o
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AOENCT
71
SDBJECTi SNIE1 PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN
CVZORS IN SOUTH YTtfU/M
SGCPZ
The purpose of thla estimate la to assess Consnunlat (Soviet, Chinese, and North Vietnamese) reactions and, whore aifmlflnant,reaotlons to certain US military actiona mended to aaslet the Government of Vietnam oope with tho Costauniet threat."
Othor National Intelligence EetiftateB pertinent to thla problem are, "Likelihood of Major CoAunlit Military Intervention in Mainland Southeastatedi1 SNIEProbable heootlona to Certain Couraoa of Aotlonngl|, "Prospects for North and Southatedj and, "Bloc, Support of tha CoEmunlat Effort Against tho Government of, "Probable Coucnunlat ReaoUona to Certain SEATO Undertakings in Southatedi.
T0PJ|Mr
approved forate
The couraoa of aotion horo oonoldoredvon to thococBunlty for the purpoaoa of thia oatinate and wore not Intended to represent the full ningo of posnible ooureoa of aotion. The given couraoa of aotion are:
introductionS airlift into andVietnam, lnorcuaul logiatioa otipport, and an lnorcaooetrength to provide US adviser* down to battalion level,
introduction into South Vietnam0 troopa, mostly engineers withln roep uae to on appeal fron President Diss forin flood relief|
introduction into tho area00 to engage with South VleLnriiteBeground, air, and naval operatlona against the Viet Congf and
onnounoenent hy the US of Ita determinationSouth ViotooBarning, either private or publio,Vietnamese aupport of the Viot Cong auat ooase or thelaunch air attacks agalnat North Vietnam. Thiahe taken In conjunction with Course A, B, or C.
the estimate
I, IHTtODOCTIOH
1, Tho interests of the Soviot Uninn, Communlotnd Cosmuniet North Viotnam overlap at rainy point" butvary con-aiderably in intensity and urgency. To llanoi, tho ouster of Preaident Diem and the raunifiootion of Vietnam under Coirmuniat rule aro baalo objootivea. Both objectives wore aooordod high priority at the North Vietnamese Communist Party Congreeshe announoeraimt of these objectivesreparatory phase and marked the baginningharp lnoroase in Vlot Cong guor-rilla, subversive, and polltloal warfare. lUring the poet year, North Vietnam haaubstantial Investment in the campaign against Diem, and ttinol is probably detorminod to press for an early victory in South Vietnam, Tho North Viotnameso loaderB are oonvinoed that they dofeated tlie Krenoh In tho Indoohina War but were deprived of the fruita of their vlotory at tho oon-feranoe table. Recant events in Uos have encouraged the North Vietnamese loaders and glvon them lnoreaeed oonfidenoo in their "national liberation" tactics. They almost certainly
bollevo that, by those taotioa, they om ln tise upoet tho Dion government ond take over South Viutnun. Thoy probably believe that they could, provided that the war would bo oanfinod within the boundarioo of South Vietnan, renderoval of US nllltary (rapport to South Viotnun eubatantiaUy in exoeee of that pootulatod In Coureo C,
2, Chinese Comunlot interests are more diroatly involved In the Ir.doohlna statea than ere thoeeSSR. Pelping'a leaders apnear inpatient for oNiorete Coamuilat advenoea, portlou-larly In arena of oubatantiol US interest. Moraovor, Cocoiuniat China would regard any increaao ln tho US onmnltnent ln South Vietnam, and ln partioular any Introduotion of US troopa Into the aroa,orloua oholletigo. The USSR, while sharing the desire of North Vietnam and Coranunlnt China to bring South Vietnam
Into tho CoDEunlat Bloo, olraoat oortainly dooa not regard thla aa Justifying the asaunptlon of aerlous rlax.
