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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUBJECT: PROBABLE SOVIET AND OTHER REACTIONS TO CERTAIN
US MILITARY MEASURES IN THE BERLIN CRISIS
THE PROBLEM
To estimate how the USSR would Interpret and react to certain eelectivo uses of nuclear weapons by tho USiven stage of the Berlin crisis, as well as the reactione of NATO members, other US allies, and tbe uncommitted countries to the came US actions.
ASSUMPTIONS
It ls assumed for purposes of this estimate that the German Democratic Republic (GBR) has denied access to West Berlin, that the US and its allies hove taken forceful measures to restore access, and that these actions have led to direct but small-ccale and non-nuclear conflict between Soviet and US ground and air forces. In these circumstances, wc examine reactions to certain selective uses
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of nuclear weapons by the US, ranging froa those which are purelythrough those which include some destruction but have little or no military signlfIcacce, to those which do destroy significant Soviet military capabilities but ore still short of all-out strategic attack.
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Headers are cautioned that this estimate deals only with likely reactions to certain possible US courses of action postulatedpecific request submitted to tbe USEB. It does not purport to deal with the whole range of possible US options with regard to the selective use of nuclear weopons in connection with the Berlin crisis, nor does it deal with the likelihood that, given the Soviet assessment of the present balance of strategic capabilities, the USSR would allow the crisis to develop in the manner specified in the assumptions.^/
1/ Tho Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, wishes to state the following:
This estimate responds directly to the specificallysituations. He feels constrained, however, to note that, taken in their totality, the "Caseo" examined teed toense of comprehensiveness unwarranted ln view of the wide range of nuclear actions open to the US in connection with the Berlin
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crisis, actions which would be oore meaningful in terms of the desired effect on the Soviets than at least some of those chosen to be examined in this paper. The over-all impact of an estimate addressing itself to these options would be markedly different If US applications of nuclear power wero made ln militarily more useful though still restricted ways. At any event, the estimate would be decidedly more valuable If lt were permitted toense of the sequence ln which various US actions were undertaken and some sense of the over-all political moves sccccrponying the military actions.
Finally, tbe estimate suffers from being forced to examine tbe effects of US nuclear actions In the postulated circumstancesmall-scale, nonnuclear war between US -and Soviet air and ground farces. In the event the West seeks to maintain access to Berlin by military means tbe option to resist and tbe forces to employ will be open to tbe Soviets. The chosen condition oviet forces opposing US forceshas pre-empted much of the analysis which would otherwise have been made regarding the Initial commitment of Soviet forces. More specifically, the full effect of the Soviet assessment of cooperative nuclearaa It would operate to restrict tbe Initialt cf Soviet forces ne been
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THE ESTIMATE
I. TBE SITUATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
1. Before proceeding to tbe estimate called for Id tbe problem, lt Is useful to examine the situation envisaged by tbe assumptions, ond to consider some of Its implications. The GDR "bas denied access to West Berlin." Both tbe USSR and the CDU, hovever, have up to tbe present time frequently and emphatically declared that they do notto deny access to Berlin, and for many reasons we think it unlikely that the GDB would have done solat proclamation and enforcement of blockade. It is much more probable that tbe GDR would have announced various requirements and conditions of access which tbe US and its allies declared to be unacceptable and therefore considered to be tantamountenial. Whatever these requirements and conditions were, they were, by the terms of our problem, sufficiently drastic to persuade not only the US, but Its allies aa well, that essential interests were being attacked, and that at least small-scale military action to reopen access was necessary.
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2. It also appears that this small-scale military action has not persuaded the Soviets to give indications of willingness to compromisesufficient indications, at any rate, to convince the US and its allies tbat their most essential points would be granted. Possibly tbe Soviets made an initial miscalculation. They may have expected tbat tbe West would give in without undertaking any military measures, and, having discovered their error, found themselves unable to disengage readily-Or they may have decided that some degree of military conflict was acceptable, perhaps even desirable in order to magnify the impact of the reverse they were still determined to inflict upon the West. In any case, the situation envisaged in the problem and its assumptions presents the Soviets es prepared to run further and greater risksore withdrawing.
