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MEMORANDUM FOR: Tha Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
MILITARY THOUGHT: "Nuclear/Missile Armament
and Some Principled of Militaryy Major-General of the Engineering-Technical" Service M. Goryainov
Enclosederbatim translation of an article vhlch appeared In the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of tbe Journal "Military Thought" F'voyen.-iayaublished by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.
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SUBJECT qLTTARY THOUGHT: "Nuclear/Missile ArmamentPrlnciplea of Militaryy Major-General of the Engineering-Technical Service M. Goryalnov
DATE OF INFO: S0
APPRAISAL OF
Documentary
reliable source
Follovingerbatim translation of an article titled "Nuclear/Missile Armament and Some Principles of Militaryritten by >taj or-General of the Engineering-Technical Service M. Goryalnov.
This article appeared In0 Second Issue of aof the Soviet military Journal Toyennava My si f This Jonxnal is published irregularlyTOP SECRET by the
of
Military Doctrine by
Major-Gen*ral of the Engineering-Technical Service
H. Goryainov
Universal recognition of the enormous andsignificance of nuclear/missile
as experience shows, does not exclude various opinions nor even radical divergencies in the evaluation of its influence on armed combat. Divergence of views on the principles of preparing for and conducting modern war, as well as on ths structure of the armed forces naturally follows from this.
In ths history of the development of armed forces there are many known instances when new equipmentespite its universal recognition/ oontinued o be underestimatedlong tine, and did not find its true place in tha army. In addition, obsolescent equipment was over-evaluatedrolonged period of tints, thus holding back understanding of the newquips* nt.
Something of the sort is taking place right now in ths introduction of ths newest types of armament and in ths clarification of their role in warfare. reat number of works and official and non-official studies have been published in many countries, in which the new weapons are evaluated and conjectures are made on their use and on the necessary reorganiza-
tion of armies.
1JMW
In thla literature it is quite clearly shown that the agonizing process of reorganization is still far from being completed even in rough form, and that there is still insufficient clarity regarding the decisive problems.
Judging by the special literature, everything which is being accomplished in the area ofand reorganization of forces, particularly of ground troops, thus far conforms well with existing, old military doctrines, principles and views on the conduct of battles, of operations and of the warhole. Questions regarding the duration of war, its sweep, the enlistment of human masses into the armed forces and the role of the economic potential aro all examined in the light of old military theories.
In specific terms, this is expressed in thehat the new weaponry is for the most part consideredeans of considerably increasing the firepower of the army; therefore, there is basically nothing new from the organizational point of view. ew technical means of combat hasew arm of troops is created, as was the case with aircraft, tanks, and still earlier, with artillery. The old arms of troops are modernized as much aa possible and "assimilate" nuclear charges, and missileaArmies continue to consist of the usual arms' 'ofi'r (modernized, oflus missile troops.
In other words, the process of assimilating tho new means of armament which is now taking place can e characterized as follows: proceeding from the experience of the past and taking into consideration the achievements of the present, armies are adapting nuclear/missile armament to tbe established views on the preparation and conduct of war.
Thisaturallessed by the ages -of an empirical approach to the solution of little-explored problems. Such an approach, which is the
possible and normal one for the military science of capitalist countries, is completely unacceptable to the armies of the socialist countries, the military science of which is built on Marxist-Leninist teachings on war. Obviously, wo must go faster and further both in the theory of using nuclear/missile weapons and in their production.
However, as is known, there are substantial gaps in our military-theoreticalumber of problems we have not shown the necessaryscientific boldness and daring, and we have long marked time".1
What, in our vlow, are the reasons why our military-theoretical thought lags behind the practical problem of organizing the army?
The first reason, an organizational-methodological one, lies in the fact that the indispensable minimum of tactical-technical information about the new means -not only ours but also theeaches the organizations which carry on military-technical work in extremely scanty amounts. This leads to insufficient understanding of and under-evaluation of nuclear/mlBsile weapons. Together with this, certain technical perfections and modernizations of of'widely known and lead to their ovor-evaluation*ontemporary conditions.
The next reason is more complex. We received our initial information on nuplear means of varfarVfrom American sources. These broadly showod the properties of low-yield nuclear weapons. As far as their potentialitiesull-scale war are concerned, low-yield nuclear weapons (and medium-yield bombs as well)
I. From the speech by R. Ta. Malinovskiy at the All-Army Conference of Socretarles of Primary Party Organizations.
-4-
are primarily operational and operational-tactical weapons. In our view, they are legitimately consideredeans of increasing troop firepower, and the use of them conforms well with previous principles of conducting war. Our own military thought has also lingered more than was necessary on the analysis of tha potentialities of low-yield nuclear bombs and, ln fact, has not approached the study of the potentialities of powerful, multi-megaton nuclear bombs.
