CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Deployment and Forward
Movementombined-Arms Armyorder ilitary District In the Initial Periody Lieutenont-General S. Andryushchenko
Enclosederbatim translation of an article which appeared In the TOP SECRET Special collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" r'.'oyennayaublished by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Coionander.
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FOR THE DSPVri: DIRECTOR, PLANS:
Enclosure
RICHARD HELMS
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
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Original: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
cc: Military Assistant to the President
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Director for Intelligence The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Headquarters, U. S. Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the' Army
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The Director of Intelligence and Research Department of State
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COUNTRY SUBJECT
['MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Deployment and Forward 'Movementombined-Arroa Armyorder Military District in the Initial Periody Lleutenant-General S. Andryuahchenko
OF1 (Prior to May) APPRAISAL OF
Documentary
eliable source
Followingerbatim translation of an article titled "The Deployment and Forward Movementombined-Arms Armyorder Military District In the Initial Periodritten by Lleutenant-General S. Andryuahchenko.
This article appeared in1 Second Issuepecial version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (MiHiaor Thought). This journal is published irregularly and Is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. It Is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army CcmrAr.der.
District ln the. Initial Periodar Lleutenant-Generalndryushchanko
In tba event of tba sudden unleashingar by tha aggreaalve imperialistic atates, and tha absencehreat period, (ugrozbayeayy period) the combined-eras amies of border nllitary districts say find then*airesifficult situation. The territory on vhlch the troops of en amy are dispersed say be subject to eneay nuclear/ missile strikes of various yields, to chenlcal/alesile strikes, snd also to tba use of bacteriological agents.
We have set the goal of studying theoretically Insofar as possible, all aspects of the conditions of deployment and forward nor erne ntue amy In tbe area of combat operations, and to check out sone of the problems in practical troop and command-staff exercises. In addition, ve studied the combined-arms army made up of four or five divisions (two or three of them up to strength snd tbe rest in cadre fam, or at reduced strength)inisami amount of frontal means Of reinforcement. The composition of the enemy was taken to correspond with his actual formation, and the probable methods of conducting combat operations ln concrete operational directions were taken Into consideration.
In tho conditions resultingudden attack by the enemy, the nature and scope of the work of field control of an army and of commanding officers and staffs of large units (units) vlll seem unique. The basic measures of the ccamnnder and tha ataff of an army in this period should be ss follows:
to evaluate thoroughly and in the qui cheat possible time tbe apparently serious and complex radiation, chemical, end bacteriological situation evolving in the entire area of amy deployment; determine the degree of disruption of control snd communi est ions, the condition of the troops, their combat effectiveness, security, and losses, the condition of materiel reserves, snd ccsnsunicstlons routes;
to clarify, without delay, the decision which was made earlier to asve the troops forward from their permanent disposition points into areas of concentration, taking Into consideration the possibility that these areas sre contaminated; to determine, in compliance with the operational assignment of tbe srnjy, tentatively, tbe problems of
constant combat readiness in future operatlone of large units and units, to utilize all Beans and methods for the most expeditious method of notifying the troops of the decision;
to restore the disrupted control of and cosaouxl cat ions vith the large units, units, and senior
to reestablish disrupted control and ccvjsunloatlona with the large units, units, aad the senior cceaaander;
to take measures to eliminate the results of sn attackweapons of mass destruction;
to organise evacuation, dispersal, and replenishment of materiel supplies j
to determine the order of entrance on duty and processing of thfcse reservists, draftees, snd technicians arriving to join large units in cadre form or at decreased strength, taking into consideration the fact that tha terrain in tha conscription areas and the routes
of movement may be strongly contaminated by radioactive or poisonous chemical substances and by bacteriological agents;
upon receiving the operational directives from tbe district headquarters, to clarify and execute the plan worked out previously to commit the army troops in the area of ccsBbat operations, or, in the case of aa abrupt change of circumstances, to worklan for regrouping tbe troopsev direction; take aeasures to conclude quickly the preparation of large units snd unitsrolonged march, tbe reconnoitering of the routes of forward movement, reconstruct sections of roads snd rood structures that were destroyed, organize the commandant's service, combat security, and material-technical support; order full mobilisation of the large units and units designated for the formation of secondary echelonsimited amount of time, or alter the mobilization plans;ecision regarding tbe subsequent forward movement of the mobilized large units and units directly behind the troops of the first sehelon;
maintain constant control of the troopa.
