-
SOVIET STRATEGIC MILITARY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE WA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM
THE PROBLEM
To reassess the broad outlines of the USSR's military doctrine and posture in the light of recent information on Soviet strategic thinking, present military capabilities,n major weapon systems, and to estimate future trends in Soviet military strategy and force structure.'
THE ESTIMATE
TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT
Bosic Principles
I, Soviet thinking about military policy has proceededeneral outlook which stresses that historical forces are movingin the direction of communism. This movement is carried forward by the struggle of "theed by theparties, to overthrow the existing social-economic order, rather than by the direct use of the military power of the Communist Bloc. These beliefs lead the Soviets to view thelr
De tailed estimates or the present and future strengths and capablliUes of the Soviet and Bloc armed forces can be found Inf NIEMain Trends In Soviet Capabilities and Policies.atedn NIEI. "Strength and Deployment ol Soviet Ixtng Range Ballistic Missilend In NIBl. "Soviet Atomic Energy
It should be noted that the present estimate does not touch on Chinese Communist militaryor possible acUoni. These might come to affect Soviet military policies and programs during the period under consideration.
armed forceseans to deter Western military action against the Sino-Soviet Bloc, to inhibit the West from intervening militarily in other areas, to maintain security within the Bloc, to lend weight to their political demands and to demonstrate the success and growing power of their cause. At the same time, they wish to have the forces toar effec-Uvely should one occur. However, theiroutlook, their military programs of recent years, and Intelligence on their currentall suggest that the Soviet leaders do not regard general war as desirable or aattack on them as probable.
Slrolegies ond Forces
ithin this general framework, the specific concepts which underlie Soviet decisions about force goals and strategic planning are difficult to discern. These principles can only beand incompletely at that, from overt Soviet statements, which are carefully framed with an eye lo both security and propaganda; from such classified Soviet information as can be obtained; from the choices reflected In the actual military programs undertaken by the
COCRU
and (torn the strategic situation which objectively confronts them.
It is worth noting that, while the Soviets have made impressive advances In modem weaponumber of factors have hampered the process of integrating theseinto their strategic doctrine. One of these factors Is the Influenceong military tradition, strongly reinforced by theirin World War II, stressing massiveprotracted campaigns, and thesignificance of ground combat and the occupation of enemy territory. Another is security barriers within the militarywhich appear to be far more stringent than in the US. Perhaps the most serious fetter, however, has been the rigid politico-military concepts which Stalin dogmatically Imposed upon military thought. It was not until the, for example, that Soviet doctrine began to relax the principle that strategic surprise and the force of the Initial blow are relatively unimportant toar between major powers, aStalin took In order to divert attention from the USSR's nearly catastrophic unpre-paredness at the outset of World War IL
The pace of military thought, however, has quickened sharply in the last two or three years, primarily at the initiative ofAl about the time when he set Inodernization of the Soviet force structure,ubstantial reduction In personnel, the regime began deliberately lo encourage controversial discussion amongofficers in an effort to spark original and creative thought.esult,ively and argumentative field of professional study In the USSR today.
Such high-level discourse as we know about docs not revolve around the questions ofattack strategics and target systems which are at the center of US militaryInstead, the chief argument ranges "conservative" against "modern" views.to the first view assert that, despite the advent of new weapons, general war Is likely to be protracted, ground combatass scale will continue to be of majorand victory will require theaction of forces of all types,ulUmilikm man army. Adherents to the second view charge that their opponents are making only minimal and inadequateof earlier doctrine to accommodate new weapons. This group argueseneral war is likely to be short, with victory decided primarily In the Initial nuclear exchange. Current official doctrine, as it appears Inby the Minister of Defense, appears to be an amalgam of both these views.
The high-level discussions or which we are aware are remarkably deficient Inanalysis of such concepts as first and second strike capability or counterfeitsThe problems of attacking hardened and mobile strategic forces go completely unmen-tloned In such information as we have ontargeting for long range attack. While most recommended target lists includeretaliatory forces and control centers, they generally give equal Importance to strikes against urban centers and their enemy's broad warmaking potential.
Wethinkertain that the strategic thought which underlies operational planning In the long range striking forces themselves is more sophisticated than this. 8ut we have not acquired detailed Soviet discussions offor the operations of long range missile and bomber forces. Planning in these forces has certainly been obliged to consider such factors as warning and reaction times and the specific characteristics of different weaponand enemy
Vindicates that at least some of these factorsnave been token Intobut not In ways that suggest veryconcepts for dealing with the problems involved.
the whole, the information wethat Soviet military thoughtis still preoccupied with the problemsnuclear and missile weaponsdoctrine and ls only beginning tothe detailed comparative analysis ofstrategies and force levels. Norpreoccupation completely surprising.
