USSR
THOUGHT CSEHp^"ff "Someoncerning Moderny Major-General V, Petrenko
OF INFO: December1
OF CONTENT
A reliable sourco (B) .
Followingerbatim translation of an article entitled "Some Questions Concerning Moderny Major-General V. Petrenko. This article appeared in)1pecial version of the Soviet Journal Military Thought which is classified SECRET by the Soviets and is published irregularly.
) was sent to press
Headquarters Comment: Military Thought is publishedUSSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTEDboon Issued monthly since while the other are Issued irregularly. The TOP SECRETinitiated in By tho ondf them during
8 FieldHerniations cited oo pagedlsseninatAHThey were superseded in
as indicated on page 8.
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Some Questions Concerning Modern Defense
by
Major-General V. Petrenko
From the moment that nuclear weapons appeared, military-theoretical thought has been persistently searching for the answer to the question: what is the role of defense inarmed combat? During this search three fundamentally different approaches to the solution of the problem ofhave been revealed.
The advocates of one of them deny the existenceorm of combat operationsuclear/misslie war. Others allow tbe possibility of using defense only at the tactical level, denying that it is an operational category, but they assert that even at the tactical level defense maylace only during friendly offensive operations. The advocates of the third approach (they are clearly the majority) recognize defense as one of the most important and natural types of combatn any scale, but differ in their views on the methods of its structure and conduct.
We too think that defenseuclear/missile warecessary type of combat operation.. It is used where, because of various reasons, an offensive is not possible or advisable. As before, defense is organized and conducted by limited forces and means against numerically superior enemy forces. However, the goal, organization and methods of conducting defenseodern war aredifferent from what they were in past wars.
The basic factors that determine the trends to develop defenseype of combat operation, are: the use of qualitatively new means of armed combat,nuclear/ missile weapons; the maneuvering fiature of armed combat,
conducting combat operations along axesontinuous front; the increased power and tbe determining role of fire in combat operations; the increased capabilities of ground troops, the basis of which are the missile troops and tanks, and the wldescale use of airborne landings; the changed methods of organizing and conducting an offensive by our probable enemies.
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An analysis of these factors shows that progressive trends in development are inherent in defenseuclear/ missile war,
One of the important trends in the development ofis the steady increase in tbe determination of th*
tune
maneuver
e mt great distances while still permitting tbe quick and reliable destruction of the nuclear means and the strike groupings of the enemy; modern reconnaissance means areof detecting means of nuclear attack and enemy troop groupingsonsiderable depth, which permit the defenders to destroy them even before they approach the field of battle and engagement; the complete motorization of troops hastheir mobility and maneuverability on the field of battle and engagement. All this permits modern defense to be assigned theo disrupt the enemy offensive which is being prepared or which has already started"
Today, not only the troops directly opposite the enemy participate in the destruction of his offensive groupings, but also those troops located tens and hundreds of kilometers from tbe field of battle and engagement; and with their missile weapons and aviation, these troops can come to the assistance of the troops under attackhort period of time. Therefore, the disruption of the enemy offensive must be declared the main goal of defending troop operations* The losses they inflict on the attacker must be such that the correlation of strength changes in favor of the defense, because only in this way is it possible to create conditions that are advantageous for passing from defensive to offensive
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operations. The requirement to disrupt the offensivethe role and might of modern fire, the capability of nuclear weapons to destroy quickly, almost Instant an-eously, subunits, units and, ln massed employment, entire groupings, and in this way change the correlation of forces, not by increasing tbe number and massing of friendly troops, but by quickly decreasing the forces of the opposing enemy. The goal of disrupting the enemy offensivelear requirement to the troops directly engaged in carrying out defensiveo create advantageous conditions for passing to the offensive for themselves, and not only for the troops that will come up from the depth or that are located nearby.