3- It follows that the US measures discussed in this paper would occurituation ln which the military forces of both the US and the USSR wereigh state of readiness. With each side aware of the other's readiness, the pressures for rapid evaluation and action would be high. This means that decisions to undertake new military moves, including those basedisinterpretation of the opponent's intentions, might be implemented quite rapidly.
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U. Tbe rest of the world, meanwhile, would be exerting the moat strenuous pressures upon both contestants to stop tbe fighting and toeaceful solution. The UN would almost certainly have token cognizance of tbe situation. Various opportunities for communication and mediation would be availableIndeed would be vigorously urged upon the cootestarts. Thla means, we think, that, although bothjthe USSR and tbe US would be heavily engaged by this stage, neither would be obliged to ask publicly for terms In humiliating circumstances if lt wished to compromise. If the time came when both sides were prepared toittle, ways would probably be at hand to stop the fighting. If tbo escalation bad not gone too for.
II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS The USSR
5. Having assumed that the Soviets let the Berlin crisis cone to actual fighting, wc cannot exclude tbe possibility that thisoviet decision to nuke no relaxation whatever in their demands and to accept whatever risks thla might involve. We still think lt much more likely, however, that even in these circumstances the Soviets would expect to avoid general war by retreating scoevhat from the positions they had taken with respect to Berlin, and that they would expect the West to do likewise.
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In interpreting any celective use of nuclear weapons by.the US, the Soviets would therefore assess this action primarily as anof how far the US was willing to go in the further enlargement of hostilities. If they had to raise their estimate on this matter, we believe tbat they would wish to halt the process of escalation. At the same time, however, they would be anxious not to leave the impression thot they themselves lacked the will touclear response. .They would not want it to appear that the US, by demonstrating its will to use nuclear weapons, could intimidate the USSR andettlement on its own terms. They would regard such an oirtcome as disastrous to their standingreat power and gravely prejudicial to their future Accordingly, we believe that, in most circumstances, they would reply to US use of nuclear weapons by using them in return in sons ccxrparable manner.
Yet the Soviet interpretation of the US act, and its reaction to it, would in most cases dependery great degree upon the whole context of circumstances. It would be affected by the Soviet assessment of US public opinion, world, opinion, the situation lo tbe UN, theof fighting in East Germany, tbe firmness of the NATO Alliance,
the attitude and intentions of Communist China, and so on. Possible but unpredictable events suchevolt in East Germany would have profound impact. Whether any of tbe postulated US actions would persuade
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tbe Soviets to take stepseopening of negotiations would also depend greatly on just bow far apart the positions of the two sides were when the military action was Joined in East Germany.
6. In any event, tho USSR wouldosture of resolution but at tbe same time seek to appear, throughout the crisis, as tbe championegotiated settlement. It would wish to emerge from the conflict, not onlytrong and unintimidated power, but alsoosition to claim thot it bad "saved the peace by the responsible use of its superior strength." Thus, in addition to proposing terms of its own, it would probably try to appear respoosive to the initiatives put forth by third parties.
9- The foregoing considerations apply primarily to coses in which the US uses nuclear weapons more for demonstrative effect than forpurposes. The latter type of case would raise broader issues, which are considered in.
The HATO Countries
10. Even though the GDR's conditions of Berlin access had been so onerous as to persuade the UK and Franco to Join the US in military action, we believeumber of NATO mombers would have opposed this course. Even among those countries which agreed that the challenge
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lHtary response, none would regard the technical Issues of access as worth general war; their agreement would almost certainly have stemmed from the conviction that broader issues of Europe's political future were Involved. We think that, with NATO agreeing only reluctantly ond incompletely to on initial use of conventional force, tbe general tendency in the alliance thereafter would be to limit the scope- of hostilities at every stage.