SCUBT
the achievement of an ICUM capability, even In the early stages of its deployment, tep-tcscnts to therofound change In their strategic situation. Forecade, they confronted an opponent whoormidable strategic capability but against whom their own long-range strikingwere relatively limited. Now. for the first time, theyeapon system capable of delivering nuclear attacks against the US with little warningeans against which there is no present defense.
The USSR probably has not elaborated any comprehensive doctrine covering the conttn-gencies of limited and local war betweenand Western forces. Public Sovietregularly insist that such wars would quickly and inevitably expand Into general nuclear war. These statements are clearly Intended to deter Uie West from embarking upon conflict on the Bloc periphery orpenetrations of Bloc territory; they are not necessarily lo be taken as expressions of Soviet military policy. Confidential sources do not reveal what detailed contingency plans the Soviets have forase. We believe, however, that the USSR would wish to avoid dlrecl involvement in limited combat on the Bloc periphery and. If such conflict should occur, would wish to minimize the chances of escalation to general nuclearould not in most circumstances take the initiative to expand the scope ofonflict. Although the degree of Sovietand the actual circumstances of the conflict would determine their decision, wcthat in general the Soviet leaders would expand the scope of the conflict, even at greater risk of escalating to general war, onlyrospective defeat would. In their view,rave political reverse within the Bloc itselfajor setback to the Soviet world position.
oviet doctrine apparently does notconflict with Western forces in areas of contentionistance from Bloc territory. Conflicts Involving local anti-Western orforces are treated under the rubric of "national liberation wars." Such forces are credited, on Ideological grounds, with thestrength to overcome "Imperialist"at military intervention. The Soviet support rather vaguely proffered is Intended to beeneral deterrent character, but docs not envisage overt Soviet military involvement. Despite the Soviet tendency In recent years to adopt an aggressive political stance Inall over the world, the Soviets have not developed the naval forces and other special components which would give them afor military operations at great distances from the Bloc
CURRENT STRATEGIC POSTURE
The strategic nuclear force the USSR has developed in recent years could permit the launching of large-scale Initial attacks on short noticearge number oftargetsore limited number of North American targets. However, theleaders cannot at present have anythat their own nation and system could escape destruction from retaliatory Western attacks even If the USSR struck first. The Soviet leaders evidently believe their current strategic forcestrong deterrent against Western Initiation of general war and arc sufficient toore assertivepolicy, particularly by virtue of the threat they pose to allies of the US Innd Asia. But there Is no Implication in Sovietthat they consider themselves in adeliberately to attack the West, or to undertake local moves which carried witherious risk of bringing on general war. These views do not exclude Soviet use ofstrategic attack forces to launch ablow should they conclude that the West was irrevocably committed to anattack.
There have been considerableIn the Soviet air defense establishment, primarily through the widespread deployment of surface-to-air missiles at major cities and other key Installations. Soviet defenses are now reasonably adequate against medium and high-altitude attack by subsonic Western bombers. We believe that the system as a
TOP fiECRBT
OH-JJT-
however. Is far less adequate to cope with sophisticated penetration tactics, lowpenetrations or supersonic cruise-type missiles. It has no present capability against ballistic missiles. Most Important, because of the susceptibility of their defenses loand degradation, the Soviet leaderscertainly cannot be confident of theto which they could cope with the diverse types and scales of attack the West couldagainst the Bloc.
In addition to forces designed for long-range attack and for defense against suchthe USSR continues to maintain large theater field forces. The Soviets regard these forces as part of the deterrent to general war. and their military doctrine considers such forces as essential to the conduct of general war should it occur. The Soviet theater forces now In being could Institute large-scale attacks in peripheral areas, but the success of such operationseneral war would depend heavily on the outcome of the Initial nuclear exchange. The Soviet leaders also regard these forceseterrent to any limitedagainst Bloc territory or on its periphery, serving at the same lime as an essential means of maintaining Communist regimes in the Satellites.