It is clear to all that event nuclear charges with missiles call for tremendous changes ln tha conduot of war and for fundamental changes in tha conduct of battles and operations. But tho question of what changes follow from the use of intercontinental missiles with chargesgt and even mora, remains little-explored to the present time. The first widely published positions on these questions were expressed. Khrushchev and it. Ta. Mallnovskly in speeches at tha January session of tha Suprome Soviet of tha USSR and later in an address by B. Ta. Ualinovakly to the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Local Party Organizations. In tha light of these widely known statements, we consider lt necessary to dwell on some of the characteristics of highly powerful nuclear bombs
with THT equivalents in millions of
. ji! y . '-"V
te know from publications of tha existence of bombsorce ln TNT equivalents0 andillion tons.
Calculations can be found in American reference books of the combat effects of bombs,illion t. In order to be able to imagine the military significance of such means of destruction, we will touch in passing on the potentialities of destruction and annihilation of megaton bombs, about which some materials have been published.
Below la Tablehlch shows the combat effectiveness of megaton bombs In relation to their yield (area is in sq. Jos.)*
TABLE 1
Characteristics
of radio-
in TNT -
wave
crtnt.ani1nfLt.1nn
cloud (sq. km.
(thousand
terrain
to
i
app.lOOr
Note: 1. The table was complied on the basis of foreign materials.
2. Exposureose-r causes death in more thanercent of cases; radiation of upeath of up toercent; the rest lose combat effectivenessumber of months; dosesr cause nausea and vomiting In up toercent of the cases and partial loss of combat effectiveness in the rest.
It can be seen from the Table that megaton bombs raise thousands and tens of thousands of cubic kilometers of radioactive dust into thehore. This dust settles back to earth quite quickly, contaminating thousands, and tens of thousands of square kilometersethal concentration and hundreds of thousands of square kilometersombat concentration (boyevayahe flash (svetovoye izluchenlyo) and the shock wave are devastating only at the moment of action, but the radiological factor of megaton bombs is hundreds of times more important.
As is well known, various shelters protectgainst tho shock wave and the flash. No sheltersn practicalrotect troops from the radioactive substances of megaton bombs, the action of which lasts for many days and weeks, and extends over tremendous areas.
hows convincingly thatof terrain by megaton bombs canprincipal factor of combatT
Let us examine more fully the radiological action0 mgt bomb on the basis of testing carried but by the Americana. ' "
Inn the atoll of Bikini, in the Pacificomb was explodedNT equivalent ofillion t. During the explosion, fromillion t.illion t. of various radioactive particles of earth were thrown into the atmospheref conventionally explodedf earth Is not so very much) .
As was reported in publications,esult of radioactive fallout as early asours after the blast, the cumulative dosage of radioactiveIn an area ofhousand sq. km., and in an area of approximatelyhousand sq.t.
In an operational situation,housand sq. km. can be considered as the territorj occupiedront (ans. vide0 km.e imagine that with the correct exploitation of meteorological conditions, the covering of the territoryront with the radioactive products of the explosion of onegt bomb would not only lower the combat effectiveness of tbe troops of the front, but would also necessitate theirignificant portion of, if not the whole of that territory.
If,esult of meteorological conditions, the radioactive products of the explosion have the possibility of spreading to an even greater area, then it turns out that in aa areahousand sq. km. the level of radiation will be, and in an areahousand sq. km.
Perhaps the figures cited here are only the product of theoretical calculations not based on actual testing. Unfortunately not. Preparing for the testing of thermonuclear bombs, the Americansanger zone in the Pacific Oceanhousand sq. km. But as is known,aen of thekuryuhichm. from;the point of de'tOMt ion;tinhabitants Of the Mnrahn.ll Islands and Aaorlcnn ailltury personnel on the atoll of Bungelap,istanceilesrom the epicenter, all sufferedesult of the explosion
These facts forced the Americans during the repeat tests onarch anday to extend the danger zonehousand sq.hat la, by six times. expeditionary vessels which were at sea from May to July established that contamination of water took place in an area bounded bytoNorth Latitude
hese figures were taken from the book, "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*.