11. In these circumstances, and particularly as the USSR laidetross upon its nuclear capabilities against Western Europe, we believe that with the Berlin crisis at tbe stage of actualNATO pressures for on early resort to negotiations would increase. France would probably join in this effort, dropping its present reserve toward negotiations, which is based upon de Gaulle's estimate that tbe Soviets, if confronted with sufficient firmness, will not allow matters to proceed to tbe point of hostilities. Since at the same timo the USSR would beillingness to negotiate, probably on terms which did not appear to require tbe West to abandon its entire Berlin position, moat NATO members would seek to dissuade the US from using nuclear weapons.
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Other US Allies
of the allies of the West lo tbe rest of the worldlittle Interest ln the intricacies of the Berlin crisis
as such, and are concerned primarily that lt should not distract American attention from their own needs and weaken tbe prestige of their protector At the same time, none of then sees anything to be gained from a. war over Berlin in which they might be engulfed, and, as the risk of generalappeared to be increasing, they, too, would, press hard for Some, acutely conscious of Khrushchev's repeated threats and the pressure of public opinion ot home, might seek to deny the US the use of military bases or facilities.
Tbe Sooaligned Countries
the uncOBBltted states the only lmportont aspect ofquestion is whether there will be war err peace. If tbeto initiate the use of force by conventional methods and thennuclear weapons into tbe conflict over Berlin, most ofnations would make frantic efforts to bring aboutand ccnrprocd.se. The leaders of the uncceniltted nationsto organize their diplomatic resources and to rally world,to persuade tbe great powers to draw back from general war. were time, some of then would try to organize general strikes,
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boycotts, massive peace marches, and denial, where possible, of land, water, and air routes to tbe groat powers.
lU. Because tbe US would have been the first user of nuclear weapons, and particularly because many leaders of uncommitted nations believe that the US is more easily Influenced than the Soviet Union,
most of the persuasive efforts of the uacoaaitted world would botoward the US. However, it is likely that from the beginning attempts would be also made to persuade the Soviet leaders to save the world by withholding retaliation and agreeing to negotiate.
III. ASSUMED ALTERKATIVK CASES
CASE A: The US usee nuclear weaponsurely demonstrativetuclear teat in the atmosphere, or it tests missiles with live warheads, announcing that lt is checking out advanced-weapons.
15. Tbe USSR almost certainly would not react by altering its estimate of US willingness to actually employ nuclear weapons. Indeed, it might infer that, comingime when combat was already under way in East Cermony,emonstration indicated that the US was unwilling to use nuclear weapons and was trying to bluff. If they reasoned in this
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fashion, tbe Soviets would not feel themselves underolitical settlement. Tbeir reaction almost certainlygo beyond an equivalent, nochostlle denonstrotlon. They mightthemselvestrong propaganda attack, coupled vlth athat, if the US went on to use these veopoao, tho USSR wouldln
CASE B: The US uses nuclear weapons against an isolated military target outside tbe USSR, and announces that it has Initiated the use of nuclear weapons for defensive purposes.
16. More perhaps than ln any of the other assumed cases, the Soviet interpretation of such an act by the US, and the Soviet reaction to it, would depcod on circumstanceson the time and place of its occurrence, the current course of the military conflict in East Germany, the state of public opinion in the US and in the rest of the world au the Soviets assessed it, and the situation in the UN. The Soviets would surely be impressed by the fact that tbe US was willing to Initiate tbe use of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, depending on circumstances, the Soviets might regard the US act as no more than an attempt to Intimidate, end asack of clear policy end firm determination. Or tbe Soviets might take ltolemn warning, and an indication of intent
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to expand the scale of conflict ouch further, if necessary. The US declaration that it had initiated the use of nuclear weapons forpurposes probably would not help the Soviets ouch in choosing between thene interpretations.