3. Thu a, we believe that the USSR would be inolinodeaa militant response than Co-muniet China or North Vietnam to any of tha given US oouraaa nf uotlon oxoopt pooalbly ln the oaao of Courao D, Moscow vould aaok to oalntaln control of tho altu-atloa and toboth Peiping end Ifanoiny roaponsoe
mm
Ufcaly, In Modiew, to run oorloua risk of oxpaudoo
hootilltioo ond thot ot Soviet forces. Tha Soviot
loaders would probably bollove that, while the US ecuiitijoot
j
uudor Coureo A*ould tonparnrliy strengthen South
Vietccrj, it would only alow down, not reverse, tho troudo favorins tha Casjunlotc in that country. Thuo thoy wouldcook to avoid oubatantid ooealotloD of tho figlYtius.
k. The Chinone, in our view, would bo raich uoro oenaltive than the Soviato to tho crrivul of US foroee in South Viotnan. They oIdolnhor priority upon tho early victory of thonlet ccujo in Southooet Aala, and would bo considerably leas car.ee mod obout the pooolhle irrpaot on CoiTiunlot interoato in Suropa. Whilo they aro eluoot certainly nore sensitive to the oonnaquanoea ofr then sous of thoir uoro rodlool state-tents indlcuto, thoir ccccern over thia possibility doeo appear to bo loos acute than that of their Soviet partner. Thoy would probchly bo uore incllnod than the Soviets to believe that the US would noturther escalation. Thus wo boliovo that theyguoapid buildup nf local Cctuunlot capabilities and tbo vifrorous onBnsouent of US forcea.
cccuniat China ia pro Gently fQcod with serious Internal problooo: the afternotheriod of croBfl ooonootothroe ouceeooive had harveatajubatontlal dlsruptloa of the eccconlQ dovelxjpnont plea. Moreover, tension ln relations vith the USSR hasew high. NovertheloBO, these devolcp-ncmto are not likely to oubotontlnlly alter Corxiuniet China's attitudes toward nllltary eomltaant in Southeast Aala.
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tho Chlnooo and tin Govteto rope tod In thesefurtlicr otr&ln would bo plucod upon Blno-Sovlotfloarovctod by Khrushchev's Indirect but ctrongtho XXII Conereoo In Koacow. Tlia Sovleto would not vich to
Peiping additional ronoono to cbarse tlian with insufficient ullltoncy and boldnees. Alao tliey would bo reluctantck avoy frCG KluruohohQv'a eft-repe cited pradoo of oupport for vara of "national liberation." At tbo nous tlta tbo Bovleto are deeply dubiouo of Chlnono prudonaa and would bo reluctant to givoree rein. Thaso otralno would be acutely felt by tho North Vietnauesu, who novo thua for ottotipted to nvcid agarovatiog either side cud proaorva forcxtuua freedec of naneuver.
II. PROBABLEEACTIONS
recpouao to olthor Cource A, B,ho Bloca uojor political and propaganda caupalgn in tho UHto highlight and occdeon tbo UB action and to brandoo an csGroooor. Tne UB would bo denounced for violatingOonovu Agreooonta end torpedoing tlie present GenevaLoce. The Intensity of this ounpaign would lncreoou no the US
tnvolvor.fflnt inQroaood, Its piuTpoaa would ho to Generate lntor-untiomil pronouro ta3 withdrawal. Tho Dice, particularly tbo USSIt, would consider that ouuotontlul jnlltlcol nnd propaatiuda gaino could be rrida fronon-^uiisiniat crltlolmi of thooo cotlona.
8 . It lo Uloily thatn particular would lead to uideopread donondaouforoncoor "noaotlotloiio" to diuiuiah the tendons cud "aettle" tho orlolo. Theowers, ond pnrticulnrly the USSR, would ulucot certulnly pruiote thle decani, ond oignlfy their villinauesa to nesotlato. Thoy would do eo In tho ecu vie tion thatrocedure woulderiod of tit* in which they could purouo their offorte ln South Vlotnau, porhopcoiwwbnt dialoished eoalo, but otill with fair euccooo and leBoened riok. And they wouldoo calculate that, conditions bolns whut they are In tbo areu, almost any foxu of nogotlutod oettlorjent would leave then with DubBtantlal cpportunltiOD to continue tlie "liberation" struggle.