Based on the current Soviet naval posture and available writings on doctrine, we believe that the mission of the Soviot Navy Is to carryariety of tasksrotracted general war. Including the support of theater forces inar. The USSR has developed some capability to deliver nuclear attacks against land targets, including some in the US. by means of short-range submarine-launched missiles. However, the bulk of the Sovietforces, predominantly torpedo attack types, mould engage In lnterdicUon operationsong war in which the US attempted to maintain extensive logistic support to overseas areas. The Soviet Navy would also conduct defense against hostile naval forces possessing long-range attack capabilities, which theevidently regardajor strategic threat. Its capabilities against US missile submarines In the open seas remain
Military Reiearch and Development
The Soviets are engaged In intensivein weapons research and development to acquire new systems which, by theirpolitical, and military Impact, would shift the world relation of forces to theirIn making their decisions, Soviet planners will have to consider such problems as rapid technological change, long lead times, developments in opposing forces, andcosts of weapon systems. Despite the rapid growth in Soviet economic resources, there will continue to be competition among military requirements as well as with theof important nonmilitary programs. Over the last two years, for example,has apparently linked his militaryfor reducing the sixcoviet forcesurther argument that additional funds could in this way be made available for raising living standards. Nevertheless, the USSR is allocating funds generously lo military RAD. concentrating major efforts on Improving the forces for long range attack and for defense against such attack by the West.
Much of Uie military RAD about which we have recent evidence is designed to fillgaps in the Soviet strategic posture. In the field of long range delivery systems, an intensive program of test firing has beento develop second generation ICBM systems, which we believe include missiles of reduced dimensions and lighter weight, more easily deployed than the massive firstSoviet ICBM. Some of the recent ICBM testing may represent development of systems for delivering warheads with yields on the orderXjn. ballistic missileupersonic "dash" medium bomber have been developed, and there is some evidence of RAD efforts in follow-on heavy bombers.
The principal current Soviet RAD program for strategic air defense, and perhaps theSoviet military developmental program,arge-scale effort lo achieve defenses against
TQP-frftOR-BT
ballistic missiles. It has been clear to us for moreear that the Soviets arevery substantial resources lo this effort. Inarshal Malinovsky stated Ihat the USSR had "solved the problem" ofallistic missile In flight. From Intelligence sources, wc believe that thearc making good progress In development work for an antimissile system. This effort has resulted in the acquisition of important data, including data on high altitude nuclear effects, and has also involved the testing of at least some system components. Othern the air defense field over the recent past has included Improved radars for early warning and fighterurface-to-air missile system for use against low-altllude penetrators. and new fighter interceptor
research and developmentreflect efforts at qualitativethe theater field forces and navalemphasis has been on mobility andfor theater forces, and shortmissiles are now availablesupport. Soviet field forces, atEast Germany, have been allocatedmissiles for defense against mediumaltitude air attack. Within the nextthree years they will probably alsomissiles for defense against lowaircraft as well as against ballisticshort ranges. With the advent of USsubmarines, the Soviet Navy hasincreased emphasis on newtechniques to extend ASW capabilitiesopen seas. We believe, however, thatnext five years, the USSR will have onlycapability to detect. Identify,maintain surveillance on submarinesIn the open seas.
Recent Nuclear Tests
preliminary information nowIndicates that1 nuclear testgiven the Soviets increased confidenceweapon systems, advanceddesign significantly, added greatlyunderstanding of thermonuclear weapon technology, and contributed vital weaponknowledge. Soviet thermonucleartechnology in particular appears to be sophisticated and advanced.1 test series will permit the Soviets to fabricate and stockpile, during the next year or so, new weapons of higher yields in the weight classes presently available.
Of thehots detected in1oppear to have been proof tests ofweapon systems, many of them with yields In the megaton range. We believe the Soviets have proof-tested weapon systems of the following types: short or medium range ground-launched ballistic missiles with yields up toT and short-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles with yields ofT. In addition, they have proof-tested bombs with yields up toT and have probably delivered more than one such bombingle bomber mission. The warheads tested in these various weapon systems are believed to be in stockpile. Those few proof-tested warheads thus far analyzed appear to8 technology.
Weapon effects tests were apparentlyunderground, underwater, near the surface of the water, and at various altitudes upun. Those at very highwill contribute valuable effectsneeded for Soviet development of anti-balllstlc missile defenses, but were probably not complete systems tests.
