CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
21
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
MILITARY THOUOHT: "The Utilization of the Forces
of the Bavyissile/Nucleary Rear-Admiral V. Lisyutin
Enclosederbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Militaryoyennayaublished by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and dlBtribuwi"down to the level of Army Conmiander.
In the Interests of protecting our source, this material should be handledeed-to-fcnow basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.
FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:
RICHARD HELMS
Enclosure
0 JUN TS
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Military Assistant to the President
Special Assistant to the President for national Security Affairs
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Director for Intelligence The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff,U. S. Air
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Army
Director .of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy
Director, National Security Agency
The Director of Intelligence and Research Department of State
Director, Division of Intelligence Atomic Energy Commission
Chairman, Quided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant Director for National Estimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
country
SUBJECT
ILITARY THOUGHT: "Tho Utilization of the Forces of the Navyissile/Nucleary Roar-Admiral V. Lisyutln.
OF INFO: 1
OF CONTENT
SOURCE
A reliable source
Followingerbatim translation of an article titled "The Utilization of the Forces of the Navyissile/Nuclearritten by Bear-Admiral V. Lisyutln".
This article appeared in1 First Issuepecial version of the Soviet military Journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal la published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. 1 First Issue was consigned to the press on
The Utilization of the Forces of tha Navyiss!la/Nuclear War
by
Rear-Admiral V. Lisyutin
Bach type of armed forces has Its strong and weak aspects. By combining the strong sides of tha different types of armed forces,combat missions can ba accomplished in tha most affective way under various conditions. There cannot be an absolute weapon, capable of accomplishing very mission ln the most effective way under all possible conditions. For this reason the different types of our armed forces are developed according to their combat characteristics and capacity to accomplish the main missionsaroncrete historical situation.
One of the main strategic missions in contemporary warfare la the disorganization of tha enemy's economy.ccomplished mainly by missile troops of strategic designation who can take action successfully against stationary economic targets, most of which" axe known in advance. However, besides the latter, there are also mobile economic objectives, ln particular transport ships. It is known that the aggressive capitalist countries have at their disposal aboutillion registered tons of dry cargo-carrying tonnage and mora thanillion registered tons of tankers. It can be surmised, naturally, that the probable enemy, preparing toissile/nuclear war, could have all this tonnage fully loaded in advance and under way at saa or dispersed far away from large economic centers. The economic supplies on these mobile objectives are vary considerable and couldig influence on the course of armed combat, especially ln its initial period. Missile troops of strategic designation cannot yet strike at such mobile objectives effectively. Thisission for aviation and the Navy.
Another most important mission facing the' armedhe destruction of tha enemy's means of nuclears oven more complicated as, besides the fact that most of these means will be dispersed, under cover andonsiderable part of them will prove to be, at tho beginningar, not on land, but on the seas and oceans carried on mobileircraft carriers, miasile carriers, submarines and in maneuvering supply detachments (manovrennyy otryad snabzheniya).
If one calculates, on the basis of tho norms adopted in the United Statos Navy for supplying vessles with nuclear weapons, intended for operations against shore and sea objectives, than it vlll turn out that not lessercent of all available nuclear warhoads will be concentrated on vessels. In the seagoing supply bases there will also be not less than one complete unit of fire, so that altogether at the beginningar, vessels and supply ships may be carrying up tooercent of all the probable enemy's available nuclear warheads, vhlch cannot be attacked by surface-to-surface (nazeatnyy) ballistic missiles, but must be destroyed by the forces of the Navy. onsiderable part of the second basicestruction of tho enemy's mobile nuclear means ofust also be accomplished by the Navy in cooperation vith aviation.
In comparison vith other types of armed forces, the Navy haa very important combat characteristics and possibilities peculiar to Itself. These possibilities aro considerably enhanced by the introduction of missile/nuclear weapons and atomic power plants in vessels.
