OA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM AS SANITIZED HS*Hse*r
1
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER
THE SOVIET STRATEGIC MILITARY
SubaUltd byIRECTOR OFNTELLIGENCE TAe loUmoIng Intelligence organizations participated In the prcpiratlon of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence organization* of the Departments of State, Defense, the Amy. the Naey, the Air Force, The Joint Stag, ABC. and NSA.
g the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD on Concurringthe Director ofand Research, Department ol State; The Director. Detente InteUtgenee Agency; the Assistant chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Amy; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operationsepartment of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. VSAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Atomic energy Commuwon flcprc-to the USIB. The Assistant Director. Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside Ol hit (urtWfcllon.
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of InteiUgence and Research, for the Department of State
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of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
for Intelligence, Joint Stall, for The Joint Staff
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THE SOVIET STRATEGIC MILITARY
APPRCVEO FOR RELEASE
PROBLEM
PROGRAM
To reassess the broad outlines of the USSR's military doctrine and posture in the light of recent information on Soviet strategic thinking, present military capabilities,n major weapon systems, and to estimate future trends in Soviet military strategy and force structure,'
THE ESTIMATE
TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT
Basic Pfinclples
oviet thinking about military policy has proceededeneral outlook which stresses that historical forces are movingin the direction of communism. This movement Is carried forward by the struggle of "theed by theparties, to overthrow the existing social-economic order, rather than by the direct use of the military power of the Communist Bloc. These beliefs lead the Soviets to view their
estimates of Uie present and future strengths and capabilities ol the Soviet and Bloc armed forces can be found inf NIRl. -Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities andatedn NIKt. "Strength and Deploymentoviet Lone Range Ballistic Missileated II Sep Umberand In NIB ll-Wl. "Soviet Atomic Energy
It should be noted that the present estimate does not touch on Chinese Communist militaryor possible actions. These might come to affect Soviet military policies and programs during the period under consideration.
armed forceseans to dcler Western military action against the Sino-Soviet Bloc, to inhibit the West from intervening militarily in other areas, to maintain security within the Bloc, to lend weight to their political demands and to demonstrate the success and growing power of their cause. At the same time, they wish to have the forces toarshould one occur. However, theiroutlook, their military programs of recent years, and intelligence on their currentall suggest that the Soviet leaders do not regard general war as desirableest-em attack on them as probable.
Strategies and Forces
ithin this general framework, the specific concepts which underlie Soviet decisions about force goals and strategic planning are difficult to discern. These principles can only beand Incompletely at that, from overt Soviet statements, which are carefully framed with an eye to both security and propaganda; from such classified Soviet information as can be obtained; from the choices reflected In the actual military programs undertaken by the
USSR, and from the strategic situation which objectively confronts them
lt Is worth noting that, while the Soviets have made Impiessive advances tn modern weaponumber ol factors have hampered the process ot Integrating theseinto their strategic doctrine. One of these factors Is the Influenceong military tradition, strongly reinforced by theirIn World War II. stressing massiveprotracted campaigns, and thesignificance of ground combat and the occupation of enemy territory. Another is security barriers within the militarywhich appear to be far more stringent than in the US. Perhaps the most serious fetter, however, has been the rigid politico-military concepts which Stalin dogmatically imposed upon military thought. It was not until the, for example, that Soviet doctrine began lo relax the principle that strategic surprise and the force of the Initial blow are relatively unimportant toar between major powers, astaim took In cedar to divert attention from the USSR's nearly catastrophic unpre-paredneas at the outset o( World War II.
The pace of military thought, however, has quickened sharply in the last two or three years, primarily at the initiative ofAt about the lime when he set inodernization of the Soviet force structure.ubstantial reduction in personnel, the regime began deliberately to encourago controversial discussion amongofficers In an effort lo spark original and creative thought. Asesult,ively and argumentative field of professional study in the USSR today.
Such high-level discourse as we know about does not revolve around the questions orattack strategies and target systems which arc al the center of US militaryInstead, the chief argument ranges "conservative" against "modem" views.to the first view assert that, despite the advent of new weapons, general war is likely to be protracted, ground combatass scale will continue to be of majorand victory will require theaction of force* of all types,ulUmillMm man army. Adherents to tne second view charge that their opponents are making only minimal and inadequateof earlier doctrine to accommodate new weapons. This group argueseneral war is likely to be short, with victory decided primarily In the Initial nuclear exchange. Current official doctrine, as it appears inby tha Minister of Defense, appears to be an amalgam of both these views.
he high-level discussions of which we are aware aro remarkably deficient Inanalysis of such concepts as first and second strike capability or counterforceThe problems of attacking hardened and mobUe strategic forces go completely unmen-Uoned In such Information as we have ontargeting for long range attack. While most recommended target lists includeretaliatory forces and control centers, they generally give equal Importance to strikes against urban centers and their enemy's broad warmaklng potential.