At tbe present time, everyone admits the need todefease at any level ln an extremely short tlse, but as yet there Is no single opinion concerning the question of the distinctionreparedastily assumed defense. Uany still continue toastily assomed defense with the indicators :that.had been set up in8 Field Servlco Regulations, where it stated that this defense is distinguished by incomplete roadiness/ resulting in decreased stability, inadequately developed and weakly organized system of fire, hastily organized coordination, and unstable control. Under conditions of tbe extreme dynamics of armed combat, the rapidity of combat operations and abrupt changes la the situation, when the enemy is organizing an offensive from tben the process of moving up troops to thehis definition of defense as being createdhort time is not only wrong, but is even harmful. Weand must not,oor defense, in which the system of fire and coordination is orgaolzod hastily, ln Just any way, in which control is unstable, etc. Even though the defense is createdhort time, it must be stable and vigorous, based on planned and organized fire of all types of weapons, on close coordination of all forces and weapons, and on firm control.
The only characteristic thato-called prepared defense from one organizedhort period is
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the degree of its engineer preparation and its saturation with various types of obstacles. All the remainingmust be the same, both for the defense prepared ln advance andefense createdhort time. We have all the capabilities foroth the reconnaissance means and means of destruction. When quickly going over to the defense during combat operations, it is nece&sary-to know tbe situation in the rone of friendly troops as well as ln the zones of adjacent troops; therefore, the process of working out and making decisions for defense will, first of all, basically consist of entering the necessary changes and additions Into the decisions made previously for theor battle. From tbe sum total of problems ln the estimate of the situation, tbe commanding officer will have to select those which will be the main and decisive onespecific given situation; and ho and his staff should concentrate their attention specifically on them. The high mobility of troops, the great range of modern combat means, the highly efficient engineer excavating equipment, and the effective means for setting up mines and otherall this helps in the organizationtable defensehort time.
An important trend ln the development of modorn defense is the evor-increasing need for troops to resolve theirtasks by aggressive maneuvering operations! aad not Ey the passive repulsion of eneny trinfchis trend made its appearance in the second half of Worldnd increased significantly ln World War II. But in the past, positional forms of defense prevailed; and while maneuver by forces, weapons and fire was considered important, it neverthelessubordinate role. This was explained mainly by the Inadequate mobility of troops and by the weak
destructive power and insignificant range of the means of fire.
Under modern conditions, the trend toward increasing the role and significance of maneuver ln defense hasto such an extent that positional defense has lost its definite place and, in essence, haseans of
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uclear/missile war
maneuver will undoubtedly prevail on the field of battle and engagement. But this does not mean that positional defense has completely lost its significance. In order to Inflict destruction on an enemy advancing In dispersed formations along separate axes and at high speeds, it is still necessary, in defending separate important areas of terrain, to combine positional stability closely with the broadest maneuver by fire strikes and by troops on the threatened axes.
ule, the defender is weaker than the attacker Id forces and in means. But heumber of advantages in his favor, which, evenuclear war,ertain extent compensate for the lack of forces and means andhim to carry out successful combat operationsumerically superior enemy. The very presence of known advantages of defense oyer an offensive Justifiesorm of combat operation. . If the mainof an offensive Is initiative in operations and the right to select the time and direction of the strike, then the main advantage of defense is the right to select the place and position for the battle and the area for the engagement. In defense, it is possible to make more effective use of the protective characteristics of the terrain; to utilize camouflage more successfully to con-coal the true objectives and to reveal the false ones, thereby causing the attacker to waste his ammunition by delivering fire strikes against empty places and secondary objectives; to study the terrain better, which facilitates maneuver by forces and means and permits the preparation of firing data; and to increase the accuracy of fire. Terrain is always on the side of the defense, and itsuse may,ignificant degree, compensate for the lack of forces and means.
However, despite all the importance of utilizing tbe advantages of positional forms of combat, the retention of the terrain must still be subordinate to maneuver. This is explained by the fact that modern means of destruction, especially nuclear weapons, arc so powerful and destructive
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or zoom, even the most rein-
^aVlly sa^"tcd with troops and combat can withstand them. Since this is the case, theot be able to hold important areas of the ^leSS inflict destruction on the attacking
l?Ward aarole in vigorous offen-?oby troopsing defensive missions
st.binthe for"uu that says tbat pSSSSi
/ Ddstrike force are essential todefense. In practice, this is reflected in thethe troops .to the second
Mctcd^iXdtresCrVeSSS,gn then vigorous missions con-with the maneuver.
n .the role of aggressiveness in defense is de-
easons' of whlcb theis thenuclear/missile weapons and the increased role of firehole.