)
toEast Longitude, that is, an areahousand sq. km. Two months after the last explosion, the radioactivity of the wateristancem. from the island of Bikini still exceeded byimes tbe maximum permissible dose for drinking water.
If one takes into consideration the fact that such countries as West Germany and England arehousand sq. km. in area, the meaning of tha residual radiation of onegt bomb blast becomes clear from all points of view.
In our view, it should be absolutely clear from the above that nuclear bombs of great yield are aboveeans of radiological contamination of vast areas with all tne resulting consequences.
As was already stated,omb ofgt is not maximal. If it is found to be advisable,
shock wave and flash are given for optimum conditions. This cannot be said for radiological contamination of terrain. It Is known'that'surface burstsTincrease the radiological potential Hies of bombs, while air bursts decrease them. Nevertheless, test studies indicate that usuallyoercent of the high-energy particles fall out in tho areas of the burst, and the rest, penetrating tha high layers of the atmosphere, fall out during the course of many years and cannot have any significance for military purposes,;
This means that from the military point-of view megaton bombs can be even more effectiveimes if optimum conditions for the burst are established from the radiological point of view. In order to do this, it is necessary first of all to know the most advisable heights for bursts. Apparently contact bursts of megaton bombsertain digging-ln to
tbe earth vlll permit tbe raising into the air of more radioactive particles, and inase more of these vill fall out in the aroa of the burst and fever vlll escape into the stratosphere. Besides this, the chemical composition of the ground and soils of the blast areas can alsoreat influence on Increasing the effectiveness of the blast products. Such elements as sodium, iron, silicon, and others can substantially increase the radioactive mass of particles which are raised into theirm knowledge of local meteorological conditions in possible strike areas becomes of enormous significance to the proper use ofpowerful bombs. These conditions should be studied well in advance, and materials should be systematically amassed in such amounts that they wouldood prediction of the meteorological conditions at any given time.
Let us oxamlne the problem of employing powerful nuclear_weapons in operational-tactical situations.
That does radioactive contamination of areascombat formations of troops? As an example,examine the effect of bomb strikes in areasoccupied by combat formations of troops on(Table. .
hows that nuclear bursts will' causa death by radioactive contamination for large masses of people dispersed over tremendous areas in the courseew hours aftor the bursts. ivision whichq. km. is liquidated withgtivisions, occupying an area of upq.ill lose their combat significance with the strike of two orgt bombs or of one orgt bombs, duringarge percentage of the personnel may die and the rest will have to be immediatelyield army (in thephousand men) can be liquidated,ilitary organism withmgt bombs. At the same time, in addition to contamination,oercent of the territory (hundreds and thousands of square kilometers) would be devastated by the shock waves and by fires from the flash.
Approximately the same results would be obtained if the combat formations of troops on the offense were examined.
Analysis of the data in the Table from theview of effective use of nuoloar bombs showsof large yield are more advantageousbombs, bothombat and frompoint 'of view.
Let us examine an example. In order to force the enemy troops to abandon an areaq.t is necessary to carrytrikes with bombs oft yield in the courseew hours. To launchumber of missilesew hours, it would be necessary to use up to ten troop missile organizations eachen andehicles of all types. Working under combat conditions, everything else being equal,roop organization will suffer losses proportional to the amount of its personnel and equipment.
Tha aame area can be destroyed withombsgt orombgt. This will be carried out /one or two wordsimes faster and, under equivalent conditions, with losses smaller to the degree that the number of people" Involved 'ars fewer and to tho degreV'that they wereositions for less
It must also be noted that the productionombs oft is apparently considerably more expensiveombsgt.
Does this mean that small-yield bombs are completely unnecessary? No. If bombs of megaton yield, correctly used, are capable of deciding the fates of nations and the over-all outcome of the war, then kiloton bombs will be completely effective for-the destruction and elimination of individual targets, for the most part the delivery vehicles (nositel) of nuclear/missile
weapons, individual bases, and launching pads. Kiloton bombs will also be needed in operations with strategic goals, particularly when it Is necessary to avoid unnecessary victims.
The existing concept that the primary form of using nuclear/missile weapons is the operational-tactical form arose ln the army from earlier doctrine on warfare. This form narrows the technical possibilities of nuclear weapons, leads to andecrease ln the yield of nuclear weapons and ultimately makes it necessary to have mass quantities of small-yield nuclear weapons, andarge number of ground troop missile units, the effective use of which becomes in itself problematical.