The majority of1 shoU weretests aimed at Improving future Soviet nuclear weapons capabilities. Some of the fission weapons tested revealed extensive Soviet efforts to increase efficiency, and toweapon size and weight. Two very large yield tests ln this scries are particularlyin that theyigh degree of sophistication in weapon design.
j Preliminary estimates give
O P
c
.f the
actual weight0Tcould be delivered by the first generation Soviet ICBMange of.
egaton deviceT weapon tested atUsed as tested, the device couldoviet strategy designed tofallout from very high-yieldof thla sire and weightpounds) could be deliveredsuch as the BEAR, or could beoffshore. If the actual weightpounds,arhead could beby the first generation Sovieta range of. We believemore powerful vehicle than the firstICBM would probably be requitedarhead against most targetsUS.
few handmade versions of theseweapons could be available nowthe near future, but seriesear or more. However,are to be employed as firstwarheads, we would expect testswith modified dummy noseconcsoperational deployment.
ests of other thermonuclear weapons, which apparently comprised the bulk of the shots in the recent series, indicate aand highly successful Soviet effort to Improve efficiencies, improve- yleld-lo-wcight ratios, and reduce fissionable materialThese testsoncentration on weapons with yields betweenT (corresponding to weights betweenhich are suitable for delivery by all Soviet bombers andmissiles. The preliminary
ignificant progress inweapons design has been achieved.
PROBABLE MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET FORCES TO THE* 2i. Major Soviet concern will continue to focus on the strategic weapons balance. In thisritical question Is whether or not the Soviet leaders will consider It feasible andto: (a)apability to destroy the US nuclear delivery forces prior toby meansirst strike; (b) seek no moreapability to deliver nuclearon population and industrial centers; or (c) seek nuclear attack forcesype and size which will be somewhere between these two concepts.
We believe the Soviets already view the first of these concepts as no longer practicable. This is partly because of the thousands ofmissiles and launchers that would beto destroy all the fixed bases of the US nuclear force programed, especially the hardened US ICBM sites. Equally important. US warning capabilities, fast reaction times, and mobile forces such as airborne bombers and missile submarinestend to offset Soviet capabilities tofixed bases. These latter factors would compound the uncertainties Inherent In any Soviet strategy for destroying US nuclear forces prior to launch, regardless of the nlxe of Soviet long-range striking forces.
Asapability to attack cities alone, there is evidence from recent statements and writings that some Soviet military mendestruction of population and. industry, not merely as something to be threatened for purposes of deterrence and intimidation, but alsoajor determinant In the outcomeeneral war. In view of the weight of nuclear attack the US can launch and the impossibility ofully effectivehowever, we believe that the Soviet leaders have decidedapability to destroy only urban and industrial centers,owerful deterrent, would beshould general war occur.
Consequently, we believe that the Soviets willarger strike capability. This will
probably be one large enough lo bring under attack the SAC bomber bases and other soft and semihardened US military Installations against which their ICBMs arc an efficient weapon system. Further, In determining force goals, they may also wish to provide themselves with an ICBM force large enough lo permit them to attack some hardened US targets, and toore substantialstriking capabilityS attack. Although the Soviets would probably nota capability on this order as adequate for deliberate initiation of general war. It would put themosition lo strikeat an Important segment of the US nuclear delivery forces should theyecision that such action was required.
aking these considerations Into account, wc believe that the USSR will have an ICBM force of several hundred operational launchers ln the. The deployment complexes presently in operation and under construction, while protected by concealment from ground observation, some dispersal, and surface-to-air missiles, are unhardened and vulnerable to overhead observation. In view of Soviet concern for US reconnaissance and attack capabilities, we believe that the Soviets will move to Increase the survivability of their ICBM force. In thes. the bulk of the force will probably be protected by greater dispersal and possibly by semlhardenlng. and some of the later launchers will probably be fully hardened. More than one missile will probably be available for most launchers.
n addition,e forecast that the USSR willix of long range weapon systems. This willeavy bomber force which will probably remainsmall but Increase in quality, and an expanding force of missile submarines. Medium bomber strength will probably dropew hundred by the, but aportion of these will be supersonic "dash" types, perhaps equipped for standoff missile delivery and for armed reconnaissance. After about the next year, ballistic missile forces other than ICBMs will be characterized by shifts lo Improved, longer range systems rather than by sheer numerical expansion.
In addition to strengthening defenses against manned bombers and cruise-typewe believeajor Soviet objective of thes will be to achieve defenses against long-range ballistic missiles before the US hasomparable capability. In Soviet eyes, this would enable them to claim an Important advantage over Ihe US. For political as well as military reasons, theprobably would wish to deploydefense In atew critical areas even If the available system providedimited. Interim capability. Considering these factors and the present status of the Soviet research and development program, we estimate that In thehe Soviets will begin at least limited deployment of an antimissile system. Soviet cities will probably havefor deployment of any AICIIM defenses availablee believe that throughout this period, the Soviets are likely to havearginal capability forwith US satellites.
