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l intelligence agency office of National estimates
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KKCRAluOUtl FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: An Appraisal of Soviet Intentions
1. In pursuingagainst the West, tho Soviet leaderstrategy which they call "peaceful coexistence." ly this they declare their intention toersistent and aggressive campaignariety of meanspropaganda and political pressure, military threat, economic and scientific competition, subversion and internal waraimed at the victory of their causeorld scale. The new aspect in Khrushchev's formulation of Soviet foreign policy is theproposition that general war is an unacceptable means of prosecuting this struggle. Unlike Stalin, he has founded Soviet policy on the belief that the "inferialists" can be forced into final submissionteady undermining of their world position and that, during this process, Soviet military power will deter themesort to arms.
APPROVED FORREIEASB3
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2. This is but oneeries of innovations which Khrushchev has sponsored in the total range of Communistond foreign policies. His revisions of doctrine and practice have frequently been radical in Communist terms, and they have not gono unopposed within the Soviet party and the international movement. The XXII Congress was the scenereat effort by Khrushchev, using the most dramatic means available to him, to make these policies binding, both at home and abroad. This effort embraced domestic, Bloc, and foreign problems, and while the main lines of the peaceful coexistence strategy have been firmly reasserted, crucial questions have been raised concerning the Soviet iexty's commanding role in world communism. The cource of political controversy within the Soviet Party, and more importantly, of the mounting tensions in Soviet relations with China will obviouslyignifleant bearing on thc conduct of Soviet relations with tho non-CcmjTunlst world.
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3. We believe that Khrushchev has not had to fear far his position since his victors' over the so-called antipoxty group In Despite this victory, however, and despito the cult which subsequently developed around his own personality, he has continually net with difficulties within thc party, and on two counts. In the first place, in the past year or two other high level leaders appear to have succeeded in limiting the revisions which he wished to make in economic priorities (greater benefits for the consumer) and military policy (downgrading conventional forces and traditional doctrine). In the second place, Khrushchev has found the parly apparatus which hear from satisfactory instrument for carrying out his numerous reforms. The great majority of party officials were trained in the Stalinist period to execute mechanically orders from above and to regard the population as rocalclteant and untrustworthy subjects. They have tended to become bewildered, resentful, and concerned for thoir careers as Khrushchev demands of them that they display initiative, elicit It from others, and draw the massesositivewith the regime and active support of its policies.
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li. The savage attack upon Stalin was meant, in the domestic contoxt, to break the emotional attachment to Stalin's person and methods which still exists in the Soviet Party. It was also meant to discredit certain Stalinist dogmas, such as the proposition that heavy industry must at all times grow faster than light industry, which had become imbedded in Soviet ideology and stood in tho way of Khrushchev's reforms. The concurrent blackening of the anti per ty group served to dramatize the penalties of resisting Khrushchev's demandsew style of work and to dostroy any luster whioh tho unrepentant and still argumentative Molotov retains as aspokesman among the middle and lower reaches of tho apparatus.
S. Tho full internal consequences of the Congress willong time In working themselves out. Certainly Khrushchev has succeeded in putting his stamp upon the present era anda direct succession to Lenin. The present compromise formulations of economic and defense policy, however, indicate that his program retain subject to some sort of consensus among the top loaders, who share his general outlook but cannot be equated to the terrorised yesten around Stalin. Remaking the entire party apparatus ln Khrushchev's own image will, wo believe,
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continue toong and difficult process. And among critically-minded olunonta of Soviet societythe youth, the cultural intelligentsia, perhaps even younger party nenborsvirtually the whole of Soviet history has boon brought into question, and along with it the activitios of present party leaders during that period. We doubt that the attack on Stalin and tho cult of Khruahchov will strengthen belief in the party's claia to wisdon and tho right of absolute leadership. Those factors are more likoly to work in the long runeakon-ing of the propositions on which party rulo is based, and to complicate the problems which Khrushchev's successors must face.