Courau A. Tho introductionB airlift into
ard withiu South Vletnnu, inoroaood lcciotlco sup-
port, and an incroaoo in maaq strength to provide
US odvioero doim to battalion level,
We do not bo Havo that thia ooureo of action wouldifiulfleant ui11tary rosponeo by Moecov or Paiplng. Hanoi Vould probobly proao forvord with ito Vlot Cong cctipclnn, Infiltrating cadroo ond loglotio oupport to South Vlotnari tlircughtiountain routoo uf uootorn looo, aaroao tho Coubodlan* VtatDOUOM border, ond by soa fron Hortb Vletnan. Additional regular north Vlotuoiwou Amy unlta probably vould be infiltrated Into South Vlotnorjut born Laoa. The Viet Cong vouldotcp up lte exploitation of South Vlotoan'e veaxnoaaua in tho plateau creaa of South Vletnan cooking toagie-tico bo ao free vhloh larger aoalo (regluoutel lovol) cporctiono could bo counted, The Ccvjtiur.loto probably vould au^ont their efforto to build up the oaetorn purt of oouth Laosjor oupply ohannel for the introduction of Bloo equipment into northern aid central South Vietnau, UB eupply andlneo vould bo horuoaad and the Coanunlats vould increaoa torrorlot and eabotage attccice against US pereonnel and IcotolLntlona. In oortaln oreaa US aircraft vould probably be subjected to antialroraft fire. Tbe Corcuniat airlift vould probably be expanded end extended to lcaludo alrdrcpa andof nupplies In South Vletnan oa well aa oouth Laoa.
e
Course ii, Tlus introduction into South ViotnonS force of0 troops, oootly engineers with oodo coabat support, in response to an appeal froaion fcr aBalatance ln flood relief.
ounounoanant that US troopa woro bolng aontVlotnou for purposeo of flood relief would not beto tho CotJiiunlat otateo or to non-Coauuniot govornrjonts. be oo even if the troopa confined their activity atrlctlyrelief work. havortholsso, poet govornoonto wouldtlie flood relief announceiMnt provided opportunltlao for
disongagoooct. Uowavor, later dlaoagagocent by the US would have serious offecti in Southeast Aele.
Peiping, ond Hanoi wouldUS aourae of ootlonignificant newof US intontlon to oupport the Men govornoont omSouth Viotnan. However, thoy alnost certainly wouldby ovortly ooanltting regular North Viotnaiaoo orforceollitary attach against South Viotnaa
IS. They would, nevertheless, probably build up their reodlnoso pooturo in the goneral Southoast Asia aroa. The Bloc oapltala would issue strong threots ognlnst tho US to withdraw
r5-
in the Southo oudtroua indication thatnter atofio tha US mLrjht urther if nacooaary to
prevent tha defect of that couoo, ho Worth Viotnausoe ana tho
J
Chlnoce Caxiuniota wouLJ viow tho nilitary foroohroat to thoir interooto in Boutlwaotnd. the reinforced US pren-er.ee ao r. potential threat to thoi uecurity. Tha objoctlvo of all throe Coxiauniat pcruoro would h to naintain CotiLiuulot baaao and otransth in South Vlotnan and, ventunlly, to tondneto tho US intervention. The Chineoe andrth Vietnaxace Oorxnuiioto xrould probably be koeuor on tho la ior point aince thoir in-toroots ere more dlraotly Involved tlie Sovioto would profur to do itore (aradunl way, throu it attrition of US forcea in the proa and diplourtio-political ooeureB eleewhoro.
Ik. Mthouch an extrora uili- <ry rooponoo pisht follow thio US couroe of action, uo bellavo It tore likely that the Connunlot ullltary reaotlou in South Viotnan (ouldoijprotdoeooce-what stronger than tho Soviotoioh but atlll licltod enough to hoopriuke under tol rablo control. Tha USSR would chioet cortainly try to tokod in eupplylna whatever out-Dide nllltary cooiBtancocea iry, lu order to caxiniso Ita
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control over tlw nitnntion. The ft th Viotnunoso would support thio ciTort Id order to ward off cui ucraaoo ln Chinooo influence within tlielr country. In airy avoii wo bollova thatou-prouiee would bo unstable, that tlv throe portnors would contlnuo to arfcuo qoouq tlwuaelveo, cud the. tho oubooquont dovolorxont of tho crlain ulrjht rosult lnro irxlopenrtent role.