Even today thereidespread opinionuclear/missile weapon la fabulously expensive, that he basic raw materials used in its construction are obtained with great difficulty and in small quantities. This leads to the conclusion that the economic factor does not permit giving thisufficiently maaa character. In this connection we will briefly examine the following two questions: the understandingmass quantity (aassovost) as applied to nuclear^missile armaments and .the cost of nuclear
What do we mean by mass quantity as concerns missiles and nuclear equipment? This question has fundamental significance in the evaluation of the role of new means of warfare and In the understanding of the nature and peculiarities of nuclear/missile Nuclear means of warfare are soomparatively small number of them can already be considered mass.
tomic bombs canurning pointattle and assure victory, then this number can be considered aa masspecific goal. If, in order toorldhermonuclear bombs are sufficient, then this quantity will also be considered sufficiently mass.
Therefore, "mass quantity" should be understood not as just any large quantity, but as that quantity which satisfies the requirement or need for itefinite degree. From this point of view as regards nuclear/missile armaments the concept^ -mass quantity" will mean that quantity which permits
the quality of individual means of armament to be
manifestedecisive
Xn light of this, the numbers of bombs mentioned above may be considered as "mass" for all practical purposes.
From tho speech of Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade B. Ta. Mallnovskly lt followsgt bombs willerritory of upq. km.esert. To inflict utter defeattate or states, it is, of course, unnecessary to completely destroy everything. It is important to destroy the important residential centers whose areas comprise not even ten butew percentage points of the over-all territory. It follows that theombs are capable of demoralizing the resistancetate which occupiesq. km.reat deal more, for example, all the Vest European NATO allies. In thisgt bombsufficiently mass quantity, sinceroblem of defeating the enemy In Western Europe is solved with this number.
esult of exercises in the USA during which strikes were delivered againstutypical city areas, it was calculated that these strikes by powerful bombs threatened to liquidatef the entire population, up to 50 percent of the means of transportation end up toof American industrial enterprises. By analogy with these figures, it followsmgt bombs can incapacitate no less than three-fourths of the industry and more thanpercent of the population of the USA.
Therefore,mgtgt bombs are tho quantity which, if used correctly, will docide the outcome of theith this figure we exhaust the understanding of mass quantity for bombs of given yields. To use this quantity of powerful bombs we evidentlymall number of strategic missile troop units.
The situation is different as concerns low-yield bombs. In radiological effect, the above-mentioned number of powerful bombs is equivalentkt bombs. It follows that in the case of such bombs, if the principal alms of the war are to be gained primarily by the use of low-yield bombs, the concept of mass quantity will be defined in many tens of thousands.
Now, regarding the cost of nuclear bombs. he production of one kilogram of basic nuclear material) cost abouthousand dollars. The total costilogram of natural uranium wasollarsilogram of heavy water,ased on these prices of raw materials and on the special features of the production of the first nuclear bombs, it was established thatmgt bomb costillion dollars. In recent years, Important research wasnatural uranium together with its isotopes,; fissionable materials in nuclear bombs, which would permit lowering the cost of the bomb0 million dollars.
In technical literature for thehere is Information to the effect that the cost of nuclear materials, and along with them, the cost of the weapons themselves had significantly decreased.
1. It appears that the liquidation of nuclear/alsBlle basesertain number of klloton bombs of comparatively weak yield /two or three words
Thisasis for supposing that0 the cost of nuclear bombs Is vlthln the limits of from several hundred thousand dollars for low-yield bombs to several million dollars for megaton bombs.9 it was reporteduclear chargegt yield for the Atlas missile is valuedillion dollars.
This cost is large, in itself, but in comparison with tanks which come to hundreds of thousand and airplanes which cost millions, somo of them even tens of millions of dollars, nuclear weapons are comparatively cheap, particularly if the military effectiveness of the two is compared.
From the above it follows that theof the largest countries permitof nuclear weapons ln massconcerns missiles there Is obviously no doubtthe present time the status of industry,
availability of processed special materials, tha construetion-technical level of missiles and guidance Instruments permit the organization of mass production of all types of missiles, including intercontinental.
judging by the foreign proas, then series production is placedillion dollars forillion dollars for strategic, and several hundred thousand dollars for perational-tactical missiles.