7 We think It certain that the strategic thought which underlies operational planning in the long range striking forces themselves is more sophisticated than thla. But we have not acquired detailed Soviet discussions offor lhe operations ol long range missile and bomber lorces. Planning in these forces has certainly been obliged to consider such factors as warning and reaction times and the specific characteristics of dlflerent weaponand enemy larBels
Jindicates that at least some of these faclors"have been taken intobut not In ways that suggest veryconcepts for dealing with the problems involved.
n the whole, the Information we have suggests that Soviet military thoughtis still preoccupied with the problems of integrating nuclear and missile weapons into general doctrine and is only beginning to cope with the detailed comparative analysis ofstrategies and force levels. Nor is this preoccupaUon completely surprising.
-TOP-SRCRKT-
since the achievement o( an ICBM capability, even in the early stages of its deployment,lo therofound change in their strategic situation. Forecade, they confronted an opponent whoormidable strategic capability but against whom their own long-range strikingwere relatively limited. Now, lor the first time, theyeapon system capable of delivering nuclear attacks against the US with little warningeans against which there is no present defense.
USSR probably has not elaborateddoctrine covering theof limited and local war betweenand Western forces. Public Sovietregularly insist that such warsand inevitably expand Intowar. These statements areto deter the West fromconflict on the Bloc periphery orpenetrations of Bloc territory;not necessarily to be taken asSoviet military policy. Confidentialnot reveal what detailed contingencySoviets have forase. Wethat the USSR would wish toinvolvement in limited combat onperiphery and. If such conflictwould wish to minimise the chancesto general nuclear war.it would not In mostthe Initiative to expand the scope ofconflict. Although the degree of Sovietand the actual circumstances ofwould determine their decision, wethat in general the Soviet leadersthe scope of the conflict, evenrisk of escalating to generalrospective defeat would, in theira grave political reverse withinitselfajor setback to theposition.
doctrine apparently does notconflict with Western forces incontentionistance from Blocinvolving local anti-Western orforces are treated under the rubricliberation wars." Such forceson ideological grounds, with thestrength to overcome "imperialist"at military intervention. The Soviet support rather vaguely proffered is intended to beeneral deterrent character, but does not envisage overt Soviet military involvement. Despite the Soviet tendency in recent years to adopt an aggressive political stance Inall over the world, the Soviets have not developed the naval forces and other special components which would give them afor military operations at great distances from the Bloc.
CURRENT STRATEGIC POSTURE
The strategic nuclear force the USSR has developed In recent years could permit the launching of large-scale initial attacks on short noticearge number oftargetsore limited number of North American targets. However, theleaders cannot at present have anythat their own nation and system could escape destruction from retaliatory Western attacks even If the USSR struck first. The Soviet leaders evidently believe their current strategic forcestrong deterrent against Western initiation of general war and are sufficient toore assertivepolicy, particularly by virtue of the threat they pose to allies of the US In Europe and Asia. But there is no implication in Sovietthat they consider themselves in adeliberately to attack the West, or to undertake local moves which carried witherious risk of bringing on general war. These views do not exclude Soviet use of avaU-ablc strategic attack forces to launch ablow should they conclude that the West was irrevocably committed to anattack.
There have been considerableIn the Soviet air defense establishment, primarily through the widespread deployment of surface-to-air missiles at major cities and other key Installations. Soviet defenses are now reasonably adequate against medium and high-altitude attack by subsonic Western bombers. We believe that the system as a
whole, however, is tar less adequate U> cope with sophisticated penetration tactics, lowpenetrations or supersonic cruise-type missiles It has no present capability against ballistic missiles. Most important, because of the susceptibility of their defenses toand degradation, the Soviet leadencertainly cannot be confident of thee lo which they could cope with the diverse types and scales of attack the West couldagainst the Bloc.
n addition to forces designed for long-range attack and for defense against suchthe USSR continues to maintain large theater field forces. The Soviets regard these forces as part of the deterrent to general war. and their military doctrine considers such forces as essential to the conduct of general war should It occur. The Soviet theater forces now In being could institute large-scale attacks In peripheral areas, but the success of sueh operationseneral war would depend heavily on the outcome of the Initial nuclear exchange. The Soviet leaders also regard these forceseterrent to any limitedagainst Bloc territory or on Its periphery, serving at the same time as an essential means of maintaining Communist regimes In the Satellites.
ased on the current Soviet naval posture and available writings on doctrine, we believe that the mission of the Soviet Navy Ls to carryariety of tasksrotracted general war. Including the support of theater forces inar. The USSR has developed some capability to deliver nuclear attacks against land targets. Including some In the US. by means of short-range submarine-launched missiles. However, the bulk of the Sovietforces, predominantly torpedo attack types, would engage in Interdiction operationsong war in which the US attempted to maintain extensive logistic support to overseas areas. The Soviet Navy would also conduct defense against hostile naval forces possessing long-range attack capabilities, which theevidently regardajor strategic threat. Its capabilities against US missile submarines in the open seas remain severely limited.