Bloc Politics
6. The consequencos of the Congress for Dice relations
aru much more irwiediato and With his surpriso attack upon thc proxy target of Albania, Khrushchev his thirdthe Ducharost meeting inhe Moscow Conference later in tho year) to repulse the Chinese Coranunist ohallcnge to Soviet leadership. In doing so, helmo of great Chinese weakness. Ho also gave his attack the greatest possible force, short of an explicit challenge, by coupling it
with the condemnation of Stalinist principles and practices in the sharpest form. He intended by thi3 to force the Chinese to choose between submitting and being openly condemned as deviation-ist. Yet in the ensuing two months Peiping, while withholding an equally dramatic response, has made clear its determination to hold to its positions. It appearshowdown of historic proportions may be Imminent.
Soviet policy, this is but the latest in aof problems arising from the Soviet leaders*reconcile the contradiction between the force oftheir own insistence upon Soviet hegemony over worldtho Sino-Soviot conflict is atlash ofWhile each professes devotion to Cccriunistseeks to mobilize tho entire world Cccrnunist movement in
tho service of it3 own aims. The Ideological element, far frccaasis for reconciliation,pecialand Intensity to this rivalry.
the lines are now drawn, it seems unlikely thatcan be papered overompromise along thel-party conference. Economic relations have
been mibatontlally reduced, and military cooperation, never very high, ia niniaal. The entire Cccnuni.it world has been made aware of the deep differences between the two, and oach is vigorously using all the weapons of pressure and persuesion to hold and onlarge its retinuo of supporters. At the least, it appears certain that full harmony cannot be restored, let the question of whether the two powers, poised now on tho brink of an overt break in party relations, take this final step ro-V- mains an Important one. So long as they do not, the way ro-mains openeturn to tolerable cooporationurface appearance of unity, and the strains on other parties can bo kept within manageable proportions. If they do, the resulting hostility wouldre profound and probably longer lasting than that which divided tho Yugoolovs from tho Conainist
nd few Communist regimes or parties would escape
its effects.
9m Fron their present behavior, it appears that both parties are ablo to contemplate this possibility. Each still hopes that the other will ln the last analysis make the concessionstoinal split, but neither seens prepared to retreat on the fundamental issue of thc locus of authority over world
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communion. At thisrial of strength is occurring ln the Soviet campaign to bring down the Albanian leadorsj success horo wouldajor blow to Chinese pretensions and to any inclinations in other parties to escape Soviet domination. We believe that tho odds are against Moscow in this campaign, but even if it succoeds, the present Chinese leadership would alcost certainly return to the lists.
10. In appraising Sine-Soviet rolations, we havo regularly strosGod tho great benofitslose allianco to the national interests of both partners and, conversely, the great losses which each would sufferrue rupture. Xet the record cf tho postonthsonsistent refusal, on tho part of tho Soviets, to licit their authority in matters of general Communist policy. Over the samo poriod, the Chinese haveproven unwilling to remain content with the role which tho Soviots would assign them in tho movanont. adical change ln Chinese outlook or leadership, we now tolicvo that tho chancesull break ln party relations between tho two during the next year or so havo increased very substantially.
Shouldreak occur, the logic of ideological conflict and the history of Ccrarainist parties everywhere make it likely that the result would be an acrimonious and protracted struggle. Each side would be impelled to proclaim itself the repository of doctrinal truth and to call for the overthrow of the competing leadership. Communists everywhere would be pressed to declare themselves; purges and splits would probably occur in many parties; some, especially those in Asia, might eventually align themselves with the Chinese*
In these circumstances, the military alliance between the USSR and Communist China would in effect become Inoperative. The Chinese probably already consider it of dubious value; they probably do not feci able any longer to count on full Sovietin the event that they become embroiled in militarywith the US.