OB,bat* high degree of combat n tLtbe-eans and close-fir0nd SWlft ^Plc^ntation of the results of lire Dy bold troop attacks following the fire strikp* a
orCm^ar,ntrlke' Si SUddeDof chemical wHponJlth conventional ammunition, followed im-
1 mall force of infantryleIeeven of a 7' Therefore, the most effective methodmodern defense mustowerfultroopimmediately concluded by
reDdhe development of modern THit *t rSlSw iDcreaslng the depth of its formation. SZL * fplles to tne depth of combat and operational troop formations, to the depth of defensive areas and and to the depth of vigorous action against the
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enemy with the destructive moans of the defense.
Since the appearance of the Field Service Regulationshe depth of combat and operational troopin defense has approximately doubled in size. The depthombat formationegiment Increasedkmm;ivision,kmkm; andombined-arms army,kmkm. Tbe depth of vigorous action against the enemy by defending ground troops using tbeir own means haskm and more for an armym or moreivision. Thethat permitted an increase in the depth of the defense were the sharp increase ln the range and destructive power of fire means and the equally sharp increase ln the maneuvering capabilities of the ground troops.
maneuver to utilize troops located in the depth of the de-
Under modern conditions, the goal of increasing the depth of the defense Is different from what it was in the past. It does not consist of bringing up fresh forces from the depth into battle In order to strengthen the combat formations of the troops of the first echelon, therebythe efforts in the threatened axes in order to
the nuclear strikes. Considering the destructive force of modern combat means and the nature of an offensive, it is unquestionably necessary toignificant part of the forces and means ln the depth of the defense, which are also capable of fulfilling such missions as: the closing of dangerous breaches made by nuclear weapons in theformations of troops of the first echelon; theof troops that have temporarily lost theireffectiveness, destruction of enemy airborne landings; the defense of important areas and objectives in the depth, *tc. But, we repeat, the main mission of the second echelon
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especially at the level of the army and front, must be tho completion of the rout of tbe enemy grouping immediatelyowerful nuclear strike.
In connection with this, tbe fundamental change In the role and nature of the missions 'fulfilled by the basicthe combat and operational troop forazationby echelons and combined-arms reservesmay be considered toully defined trend in the development of modern combat. The first echelon of the operational and combat formation will not always play the decisive role lnan enemy offensive. Furthermore, there areto assert that the leading role in the resolution of this mission will most frequently belong to tbe nuclear/ missile weapons and troops located ln the depth, and the troops of the first echelon will only provide advantageous conditions for delivering nuclear strikes and for carrying out broad maneuver by the combined-arms reservos for the purpose of completing the rout of the enemy. All this -Inevitably leadstriving to decroase the composition of the first echelons and toarge and the most mobile part of the forces and means to the second echelons.
The missions of these elements of troop formation are also undergoing serious changes. During World War XI,echelons were assigned two typical missions' to carry out counterstrikes and counterattacks; and to holddefinite zones and positions in the depth On the probable axes of the main enemy strike. In accordance with this, the troops of tho second echelons were assigned specific combat missions before tho start of active defensive ule, specific missions were aot defined for the combined-arms reserve before the start of the enemy offensive; It was usually oriented as to the possible nature of the operations during the defensive battle and engagement.
A characteristic featureodern defensive operation is the steady Increase in the depth of the simultaneousof vigorous defensive operations*on the axes of enemy strikes, and also the need io resolve various missions
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[WON6ARKJ
not successively, one after the other, but simultaneously. The experience of many postwar exercises shows that active defensive operations quickly spread to an enormous depth. An example is tbe war game conducted by the Commander-in* Chief of the Ground Troops ln February of this year, in which the active defensive operations of the front troopsepthkm; in this case thewas conducted simultaneously by troops of the first echelononsiderable portion of the second echelon of tbe front. It was characteristic that, before tho army which made up the second echelon of the front was committed into battle for the purpose ofounterstrike, it was practically expended in carrying out missions which had not been anticipated: two of itswere thrown into combat with the operational "enemy" landing; and two other divisions had to enter into combat with tank large units that broke through into the depth.