Military Research ond Development
The Soviets are engaged In intensivein weapons research and development to acquire new systems which, by theirpolitical, and military Impact, would shift the world relation of forces to theirIn making their decisions. Soviet planners will have to consider such problems as rapid technological change, long lead times, developments in opposing forces, andcosts of weapon systems. Despite the rapid growth In Soviet economic resources, there will continue to be compeUtlon among military requirements as well as with theof important nan military programs. Over tho last two years, for example.has apparently linked his militaryfor reducing the site of Soviet forcesurther argument that additional funds could in this way be made available for raising living standards. Nevertheless, the USSR is allocating funds generously to. concentrating major efforts on Improving the forces for long range attack and for defense against such attack by the West.
Much of the military RAD about which we have recent evidence Is designed to fillgaps in the Soviet strategic posture. In the held of long range delivery systems, an intensive program of test firing has beento develop second generation ICBM systems, which we believe Include missiles of reduced dimensions and lighter weight, more easily deployed than the massive first genera-lion Soviet ICBM. Some of the recent ICBM testing may represent development of systems for delivering warheads with yields on the orderT.allistic missileupersonic "dash" medium bomber have been developed, and there Is some evidence of RAD efforts In follow-on heavy bombers.
The principal current Soviet RAD program for strategic air defense, and perhaps theSoviet military developmental program,arge-scale effort to achieve defenses against
ballistic missiles. It has been clear to us for moreear that the Soviets erevery substantial resources to this cfTort. Inarshal Mallnovsky stated that the USSR had "solved the problem" otallistic missile in flight From intelligence sources, we believe that theare making good progress In development work for an antimissile system. This effort has resulted in the acquisition of important data. Including data on high altitude nuclear effects, and has also involved the testing of at least some system components. Othern the air defense Held over the recent past has Included improved radars for early warning and fighterurface-to air missile system for use against low altitude penelralors, and new fighter interceptor
lfl Soviet research and development activities also reflect efforts at qualitative Improvement In the theater field forces and naval forces. The emphasis has been on mobility andfor theater forces, and short and medium-range missiles are now available (or their support. Soviet field forces, at least in East Germany, have been allocated surface-to-air missiles (or defense against medium and high altitude air attack. Within the next two or three years they will probably also have available missiles for defense against towaircraft as well as against ballistic missiles of short ranges. With the advent of USsubmarines, the Soviet Navy has recently placed increased emphasis on new weapons and techniques to extend ASW capabilities to the open seas. We bellove. however, that over tho next five years, the USSR will haveimited capability to detect. Identify, localize and maintain surveillance on submarinesin the open seas.
Recent Nuclear Tests
he preliminary information nowindicates thatt! nuclear test series has given the Soviets increased confidence in current weapon systems, advanced their weapon design significantly, added greatly to their understanding of thermonuclear wcajwn technology, and contributed vital weaponknowledge Soviet thermonucleartechnology In particular appears to be sophisticated and advanced.1 test series will permit the Soviets to fabricate and stockpile, during the next year or so, new weapons of higher yields in the weight classes presently available.
Ol thehots detected In1oppear to have been proof tests ofweapon systems, many ol them with yields In the megaton range. We believe the Soviets have proof-tested weapon systems of lhe following types: short or medium range ground-launched ballistic missiles with yields up toT and short-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles with yields ofT. In addition, they have proof-lasted bombs with yields up toT and have probably delivered more than one such bombingle bomber mission. The warheads tested in these various weapon systems are believed to be in stockpile. Those few proof-tested warheads thus far analyaed appear to3 technology.
Weapon effects tests were apparentlyunderground, underwater, near the surface of the water, and at various altitudes up. Those at very highwill contribute valuable effectsneeded for Soviet development of anli-ballistlc missile defenses, but were probably not complete systems tests.