15. However, on balanceevo that the Initial Cbrtiunlct reactions would be directedolding operation In South Vletnuu. In addition to an intenn Clcatlon of the typos of CouiTunl st reaponoe we haveould ensue frca tlie Initiation of oltherr B, vo bollev thatould evoke the following aetlouoi strong and spt if lc Soviet and Chinese Cctriunlot deelnratlons of thoir iirtantlon t( aolntelo the security af Northnd sustain tho "revolutii ,nry struggle" in South Vietnaoj and an in area so in theong guerrilla of forts against tho U3 foraosj and possibly theeduction of Chinose Cotijunist or Soviet air unite into North.nan.
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ion
Wo believe that the Cocoui
onfldeooe 'that those uonnurea voult:
tfaotlve US arned assistance to So;
3 action appeared to bo seriously 1
avetient ln South Vletnan ond esteb)
ssltlon ln the country, the Coaiuni
rovldlng nore direct arnod oupport,
orjrjunlsto night ooaalt najor North
lntroduooletnan and/Chlnose Cormnlst
letnan, although thoy would racogm
jiioe the rlslta of broadening the vi.
I
fcher hand that thay would lovar thi
J
South Vietnamiew to rait
would havo considorable in tho long terra renderletnan, If, however, the roatening the Ooanunlattrong rjilitary ts would owlouely consider In those circumstances, the letnaosse rogular units in upport units intohat this action vould It is possible on the tonpo of ailitary activity ng it at another tino or
another place in Southeast Asia.
fclHM^TOSTRIBUj con
Ctnirco 3. In announcement by tho US of ita do to rrd.to hold South Vietnamnlnc, clthop urlvata or publio, that Ncrth Vietwi.nosef tho Vlot Cons muat cease obt tho US would launch air attacks aenimrt North Vietnam. Thia Courno would, bo tnHon in conjunction with Courao r 0.
17. Awornineai* ntttoke against North Vietnam, who thor oonvoyed privately or publicly, would evoke vary aorloua conoern amona all three Ccrcmunlst powora. arning of air attacks on North Vietnam would bo taken pnrtloulcrly seriously if it woro issued in conjunction with tho commitment of substantial US troop etron(jth, ao under Course 0, Moaoow ond *tei,:lneord the dofenae of North Vietnam aeclnot ouch on attaok aa imporative. Thay would eoek to forestall ouoh an attaok to prevent military dannco to North Vietnam and also to ovoid tha risk of expanded hostilitioo. If thearning were elver, privately, the Ccmunlet powers would probably fool that their intersould beat bo served by nicking publio the warning and castigating ithroat to world poaco* Thay would .robably see considerable advantago in thia ooursa and in bringinR tho oaso boforo the DM oven if they did not believe that tha U3 wasroto makeon ita thro**.
LDU^^TlSTA] UTICK
Mnaei* and helping would probably announoo thoirto defend tha Karth Vietnam acalnat attaok and atroaa that any such nation would oorjy tho risk cf general war. Tha Ooatnunlfft poworu would probably alao tako oartaln nllitary moasuroa not only to mnko orodibla thoir position but alao to ;irovida for ln-ivovod idr dofor.so of North Vietnam. These noasuvos would probably inoludo thu stationing of Soviot and/or Ghlnoae Oonjminist oir-oraft and antiaircraft unlta ln North Vietnam. It is alao poaaibloNorth Vietnamese" Air Faroe, oamplota with Jot fichtore, ndchtba unvoilod, Tho Soviot leadora would probably oalouloto that thoy oould, ly such political and nllitary meaauros, gonerato suffioiont worlduida praasuroa to diBOundo tha US fron ita throat, particularly if it oould bo dopiotodhroat to uae nuclear weapons. While not do airingajor military incident, tho USSR and Communist Ohino would ho detorminod tondue tine thoneelvoo inanner aa to let the US ojr.oluda that it haday to stop Ocmmunist support of "Nationalvomonta.