All the sbove-Usted measures must be carried out simultaneously,hort period of time, measured in hours, and even la minutes, apparently under circumstances during which conalderabla losses say have taken place in comaend complements--
and transportation.
la equally' important to aecure from destruction, primarily by radiation and poisonous substances, tbe personnel sod equipment whlcb Is being mobilised snd is arriving from tbe national ecoDcmy, especially from Industrial centers which have been subjected to strikes. It would seem that the Ideal situation vould be one where tbe personnel and equipment are directed to the reception centers of the fully mobilizing large units and units along routes which ware ascertained by prior reconnaissance to be uncontanlnated. owever, the terrain will often be so contaminated that it will be difficult to establish such routes, hese circumstances the personnel and equipment will have to proceed, without tba means of radiation reconnaissance and antichemical protection,from areas wlti very high levels of radiation (concentration of poiaoncua substances -ov) or cress these sectors en route, naturally the personnel will Join tbe units unfit for combat> or will have received large doses of radiation (contamination). ddition, the lack'of recording evices might result ln tbe Inability to determine the degree of radiation received.
The way out ofituation, as we see It, isertain part of the antichemical protection equipment should not remain In the warehouses of the large units and units, but should be banded over to institutions, enterprises, and kolkhoxes, ao that the latter could then issue the equipment to the reservists 'subject to call at the timehreat situation or in ease cf necessity. The reasoning behind the advance transfer of these means la also Justified by tbe principle cf deconoeartration of materiel supplies.
Prom our point of view it is necessary to deconcentrate not only the antichemical protection resources snd part of tbe radiation and chemical detection equipment, but also clothing, by having the institutions, enterprises, snd kolkhozes Issue tbe latter directly to those subject to military call-up, with the stipulation that tbe uniforms be kept In special bags at the place of real dance.
There need be no apprehension regarding loss or premature use of part of tba clothing. Experience shows that storing such supplies in warehouseshich in turn require the maintenancearge ataff and expenditures for upkeep of the building, costs tbe government sizeable amounts, even if ve rule out the possibility of spoilage. Issuing this equipment to persons subject to call-up, and holding them responsible for it, willreat deal less. The management personnel of the enterprises (institutions) and the military
The ayatem of hospitalizing Irradiated military personnel also warrants attention. It Is known that the army doss not hare adequate hospital facilities for accepting and taking care ofersonnel, ao will be required for elimination of the consequencesudden enemy attack. Apparently lt will be necessary to send the casualties to civilian medical establishment*. However, tbe masa of tbe civilian population that received combined .lajuriea* will also be going there, and there might not be any vacancies. This question must be carefully thought out by specialists, snd the necessary decision should be made.
In our opinion, lt Is essential to examine such matters as the maintenance, even in peacetime, of fully staffed chemical protection sub -units in large units of reducedS ia knovn, during fullivision must set up six or seven reception centers for personnel and equipment, and In each one of these, posts for medical and special treetment. Besides, the division, as it is presently staffed, .does not have at its disposal the appropriate sub-units, nor are there any under the subordination of the army commander. Practicallyivision le not capable of conducting radiation, chemical, and bacteriological reconnaissance of Its on concentration area, and the army commander cannot carry out these measures in the Interests of the fleld comnsnd, amy units, and in the Interests of the armyhole. There are no means for setting up dosimetric examination of the arriving personnel and equipment tbat was mobilized from the national economy, we consider lt expedient to propose the following:
besides'a chemical protection company, the divisions st constant readiness shouldpecial treatment ccesjmny that vould be equipped with all the necessary materiel and equipment as one of the motorized rifle companies; the combat readiness of ths division vlll not be decreased by this.and thus, even in peacetime, the cadres will be ready that will subsequently be the backbone in the formation of special antichealcal protection sub-units;
in divisions of decreasedhemical protection company should be maintained, composedlatoon of radiation and chemical reconBalisaanceand two special treetment platoons, each of the latter settingpecial treatment post; regiments should maintain radiation snd chemical reconnaissance platoons comparable In composition to similar platoons in regiments at full strengthj
- in peacetime tbe army shouldull-strength separataand chemical reconnaissance company and an army chemical-protection battalion, composed of three special treatment companies.