In conditionsudden outbreakissile/ nuclear var, the Navy has greater combat stability than the other types of armed forces, owing to the possibility of being at dispersed basesong stretch of coastline, and also of being able to put to sea in advance. Dispersed naval forces vill not present an attractive target to an enemy for strikes by the
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enemy's milti-megaton nuclear chargeshe use of which la most likely at the beginningar, at the time when the large units of other types of armed forces, though dispersed over large areas, can be subjected to great destructionesult of such strikes.
If the problem of withdrawing these or other forces from the enemy's first missile/nuclear strikes has not been solved successfully, their employment in the war la very problematical. The possible dispersion of and partial cover for such forces will not enable them to avoid losses, and consequently, to retain their full combat effectiveness. Even the moat mobile type of armedviation, which, under certain conditions can be withdrawn directlytrlke, will, If deprived of airfields, lose its combat effectivenessonsiderable extent. On the other hand, naval forces deployed at sea, with their mainubmarines, cruising submerged, can ba witbdrawn most successfullytrike, and can, therefore, be used with full oombat effectiveness during the first strikes at the enemy.
The most important quality, peculiar to the Navy, is its ability to deliver powerful strikes at moving objectives it m. The force's of the Havy, armed with modern alaalle/nuclear weapons,igh degree oi operatlonal-coabat capacity. Thus, tho operational-strategic exercise conducted by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy In0 showed tbat even one submarine with an atomic power plant can make repeated attacksarrier strike large unit at sea and destroy one or two large vessels. rigade of such submarines can successfully accomplish the mission ofarrier strike large unit consisting of several aircraft carriers and operatingefinite direction occupying, along tha front /two or three words missing?. The destructionarrier strike large unituclear warheads means that the enemy Is deprived of these nuclear warheads for use against our installations.
r* If one considers tha possibility of repeatedof the carrier strike large units, then their destruction will save us from many hundreds and even thousands of nuclear strikes.
In the near future the United States will have up totomic submarines, armednd possibly more, "Polaris" type ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. In tha course of one cruise these submarines will be able to use upnd more nuclear warheads against our installations, and -if resupplied twice atpuclear warheads. It is mainly the Navy that can conduct combat against such submarines.
The arming of our submarines with ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads makesary effective weapons in tha accomplishment of tha mission of disorganizing tha enemy's economy and destroying his means of nuclear attack. It is true that in some respects submarines armed with ballistic missiles are inferior to surface-to-surface ballistic missile installations (lower accuracy of fire, reduced readiness ln view of the necessity to deploy and take up firing positions,ut they also have important advantages.
while surface-to-surface missile Installations cannotignificant number of salvos ln present-day conditions from the same position without suffering retaliatoryubmarine, especially in launching missiles when submerged, can successfully make use of its whole unit of fire of missiles from one position, remaining under way all the time.
Possessing high maneuverability andissile-carrying submarine will, in the initial period of war, prove to be tha least vulnerable and most stable combat means, capable of delivering sudden and powerful nuclear strikes in important directions.
In modern conditions nil ground nanus are vulnerable to effective action from enemy nuclear weapons. Moreover if they are not destroyed, they will be in the zone of radioactive contamination, which will reduce considerably their combat effectiveness. On the otherissile-carrying submarine, being under water, is not vulnerable to radioactive contamination, and can always bypass dangerous zones.
Missile-carrying submarines, being least vulnerableudden missile/nuclear attack by the eneay, canpecial weapon in the hands of the Supreme High Command. It is not mandatory to use them immediately on the outbreakar; they can be held in reserve for accomplishing missions directed toward the successful completion of the Initial period of war. With tho possibility of rosupplylng missile-carrying submarines at aea, use can be mada of them repeatedly (both at tha very beginningar, as well as during its initial period and subsequently).
Thus, the Navy possesses important operational-combat capabilities and advantageously complements tha missile troops of strategic designation in the accomplishment of the most important strategic aisslons with which tha armed forces are faced. However, the methods of using these capabilities of ths Navy and the methods of conducting naval operations require, in our opinion, further serious elaboration.
