CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
1
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
MILITARY THOUGHTi "The Most Urgent Problems of Training Conmand personnel and of Increasing the Combat Readiness of Border Military Districty Major-General A. Klyukanov
erbatim translation of an article vhlch appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Militaryoycnnayaublished'hy'the Ministry 'of Defense, USSR, and distributed dovn to the level of Army Commander.
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HE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:
Original; Tbe Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
cc: Military Assistant to tbe President
Special Assistant to the President for national Security Affairs
Director for Intelligence Tbe Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Headquarters, U. S. Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Army
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COUNTRY SSR
SUBJECT 'I LIHOUGHT: "The Host Urgentof Training Cooaand Personnel and of
Increasing the Combat Beadlness of Border Military Districty Major-General A. Klyukanov
DATE OF
OF CONTENT
SOURCE 'reliable source (By.-
Followingerbatim trauslatlon of an article titlod "The Most Urgent Problems of Training Command Personnel and of Increasing the Combat Beadlness of BorderNilitary Districtritten by. Klyukanov.
This article appeared ln1 First Issuepecial version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This Journal is published Trregularly and is classified TOP SEC BET by the Soviets.1 First Issue of Military Thought was sent for typesetting on0 and sent to press on It la distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Ccemisnder.
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The Most Urgent Problems of Training Command Personnel
and of
Increasing the Combat Readiness of Border Military District Staffs
by
Major-General A. Klyukanov
Timely proposals'have been appearing in the pages of our military press with regard to the improvement of the methods of operational training of generals, senior of fleers, and staffs. Ve believe that, in addition to the problems advanced by the authorsumber of articles, the necessity has arisen to examine ways of qualitative improvement of the organization of the training of troop command personnel of border districts with the aim of bringing it even*closer to the operational assignment of troops and to the conditions which the generals and officers will meeteal situation of the initial periodar.
The maintenance of tbe constant combat readiness of our Armed Forces in order to strike, if the necessity arises, an immediate and crushing blow on the enemy, demands from generals and officerontinual and comprehensive theoretical elaborationractical fulfillmenthole series of most important measures.
The command personnel of border district troops, who will be the first to engage in battle, must pay particular attention to working out measures for training troops for swift combat action directly out ofareas along definite operational axes.
As Is known, the concept of combat readiness of troopsumber of factors,including the following decisivehe comprehensive theoretical and practical preparedness of generals and officers and of their organizational ability. The higher the level of the theoretical training and of the professional and political qualities of officers and generals, the higher the degree of combat readiness and combat efficiency of the troops and staffs.
In order to be prepared for immediate combat operations along the probable operational axes envisaged by the plan of operation for the initial periodar, the basic troop command personnel of border military districts and armies (by the latter we have ln mind Military Councils of armies and the command elements of line large units) must know tha operational assignment of the formations and large units.
Unfortunately, commanders of large units and commanders of armies do not know the specific combat tasks which they must fulfill in the course of tha Initial operations. This may leadituation similar to the one quite well known from the sad experience of the initial period of World War II,eault of the staffs' loss of control of operational formations, some commanders of large units did not know what to do during the surprise offensive of the German-fascist army.
In modern conditions of warfare, with the widespread use of nuclear/missile weapons, lt will be difficult, ln the eventhort threat period, to accomplish combat tasks to work out and organize the total sum of measures for repelling the enemy offensive, and lt will be completely impossible to implement practical study of the directions designated for the conduct of troop combat operations, of specific lines, and of objectives on them.
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If wo assume that there vlll be no threat period and that the enemy, by sudden massed strikes of nuclear/missile weapons, aviation, and other means of attack, willar and vlll disable some higher staffs, then the importance and acuteness of the need for advanced (even la peacetime) transmission of their operational assignments, even if only to commanders of line large units and commanders of border armies vlll increase many fold, as vlll also the study of the probable directions of their combat operations.
Undoubtedly, strict secrecy must be observed in the study and elaboration of these important problems vhlch have great State significance. To these ends, it ia necessary to think through and carryhole series of measures in order that tbe entire operational plan for the initial periodariven direction remain secret.
We believe that staffs of military districts should organize one or two specialear for commanders "of armies and commanders of line divisions,iew to raising ths readiness of the basic troop command personnel of border military districts to assume immediate control of units and large unite of first-line readiness in their movement directly out of concentration areas on predeslgnated axes and in their commitment to battle. In these training exercises and studies, there should be an elaboration of the measures dealing with the organization of troop combat operations in accordance with their real operational assignments.
To these same ends, lt is desirable to conduct special tactical rides (polevaya poyezdka) along probable axes and lines of troop movement in initial engagements, both on the territory of the Soviet Union and on the territory of the bordering peoples' democracies. Our border military districts, aa is known, are located at various distances from tbe national borders of capitalist countries. Consequently, the conditions for conducting combat operations during a
surprise attack by the eneay will be different for the troops of different districts. Some will have to operate independently from the territory or on the territory of the Soviet Union. Others, in all probability, will engage in battle in coordination with armies of the countries of the Socialist Camp either oa the territory or from the territory of these states. In our opinion, the above-mentioned circumstances explain the great importance of careful advance study by command personnel of concrete operational axes in their areas.