All that has been said above about the'/effects of megaton bombs, about economic and productive capabilities, permits us to come to thehat the nuclear/missile weapon has becoma (or canass weapon, and its destructive, and in particular Its radiological characteristics, are actually capable of creating conditions In which the fundamental object of thehe destruction of hean be accomplished technicallyhort eriod or time and without overtaxing the economy oi powerful industrial countries"
We bellevoiew of contemporary warfare, of prevailing military doctrine and of tho principles of organization of the armed forces must differ radically from views of war, not only of the pre-atomic period, but alsoar in which the operational-tactical use of low-yield nuclear/missile weapons plays the leading role. Proceeding from this, we will examine the following questions:
the time limits (limit of duration)uclear/issile war;
the nature of the course of the initial period of war and the tasks of the armed forcesuclear/ missile war;
the principles of the organization of the armed forces.
The time limitsuclear/missile war. The history of mankind recalls wars of various durations, up to hundred-year wars. The duration of wars depends principally on'tbe sharpness of the contradictions and the economic and technical capabilities of tba warring sides. The question of the permissible time limitsar had no decisive significance in the past. The means of warfare, the means of destruction were essentially so" small in comparison with the creative capabilities'of mankind and of nature"that the thought of the possibility of monstrous destruction and mass annihilation of people never arose.
The question is posed differently today. It is clear from the above-mentioned considerations that if the number of nuclear weapons sufficient to liquidate human life on earth has not yet been created, it can be created in the immediate future. In this connection, the moat destructive factor is radioactive contamination.
However, the process of radioactive poisoning of the atmosphere and the earth's surface cannot be
Instantaneous. This process can take placeertain span of tine. Consequently, the tine apan froa the moment of the beginning of a. nuclear worldo the none nt or the poisoning oi tbe atmosphere
obagiven zone oi it; with aof radioactive substances dangerous toearth can be caned the tine limitsar.
The ultimate limitar dependseries f factors, namely:
the scientifically determined limit of concentration or radioactive substances ln the atmosphere;
the quantity and quality of the nuclear devices detonated;
the intensity of the nuclear bursts;
the height of the bursts and their distribution over tbe surface of the globe, and on certain other factors.
We will not examine tho above-mentioned faotors in detail. For the goals of this work It is Important to show that the scientific solution of the question of the time limit's ot war is an absolute necessity.
Obviously, the basic solution of this question on the definition of the maximum permissible of atmospheric contamination. Kissinger's book, Weapons and Foreigntates thatof the natural dose is required tolife, which can be achieved inmgt bombs or
gt bombs. This number of bombs can evidently be built by even one state.
What conclusion should be drawn from the arguments on the time limitsuclear/missilo war, ifar is thrust on us? There can be only one. The main decisive phase of the war, defined as the complete
para.lyzation of tho enemy's nuclear strength, must be achieved in the shortest possible time; this must be much shorter than the time necessary toangerous radioactive concentration. The technical possibilities forolution are evidently available.
A protracted nuclear/missile varecision in favor of one side is excluded becausear on the strength of military logic, as past experience teaches, must be waged with increasing severity and with the use of ever more powerful and gver more numerous destructive nuclear weapons.' Tbe result ofourse of war would be equally disastrous for all warring sides.
A decision in favor of one side depends on readiness and ability to finish the war in the shortest possible time", reat deal has been said in our press recently concerning the fact that even the bourgeois military ideologists reject the theoryhort-term nuclear-missile war. Such statements have, in fact, been made in the West. But this cannot serveerious argument in favorrolonged nuclear/missile war.
Prior to the appearance of nuclear armaments, representatives of Western, militaryarge number of theories about short-terra war't about blitzkrieg. It is well known that Hitlers military doctrine was based on this. Such blitzkriegs were particularly alluring against countries with Inadequately developed industry or with comparatively small territory. Capitalism was deeply interested in such an approach to war because an extended war accompanied by arming of the masses In our time would very probably lead to revolutions. The experience of two world wars has already shown that both wars were prolonged and protracted. The principal reason for this phenomenon could be formulated thus: comparative equality of forces, means and potential capabilities of the warring sides in the courseertain segment of time under conditions of comparatively weak means of warfare (destruction).
in there anything nev in this question of nuclear/ missile veapons? Evidently, yes. The material basear lasting for years may not evononsidering contemporary means ofhlch substantiallylarge factorj exceed the means of creation"'
Bov are these nev conditions reflected in the interests and the ideology of tbe varring classes?
First of all, one must keep in mind that no normal man can be interested in the destruction of mankind. The matter is different, however, from the point of view of the ruling classes who are disappearing from the scene of history.
History has shown more than onceying ying social order, gives birth to theories *nd dogmas of human destruction characterised by the phrases "apres moi le deluge" and "better be atomized than communized". For reactionary forces, doomed to perish by dint of historicalong var (like any other var) is not contraindioated, the more so since preparation forar is economically advantageous for certain monopolistic circles.