The highly maneuvering nature of combat operations; and the abrupt changes in the situation that are inherent in them,ew way of utilizing second echelons and reservesefensive operation and in combat.
In modern conditions troops located beyond the first echelon areultitude of various missions: to defend important areas in tbe depth; toaneuver in threatened axes with tbe goal of stopping or destroying the enemy grouping that broke through; to deliver counter-strikes and carry out counterattacks; to close dangerous breaches in the defense of the first echelon or to replace tho first echelon troops that temporarily lost theireffectivenessesult of enemy nuclear strikes; and to aunihilate enemy airborne landings.
It is completely unrealistic to presuppose that these missions will be fulfilled successively, one after the other, or that it will bo possible to determine beforehand, before the start of active defensive operations,mwhich part of the forces and means of the second ecbelon should be brought ln to fulfil this or that mission. It is more probable that tho
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?QNBAft<|
majority of the indicated missions will have to be fulfilled simultaneously and that specific combat missions for tbe troops located lo the depth will have to be defined during the engagement as it develops.
Whenecision for defense by the large units and units vblcb make up tbe second echelon, tbe aboverequire that not only the main mission bebut also tbe secondary missions which they must boto carry out during defensive operations. ln the use of second echelon troopsis an essential condition in tbe planningodern defensive operation and battle, la order toigh degree of readiness of second echelon troops for the fulfillment of any of the missions that arise during defensive operations, they must be able to maneuver freely; and to do this they must be located at the greatest possible distance from the lines of contact with the enemy. Taking Into consideration' that the widtharge unit defensive front may reachm. or more, and that that of an army mayloaf It is advisable to locate their second echelons correspondinglyistance ofm andm. from the main line of defense.
Regardless of their intended use, the troops allocated ln the depth (second echelons and reserves) should beln those areas of the terrain where, according to the concept of the battle and operation, they are expected to hold the ground tenaciously. Each disposition area of units and large units that are part of the second echelon composition must also simultaneously be their defensive area.
There has longeed to examiae the questions of
dividing troops into echelons and combined-arms reserves
and to define their role and place ln an operational and
combat formation, as well as their most typical missions.
Sometimes It is difficult to explain why in some cases a
large unit that is allocated to tho depth,efense Is
called the second echcloQ, and in,another case the reserve,
because in both cases their missions are usually formulated identically.
Probably it will be correct to establish that the combined-arms reserves are always allocated onlyront formation (frontovoye obyedinenlye), In an army and division they are allocated onlyingle echelon formation, which is explained by three main reasons: troops of the second echelon and combined-arms reserves of an army and division now fulfil similar missions;imited number of combined-arms large units is allocated for an army defensive operation; it is necessary toowerful second echelon ln an army and division. Onlyront is it actually possible to have reserve large units intended for the strengthening of the army or for fulfilling missions that arise suddenly.
Reserve large unitsront may be formed from large units arriving from the zone of the interior, as well as from large units taken from the composition of armies for replacement. Naturally, both groups of large units will not have combat missions before being turned over to the armies or before being used for some purpose by the front.
At the present time, the trends in the development of modern defense which deal with the forms of its structure have also become clearly defined.