In recent years, during command-staff exercises on the ground dealing with the initial periodrovisional national .border waa usually established deep within the territory of our country. Staffs were concentrated and provisional groupings of our troops and of probable enemy troops were created behind this provisional border. The execution of combat operations of the antagonists was carried out in the zone along the provisional national border and then to either side of It (in the direction of the actual border or into the depth of theut always on the territory of the Soviet Union. The training goals of these exercises were fulfilled but removedertain extent from the actual situation in which troops find themselves in peacetime and from those concrete tasks they will have to fulfill in the first daysar.
Of course, such exercises are highly useful for the numerous staffs and for the generals and officer personnel participating in them, and it is extremely nocessary to conduct them in the future. However, along with such exercises, command-staff exercisea under conditions existing in the border territory should be conductedimited number of troop command personnel of border military districts.
In accordance with instructions of the Minister of Defense in his directive on operational trainingt would be an extraordinarily useful method of
training troops and staffs toeries of exercises sod group exercises which would begin with placing staffs on combat alert and with their transfer to the established concentration areas.
In such exercises and group exercises, the possible nature of tbe combat operations of the probable enemy's army should be studied not only from the point of view of his approach to methods of surprise attack and to the conduct of combat operations in general, but' yafl with regard to those probable tasks which enemy troops may have In the engagements of the initial periodar. In connection with this, lt is necessary to take the
f
rouplng of our troops, border armies, and military lstricts actually existing at tbe present time with their actual composition, TOE, number of large units, units, and the areas of their actual concentration.
In the plans for these exercises, it is essential to reflect the concrete conditions of the disposition of the troopsorder military district, the probable nature of the operational situation and the tasks of formations and large units, not disclosing by this, of course, the real operational plan.
Vor example, the troopa of the border Odessa Hllitary District are deployedistanceilometers from the coastal borders of countries of the aggressive military bloc (Turkey, Greece). The probable enemy plana,,by meansurprise launching of nuclear strikes by missiles, aircraft, and naval forces in this direction during tbe Initial periodar, to destroy or annihilate the vitally important administrative-political, economic, and military centers of Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, and of the southwestern oblasts of tbe Soviet Union and,imultaneous invasion by ground troop/ groupings deep into the territory of
the socialist countries, to seize the nost important objectives and to rout the basic army troop groupings oi' countries friendly to us.
It Is to be expected that the enemy vlll assign his troops tho mission of destroying, by means of nuclear/missile strikes, or of capturing, by means of dropping airborne forces and by operations of mobile units of ground troops, the existing crossings over the Danube giver and other vater barriers and also the basic passages across the Eastern Carpathians and Transylvanlan Alps, in order to cut off and isolate the troops of Albania, Bulgaria, and Rumania from Soviet troops.
In such conditions, it seems essential to us that the basic command personnelistrict and the personnel of its large units study the following problems ln the system of operational and command preparation; the organization and the conduct of marches over long distances; the crossing of vater lines, mountain passages and passes under conditions of enemy counteractions; the organization and conduct of meeting engagements as the most typical form of troop combat operations under the conditions of an invasion initiated by the enemy; the organization of capturing and holding advantageous lines until the second troop echelons, mobilized at the beginningar, are brought up; the problems of the organization of coordination with the armies of the peoples* democracies; measures for materiel, technical, and medical support, and other problems.
In the example under consideration, district troops may encounter particular difficulty ln the organization and conduct of regroupings over considerable distances with an exit, if such Is required, for example, into the territory of southern Rumania and Bulgaria. The fact is that during the conductegrouping by combined methods (units move on thoir own on wheeled transport and tracked equipment is transported bypproximately
twice as much time ia demanded for completeof troops than if they had completed tha march exclusively under their own power. The difference ln width of railroad gauge ln the USSR and ln Bumaoia and Bulgaria requires additional time for transloadlng tanks and other tracked equipment, by dint of which tanks will not be able to take part ln combat operations simultaneously with their units and large units which completed the march by motor vehicle. We consider the best method of regrouping under conditions of nuclear/miaalle war to be the simultaneous movement of units and large units under their own power. To this end units of tho Odessa Military District, for example, are conducting appropriate studies to increase the cruising range of wheeled and tracked vehiolesilometers by adding to the amount of fuel contained in the vehicles.
Measures for combat, engineer, materiel-technical and other types of march support will require the most serious attention,and they need, ln our opinion, further study and clarification during the oxerclses and group exercises proposed by us. It seems necessary to us, ln this connection, to solve all problems of the planning of regrouping and of the conduct of our troop combat operations ln coordination with the Rumanian and Bulgarian armies.