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The ccmblned-erms snsyordor military district, deployedistance0 km from tbe probable sres of military operations during tbe Initial period of war, can make up the second echelon of tha front, since the main blow of tbe enemy ground forces will be absorbed by the troops located in tba zone near tha front. Consequently tbe army vlll receive simultaneously tbe tasks of fully mobilising tbe large units st decreased strength, snd st tbe sane time, have the large .units st constant readinessorced march to tbe area of combat operations, vith subsequent immediate engagement from the move (from the march).
Becauae of the possibility that large railroad centers may be put out of commission, snd also because of the difficulty ln effecting transport, caused by tbe difference la the gauge of Soviet and West European railroads, it is Impossible to depend on railroads slone for the transport of the troops at constant readiness. The executionombined march can be accomplished only under more favorable conditions. There Isossibility of shifting separate large units, especially from the second echelon, after they sre broughtto full strength, by sir, using military air transport. It Is most probable that,ule, the army will have to carryarch0 km on its ovn.
In our opinion, lt vould be expedient to assign to theons no lessm vide for executing the march. Inone it vould be possible to use up to six to eight routes (tvo for each division) for troop movement, sod tvo routes for-the field command of the srmy and large units snd units, sod also to carryaneuver during an abrupt change in the direction of movement or in case of destruction of communications bridges and roads.
The march formation of tbe firat echelon of the army may vary according to the number of divisions snd routes in the zone of movement. In the beginning of the march (during the first msrch periods) lt is expedient to have columns made up of similar vehicles. Tanks and artillery drawn by tracked vehlclea must travel byroutes. At the end of tbe march, possibly during the last day's march, depending upon circumstances, the march columns should be formed inay that the troops vould be reedy for Instant deployment aod commitment to battle. In our opinion, ^themiBalle
unite should follow tha forward regiments; they should be moved to the front during the last day's march with suitable protection, and should then follow the advance guard of the forward regiments.
esult of experience gained from training, weeries of prescribed norms is subject to review appropriate to tha demands of the initial phase of the war. arch0 km, using our existing vehicles, equipped with additional fuel capacity, can be executed In four march periods: the firstm, the second-m, the third upm, the fourth upm. It would be expedient to execute he last march period at night.
In the situation under review, ve feel that it would be expedient to call balta as follows: short (up to cue hourfterours of movement, long (notoursoours of movement. During the last march period (at night)houldhort haltours' duration. Personnel shouldest period after each march periodoours.
In order to maintein minimum vulnerability to destruction by nuclear weapons, to insure maximum speed of movement and execution of maneuvers when bypassing contaminated sectors snd various obstscles, it is expedient toistance of. betweenm. between battalions,m between regiments. Distances between companies (batteriea) should be the same as between vehicles, because the prescribed distance . only increases the total depth of tbe column, andule is not maintained in actual troop' movementa.
Traffic control lines should be set upours ofo have no more than two in each day's march. Settingreater number of control lines is not advantageous, because tola Units, upoint, the initiative of the commanders of largo units and-units, snd eliminates the possibility of moving the column at Increased rates of speed in sectors where the roads are of better quality, even if the routes of march are made available to the army for definite periods of time.
The commandant's service has the leading role in ensuring organised and timely transfer of troops. Careful study shows that during long marches the organization of the commandant's service presents certein difficulties, and the recommendations contained in the Manual ofervice, published backoes not completely fulfil modern requirements. The situation is radevcrae
Emm
En route the forward command post moves along with the main forces of the division, deploys and sets up communications with the troops, the command post, and thef the frontg halts and in rest areas. The commend poet of the army moves by bounds andin spots tbat ensure the use of permanent lines of coummications with the headquarters of the front, the forward command poat, and the troops. The duration of the halts will be determined in each case by the time necessary toituation report from the troops, transmitting orders to the latter, and reporting to tbe higher headquarters. Shifting the command post of the army in this manner may result in its lagging as muchm. behind the troops and the forward command post. In order to avoid thisarch made in separate sectors, the command pest' and the .forward command poet must be on the move slmultancoualy, but for periods not toours, due to the necessity of maintaining constant communications with the higher headquarters and the troops. After each march period the control points are placed in the area of disposition of the troops.