Before the mass use of nuclear/missile weapons and other modern means of destruction, the troops, when going over to the defense, strlved toontinuous front, not only.at the level of subunits and units but also of large units and operational formations. The front of the battle was almost always concentrated in one direction. For the purpose ofingle solid defense and better coordination between the large units, zones of definite sizes were formed for thorn. These zones and positions were formed accordingingle plan of the senior commander, who Indicated their location and outline on the terrain. efense had the form of continuous defensive zones, dividederies of continuous defensivewhich, in turn, were composederies of continuous fortifications and trenches. This 'form of defense corresponded
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to the conditions for conducting combat operations in the past war, where it fully justified itself.
uture war the nature of combat operations will become completely different. Soviet military art is based on the fact that maneuvering forms of combatuture war, that there probably will not be any continuous fronts, and that combat operations will develop along axes. Deep breakthroughs by troop groupings of both sides will eliminate the linear front of combat operations, aod the mass use of nuclear weapons will predetermine the appearance of large gaps and breaks between large units and formations.
In these conditions, tbe divisions of tbe first echelon of tbe army, when going over to tbe defense, will not be located on one line, and the combat front for each division will be able toifferent axis. Eachwill have to build Its defenseifferent manner. This means that the single continuous army defensive zone has already broken down Into separate defensive areas and centers and has lost its former orderliness. Now the army defense will be characterized not by the orderly contour of solid defensive zones and positions, but by separate defensive areas, centers and positions unevenly dispersed along the front and over the entire depth of the army defense.
Thus, the evolution of the structural forms of defense leads to an intermittent-center', (preryuchato-ochagovyy) system, based on the creation of defensive areas of different sizes and configurations that intersect the most important axes.with considerable gaps between defensive areas. This does not eliminate the possibility that, should the front be stabilizedomparatively long time, separate defensive areas may bo gradually combined, with the result thatsectors of tho front mayingle (divisional
or army) continuous defensive zone. But naturally this takes time.
Modern defense must bo basedight joining of
maneuvering and positional forms, with maneuver, as we have already indicated, prevailing over stability. Tbe main feature of defense is vigorousness. Positional forms of defense must serve only as an important means for onsurlng the preparation and implementation offire strikesecisive troop maneuver designed to rout the strike groupings of the advancing enemy.
The basic structural form for modern defense at all levels oust be considered to be dispersed areas whichpositions for combat and which ensure all-aroundconvenience for combat, and defense from enemy means of mass destruction. However, the intermittent-center system of defense must not be full of holes that permit the enemy to maneuver freely between the defensive areas. not continuous In its form, modern defense must never theless be monolithic. This means that defense is organized by separate areas, but tiedingle system, and that gaps are permitted when organizing defense between subunits, units and large units, but the size of the gaps must not destroy the integrity of the defense. The monolithicof defense and the coordination of troops operating on separate axes within their defensive areas are ensured not by close lateral contact but by the long range of fire means and the maneuvering capabilities of troops.
In general terms, those are the trends in tboof modern defense. Their analysis shows the needundamentally new approach to the solutionhole series of Important questions of organizing and conducting modorn defense. Some of these questions are examined below.
The principle of concentrating the basic efforts inand intensifying the resistance to the advancing enemy aroseesult of defensive counteraction to offensive methods, and is an expression of the art of defending troops and their skill in conducting successful combat operations against numerically superior enemy forces. In the past wax, the highest art in concentrating ,the basfc efforts consisted of the following: with an overall Inequality in the forces
and means of both sides along the entire front, tbe defender achieved equality, or even superiority over the enemy ln per sonnel and combat oquipmentelected position or zone.
In conditions of mass employment of nuclear/missile weapons, tbe main materiel basis for counteracting the attacking enemy cannot be considered to be personnel and conventional combat moans. As is known, tbe basic means for combatting tbe attacking enemy now is nuclear/missile and chemical weapons, supplemented by tbe fire ofmeans. Therefore, the concentration of the basic efforts must not consist of having the defenderertain position or zone ahead of time and concentrating his main forces and means there, or even, during the battle or engagement, ofaneuver of forces and means to these selected positions and zones in order to Increase the number of troops there. Instead, it consists of having the defender foresee and carry out timely, powerful fire strikes with nuclear weapons, in combination with other means of destruction, against tho nuclear means and the main grouping of troops of the advancing enemy; and then,trike by his own forces and without delay,tbe results of the fire strikes with the goal of completing the rout of the advancing enemyefinite axis. This is the very essence of concentrating basic efforts and intensifying resistance ln modern defense.