We have dwelt ln detail on one example ln order to show how important lt will be, in our opinion, to conduct operational training of command peraonnal of border military districts under conditions as close as possible to the probable nature of military operationsiven operational direction. Such training, carried out in advance in peacetime, willarge number of problemsheoretical nature and will fulfill practical preparatory measures of organizational and technical procedure.
It is perfectly obvious that with attentive examination in each border militarypecial list of problems, questions, and measure a
tamp]
vlll arise which must be solved ln accordance vith the given conditions of the theaterX7 operations and vith local peculiarities.
The Armed Forces of the USSR have good experience In strengthening friendly contacts and in organization of coordination vith the armies ot the Warsaw Pact countries, and also In the study of the general principles of combat operations from the command-staff and other exercises to which command personnel and aome staffs of formations of tho armies of the peoples1 democracies are invited. Unfortunately, this experience is not shared evenimited number of generals and senior officers of the Soviet troops deployed in the border military districts who, in case of war, must personally direct combat operations of their troops ln coordination with the troops, and on or from the territory of the countries of the Socialist Camp.
For example, in the practical conditions of the Odessa Military District, for raising tho combat readiness of large unit commanders and of the comnand element of operational formations, and with the aim of establishing coordination, strengthening friendly ties, and becoming familiar with the armies of Rumania and Bulgaria, for the study of the terrain, probable lines of combat operations, water obstacles, mountain passages and passes, road conditions and other peculiarities of the theater of military operations, it is highly expedient to assign command personnel periodically to exercises o'f troops and stairs or thedemocracies, to organize field and milltary-historical trips, tourist trips, and excursions, to send generals and senior officers for rest periods to the sanltoria of these countries, and to utilize other possibilities. All this will contribute to the careful study of the theater ot military operations and of actual operational axes.
Under modern conditions the small peacetime composition of the ground troops of border military districts will be reinforced, if the situation demands.
with large units aad formations by full mobilization of the latter. These complex and responsible tasks, naturally, must constantly be the cynosure of attention of tbe command personnel and higher staffs. In light of these demands on the command-staff exercises proposed by us, it is necessary to explore all aspects of the organization ot troop controlorder military district connected with the difficulties of simultaneous solution of two problems: the conduct of combat operations and the fullroope. Thus, in the peacetime composition of troopsilitary district there are line divisions (of lncroased combat readiness) and divisions of reduced strength. The field command of an army, amy units, and front units are also kept at reduced strength. It is natural tbat the line divisions, after concentrating in their areasesult of combat alert, willarch to fulfill combat tasks, and that divisions of reduced strength, army units and supporting subunits of army headquarters will begin full mobilization.
Therefore, the commander and the field command of an army must assure firm control of large units on the march and of their combat Operations in the event of deployment for engagement with the enemy and, simultaneously, to direct the conduct of full In this connection, the distance between the large unitsarch or engaged in battle and the areas of full mobilization, will increase continually. This Is why lt is necessary to work out right now methods by which* a'reduced strengthvith limited means of communication could assure uninterrupted control of troops until the completion of mobilization and the bringing up of fully mobilized units and large units to the area of combat operations of the first echelon of the army.
Therefore, problems of the organization of troop control of border formations in the course of the first operations of the initial periodar demand urgent study and practical assimilation.
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Without question, tho mastery of practical measures for full troop mobilization is connected with the removal of people and equipment from the production of material wealth. This Is an expensive measure for the State and it is, therefore, undertaken very rarely. At the same time, the demand for full mobilization of various large units within the shortest time is especially important for the formations of border military districts, because the speed of buildup of first-echelon troop strength, consistingimited number of divisions of increased combat readiness,epend on the period required for fully mobilizing large units and units of reduced strength,of which,ule, the second echelons and reserves of armies will be created.
As is known, the military leadership of the imperialist states is planning in advance to launch nuclear strikes in the initial period of war, against the most important administrative-political centers, with the aim ofcontrol and disrupting the mobilization and buildup of the armed forces of the countries of the Socialist Camp. These intentions'of the aggressive circles must be considered in our mobilization preparations and work.
In our opinion. It is necessary to organize Joint special exercises of the basic command personneltroops and of military commissariats, in tnese exercises we should work out andhole series of measures directed primarily at:
the maximum curtailment of the time required for full mobilization of the troops;
the protection of the personnel, motor transport and other equipment withdrawn from the national economy for the mobilization and buildup of troops, from nuclear strikes and other enemy means of mass destruction;
the creation of conditions for stable and uninterrupted control of the process of full mobilization.
The above-mentioned problems of improving the training of generals, senior officers and of the readiness of the staffs of border military districts for control of troop combat operations do not encompass the whole range of tasks, in support of troop combat operations, which must be fulfilled by operational formations and large units on their entry into engagements of the initial periodar directly from concentration areas and of full mobilization along designated directions;however,they ore, in our opinion, most Important in the problem of increasing the combat readiness of our border district, troops.
Original document.
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