It is also expedient toorward command poetommand post within divisions on the march. They must move along asperate routes sndistance which ensures stable communications
with each other.
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Certain dixflculties are encountered in ensuring crgnramicatlona during long marches. In order to conceal the troop movements,adio nets of the marching troops cannot be used, and tbe permanent communications lines, even those on the territory of the Socialist Camp countries, may not be entirely familiar to'the communication units of the army. Those circumstances compel tha use of commandant's service radiocommunications and mobile means, above all,adio stations of the commandant's service network are set up along specific lines. These stations operate by means of rebroadcast or relay of radio signals. As each unitre-arranged signal is transmitted over the radio, vhlch is duplicated by all the other stations and is received simultaneously by tbe control points of the division and army. The signals must bene-way type, without call letters or coded service phrases- Daring thehour march, radio communications of the commandant's service are organised using shortwave stations, during the second and third, ultra-short wave Is used, and for the last day's march, consnunications are carried on with tbe assistance of radio-relay stations.
In carryingong march lt must also be taken intothat the troops ray suffer losses from the enemy weapons of mass destruction, and ln some cases entire sub-units and ever, units may be put out of action. This is particularly pertinent in cases when the personnel receive large doses of radiation. In thesea new problemeplacement of personnel losses right uring tbe march. The equipment not effected by the Shockwave"which elongs-to the radiation-contaminated sub-units and units, can be used after decontamination. It would seem that ln peacetime plans, provisions should be made to provide for the formation of sub-units and units (of the march company and battsliont tha district level that could be shifted by air to the formations carrying out the march, and which could be used later as replacements for losses sustained during combat conditions.
The conditions under which -wayorder military district that is moving forward from the depth is committed to combat, will always be determined by the nature of the combat operations carried out by the first-echelon troops of the front during the first days of the war, and it Is rather difficult to predetermine them in advance. It is most probable that the army will be committed to combat directly from tho march, and this Is always Vttendeor"by great difficultieseries of peculiarities which require detailed study.
first of all, about the work of commandera and staffs in these conditions. It is apparent that the commander and the ataff of the army will get the order from the front to commit tho army to combat while moving (marching)istancem, or more, from the front line. Therefore the clarification of the mission, evaluation of the situation, making of the decision, planning, and informing the large unite of the tasks will all be doneery limited period of time, en route, without halting. Otherwise the connanders and the staffs may straggle behind the troops and lose control.
The situation is aggravated by the fact that at the present time the staff field equipment does not ensure operation on the.march. Evenf the commander of an army does not have an equipped mobile control point capable of ensuring operation and control of troopsovementong distance. The creation from the forces and equipment of tbe troops of improvised mobile command posts, and the equipping of buses andehicles for operating in field conditions has indeed helped consfderably in cutting down the amount
of cumbersome equipment at the control, points, and has made them more mobile, but it involves great expenditures, and does not basically solve the problem. The means of radio ccessunication remain the same, and the cross-country ability of the automobile chassis does not conform to modern requirements.
While planning the commitment of the army to combat, andout of offensive operations in the entire depth,staffs must simultaneously define in detail the remainingthe march, taking into ccmalderetlon the ccemdtment of largecombat and the conduct by them of an offensive, to informof tha change In the plan of march, to control theto organize and maintain constantly coordinationlarge units opereting ahead, ensure replenishment ofand fuel expended In the march, snd to carry outof the
According to experience gained from ths var games carried out in our army, lt vould be expedient to organize the work of the commanders and staffs In similar situations in the following mannert
Beforehand, when the srmy co-mander receives the district operational directive to march, he sends out on operational group to one of tbe headquarters operating ahead of the troops in the direction that the army ia moving forward; their mission la to constantly provide Information about the situation In the area of combat operations. The group should consist of five or six persons (officer-operator, intelligence officer, artilleryman, ccnaounlcations officer, chemical officer) sodquad of lediatlon and chemical reconnaissance. It follows foam line misting/ of operations and methods of transmitting information must be planned beforehand, In peacetime.