The majority of1 shots weretests aimed at improving future Soviet nuclear weapons capabilities. Some of the fission weapons tested revealed extensive Soviet efforts to increase efficiency, and toweapon sire and weight. Two very large yield tests In this series are particularlyin that theyigh degree o( sophistication In weapon design.
j Preliminary estimates give
p-
c
actual weight0Tcould be delivered by the first generation Soviet ICBMange of.
egaton deviceT weapon tested atUsed as tested, the device couldoviet strategy designed tofallout from very high-yieldof this size and weightpounds) could be deliveredsuch as the BEAR, or could beoffshore. It the actual weightpounds,arhead could beby tho first generation Sovieta range ol. We believemore powerful vehicle than the firstICBM would probably be requiredarhead against most targetsUS.
few handmade versions of theseweapons could be available nowthe near future, but seriesear or more. However.arc to be employed as firstwarheads, we would expect testswith modified dummy noseconesoperational deployment.
ests of other thermonuclear weapons, which apparently comprised the Bulk of the shots in the recent series, indicate aand highly successful Soviet effort to improve efficiencies, Improve- yield-to-wcight ratios, and reduce fissionable materialThese testsoncentration on weapons with yields betweenT (corresponding to weights betweenhich are suitable for delivery by all Soviet bombers andmissiles. The preliminary analysisthat^
progress inweapons design has been achieved.
PROBABLE MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET FORCES TO THE
ajor Soviet concern will continue to focus on the strategic weapons balance. In thisritical question ls whether or not the Soviet leaders will consider it feasible andto: (a)apability to destroy the US nuclear delivery forces prior toby meansirst strike; (b) seek no moreapability to deliver nuclearon population and Industrial centers; or (c) seek nuclear attack forcesype and slae which will be somewhere between these two concepts.
We believe the Soviets already view the first of these concept* as no longer practicable. This Is partly because of the thousands ofmissiles and launchers that would beto destroy all the fixed bases of the US nuclear force programed, especially the hardened US ICBM sites. Equally Important. US warning capabilities, fast reaction times, and mobile forces such as airborne bombers and missile submarinestend to offset Soviet capabilities tofixed bases. These Utter factors would compound the uncertainties inherent In any Soviet strategy for destroying US nuclear forces prior to launch, regardless of the size of Soviet long-range striking forces.
Asapability to attack cities alone, there Is evidence from recent statements and writings that some Soviet military mendestruction of population and industry, not merely as something to be threatened for purposes ol deterrence and Intimidation, but alsoajor determinant in the outcomeeneral war. In view of the weight of nuclear attack the US can launch and the impossibility ofully effectivehowever, we believe that the Soviet leaders have decidedapability to destroy only urban and industrial centers,owerful deterrent, would beshould general war occur.
Consequently, we believe that the Soviets willarger strike capability. This will
be one large enough to bring under attack the SAC bomber bases and other soft and semihaidcned US military installations against which their ICBMs are an efficient weapon system. Further, in determining lorce goals, they may also wish to provide themselves with an ICBM lorce large enough to permit them to attack some hardened US targets, and toore substantialstriking capabilityS attack. Although the Soviets would probably nota capability on this order as adequate tor deliberate initiation of general war. it would put themosition to strikeat an Important segment oi the US nuclear delivery forces should theyecision that such action was required.
these considerations intobelieve that the USSR will have anor several hundred operationalthe. Thepresently In operation andwhile protected byground observation, some dispersal,missiles, are unhardenedto overhead observation. InSoviet concern for US reconnaissancecapabilities, we believe that themove to increase the survivability offorce. In thes. the bulkforce will probably be protected byand possibly by semihardening,of the later launchers will probablyhardened. More than one missilebe available for most launchers.
addition,e forecastUSSR willix of longsystems. This will Include aforce which will probably remainsmall but Increase in quality, andforce of missilebomber strength will probablya few hundred by thes. but aportion of these will betypes, perhaps equipped fordelivery and for armedabout the next year, ballisticother than ICBMs will be characterized by shirts to improved, longer range systems rather than by sheer numerical expansion.
In addition to strengthening defenses against manned bombers and cruise-typewe believeajor Soviet objective or thes will be to achieve defenses against long-range ballistic missiles before the US hasomparable capability. In Soviet eyes, this would enable them to claim an important advantage over the US. For political as well as military reasons, theprobably would wish to deploydefense in atew critical areas even if the available system providedimited, interim capability. Considering these factors and the present status Of the Soviet research and development program, we estimate that In thehe Soviets will begin at least limited deployment of an antimissile system. Soviet cities will probably havefor deployment of any AICBM defenses availablec believe that throughout Ihis period, the Soviets are likely to havearginal capability forerencc with US satellites.
