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THE OUTLOOK FOR CYPRUS
THE PROBLEM
To estimate probable developments in the internal affairs and internationalof Cyprus over the next few years.
CONCLUSIONS
the foreseeable future, mutualbetween the Greek and Turkish communities will dominate the life of the half million Cypriots and preventense of nationhood. However, the moderate approach of the communities' top leaders has reducedsomewhat. So long as Greece and Turkey remain determined to keep Cyprusesumption ofviolence Is unlikely. )
The strength of the Communists lies almost entirely within thc Greekand the chief sphere ofinfluence is in the labor movement, where it is dominant. Archbishop Ma-karios, the President of the Republic, has accorded the Communists recognitionignificant element in the island's life, but he has successfully limited their power within the government.AKEL. the local Communist Party, is the best organized political grouping in Cyprus, its strength will probably increase over the next few years, and it could, if Makarlos were to retire
from active political life, seriouslymoderate Greek control in5 elections. However, especially if thisseemed likely, we believe that Makarlos would remain active and would rally sufficient support to continue non-Communist control of the Cypriot
Cyprus will continue to face antrade balance, risingwater shortages, and lowproductivity, problems whosels sharpened by unrealisticamong the population. Although preliminary development plans haveimpressed the populace, theysomewhat unrealistic.while the Communists may make some capital out of dissatisfactions,of economic progress is not likely toritical threat to poUticalunless thereubstantialin unemployment. )
eutralist tendency of the Greek community. Cyprus will remain
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pro-Western In outlook.will probably be cautious inBloc aid, although trade anddealings are likely to expand gradually. While the Communists will seize any opportunity to exploit the irrita-
tions caused by the existence of UK bases and other British and US facilities, the US and Britain will probably continue to enjoy use of these during the period of this estimate at least. )
DISCUSSION
Since Cyprus became independentnly limited progress has been madeesolution of its basic problems. The communal disputes between the ethnic Greeks, who make upercent of the population. and the IS percent of ethnic Turks remain and tend to be perpetuated by the rigid constitution Most Greeks still desire union with Greecehe Turks still fear that they will be submerged by the Greeks: and neither element has developed any sense of loyalty to Cyprus as anstate. Greece and Turkey, quite aside from their rights under the London-Zurich Accords,ignificant role in the day to day affairs of tne Island, anden respectively The UK retains sovereignty overquare miles of base areas, and Cyprusember of the Commonwealth. Politically, theare taking advantage oi the poor organization among non-Communist Greeks to increase their already strong position. Only limited progress has been made towards the achievementelf-supporting economy. AH these problems make the task ofCyprus very difficult and provide readily exploitable Issues for the Communists."
I. THE PROBLEM OF COMMUNALISM
he Greek community still regards enostaegitimate and desirable goal, butthe Impossibility of achieving it in the foreseeable future. The Turks for their part are afraid of being swamped by superiority of
* For fuller background andsummary ot Use London Zurich Accords seeS. "Thefor An Independent8
numbers on the Oreek side and so resist strenuously any degree of integration. For example, the Turks insist on having theercent of civil service posts allotted to them by the constitution although they cannotenough qualified people. Turkishon geographically separatehas prevented the establishment of the new administrative entitles provided lor by the constitution in the flvr largest towns. Similarly, the Greeks want virtually complete integration of the Cypriot Army while the Turks want separate Greek and Turkish units, at least at company level. Disputes over pending tax legislationurrent source of Irritation between the communities. In short, the communal strife of recent years haseritage of distrust and suspicion which will not be easy to overcome, and allegiance to one's community still permeates all aspects of life on Cyprus.
evertheless, Cyprus is fortunate in having essentially moderate men as community leaders. Archbishop Makarios, the Greek President of the Republic, and Fazel Kuchuk, the Turkish Vice President, are under pressure from their own extremists, the moat dangerous of which are probably Greek elements formerly associated with the EOKA terrorist movement of George Grivas. Thus, Makarios and Kuchuk can afford to make only limitedHowever, both have generally worked for communal harmony, and tensions have subsided somewhat in the past two years. The administrative machinery Inherited from the British Is still running, but it ls sufferinghortage of competent personnel
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long an Greece and Turkey remainto keep Cyprus peaceful, lt isthat there willecurrence ofcommunal violence ShouldAthens come to believe thatIn Cyprus or elsewhere wasessential to their nationalelements in the Cypriotwould be encouraged and communalwould probably break out again.we believe that the chances ofdevelopment arc leas than even and thatcommunities will make some progressto live with one another; tt ishowever, that effectivewill develop ln the
II. THE PROBLEM OF COMMUNISM
Another of Cyprus' major problems is lhat of communism. The Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL) Is thc best organized and most efficient political grouping on the Island and ls growing in strength. The exclusively Qreek AKELembership oft controlsman Pan-Cyprianof Labor (PEO)umber of front organizations. It exerts substantial influence over an important segment of the press and holds mayoralitles In three of the largest towns PEO, In particular, is an important source of strength because ltecord of getting benefits lor the workers and because it hasree hand Ln the labor field. Its only opposition ts the Cyprusofovernment-supported group which Is riven with factionalism and poorly led.
Neither the presidential election9 nor0 election to lhe Houselear picture of Communist voting strength. In the presidentialanti-Makarlos Oreek elements polledercent of the vole, thc bulk of which was probably Communist-controlled. The system under which the House elections weremade It doubtful whether AKEL would have won any seats. Makarlos, however, felt that exclusion of AKEL from representation would increase Instability. Accordingly an
agreement was made to give AKEL five of the Oreek community'souse seats.