Preparation for an ox tended .war istimesmore costly thanbort var and the 'prof its of !capitalists many times higher in thisreparation for an extended war la conducted on the baais of the theory of maximum application of tha country's economy to the needs of war and requires expenditures on all other forms of armament and other requisitesong war as well as on nuolear/missllehis facilitates an increase in the concentration of capital and in the monopolistic power of certain groups. But from the point of view of the cost of the military machine and its combat effectiveness, the nuclear /alas lie weapon Is the cheapesthort nuclear/missile var is relatively the most economical in expenditures on the forces of destruction. And if the nuclear/missile
weapon, in reducing the duration of war, reduces the incomes of the monopolies, then the pertinent groups of monopolists will, of course, beong war. _
Therefore,esult of economic reasons and partly because of the aspirations of groups connected with military production to preserve the commanding position which they hold ln the economyountry like the USA, the theory of an extended war receives wide, circulation. This theory ties in well with the necessity of keeping colonial and economically weakly developed countries under the threat of war and even to thrust wars upon them.
The interests of the progressive forces of the worldifferent approach. The material prerequlsties for the victory of the socialist world over the capitalist world by peaceful means have already been created. Consequently the progressive forces are keenly Interested in avoiding war. But if war becomes Inevitable, the new world, naturally, must strive to keep war lossesinimum and consequently should do all possible to keep the war short and, in any case, to finish the decisive phase of the war prior to substantial atmospheric contamination over large areas;
the "infeia^pwlbd"
of a'war'and the tasks of the armed forcesuclear/miaslle war. In examining 'these questions we start from the proposition that the lending capitalist states are preparinguclear world war, in which they will striveecisive result at all costs. In technical times,ecision means the inevitable use of the most powerful nuclear and other weapons against which the other side must use no less powerful destructive weapons within certain time limits to gain the victory.
Before the age of nuclear/missile armaments it was considered that the direct manifestation of war was armed conflict between two opposing armies of
peoples, of states, or of social classes. Contemporary technical moans of warfare, as N. S. Khrushchev pointed out,ifferent concept of the pays leal process of war itself. umber of economically powerful and heavily populated states which are, however, small ln territorial size, the war can end in their complete defeat and even destruction before the main part of the armed forces of these countries can enter into action. For the USA, the situation is omewhat different. The disrupt loo-of their potentlalies for resistance will require more time and weapons and, obviously, It will be difficult to avoid some strikes from their side. In these circumstances, strikes ln the enemy's industrial rear, and on hla political and administrative centers acquire an overwhelming significance. Powerful strikes, capable of disrupting (or liquidating) the economy and the organized control of the country and the army, will naturally undermine the base of military activity and the existence of the armed forces.
Concurrently, strikes must be made on the necessary number of strategically active (or potentially active) targets (bases, launching pads, naval vessels) from which the enemy can launch nuclear weapons at our economic and In those cases, the strikes could be made with bombs of lower yields. Given the selection of the appropriate bomb'ylelds and their technically correct use, it is possible to indicate tentatively the quantity of nuolear weapons required. We realize that defining our vlewa on Just this point in concrete terms can be most vulnerableumber of reasons. But the importance of the problem demands this concrete definition, itoint of departure. In our opinion,istakeimes ln this case should not be embarrassing; lt is important to show the possible nature of the process based on actual material.
Analysis of data published ln foreign literature indicates thatorld warombsgtgt andombs from
ot (Cor strikes on nuclear weapons targets, If theres Is roported in tho press) are needed,1
It would seenotaluclear strikes are not manyorld wnr and all these deliberations may appear to be unfounded. However, it should be rememberedimilar number of strikes (chiefly by hydrogen bombs of the type detonated at Bikini) is capable of creatingcontamination (higher) of an area ofillion sq. km. and contamination of overf an area of aboutillion sq. kn. (This does not allow for the enemy's detonations of nuclear weapons.) moreover, hundreds of thousands of kilometers will be devastated by shock waves and flash radiation. This factery careful approach to the use of megaton bombs in general, and particularly in Europe, where population density is extraordinarily high.
Apparently, however, the use of nuclear/missile under technically optimum conditionsuantity of megaton bombs
destruction of the NATO bloc.