19. If tho US did oubjoot North Vietnam to air attnoka, tho USSR and Ocacunist Ohina would commit air powor to dof end North Vlatnan, They would probably undertake retaliatory nttaoka agalnat toxflotB In South Viotnam and acainst tho base* or onrrioro from
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whloh tlw attacks on North Vietnam had boon launched. Thosenttooloj vould probably bo ma daNorth Viotnamsso" Airiiloh would, in Toot,ixed fores. Similarly, a
response.
20. ostulated oouraas of U3 aotion in South Vietnam would have anon Oomouniat tnotioaoa. Tho Carrrjunlata would {ratably intarprot tho US action (oxcept poasi.bly Gaurae A) aa evidencetiffening US attitude ln Southeast Asia. Thoy would prifcably drag their foot in tho necotiotior.fi rt Qoneva and step up thoir off carta to consolidate and expand thoir military and political position in Loos,
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( III, NON-CCvMIMlST REACTIONS
21. South Vietnam, Moat South Vlatnaiwse would atro/tgiy welcomer fi. In view of the seriousness of the aeourlty situation and its advoraa lmpaot on national morale, we do not believeubatantlal lncreaae In tha innber of Awrloano ln Vietnam would generate any appreciable concern that the country waa coning under US da-^natlon. While supporting the Introduction of laroor numbera of troopa auch aa envisaged undor Course C, the South Viotnajwae Government would probably desire that they be used, at least initially,tatle dsfonse force freeing South Vletnnnoos military unlta for oombat operations. The introduction ofS forco might precipitate somereaction within middle and lower eohelona of theand within oortnln intellectual elemonta in Saigon*
The people of South Vletnan would also stronglyS announcement of dotormlnation to defend South Vietnam, but would bo apprehensive of Ccemunlet retaliation against South Vietnam cities ahould the US sttaok tha cities of North Vietnam.
Laos. Phouwl and Doun Oura would probsbly interpret Courses D, C,S dooialon to harden its position in
,
U
DITTOS
Asia and aa raioing the llkallhocd of US support of their poaltlon in Laos, eapecially if hoatilitiea ware resumed in that country. Souvanna Phouma would probably feel that hla poaition had bocorao impossible to maintain and he would probably eithor awing fnlly to tho aide of Hanoi or abandon the field to tho Pathet Lao.
2U. Crjgbodlq. Sihanouk would te highly concerned by any lncraaae ln US military activity in South Vietnam, fearing that it might lead to on expansion of hostilities in which Cambodia would hooome involved. Kia traditional fear and suspicion of Thailand and South Vietnam would color hia viows as to US Intentions. He would continue to be susceptible to Soviot or Chinese Communist pressures to sccarmodste Cambodian policy to Qloo purposes in Southeset Asia. Sihanouk would, howover, seek to keep the North Vletnamoao regime at arms length.
EA TO. With the exception of tha UK and Franco, tho SBATO members would welocme Courses A, B,o evidence of BS determination to defend lte allies in Southeast Asia. Tho SEATO members would be In varying degrees apprehensive of any US threat to carry tho war to North Vietnam. France would almost cortainly refuse to take part in any military ootlvity in South Vietnam and would probably oppose suoh US aotion.
26. Neutrals. Burma, India, nnd Indonesia would allery alarmed view of B, C, and D. Burma In particular le acutely eonseloua of Chinese Communist power and would be particularly susceptible to pressures from Peiping; riticism would center primarily upon the violations ofU Qonova Aocorda which would be Involved ln any of the given courses of US action. Tho ICC would file reports of tho US violations and Its members (particularly Poland snd India) would acok an internationalto resolve the conflict.
JOk*
Original document.
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