Instead of selecting some one position ln tbe defenseivision,one in tbe defense of an army, theof which up to now required the concentration of their basic efforts, it is now necessary to select areas of terrain in which it is most advantageous to destroy the advancing enemy grouping with massed fire strikes inwith troop strikes. It is expedient to call these areas fire destruction areas (rayon ognevogo porazhenlya).
It is necessary to select fire destruction areas both in front of the main line of defense within the range limits of the defender's fire means and in the depth of defense of his own troops. Within the limits 'of these areas, strikes
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by nuclear veapons and aviation, fire by othor means of destruction, and troop strikes are planned with the goal of completing the routredetermined enemy grouping.
In order to create advantageous conditions forconcentrated fire strikes and troop strikes, it is essential to select advantageous areas of terrain which are to be held tonaciously. Usually they will be located on the probable axes of "the enemy offensive, both within the limits of the main line of resistance and ln tbe depth. For the defense of these areas the minijaum necessary number of troops is allotted. With tbe use of the organized fire of all means, barriers and other positional advantages, these troops have to delay the advancing enemy, compel him toln an area of terrain that is advantageous to the defender, and ln this way create conditions for delivering an effective fire strike and troop strike against the enemy.
A fundamentally new approach to the methods ofefforts and intensifying resistance id defense must Inevitably produce new content ln the concept ofand ln tbe bases for decisions by the commanding officer for its organization and execution.
In modern conditions tbe basis of the commanding officer* concept for defense must Include the definition of: tbe axes of probable enemy strikes and bis grouping against which it is necessary to concentrate the basic efforts of one's ownhe areas of terrain that it is necessary to hold at any cost; groupings of one's own forces and means and the nature of their maneuver during defensive operations.
Such content of the conceptecision to be made on the organization and execution of defense, taking into consideration: the decisive role of fire, the basis of which consists of nuclear strikes; the conduct of combat on axes, one of which will always be the main one; thefor antinuclear protection, ensured by dispersing and locating forces and meansront'which is not con-tinous; and the need to carry out' the broadest maneuver bv
during the defensive battle.
presence of missile units and subunits in
composition of the army and division, tbe considerable decrease ln number of tube artillery on carriages, the Introduction of antitank guided missiles into the troops and improved antitank grenade launchers, theof transports from means of transport into combat vehicles,hole series of other changes in theof troops, require considerable changes ln the structure of troops for defense.
The saturation of motorized rifle subunits withguided missiles (PTUBS) and improved grenade launchers permit them toirm antitank defense in their own areas with their organic means. Therefore, now there is no such need as before to reinforce tbea with tanks from the tank battalion of the motorized rifle regiment. When usedentralizedank battalionowerful moans of maneuver on threatened axes; It permits the creationeeply echeloned antitank defense. It is evident that there is no longer any need to create such an element as the antitank reserve In theegiment. With modern means of combat, each platoon strong point and tbe defense areaompany,and division can, and must, be based on antitank fire ln combination with antitank barriers of all types. Therefore, there is now no sense ln creating company antitank strongattalion antitank centers, and regimental, divisional and army antitank areas by tbe special allotment of means.
It Is generally recognized that in modern conditions there is no opportunity, or even any need, to create artillery groups in an army and division. In our view, this should not be done even egiment, if tbe commanding officer of the regiment has less than two artillery battalions at his disposal.
At the same tine we consider, that It* Is absolutely essentialegimentobile obstacle detachment
RONBAgKl
and that tho division and army have not less than two such detachments. This Is dictated by the broad front and the increased depth of defensive areas of units and large units, by the presence of large gaps between battalions, regiments and divisions, and by exposed flanks. The enemy offensive along axes and his use of airborne landings demand quick actions by the defending troops ln building up their efforts on the threatened axes, Including the creation of various types of obstacles. In order to create obstacles in short periods of timeattle and operation, it isthat commanding officers of regiments, divisions, and armies have highly mobile and technically equipped obstacle detachments.