Therefore, it appears that Justowerful nuclear bursts will be thej--declslvo factors affecting the outcomo of the'.;war" and that they will be made in tho first hours/and days of the war. It follows that tho initial'periodar becomes its decisive period, the period in which the armed forces solve the primary technicalproblem of theo liquidate the enemy's capability to use nuclear/missile'weapons, io undermine hla'"will to fight and to weaken decisively his forces and means.
1. If enemy atomic targots are greater ln number, or If these targets are specially concealed, then the number of small-yield bombs can be increased somewhat. 3ucb an Increase on the radiatlonal situation in thewo or three words
The second period of war, undoubtedly protracted In time, will evidently consist of liquidating the resistance of military organisms still extant, of rendering immediate all-round aid to victims and of reconstructing the economies and state systems of the appropriate countries.
In this period, considering the scale of destruction, reconstruction work will require extended and enormous offorts by the socialist countrios and the enlistment of large masses of peoples, possibly numbering in the millions.
It appears that during this period, the principal role will be played by tho ground troops, aviation,and navy.
One can proceedifferent concept,which the primary tasksuture world warresolved by ground armies on fronts instrategic missile troops, aviation, and theachieve victory it is necessary to destroyarmies and to occupy his territory;the strategic missile troops deep in the enemyplay an Important but subsidiary role. Thisthat we underestimate the potential ofnuclear bombs and of long-rangewe will have to create tens of thousands ofnuclear bombs,arge number "ofalesile units, maintain various massulti-million man army, and base allan extended war with the inherent consequences ofoverstress and of losses many timesthe losses of World
A third concept is also possible. Keeping aside,echnical and practical sense, the principal and decisive role of strategic missile troopa, to maintain powerful ground and interacting andair and naval forces, which, like the ground troops would be saturated with operational-tactical missile units and constantly perfecting (by type of troops) their combat and auxiliary equipment.
Thisautious concept calculated to finish the war in the shortest possible tiate, but if unsuccessful, in this, to be prepared to wage an extended war with the maximum efforts of all the forces and means of the country and of coalitions of countries.
Past experience teaches us that at the beginning of all great wars, the opponents seriouslytheir oen strength and underestimated the enemy's strength. Moreover, ingle war ever went the way lt was planned.
It is possible that in the courseituation can arise in which the strategic missile troops of both sides will turn out, for various technical reasons, to be not entirely reliable, that they will only partially fulfill their tasks, and that the decisive effect will not be achieved. In this Instance, during tbe time period necessary for the restoration of the combat capability of the strategic missile troops for the Eurasian war sector, the role of the ground troops and of aviation will become decisive. The role of the navy will also increase, particularly that of submarines. From this point of view, the third concept appears to be the most acceptable, despite the faot that it leadsubstantial Increase in the burden of expenditures prior to the beginning of war and presupposes an even sharper ncrease with tbe initiation of war.
At tbe same time, if var is thrust upon us,be so prepared that the strategic missilesend sufficiently powerful strikes in theto paralyze the enemy countries andto deprive him of his nuclear/missileoperations of the other types of troopsinitial period of war must be coordinated withof the strategic missile troops andto
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From all that has been said it is obvious that the nuclear/missile weapon is primary and decisive in the present period fo time; for this reason the strategic missile troops have become the primary and decisive type of troops, with all the consequences ensuing from this fact. The situation is somewhat different as concerns the quantitative side of the question. The primary and decisive type of troops need not be and Indeed will not be the most numerous. The ground troops and thewill be more
The new means of warfare, as was said earlier, upon the scene other-types of troop formationsand roconstructioji_^oxmationsreason to be mass formations, and be formed and undergo training on
principles. In our opinion this question requires profound
Until the recent past, ground troops were legitimately considered as the primary type of armed forces, since they carried out the principal tasks of war, which amounted to the total defeat of the enemy's armed forces and the taking Of his territory. How, when the forms of war are changing and its principal tasks will evidently not be dec'lded;bn fronts in direct engagements of opposing armies', but rather in the interiors of countries, the ground troops cannot carry out the principal task of war independently.
In addition to the usual resources of combat materiel, the ground troops have missile equipmentimited radius of operation. With these means of armament, the ground troops can neither withstand the strikes of strategic missile troops nor protect the country from these strikes. At the same time, the ground troops must be regarded as forces which, together with the air forces are capable of assuring victory in all circumstances.
Taking into account tho possibility that megaton bombs may be used on the battlefield, it is necessary to make an all-round evaluation of the existing organization and the current combat formations of ground troops and of their suitability for nuclear/ missile war.