17. It seeas to us unJIkely that tbe Soviets wouldS nuclear attack on one of thoir aircraft, ships, or otherthe USSR without sone military reply intended to show thatreat power they could not be treated this.way with impunity. Perhaps they would seek out sone similar US target and attack ituclear weapon, or Increase the scale of their conventional military effort in East Germany. Since the US act had small military significance, the Soviets might not think it essential to reply with nuclear weapons. We believe there is some chance that tho Soviets would refrain fromeply, in tbe expectation of deriving advantage froa tbe opprobrium which would almost certainly descend upon the US on account of its initiation of nuclear warfare. Again, however, almost everything would depend upon the accompanying circumstances. We think it possible, but by no means probable, that the US act would bring the Soviets to the point ofnegotiations on terms giving some promise of success.
CASE C: The USingle nuclear attack on an isolated installation ln the USSR, such as tbe
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Novaya Zemlyo nuclear test site,.conducted with no public announcement but accompaniedaximum atate of alert in SAC
The immediate Soviet reaction would depend heavily upon the state of the USSR's assessment of US military intentions. There-is some chance that this action would appear to the Soviets aseneral nuclear attack. Their own military forces would beigh state of readiness at this time; and If they did reach this conclusion, we believe that they would immediately decide to launch an all-out attack against Europe and the US.
If the USSR for any reason did not respond immediately,it would soon discover that tbe US attack was an isolated action. In this event, we believe that Soviet sensitivities concerning tbeof their territory are so intense that they would feelto retaliate. Even if the US attack remained unknown to the world at large, the Soviet leaders would be determined that the main enemy should not consider that be could get away unpunished in such an act. Thereumber of possible forms of Soviet retaliation, but on the whole we think the most likely would be the useuclear weapon against US or NATO territory. Inarget for this purpose, the Soviets would probably select an isolated installation ratheropulated location.
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Soviets would almost certainly conclude that the USto run much greater risks of general war than theyestimated. Even so, we do not believe that they wouldequivalent response. But, along with replying in kind, theywish at this point to stop the further development of tbeby assuring tbat negotiations were resumed. We cannot say,they would agree to terms which were also acceptable to theindeed whether any negotiating moves short of abandonment ofwould halt the conflict at this stage*
IV. OSSIBLE TURNING POINT
cases yet to be considered involve tbe useubstantial scale andanner intended to have anmilitary effect. Theyhange in the character ofand, what may be even more important, in the attitudes ofcontestants toward it. uclear exchange had got underimportance of tbe modalities of access to Berlin would rapidlywould be seen as tbe occasion rather than the cause ofsurvival would become the central issue. The point ofcannot be precisely established in advance, but it canas tbe stage at which those involved come to regard the
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struggle as tbe ultimate showdown between East and West. When this stage had been reached. It would become exceedingly difficult, ondimpossible, to stop the fighting by agreeing to negotiate about the arrangements for access to Berlin.
22. As this stage was opproocbed, the members of NATO would focus increasingly upon tbe risks of general war, and would evaluate USor actions almost exclusively from the standpoint of the probable Soviet response. As their assessment of tbe chances of general war rose, wo believe that they would, virtually without exception, becomeinsistent in urging moderation upon the US and in arguing ogainst any further nuclear initiatives. At the same time, however, NATO governments would realize that, even if they publicly dissociated themselves from the US course of action, they would not necessarily thereby guarantee themselves Immunity from Soviet attack; on the otber hand they would fear that, if tbe crisis were sxreounted without general war, they would hove gravely endangered the alliance and the foundations of their defense against Soviet inroads. Thus theso countries wouldextreme internal strains.
23* The Soviets too would probably come at about the same timeimilar feeling that tbe conflict was taking on tbe characterinal test. They would increasingly suspect that tbe US was by this
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time detereined toetback bo decisive as to prejudice gravely their whole future and. if they resisted, to go even furtherull effort to deetroy their state and their Byatom.