We believe that the Soviet leaders willto retain large theater and naval forces. The extent to which these forces are reduced in the next few years will depend in part on the prevailing international situation, but we now believe it may rest equaUy on the course of the internal Soviet discussion regarding the nature and durationarge-scale war fought with nuclear weapons. In general, we believe that economic and political factors,with the further growth of nuclear capabilities, will at some point persuade the Soviet leaders to revert to the militaryreductions begun0 but suspendedround divisions and tactical air forces will probably be reduced and older ships retired or mothballed, but the USSR willsizable forces calculated to be sufficient for all types of warfare, nuclear andlimited and general. Moreover, the Soviets will not abandon the reservist and
system designed to augmentorces rapidly should the need arise.
he recent nuclear test series does not in itself provide clear guidelines as to possible changes in force structure or strategic con-cepts. We believe that long-range striking forces have been given priority in theof available nuclear materials, and that limitations in the Soviet stockpile haverestricted the nuclear capabilities of other forces. The broad range of proof tests, weapon effects tests, and developmental tests in1 series suggests an effort tothe nuclear capabilities of all arms of the Soviet military establishment. Wc had anticipated that in any event the limitations on allocation of nuclear weapons to airtheater, and naval forces would have eased by thend this trend may be hastened by the recent tests. These forces will thenreater variety of nuclear weapons at their disposal.
t now appears that the trend in nuclear weapon yields of long-range missile and bomber systems wUl be upwards. The use Of higher yield weapons would tend to reduce Soviet numerical requirements for delivery vehicles to accomplish given objectives,for attacking military targets the accuracy and reliability of the Soviet weapon systems are generally more critical thanyield. Warheads In theT class, which could probably be made available In quantityear or so, would enhance the capabilities of the first generation Soviet ICBM against hardened targets. It isto believe that some Of the new ICBMs now under intensive testing are designed to carry warheads of very high yield.we continue to believe it unlikely that the Soviets would try to acquire the very large number of ICBM launchers needed forattack on all the hardened ICBM sites planned by the US. For the present, the very high yield devices are probably intended to support deterrence and psychological warfare, although we have no doubt that military uses are also intended.
POLICY AND STRATEGIES TO THEs
From the developments likely to occur In Soviet forces, and from implications found In current discussions of military doctrine, we conclude that, over the next five years or so. the Soviets arc unlikely toilitary strategy and posture aimed at the deliberate Initiation of general war. They arc likely to continue to believe that their policy goals cannot be achieved by this means.their first priority, since they evidently do intend to pursue forward policies Involving some level of risk, will be loredible deterrent against Initiation of war by the West. They will recognise that deterrence may fall, and if completely convinced in some situation of high risk that the West was about loeneral nuclear attack, wouldto pre-empt. Their strategy for the conduct of general war will probably call for delivering large-scale nuclear blows against Western striking forces and national centers of power, protecting the Soviet homeland against nuclear attack to the extent feasible, and subsequenUy committing their remaining forces to exlended campaigns probably aimed initially at the occupation of Western Europe.
The Soviets willormidableposture primarily to preventar, but they will also want itupport to vigorous policy initiatives short of war. These latter will include in particular theof revolutionary activity directed atCommunist or pro-Soviet groups to power In any part of the world where the opportunity exists or can be created. It Is this sort of struggle below the level of directengagement with the major Western Powers which will almost certainly continue to be the Soviets' principal reliance In seeking the expansion of their power.
It Is conceivable, however, that by thes the Soviets will come to regard the deterrence which they can exert upon the West as strong enough to permit them,excessive risk, to use their own forces ln local military actions. They will certainly continue to have field forcescale to "permit this In areas peripheral to Soviet Bloc
B
and these will be forces of increased mobility and flexibility. They are alsoof acquiring the naval strength, airand special forces lo conduct localaction in more remote areas. On the whole, however, we believe that the Soviets are unlikely to adoptourse as aof general policy, in part because of the risks involved but also because In their view there is likely to be increasing opportunity to advance their cause by nonmllitary means.
he use of Soviet forces in local military actions outside the Bloc, If attempted, would be unlikely to take the form of naked military aggression. Instead, any use of Soviet forces outside the Bloc would take the form oflo revolutionary actions by localor pro-Soviet forces,retext could be made that Soviet intervention was intended to forestall intervention by theWe believe there is somethattrategy will emerge by thes and will be applied to vulnerable areas bordering on the Soviet Bloc. We think it more likely, however, that the Soviets will continue to rely on local political revolutionary forces, operating without overt Soviet military support but under the protection of andeterrent power, toore gradual expansion of the area of Soviet control.
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Original document.
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