We believe that the Soviet leaders willto retain large theater and naval forces. The extent lo which these forces are reduced In Uie next few years will depend In part on Uie prevailing international situation, but we now believe It may rest equally on the course of Uie internal Soviet discussion regarding the nature and durationarge-scale war fought with nuclear weapons. In general, we believe that economic and political factors,with Uie further growth of nuclear capabilities, will at some point persuade the Soviet leaders to revert to the militaryreductions begun0 but suspendedround divisions and tactical air forces will probably be reduced and older ships retired or moth balled, but Uie USSR willsizable forces calculated to be sufficient for all types of warfare, nuclear andlimited and general. Moreover, Uie Soviets will not abandon Uie reservist and
TOP OliOElUT
system designed to augment their forces rapidly should the need arise.
The recent nuclear test series does not In itself provide clear guidelines as to possible changes in force structure or strategicWe believe that long-range striking forces have been given priority In theof available nuclear materials, and that limitations In tho Soviet stockpile haverestricted the nuclear capabilities of other forces. The broad range of proof tests, weapon effects tests, and developmental tests In1 series suggests an effort tothe nuclear capabilities of all arms of the Soviet military establishment. We had anticipated that in any event the limitations on allocation of nuclear weapons to airtheater, and naval forces would have eased by thes and this trend may be hastened by the recent tests. These forces will thenreater variety of nuclear weapons at their disposal.
It now appears that the trend in nuclear weapon yields of long-range missile and bomber systems will be upwards. The use of higher yield weapons would tend to reduce Soviet numerical requirements for delivery vehicles to accomplish given objectives,for attacking military targets the accuracy and reliability of the Soviet weapon systems are generally more critical thanyield. Warheads in theT class, which could probably be made available in quantityear or so. would enhance the capabilities of the first generation Soviet ICBM against hardened targets. It islo believe that some of the new ICBMs now under intensive testing are designed to carry warheads of very high yield.we continue to believe It unlikely that the Soviets would try to acquire the very large number of ICBM launchers needed forattack on aU the hardened ICBM sites planned by the US. For the present, the very high yield devices are probably intended to support deterrence and psychological warfare, although we have no doubt that military uses are also Intended.
POUCY AND STRATEGICS TO THE MID-lWi
Prom the developments likely to occur In Soviet forces, and from Implications found In current discussions of military doctrine, we conclude that, over the next five years or so, the Soviets are unlikely toilitary strategy and posture aimed at the deliberate initiation of general war. They are likely to continue to believe that their policy goals cannot be achieved by this means.their first priority, since they evidently do intend to pursue forward policies involving some level of risk, will be toredible deterrent against initiation of war by the West They will recognize that deterrence may fail, and if completely convinced In some situation of high risk that the West was about toeneral nuclear attack, wouldto pre-empt. Their strategy for the conduct of genera] war will probably call for delivering large-scale nuclear blows against Western striking forces and national centers of power, protecting the Soviet homeland against nuclear attack to the extent feasible, and subsequently committing then- remaining forces to extended campaigns probably aimed Initially at the occupation of Western Europe.
The Soviets willormidableposture primarily to preventar, but they will also want Itupport to vigorous policy initiatives short of war. These latter will Include in particular theof revolutionary activity directed atCommunist or pro-Soviet groups to power in any part of the world where the opportunity exists or can be created. It Is this sort of struggle below the level of directengagement with the major Western Powers which will almost certainly continue to be the Soviets' principal reliance in seeking the expansion of their power.
It Is conceivable, however, that by thes the Soviets will come to regard the deterrence which they can exert upon the West as strong enough to permit them,excessive risk, to use their own forces in local military actions. They will certainly continue to have field forcescale to permit this in areas peripheral to Soviet Bloc
TOP CBCrtB^-
and these will be forces of Increased mobility and flexibility. They are alsoof acquiring the naval strength, airand special forces to conduct localaction In more remote areas. On the whole, however, we believe that the Soviets are unlikely to adoptourse as aof general policy, In part because of the risks Involved but also because In their view there is likely to be increasing opportunity to advance their cause by nonrnilitary means.
he uso of Soviet forces In local military actions outside the Bloc, if attempted, would be unlikely to take the form of naked military aggression. Instead, any use of Soviet forces outside the Bloc would take the form ofto revolutionary actions by localor pro-Soviet forces,retext could be made that Soviet Intervention was Intended to forestall intervention by theWe believe there is somethaitrategy will emerge by thes and will be applied to vulnerable areas bordering on the Soviet Bloc. We think it more likely, however, that the Soviets will continue to rely on local political revolutionary forces, operating without overt Soviet military support but under the protection of andeterrent power, toore gradual expansion of the area of Soviet control.
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: