THAILAND'S SECURITY PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
THE PROBLEM
To analyze Thailand's security problems and to estimah? the trends insecurity and foreign policies over the next year.
CONCLUSIONS
the end of Worldoreign policy has beenby close and active alignment with the US. Recent events in Southeast Asia, however, have caused the Thai to question seriously the assessments underlying this policy. Although no longer convinced of the efficacy of their alliance with the West, the Thai have not yet come tothat their interests would be served by withdrawing from it
The Thai leaders are now seekingevidence of US determination and ability to halt the Communist advance in Southeast Asia. At the same time, we believe that Thailand will soften the sharp outlines of its anti-Communistand examine the possibilities of some alternative to total reliance on the West. However, we do not believe that the Thai Government will undertake any far-reaching accommodation with theBloc or withdraw from alliance with the West at least within the next year or so.
hinese Communist or Northovert military attack against Thailand is highly unlikely, at least for the period of this estimate. Communist policy toward Thailand will probably be directed at moving Thailand away from close association with the US andeutralist position. To this end the USSR and Communist China willconcentrate on political pressure, military threats, and economicrather than on major guerrillaThe Communists will, however,their subversive and organizational efforts in Thailand, and incidents ofterrorism will probably occur. The internal security situation inparticularly in the northeastis likely to deteriorate during the period of this estimate. )
DISCUSSION
THAILAND'S FOREIGN POLICY REAPPRAISAL
The historic character of Thai diplomacy has been to balance one power againsttoommunity of Interest with the strongest power in Southeast Asia, toimely accommodation to changes in the area's power realities, and, above all, to avoid policies so rigid as to makeirect confrontation with the dominant power. This enabled Thailand to outlast the thrust of European colonialism and to emerge relatively unscathed from the period ofimperialism.
Since the end of the Second World War, Thailand's foreign, policy has beenby close and active alignment with the US. The Thai Government has generally supported US policies in the Far East and ln the UN, and lt has been outspokenly anti-Communist. The constancy of this policy is explained by the basic assessments made by the Thai leaders that the US was the dominant world power, and that alliance with the US would enhance Thai international prestige and would insure sympatheticof Thai Interests by the major powers.
Later, when the Chinese mainland had fallen to the Communists and Communist armed uprisings were raging In Burma,and Malaya, the Thai leaders made further basic assessments which served to draw Thailand still closer to the US. Tbey concluded that communism was an urgent threat to Thailand's Independence andthat open alliance with the West would deter the Communist aggression, and that the US had the ability and the will to defend Thailand. The Thai leaders also found that outspoken anticommunism opened the way to extensive US economic and military aid.
However, as Communist China's power in the Far East Increased, as the position of the Western Powers in Southeast Asia declined, and as neutralism spread throughout South and Southeast Asia, the Thai Government began to feel isolated and dangerouslyIt was, in part, to reassure Thailand that SEATO, with headquarters In Bangkok, was organizedhailand has been very active in SEATO and has encouraged moves to strengthen the organization.the Thai Government has always looked to the US, rother than to SEATO as such, to prevent the expansion of communism in Southeast Asia and to protect Thailand against attack.
Recent events in Southeast Asia,during the past year, have caused the Thai to question seriously the assessments underlying Thailand's post-World War IIpolicy. SEATO'b Impotence during the Laotian crisis has shaken Thailliance with the West as the best means of delerrmg Communist aggression. TheCommunist campaign of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam has further Intensifiedsense of insecurity. Tho Thai leaders are fearful of Communist infiltration across their long borders. Communist subversive activity tn the north and northeast provinces is increasing andotentially serious security problem. The That leaders are fearfulossible repetition in Thailand of the kind of guerrilla war the Communists have waged ln Laos and South Vietnam. Thai feelings ot vulnerability are enhanced by the presence in the northeastommunist-oriented Vietnamese minority and by theloyalties of the three million Overseas Chinese in Thailand.
hailand again feels itself menaced by the irruption into Southeast Asia of powerful and expansive forces. The Thai are acutely conscious of the nearness of the mass armies of Communist China and Communist North
Vietnam, and they arc convinced that Laoseutralist government can no longer serverotective butter. They arethat their rich rice-surplus countryempting target to Chinese aggression.eriod of sucholicy of accommodation carrying the sanction ofexperiencetrong appeal.
The Thai sense of national exposure and insecurity is increasing, while their confidence in US ability and willingness to defendAsia against Communist expansion is dropping. Moreover, the Thai arc becoming increastngly dubious that alliance with the US produces any special advantages ln regard to economic or military assistance not en-Joyed by neutralist states, of which theyCambodia as the most immediate and galling example. At the same time, the USSR has, for the first time, exerted strong anddiplomatic pressure on Thailand toits ties with the US.
Foreign Policy Proipccls. The Thaihaveerious reappraisal of Thailand's International posture. They have criticized SEATO's failure to act in Laos and have blamed France and the UK for this failure. Implicitly, however, their criticism of SEATOeiled and indirect expression of Thai disappointment In the US. What the Thai leaders are seeking Is some concreteol US determination, and somedemonstration of US ability, to halt the Communis! advance In Southeast Asia.
Although the Thai are no longer convinced of tbe efficacy of the alliance with the West, they have not yet come to believe that their Interests would be served by withdrawing from it. The Thaieep suspicion and fear of Communist China, and view communism as Irreconcilable with Thai identity and
The Thai military, who dominate therecognize Thailand's near totalupon the US to deter Communist attack or to protect Thailand ln the event of an attack. They are appreciative of their need for US assistance in the event of aCommunist paramilitary effort against
Thailand. The Thai leadership group, and in particular Premier Sarit, Is profoundlyto communism. Moreover, theis hopeful of new US assistanceThus, we believe it unlikely that the Thai Government will undertake any far-reaching accommodation with theBloc or withdrawal from the Western Alliance, at least for the next year or so.
if tlie Thai leaders are notby the US response to their policythey will probably conclude thatbegin attempting toasismodus vivendi with the Communistan effort would almost certainlyon immediate or abrupt redirectionforeign policy. Any shift would beneutralism rather than corrununlsmcloser rapport with MoscowPelplng, for the Thai would hopethe Chinese at arm's length in anyan accommodation with theBloc.
believe that over the next year orforeign policy will be characterisedseries of calculated ambiguities designedthe sharp outlines of Thailand'sposture, to reduce Thailand'sfrom the uncommitted nations,Increase the degree of flexibility andin Thai foreign policy.will probably present these moves toas minimal responses toor dismiss them as gestures ofsignificance. To the Soviets, thebo presented aa tentative buttoward an accommodation tointerests. In the meantime, the Thaiexpanded US military and economicwhile continuing the search foralternative to total reliance on
pace and nature ot events inSouth Vietnam will affect theThai reliance on the US andtoeutralist modusthe Communist Bloc. Furtherol the security situation inwould weaken tho already faltering
Thai resolve to maintain an anti-Communist position. If the US were to commit troops in an effort to keep South Vietnam and all or part of Laos from falling under Communist control, theernment would cooperate with the effort and would probably be willing to commit its own forces as well. The Thai would much prefer that their country be defended by fighting outside Its borders. If, however, the Thai became persuaded that the US was not willing toommitment of sufficient size or duration to protect those countries. Thai doubts of the utility of the alliance with the US would be reinforced.
death or incapacity of Premierhas been in uncertain health forwould probably not have aon Thailand's internationalPolitical power would probablythe hands of the military, but it isany single figure would dominateas Sarit has done. Althoughsuccessors in the military Juntathey appear to be moreand might be somewhatto Soviet pressures forcontacts and for Trial neutralism.
II. THAILAND'S SECURITY PROSPECTS
Situation. There has neversignificant Indigenous CommunistIn Thailand. From time to timebeen upsurges of leftist andactivity in the Thai universities,of the press have played upanti-American themes, seeking toneutralist sentiments. There hasevidence of some Communistdirected against governmentSarit regime, however, has keptand pro-Communist activity at aMore important threats toare posed by the possibility ofmilitary aggression or, moreand guerrilla activities byor other ethnic minority groups nowor which may be infiltrated into
g borders pose seriousproblems. Thailand and its neighbors are unable to seal their thinly populated boundaries against the Infiltration of agents and guerrillas. Large parts of the borders are in mountainous or heavily forested areas similar to the terrain along thefrontier. Many tribal and ethnic groups straddle the border and havemoved freely to and fro. Even tbeRiver provides no effective barrier to infiltration.
Thailand's chronically depressedprovinces provide the best target for Communist Infiltration, agitation, andand one ln which the Communists have recently become Increasingly active. These provinces compriso about one-third of Thailand's total area and about one-fourth of the population. Tho northeasterners are aware of and resent the economic difference between themselves and the central Thai. This discontent gives leftist agitation aclimate In which to function. The political vulnerability of the northeast isby the considerable ethnic anddifference between the central Thai and the northeasterners, who are more closely related to the Loo. This relationship makes Thailand particularly sensitive to Communist advances in Laos.
The vulnerability of the northeast isby the presenceietnamese minority which crossed Into Thailand from Laos as refugees duringWar.roup originally estimated at0 have beento North Vietnamhai-North Vietnam Red Cross agreement, but it isthat most of the repatriates are either very young or very old. Repatriation win probably continue, but we believe that substantial numbers of aWe-bodled and well-trained Vietnamese, wholly responsive towill remain. Thoy willontinuing threat to Thai security.
Thailand's unasslmllatcd Overseascommunity of about three millionotential security problemource of
concern to the Thai Government, Thereard-core Communist element operating among the Overseas Chinese. However, the Interests of the Chinese areand so long as commercialremain, the great majority of them will probably not risk the heavy government oppression which would almost certainlyIf they were to associate themselves with the Communist cause.
The Thai Armed Forces,urrent total strengthnd operating in conjunction withmember National Police, would be hard pressed even tointernal security in the face of sustained guerrilla activities supported and directed by Chinese Communists or North Vietnamese. Major Thai Army units are concentrated ln the vicinity of Bangkok, with the result that the army's capability to defend the country from either Invasion or subversion Is severely limited. In addition, deployment of Thaiunits to outlying regions to defend the border would be extremely difficult because of the almost total inadequacy of the rail and highway networks.
Securityommunistor North Vietnamese overt militaryagainst Thailand Is highly unlikely, at least for the period of this estimate. The Chinese leaders almost certainly estimate that such action would result in militarywith the OSajor scale, and In view of the current tension in Sino-Soviet relations the Chinese may be uncertain as to the willingness of the USSR to support them inonflict Moreover, an overtwould be out of character withChina's efforts to project an image of "reasonableness" and to win increasedfor Its policies among Asian and African nations.
Communist policy toward Thailand will probably be directed at moving Thailand away from close association with the US andeutralist position. To this end the USSR and Communist China will use political pressure, military threats, andajor guerrilla war orliberation" struggle in Thailand Is not likely during the period of this estimate. The Communists probably consider that theconditions" In Thailand must be further prepared before the phase of overt action can be initiated.
The Communists probably will, however, increase their subversive and organizational efforts, particularly in the northeast provinces. Infiltration of agents to work among theVietnamese, and Laotian minority groups, as well as among the Thai willIncrease. Communist activity among the Vietnamese minority will probably be stepped up, and incidents of Communistwill probably occur. The internalsituation In Thailand, particularly in the northeast provinces, is likely to deteriorate during the period of this estimate.
Original document.
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