Inasmuch as tbe army does not have an airtransportmust move in
motor vebiclss, snd the latin- must movepeed of up tom per hour. Moving twice es fast ss the army troops, the operational group will transmit the first information about the situation from the area of ecsabat operations, at the time when the troops moving forward will be halfway to tbe concentration area, or tbe line of deployment. Moving along one of the basic routes, the operational group will be able to determine the condition of the route, and after arriving at tbean fully reconnoiter the area of command poet disposition, and detersune tbe presence ofand poisonous substances and bacteriological agents. The
-Ik.
organization of ccmmainlcationa with tho operational group nutthought OUt intilising Intermediate radio stations, cceanunlcations of ths front, of tha concandsnt's service, and, with the approach of the troops, mobile equipment.
whan ha receives directives, to commit tbe amy to combat,ay ccmnmndor will sake hla decision by consulting the map. The army command post, heeded by the chief of ataff, must transmit the missions to the large units and control the forward movement of the troops, and with the forward command post the ccammnder and tha comancders of the large unite move forward to the line of commitment to battle, in order to clarify the situation, organise coordination with the troops operating ahead, resolve tbe questions of support of commitment to battle, and possibly to change the original decision. The forward command post of the army must plan the operation quickly, resolve the questions cf coordination snd supply, and together with the forward command posts of the large units, sssume control of the arriving troops. In connection with this, the forward command post must be very efficient, small in number, highly mobile, and must have adequate numbers of means of communications with the troops, the headquarters of the front,and of adjacent units.
The scope of work of the commanders and staffs underrequires detailed study,nified method end control must be worked out" Many sre oi theell these problematical questions should be formalized byStaff in official instructions oranual. We are ofopinion. It la impossible to foresee all oaaea andunder which the srmy may be ccaenitted to combat fromechelonront, and to Incorporate operating
in one official manual. It vould be nore beneficial to study similar problems constantly, check them out as much ss possible during training exercises, snd publish them ss discussions. This method develops deep thinking and. increases the general military outlook of the commanders and staffs.
It la another matter to resolveentralized manner questions regardingateriel bass for command, communications, and technical support of commanders, stsffs, and troops, with modern means of control. For instance, the critical need arises for tbe commanders of armies snd large units to haveontrol points equipped with the newest, sraallj long-range radio stations, ensuring secure conversations without resorting to numerous conversation and signal codea. In the operations department of tbe army there shouldomputer capable of quickly producing tho data needed for the
evaluation of tha(above all tbe radiation altuatlon) and arriveecision. quadron of heUcoptera should beart of the army field, to implement troop control, for conducting radiation, chemical, and engineer reconnaissance, and for fulflling other Important tasks.
Another problem which needs to be solved Is the method of recording the degree of radioactive contamination of the personnel. The commanding officerub-unit cannotritten record for each soldier, especially during the frequent transfer of personnel from one sub-unit to another, end especially afterat ion. it is eppsrently necessary to issue to personnel, individual, miniaturised devices of tbe "pencil" type, with codedhia will exclude ths possibility of independent reading of the radiation doesge received by the personnel themselves, but winccmainding officers to determine the true meaning of these doses with the aidorresponding decoding device (oneompany).
It la known that modern conditions forattle and an operation demand exceptional speed snd maneuverability by' Jherefore it is necessary, even now, to change radically their style of work. Up to this time there producing nany^documents. Even though in the pest few ye*re they have eliminated some or toe written documents, these same documents are now being worked out on maps, and often duplicate each other; thia takes
even
more of tbe staff offlcera' time than before. Frequently theW Judged by the number of documents produced. Thisfact that in allarge camber of additionaltaken from tha troops for work in the ataff. Aa yet thenot have staff field service instructions which fulfil This also appears to be one of the reasons for sehcrtccsaings in staff
avo raised call for thorough study during
coamir^-sUff exercises, war games, snd. daring the buildup ofto wartime
Original document.
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