with west germany. otherwise, any con cessions the soviets made would be made to the western powers without primary attention to the'

nrasRESTS o? west Germany, since west Germany could rot in any case produce

many atomic weapons, 'ihe weistern powers would have nothing to fear. on the othertrong modern army should be formed that could stop any soviet conventional attack. schpoedfk, strauss and the young turks agree that if the germans could use atomic weapons, the soviets might be more genuinely interested hi an atomic ban.

for tee time be dig schpoeder, strauss and the young turks agree to oppose all proposals fop regional disarmament or any limitations on

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GERMAN LAMENTS. INSTEAD, THE WEST is TO BEUBSTANTIAL GERMAN CaTraTBUTICW FOR DEFENSE,HARE in THE COSTS OF CONTINGENCY MEASURES. in THIS WAY, STRAUSS EXPLAINED TO THE FDP, THE THREE WESTERN POWERS CAN BS PREVENTED FROM LOOKING FOR POLITICAL OR OTHER CONCESSIONS to

CCORDINO TO STRAUSS, MEANS THERE WILL BE 8UNDESWEHR OFFICERS LN HIGHER JOBS IN ACCORDANCE WITH BONN'S DEFENSE CONTRIBUTION, OHMAHDER-IN-CHIEF, CENTRAL EUROPE, WHO, Dl STRAUSS* OPINION, SHOULD SHARE IN DECISIONS ABOUT ATOMIC WEAPONS.

5- SCHROEDER, STRAUSS AND THE YOUNG TURKS CO NOT SUPPORT EUROPEANIN ITS ORIGIN AL SENSE. EUROPE DES PATRLES" IS SUPPORTED BY ALL THREE, INSOFAR AS THIS DOES NOT REDUCE WEST OERMANY'S SOVEREIGNTY. THEIR REASON IS THAT WITH COMPLETE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IT WOULD BE DffOS-SIBLE TO PURSUE "NATIONAL AMBITIONS AND RIGHTFULINCE THEEMBERS WOULD ALWAYS OBJECT. THEY SUPPORT THE INCLUSION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM El EEC VAINLY AS THE BALANCING FACTOR AGAINST THE FRENCH. FURTHERMORE,. WOULD NEVER AGREE TO ANYTHING CURTAILING NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTIES. WEST GERMANY WOULD ALMOST AUTOMATICALLY BECOME FIRST AMONG EQUALS XN EUROPE, ONCE DE GAULLE WAS GONE.

THAUflS AND SCHROEDER AGREE THAT THERE CAN NOT AND SHOULD NOT BE REUNIFICATION BASED ON CONFEDERATION. INSTEAD, EAST GERMANY SHOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO WEST GERMANY. STRAUSS ENVISIONS LIBERATION WHEN EAST

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IS NOREAT ASSET TO THE SOVIETS AND WEST GERMANY LS STRONG ENOUGH NOT TO BE OVERRUN WITHOUT SOME EFFORT. HEEVOLT EN EAST GERMANY COULD BE USEDRETEXT TO HELP ENSLAVED PEOPLE. SCHROBQSR BELIEVES THE SOVIETS WILL EVENTUALLY BE PREPARED TO GIVE UP EAST GERMANY IP THIS WILL SPARE THEM CONTINUOUS CONFRONTATION WITH. DITRONG GERMANY WHICH WOULD BE NO REAL THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION BUT WOULD GUARANTEE THE STATUS QUO IN EASTERN EUROPE WOULD ALSO BETO THE USSR.

7. THE YOUNG TURKS BELIEVE REUNIFICATION SHOULDERMAN REICH, HOT JUST AN ENLARGED WEST GERMANY. THEY AGREE THAT NECESSARY STRENGTH MUST FIRST BE BUILT UP. WHEN THIS IS ACHIEVED, HOWEVER,WITH THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN WITH AN OFFER TO DISSOLVE NATO IN EXCHANGE FOR REUNIFICATION. THEY BELIEVE RELATIONS WITH THE SATELLITES SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED HI ORDER TO OVERCOME THESE COUNTRIES1 OPPOSITION TOND THAT LARGE-SCALE ECONOMIC PROGRAMS SHOULD BE INITIATED IN TH? FORM OF AN EASTERN EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT PLAN.

6. THE WESTERN POWERS CAHNO? BE RELIED ON TO HELPNITED GERMANY IN ANY FORM BECAUSE THE WESTERN POWERS ARE NOTNITED GERMANY WOULD IMPROVE THEIR OWN POSITIONS. PROPOSALSNITED GERMANY WHICH WOULD STRENGTHEN THE WESTERN POSITION ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION.

9- DIFFERENCES EXIST CONCERNING THE TIMETABLE AND STEPS TO BE TAKEN

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IT.IOREUNIFICATION. SCHROEDER TUCKS REUN XPXCATTOVT THE DISTANT FUTURE AND THAT, TN THE MEANTIME, THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE CONVINCED THEY MOULD /ARE BETTER LT THEY LIBERALIZED THE EAST GERMAN RECCMS. CERTAIN ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS COULD BE KALE IN EXCHANGE FOR LIBERALIZATION. COULD EVEN BE GIVEN TOIBERALIZED EAST GERMAN STRAUSS DOUBTS THAT LIBERALIZATION HAS ANY VALUE AND BELIEVES IT WOULD REMOVE THE POSSIBILITIES OF REVOLT IB EAST GERMANY. HE DOES NOT RWLE OUT DE FACTO RECOGNITION, IF THIS WIIJ. CONTRIBUTE TO THE MILITARY BUILDUP

CONTACTS WITH EAST GERMANY BECAUSE THEY FEEL THAT WEST GERMANY CAN MORE EFFECTIVELY UNDERMINE EAST GERMANY THAN VICE VERSA.

10. STRAUSS, SCHROEDER AND THE YOUNG TURKS AGREE THAT WEST GERMANY SHOULD NO LONGER PAY FOR THE RIGHT TO BE ACCEPTED IN WESTERN COUNCILS. FROM NOW CN, THERE WILL BE NO MORE PLEADING BUT RATHER DEMANDS FOR RIGHTS BASED ON OONTRIBUTION AND POTENTIAL. CONCESSIONS AND SACRIFICES WILL ONLY BE MADE OF THEY IMPROVE WEST GERMANY'S POSITION AND STRENGTH. ISSSH: STATE (DCM, POLIT SEC).

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