2k, If the Soviets sensed that events were rapidly approaching this stage, and sensed it before an lneacapablo challenge to theirbad bee coo aanlfeat, they would probably take what they thought were tbe steps necessary to novo the issue from tho battlefield to thetable. In doing this, they would probably expect to reap political gains of the first magnitude in the aftermath, od tho calculation tbat Western Europe, having recoiled from the brink of nuclear destruction, would have the greatest difficulty in bringing ltaelf to the point of firm resistance against future Soviet demands. But tensions would be at an extreme pitch, and tbe Soviets might miscalculate tbe minimum moderation necessary to end tbe fighting, or tboy might believe that they had come to this realization too late, that the die was cast, and that their best remaining choice was to initiate general war.
25. We do not know the point at whichhange in the character of the struggle would be apparent; to some extent it wouldupon Immediate and unpredictable circumstances. In the range of actions posited in this estimate, it might come with Case C, which, even though it has little military significance,irect nuclear attack
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upon Soviet territory. Tbe chances that Case D, sizable nuclear attacks in East Germany, would constituteoint of transformation aregreater. We believe tbat Casearge-scale attack upon the greater part of the strategic striking forces in the USSR, would carry tbe situation well beyond this point.
CASE D: The US uses nuclear weapons ln East Germanyilitarily significant scale after tho failure or impending failure of conventional efforts. Formall number of low-yield weapons would be used against Soviet ground forces engaged with allied forces, or theajor military airfields ln East Cermany would be subjected to nuclear attack. At the same time, SAC wouldosture of maximum alert and readiness
26. We believe that, at this stage, tbe Soviets would count lt as highly probable that the US was determined not to accept defeat in the local conflict. They would probably recognize that, if they responded locally with nuclear weapons, the US probably would increase its local use of the same weapons, and perhaps would react by launching aattock upon the USSR. But while they would see the risks of escalation as high, they would also feel it to be well-nigh intolerable
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to allow the fighting to end at this point. Alongove for negotiations, they would probablyuclear counterblow at tbe Allied forces, or they might choose toeavy nuclear blow at West Germany in order to underline their maaslve capabilities against Western Europe, hoping that the resulting panic on the continent would forestall another US counterblow. However, tho USSR might at this point conclude that general war was inevitable and would thereforeeneral attack. The chance of this outcome is perhaps somewhat greater in the case of the postulated airfield attack than in the more restricted case of the use of nuclear weapons against ground troops.
27. With respect to tbe European allies, wc doubt that any of them would approve the US action in advance or to agree to cooperate in carrying it out.
CASE E: After NATO has tried and failed to reopen air and ground access, the US seeks to destroy tbe USSR's entire missile and aircraft capability against Western Europe with nuclear strikes against all airfields in the Satellites containing nuclear-capable Soviet aircraft and all MRBM/IRBM bases and BADGER bases in Western USSR. ull alert of all other US forces is in effect. The US announces that
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it has made the attack, has avoided cities and minimized casualties, harbors no aggressiveon the USSR, but will strike again if reprisals ore attempted.
the Soviet point of view, the action posited here>rnuclear strikesdd targets in the USSR, wouldinitiation of general nuclear war by the US. In theseappears to us virtually certain that, as soon as tbe Sovietcould establish and report the scale of the attack beingthe US, the Soviet leaders wouldeneral counterattackmissile, ground, air, and naval forces. Even if the positedof intentions was available to them prior to this decision,
it would, in our view, be without effect.
do not believe that any US ally would approve thisaction unless it was already convinced that general war hod If they were so convinced, however, most of theIncluding the UK, France, and West Germany, would
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30. In concluding, we think it Important to 6tress that, should substantial hostilities occur over access, this would representajor Soviet miscalculationajor change in Soviet intentions as we have hitherto conceived them. 'Wboreas we presently believe that the Soviets regard the Berlin crisis as within their control, theof fighting would signify either their failure to manage events in the way they had anticipated or their willingness to accept more substantial risks than we bad thought. To the uncertainties flowing froa this turn of events would be added the uncertaintiesotally unprecedented situation in which the two nuclear superpowers werein direct military combat.
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