The Soviet and Chinese loaders may still find some way to get past the current tensions. Even if they do, we believe that the result will be an uneasy and distrustful truce, marked by cooperation at various timos and placefi ond by competition at
others. In short, we believe thnt tho Sino-Soviet relationship rests upon an unstable foundation, andreach. If It is avoided fcr the present, will remain in the foregroundontinuing possibility.
Forolgn Policy
entral problem in Sino-3oviet contention has boon policy toward the non-Communist world. This hasreat deal of misrepresentation on both sides. Thusllegation that the Chinese regard general war as either inevitable or dosirable,elling argument insofar as he can make lt convincing, is not true. Similarly, Chineso charges that Khrushchov's strategy of peaceful coexistenceonlal of revolutionary aimsross exaggeration, although tho real with which Holotov's parallel criticims were attacked at tho Congress suggests that this indictment finds considerable resonance In the Soviet and other parties*
Tho peaceful coexistonco line, far from being an abandonment of Soviet expansionist goals,acticalconoidercbly ncre effoctivo than tho compound of heavy-handedness and isolationism which was Stalin's foreign policy.
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It is Infornod by on appreciation of the aanif old opportunities presented by all the groat straina and disharmonies of the non-CornEunist worldnational rivalry, colonialism, tho desire for economic development, tho yearning for paace ond disarmament. Peaceful coexistence socks to capture those sentiments and turn then against thestates, using all tho weapons of political struggle, economic assistanco, and subversion, and underlining its points with demonstrations of Soviet military, scientific, and economic prowess*
16. At tho same time, this policy also embrace0 thethat general nuclear war would bring intolerable damage upon the USSR itself ond should therefore be avoided. The Soviets aro continuing to develop thoir already formidable de-
fense establishment. Out tho programs presently underwq? do notelief that it ia possible toecisive advantago over tho West, ono which would permit them to launch general war with assuranco of success ot sorao acceptable cost. Rather, what we know of those programs, and of Soviot strategic thinking aa well, suggests that the Soviet leaders oro aiming in
tho flrat instanceapability largo onough toestern resort to general war.
17. The Soviets apparently boliove that they have already in large measure achieved this end. Dot they recognize that the forward policies which they wish to pursue involve somo element of risk, and that they may not always be able to control these risks. In building their forcos, they are probably seeking an offensive nuclear capability largo enough, not only to dotor their opponent, but also to bring under attack those elements of Western striking power and national strength which can bo effectively attacked by IC3Hs and other lonG-range delivery systems. On tho defensive side, in addition to improving thoir dofenses against manned bombers ond cruise-type micsiles, they are exerting major efforts tc develop and deploy an effective anti-ballistic missile system. At tha saao time, they also intend to retain large and modernized ground and naval forces. In all these programs, the Soviets will boombination of forces which would permit them totack on the US, should thoy concludeS attack wes in-minent, ond to prcaotnte general war effectively if deterrenco should fail.
Soviet leaders are alert to search out areas
Y where their military power con be brought into play to shield Communist efforts to advance by safer means, such as internal war in Southeast Asia or political blackmail in Berlin. We believe, however, that the USSR will wish to avoid involvement af its own forces in limited combat on the ECLoc periphery and, if such conflict should occur, to minimize the chances ofto general war. Consequently, it would not in most circumstances take tho initiative to expand the scope ofonflict. The degree of Soviet commitment and the actual circumstances of the conflict would of course determine this decision. But we believe that, in general, the Soviet loaders would oxpand the scope of the conflict, even at greater risk of escalating to general war, onlyrospective defeat would, in their view, have grave political repercussions within the Rloc itself orajor setback to tho Soviet world position.
the limits set by these appraisals, thehave purposefully displayed both militancy andat various times and in various proportions as seemedto them. Over the past year or ao, however, tho
cf the Chinese challenge has been one factor helping to keep tho "hard" line in the foreground. Thc thrust of the XXJJ Congross in this respect was to reassert thc USSR'hupon full tactical flexibility. Thus the USSR has not only continued its attacks on Chinese positions but has made some conciliatory moves, such as removal of tho Berlinrum, and publication of Adzhubey'a interview with tho President,
Thuse measures have accompanied, not replaced, tho harsher tactics which comprise the militant side of peaceful coexistence. At the same time Finland has been bulliodj atomic tests have been resumed; Soviet military strength has been strossod; the Soviet position on Berlin remains highly Tho Congress attacks on tho opponents of peacefulwore meant only to nako roomull range of maneuver, not toonuinQ accommodation with the West.
