CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR SOVIET CLAIMS ON ANTI-MISSILE CAPABILITY

Created: 11/2/1961

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

1, In our view the draft contingency plan for Sovietanti-missile capability is generally sound. There are

aspects of the problem, however, that mayause for

concern.

2i We are dealing hereighly technical problemmany arguments and counter-arguments arc Most of these arguments could be followedbyelatively few people in any country. cases even these people couldound judgmentthey were awareide range of facts which wouldpresentedoherent package in the normal The United States has had enough experience in tryingits position on nuclear testing over the pastto know how difficult it is to convince world public

hole, or even many key parts of it, in technical

of this

3. An added problem related to the technicalthe issue is that if we base our arguments entirelyrationale we are likely to be placed continually onby the other side whose claims might have less

in scientific fact> Inituation the Soviets could take the initiativeuccession of claims which had strong emotional /

appeal, and we would be leftelatively* disadvantageous position in trying to shoot down these emotional claims by means of an intellectual argument that was basically difficult to understand.

The draft contingency plan itself implies the difficulty of the situation in its discussion of the U. S. approach. The introductory paragraph of this section calls. initiative, but the various specific measures discussed in the subordinate paragraphs are basically designed to react to various actions or arguments that the Soviets might advance.

In view of the difficulties suggested above, it might be well to think. S. program aimed at two different types of audience. One approach, aimed at those who could understand the technical argument, should publish all of the pertinent unclassified facts, in as complete and well reasoned form as possible. The other approach, aimedider and less well informed audience, should concentrate more on the emotional problem of creating a eeling of superiority on the U. S. side and disbelief toward Soviet claims. With this latter audience it might be better for us to avoid technical arguments completely by merely stating that we have known about Soviet developmentsong time and that we have taken adequate measures to render our missiles invulnerable to

Soviet anti-missile

Two additional points could givereat deal of difficulty in this matter. One would be if the Soviets were toatellite in orbit. Although technicians would recognize that such action would not be equal to an anti-missile capability, most of the general public could not make this fine distinction any more than they did with respect to the space shots and ICBM capability. The second point is that our difficulties regarding the production and deployment of the Nike-Zeus system have been publicized and might tend to discredit any claims that we might makeapability in the anti-missile field equal to the Soviets.

To be most effective. should initiate action before the Soviets make claims orne or both of the following might be used:

a; Claim that the technical capabilities (decoys, multiple warheads, radar-neutralization,. missiles invulnerable or that the number. missiles would saturate Soviet systems.

b. Claim that our own anti-missile system is superior to any system that the Soviets might develop. This could be supported by exploiting each success of the Nike-Zeus system as it comes along.

In general the theme of point a; aboveore positive theme and would be more likely to enhance. position.

Original document.

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