Unable to exert much influence inAKEL will probably concentrate on strengthening its hold on labor and ondissatisfactions in the GreekIt will probably exercise its capability of fomenting demonstrations and strikes, and continue to expand its strength. Makarios and his supporters will speak out against AKEL from time to time, but are likely to be more concerned with communal ism and their own internal squabbles than with taking timely action against the growing strength of the Communists.
Makarios is in fact the linchpin of Greek Cypriot politics. His roleeader in the struggle for enosis and his position as head of the Cyprus Orthodox Church combine to give him Lsland-wide appeal.9 he established the Patriotic Front, the onlypolitical group in the Greekother than AKEL. The Front,isersonal vehicle and lacks organization and proven second echelonMakarlos has indicated that he would like to retire from politics at the end of his term5 and devote himself to religious affairs. Should he doivided right might fare badly in that year's elections and be forced to share the government with Ihc Communists.
This prospect, of which Makarlos cannot fail to be aware,trong pressure against his retirement from politics. The Oreek Government, If It continues Its present orientation, would be loath to see aor influenced government in Cyprus and would probably press Makarlos lo remain In politics. Also, Makarios lurnself may enjoy Increasingly being the political as well as religious leader of Cyprus. In any event, while we cannot specifically predict the decision Makarios will takeche probably will remain active politically and that his appeal will rally sufficient voter support to give the non-Communlst Greeks continued dominance in the CypriotAt the same time, some growth In AKEL strength appears virtually inevitable.
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THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM
has economic difficulties towith. Its economy expandedthe past decade. 1 and
per capita income Increased byhird toavorable markets for copper and citrus fruits resulted Ln goodearnings. Heavy military-connected British spending in the emergencyaused rapid though uneven economic growth. However, little was done toase for future economic growth, and since
unemployment has been steadily rising. The cumulative effectshree-year drought drastically reduced grain crops and forced the island to rely to an unusual degree onincludingheat. Export earnings have fallen oflyprus thus arrived at independence with its people expecting economic betterment butosition where much basic work needed to be done before lasting progress could bo made.
Several of the troublesome aspects of the Cypriot economy are long-term problems. Unemployment and underemployment have appeared with the reduction of heavy UK spending. While Industry and mining can absorb some of the labor force, jobare limited and unemployment Is likely to remain high. Indeed, It would rise sharply if legislation currently under consideration in the UK seriously reduces the customaryof Cypriot workers to Britain.averagedearlyut has risen to0 annually. Cyprus' exports are limitedew products, which are subject toin foreign markets. British subsidies and military expenditures are lessening and can no longer cover balance of payments deficits.
Agriculture is likely to be the mostspot in the economy for many years. Water supplies are insufficient andand much water is wasted or used inefficiently. Old-fashioned farmingand fragmented holdings are alsofor low agricultural production. Even if steps are taken to correct these deficiencies.
Cyprus will need to rely on imports of grain and other foodstuffs for years to come.
an effort to deal with theseproblems, the government Is tryingforeign capital and promoteimportantly, it has recentlyoutlineive-year developmentcoating5 million.the plan, which has had aon the populace, appears to belist of useful things to do than aprogram. Both thc overalland the amount of foreign aid requiredIt (almost half of the total) arehigheream of UNearlierower levelIn line with the current capabilityto absorb economic aid, but afor determining foreign assistance bRegardless of what Is done,will probably continue to expectthe economy Is likely ever to give.be able to make some capital frombut unless there Is aIncrease in unemployment, slownessprogress Is not likely to pose athreat to political stability.
IV. FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Cyprus' foreign policy Is stronglyby the attitudes of its two communities and by Its relations with Greece and Turkey. Generally pro-Western in outlook, thc Cypriot Government alsoendency toward neutralism largely due to anticolonlaldeveloped by the Greek CypriotIn its struggle against the British. Consequently, one finds Cyprus, on the Greek community's Initiative, attending theof nonaligned countries in Belgrade and playing up to Nasser; at the sameurkish Cypriot delegation has toured Israel ln conformity with Ankara's policy ofwith Tel Aviv. This sometimesoutlook is likely to continue for several years at least and will shade Cyprus' basically pro-Western orientation.
Relations between the Cypriotand the UK, while distinctly coolthc years of terrorism, are slowly Improv-
Cyprus has joined the Commonwealthive-year trial period. Britain is going ahead with construction of facilities In the two base areas, and has already made the first payment2 million pound aidwhich the Cypriot Government regards as payments for the bases. We believe that for the period of this estimate at least, the Makarlos government, with the support Of Athens and Ankara, will maintain favorable relations with the UK and permit theuse of the bases, though particular uses offensive to Cyprus' Mid-Easterncould raise serious frictions with the Cypriot Government. In addition, it Is likely that the sovereign enclaves and the other UK and US facilities will continue to produceirritations. The Communists mayat some time to blow these Irritations up into major Issues, particularly If theyood chance of reducing the usefulness of these facilities to the West.
elations between Cyprus and the US will probably remain good- While less closely connected with the US than with thepowers, Cyprus looks to the USoten-
tial source of major economic aid. The US has important communication facilities on Cyprus, established by agreement with the UK prior to Cypriot Independence, and Ma-karios has agreed informally to theirThe Makarlos government willconfirm this in more formal negotiation yet to take place but is likely torice in terms of aid.
yprus' relations with the Soviet Bloc will probably continue to increase gradually. The USSR hasarge diplomaticin Cyprus and will exploit opportunities for economic penetration and for politicalboth directly and through AKEL. Makarlos ls likely to be cautious in accepting Bloc aid, although trade and commercialare likely to expand, as shown recently In the acceptanceolish bid for theof Famagusta harbor. In any event we believe that for the next few years at least Cyprus is likely toasically pro-Western orientation, partly because of Makarlos" own inclinations and partly because of the influence of the guarantor powers on Cypriot policy.
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Original document.
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