Currently, however, Soviet foreign policy is by no neans completely freed of the pressures far more militancy which stem fron the Chinese challenge. Should an open break occur, Moscow's initial reaction would probably bo to emphasize "hArd"
tactics ln order to justify tighter controls in Eastern Europe and to cecaonstrate that it vas aa vigorously an ti-imperialist as its Chinese conpetitar. Over the long run, thc consequences night be quite differrotracted break night givesupport to that tendency in Soviet foroign policy which seeks to put relations with the Westore stable footing. It ia conceivable that, faced with an actively hostile China whoso strength was growing, the USSR might in time cctno to accept, at loast tacitly, socio mutual delimitation of alms with tho West and thus acme curb upon its expansionist impulse.
22. For the present, nevertheless, we conclude that the Un Congress has initiated no marked departures in the foreign policies which have emerged under Khrushchev's leadership cf the last five years. On Berlin, the USSR is presently in an inter in phaso, marking time in order to dctoraino whether its earlier proseuroa will bring the West to tho negotiating table with at least somo concessions, or whether another round of threats, and perhaps oven unilateral action, in roquirod. Even aSoviet rupturo would not be likely to alter tho basic Soviet
position on Berlin and Germany,ajor clement in that position is the desire to stabilize the Soviet-controllod regime in East Germany and, by extension, those of Eastern Europe*
23. In tho disarmament field, we perceive in recent Soviet moves no appreciable desire for agreements on terms which the West could regard as acceptable* Instead, the USSR continuos to regard this as an arena for political struggle and, via manauverings over parity and tho compositionorum, for enhancing Soviet stature and cultivating neutralist opinion. In addition to the theme of general and complete disarmament, thc Soviots will probably also agitate such limited measures as regional schemes, agreements to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, and other proposals which might inhibit Western defense programs,
2li. Slno-Sovict strains raise considerable uncertainties regarding prospective Soviet tactics in Southeast Asia. The USSR will probably continue to press cautiously its advantages in Laos and South Vietnam, seeking simultaneously to advance Communist prospects there, toajor US intervention, and
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keep Chinese influence from becoming predominant, urther radical worsening of relations between Moscow and Peiping, however, could leadreakdown of Bloc cooperation in these ventures. In this event, Moscow would probably try to retain as nuch control as possible through the North Vietnamese regime, which, at least initially, would seek to preserve the Soviet connectionounterweight to China.
2$. In recent years the USSR haa consistently looked upon tho underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and latin America aa the prime targets for its tactics of peaceful coexistence. Doginning inowever, Soviet pronouncements haveense of disappointment at the failure of some of the "elder" neutrals, such as Nehru and Nasser, to move from the achievement of independenceull association with Soviet policies and thence along the path toward Communist control.
Nevertheless, tho Soviet appraisal of its prospects in those areas remains highly optimistic. The USSR continues to believe that, by harnessing anti-Western and anticolonial sentiment, extending judicious offers of military and economic assistance, and sponsoring the political ambitions of new governments, it can make important gains in weakening Western positions and
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preparing the ground for further advances. The Soviets will not abandon those states which they have unsuccessfully sought to drawlient relationship. Dot they will probably increasingly focus their twin energies upon Africa and Latin America and, within those contlnants, upon thc radicalleaders who aro most ooslly set against Western ties. Soviet activity in those areas will continue to conflict with, and normally to take priority over, any desire to adopt aline toward tho major Western powers.
SHERMAN KENT Chairman
FOR THE DOARD OFSTTKATES:
Original document.
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