As history teaches, the combat formations of troops and the corresponding organization of troops change form depending on the means of combat, and primarily on the decisive moans, firepower. The more effective tho fire means of war, the more profound the changes. Right up to the appearance of nuclear/ missile weapons, to the degree of the strength of fire, combat formations have grown more and morewo or three words missing7.
The tendency to thin out military formations has increased in the past five years under the Influence of nuclear/missile operational-tactical weapons, but contemporary organization of troops (preserved from the pre-atomic period) and under-evaluation of the new conditions of conductingetter and retard this tendency.
It appears that combat formations of ground troops can become sufficiently vital and combat ready through ;fulfillment of the following; conditions:
increasing the combat independence (autonony) of all organizational levels (zveno) of troops, and particularly of thehe tactical ones;
increasing the firepower of tactical elements of units and large units;
substantial increase in the speed of moving of troopa;
a sharp thinning out of personnel and equipment in combat formations.
Increasing the combat Independence of all levels (zveno) of the troop organism Is possible by weakening or eliminating the mutual dependence ln combat (but not cooperation) between organizational elements (yedlnitsa) of troops. The principles of standardization of the moans of combat and auxiliary equipment, of organizational autonomy androad Independence in carrying out combat missions, must underlie army structure from tho primary cells (yacheyka) through all succeeding levels.
Organizationally, it appeara advisable to create units (chast) composed of interchangeable, uniform, primary- tacticaledlnitsa) . The creation of regiments of ground troops composed of elements which have high firepower, are completely mobile, tactically Independent, and low in personnel composition, and which ln case of loss can be easily replaced by similar ones, mustositive effect on the viability of combat formations.
An Increase in speed of movement can be achieved by full mechanization of troops, which would increase this speed by several times ln cross-country, as well as in road, movements. Movements of large combat groups of ground troops by aircraft must become common and be applied in the very broadest dimensions.
Existing military doctrines are built on thebasic principles:
a country's entire economy and the countryhole prepare for war beforehand;
calculations are basedrotracted war and
on mass armies which will enlist the greatest possible number of the healthy male and female population;
victory or defeat in war is decided on fronts of opposing armies; the strongth of armies is determined in the final analysis by the viability and power of the rear;
the theaters of military operations are studied from the standpoint of the decisive significance of frontal combat of armies, and in this connection, plans for achieving war aims are worked out which take into account the factors of time, space, forces andhe capabilities of enemies and allies are studied
in this same manner;
military operations are based on principles of seizure of the initiative, concentration of maximum forces and weapons on the main axis, on the selection of the most advantageous time for initiation of operations and for delivery of the main strike;
the achievement of the basic goals of war absolutely presupposes the total defeat or destruction of armies and the seizure of the most Important parts or all of the enemy's territory.
In light of the new quality of nucleer/miss 1lt con be said that the above-listedcontemporary military doctrine are subjectradical review. Some of the principles will loseentirely, others will take on a
New doctrines must be built on the basis of the potentialities of mass nuclear/missile and radio-electronic means of warfare. Their principles mustewev understanding of the dimensions of time, space, destructive forces, and forces of resistance.
The new military doctrines must proceed primarily from the principal and decisive role ofissile strategic weapons in war, and, consequently, from the principal and decisive role of the type of troops armed with these means of combat.
Basic principles of the nev doctrine could include the following propositions:
the contemporary power of the forces of destruction is Immeasurably greater than that of the forces of creation;
the nuclear/missile weaponass type of weapon, is relatively economical, and, from the combat point of view, lt is the most effective; ?
the range of nuclear/misslie weapons ensures their reaching any point on the globe; in this connection, their accuracy satisfies practical
the theater of military operations is the entire globe;
the primary task of the armed forces in war (from our point of view) should not be the seizure of territories, but of depriving the enemy of the possibility of using nuclear/missile weapons; In
case of necessity, temporary occupation is permissible;
/- uclear/missile war must be short-lived; its /active phase can be measured in days or weeks;
A the time Unitsar must be determined the power of the nuclear weapons, and the Intensity '. and number of bursts which will notaturation of the atmosphere and of the surface of the globe or the expanse of our country, or allied and non-combatant countries, with radioactive substances.
In our opinion, investigation of the questions connected with the elaboration of military doctrinesiscussion of them within definite limits must ba considered the most vital necessity for contemporary military thought. It is in this light that the present article offers Itselfeans of posing the question. Moreover, it seems to us that the time hae come not only to exchange views on these questions through articles in journals, but also to cooperate in every way in the creation of fuller works.
Original document.
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