The noxt question that requires critical examination is the planning of fire and the organizationystem of fire in defense"
At the present time, troops are armedreat variety of weapons having various combat characteristics. The larger themilitary unit tho greater the amount of various armaments that it has. Even rifle subunlt6 have eeveral types of armament that vary in construction, rapidity of fire, range of fire and In other combat characteristics, as well as ln their intended use. In modern conditions the enemy represents tbe mosttargets: Infantry, armored vehicles^various artillery systems, missile installations, control points,stations, rear area objectives, various air targets, etc. These targets may be single or group, covered orand may be stationary or may move at various speeds.iven time there may be few or many of them on the battlefield, and they will be located at various distances from one another but will operateoordinated manner accordingingle plan.
The quick and effective destruction of all the targets which constitute the enemy by the fire trpm tbe various meansather complex matter and requires great art in theof fire. Modern fire means can only reveal tbelr
qualities fully when tbey are used in an organized and purposeful manner and coordinated according to target, place and time.
The term "system of fire" is used in our military art quite often, but it hasroad connotation that it is impossible to givelear-cut definition. It is not accidental that the Field Service Regulations do not giveefinition. They only state that "the system of fire in defense is built on the coordination of tbe fire of all types of weapons, atomic strikes and strikes by aviation".
As used in military literature and in troop training, the term "system of fire" likewise applies to the grouping of fire means and to the combining of the fire of types of weapons.. It means the organized fire of all the fire means of this or that troop*organism, and, therefore, we speakystem of fire of subunits, units and large units. At the same time, this concept refers to the organized fire of artillery (system of artilleryhe fire ofmeans (system of antitank fire), the fire ofmeans, infantry weapons, etc.
The need has arisen to examine the concept of "system of fire" in defense and to answer the question of whether or not this system can ensure an organized and purposeful employment of various fire meansodern defensive battle or operation.
As is known, the organized employment of fire inmust serve the main goal to disrupt the enemy offensive which is being prepared, or which has begun, and to ensure the transition from the defensive to the offensive. In order to achieve this goal in modern defense, the following basic missions are assigned to fire: the destruction of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction as theyare disclosed; the destruction or neutralization of enemy strike groupings in'concentration areas, on lines of deployment, when 'moving out to the main
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line of defense, and in departure areas for the offensive; the destruction of the enemy, who has passed over to the offensive, on the main line of resistance, and when he breaks through into the depth of the defense; theof the air enemy who is at the approaches to the troops on defense, or overhead; and the destruction of airborne landings at the time they land and when they are dropped (debarked).
Besides these basic missions, fire is alsoeries of individual missions that result from thefor the defensive operations. upport zone exists, fire must support the operations of the forward combat security detachments and cover engineer obstacles, unoccupied gaps in the combat formations of troops, open flanks and flank junctionsreaches in the defense formedesult of enemy nuclear strikes, etc.
To the question about whether the present understanding of "system of fire" satisfies modern requirements, it is necessary to reply in the negative. Since it is anof positional defenseontinuous front, "system of fire" can no longer be the basis of organized fire in defense in which positional and maneuvering forms are combined, especially at the operational level. Theof defenseront which is not continuous, tho conductefensive battle and cn^ironcnt on axes,
broad maneuver by fire, forces and weapons, the irregular developmentattle along the front and depth and its rapidity of movement, and the diversity in types of troop armament, require both centralized and decentralized use of fire and broad initiative in all instances in the use of fire for the immediate destruction of disclosed targets. In order to carry out both centralized and decentralized use of fire and its control, it is first of all necessary to have clear-cut planning of fire at all levels from the division to the front and, secondly, toystem of fire for the types of weapons in subunits and units.
In the interests of defining'the concept of "system
-
of fire aad of workingingle opinion concerning this question we propose to establish that: a) inystem of fire is created by types ofifle, artillery, mortar, antitank;ystem of fire of types or weaponsomposite part of the large unit fire plan is created"only in subunits and units;ystem or lire of types of weaponsthis is mainly the creation
*of thG fire capons of the subunits and units and their disposition on the terrain in accordance with theircna*;acteristics for the continuous and effectiveof the enemy during the entire battle.
biS^y: tho"system of fire" inwill include only the organized fire of theweapons of subunits and units; therefore, we willspeak,notystem of fire in the defensesystems of fire of definite types ofon the scale of the subunits and
. In modern defense, the planning of fire is the mostaspect of the decisionattle and operation, its meaning consists of making the most effective use of fire means and ammunition to deliver the greatest destruction on the advancing enemyime and place which are most advantageous for the defender.
,K, *nen Planning fire, it is necessary to proceed from the lact that in modern defense troops basically carry out three types of fire activities.
The first of thesethe immediate destruction of disclosed targets and objectives. This fire activity is carried out during the periods between massed fire strikes,
. initiative of both the enlisted man armeduDmachine gun or machine gun and of commanding officers of all grades who have at their disposal weapons, mortars,nd artillery subunits, units and. large units, and aviation. The immediate destruction of disclosed means of mass destruction, especially nuclear/missile means, has the
greatest significance. To accomplish this, use must be made of any fire means capable of fulfilling this mission.
The second type of fire activityfire from allweapons brought up to the highest intensity, with thedisrupting the enemy tank and Infantry attack. Thisis carried out on the initiative of theof those troops against which the onemy hasto the
Finally, the third typo of fire activity consists of delivering massed fire strikes with the goal of disrupting
nat prepared or that hasfire strikes are the most important andof the planefensive operation and battlounits. The basis of the fire strike Is the use ofweapons. ire strike is delivered incontact with theecessary requirement willimplementation of its results by an immediatetroops in order to complete the rout of the enemya given* p B
The fire plan in an array defensive operation, orefensive battle of large units, may include:
fire missions to be carried out in an army operationivision battlo, and such missions may be: the immediate destruction of disclosed means of mass destruction and other important targets and objectives of the enemy: the disruption of an enemy offensive that is being propared by destroying groupings of his troops before thoy go over to the offensive; the disruption or weakening of the enemy's lire preparation and tho destruction of his strike groupings on lines of deployment; the destruction of nuclear means and enemy groupings that have broken Into the defense; tho delivery of counterstrikes (carrying out counterattacks) br troops of the army (division);
"esconcentrated .fire efforts of the array
(division) and selected areas of fire destruction on these
axes; as has already been emphasized, areas of fireare selected both ln enemy dispositions over the entire range of the army (division) fire means and in one's own disposition over tho entire depth of the defonsive formation-the size of each area of fire destruction must bo proportionate to the basic capabilities of the army (division) In order to ensure the reliable destruction of the selected enemy
the fire moans brought in to fulfil fire missions on selected axes and in each area of fire destruction, and also the norms of ammunition expenditure for each typo of weapon;
he sequence of employment of fire weapons and the basis for coordination among them when fulfilling each fire mission.
The fire plan is prepared by the headquarters of tbe army (division) on the basis of the decision for defense. First, the fire plan is brought to the attention ofby the commanding officer personally when assigning combat missions for dofonse and when organizing coordination. The headquarters usually draws up the fire plan graphicallyapegend,upplement to the plan of the army operation or to the divisional commanding officer'sorder for defense. Commanding officers and staffs of the subunits, units and large units to be used in the direct fulfilment of fire missions detail the fire plan to the necessary degree and clarify specific missions for their fire means, basing it on the characteristic of the fire means and on the conditions of the situation.
The fire plan, like the decision for defensehole, is constantly elaborated upon, and, in the event of an abrupt change in the situation, it is changed.
The organization of fire in defense examined above permits the most effective use of, all the various fire moans, taking into consideration their combat characteristics
and the combining and maneuvering of the fire of various types of weapons in the interestsecisiveof efforts on Important axes and ln selected areas,
Without claiming completeness and absolute correctness in stating the questions touched upon in this article, our main goal was to call them to the attention of generals and officers ln order to carry out, through common efforts, the Minister of Defense's task for finding new and the most expedient methods for organizing and conductingdefense -
Original document.
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