Even during the most Important exercises and games, we have hitherto, in essence, considered the operations of tha Navy only at tha very outbreakar, and not during the whole of its initial period, which has afforded possibility for studying only questions connected with delivering the first strike. It is essential to work out the complete accomplishment of the basic missions during the initial periodar, and foremost in the theoretical field.
Let us examine, briefly, the main missions of tha Navy, the possible conditions, and the methods for their accomplishment.
Tho destruction of the strike forcea of the enemy's including striae aircraft carriers,vessels, and, in the near future, atomic submarine missile carriers, is one of the priority tasks of the Navy.
At the beginningar tbe probable enemy is able to deploy up to seven carrier strike large unitsach consisting on the average of three aircraft carriers, three cruisers armed with missiles andoestroyers, armed partly with antiaircraft missiles, it is moat probable that these carrier strike large units will be distributed in theaters la the following way: North, Pacific, Mediterranean Sea and Indianach.
Combat with carrier strike large units must be conducted in three directions; destruction of the ADS themselves, destruction of their mobile supply detachments at sea, and deatruction of the naval bases at which they are based.
The destruction of the AOS at sea (In the ocean) must be the main mission of submarines, missile aviation, of the Navy and long-range aviation. The destruction of mobile supply detachments at aea, insofar as they are beyond the range of aircraft, will be the mission of submarines. Finally, tha deatruction of tha baaea ot carrier strike large unite (including the shore bases of carrier aircraft) must ba accomplished by missile troops of strategic designation. The use of missile-carry lng submarines for tha latter also ion ia also not excluded.
Taking into account the atriving of tha probable enemy toar suddenly, it may be expected that at its outbreak all atrlka aircraft carrier and missile-carrier large units will not be at baaes, but at sea, at the takeoff lines of deck-baaed aircraft for atrikea. So long aa tha AOS remain beyond these lines before the beginning of military operations, there would In most cases be no grounds for action against
efore they approach these Lines. Consequently, our forces should be deployed on the probable lines where the enemy's deckbased aircraft will take off. Here, too, should be concentrated the main efforts of atomic and dlesel-battery submarines and missile aircraft using nuclear weapons, for the most part.
The complications involved in deploying forces whenudden nuclear strike by the enemy at the outbreakar, and the striving to employ strike aircraft carriera in accordance with the principle of swift approach, strike, and rapid withdrawal, cannot always create conditions for the complete destruction of carrier atrlka large units with the first strike, which will require continuation of operations until the mission is fully completed. In such circumstances, missile aircraft, after reloading, prepareepeated strike at tbe ADS when the latterew attempt to approach tha line for launching deckbased aircrat, while atomic submarines pursue the enemy and inflict repeated blows on him. An especially advantageous time for such atrlkes will be the period when the vessels are being reaupplled and refueled by the mobile supply detachments, which must also be objectives for strikes by atomic submarines.
At the beginning of combat operations, dlesel-battery submarines, disregarding the lines of takeoff for deckbasedhould move farther aheadiew to inflicting preventive strikes on aircraft carriers before tha carriers repeat their approach to the line of takeoff for deckbased aircraft, naturally, after the beginning of combat operations, tha llnea where the main efforts are to be concentrated should ba selectediew to delivering strikes on tha ADS before they approach to within range of deckbased aircraft. Atomic submarines, making use of their great maneuverability, can deliver strikes on AUS in the ocean wherever they overtake them.
Such can be the general scheme for the complete accomplishment of the mission of destroying each ADS.
Combat with missile-carrying submarines which, on the outbreak ol war, will also be deployed ln lines from which missiles can be launched, should take form from operations for the destruction of the submarines themselves, their shore bases, and their mobile supply bases at sea.
The1 most probable areas of deployment of missile-carrying'submarlnes will be the Northern Arctic Zone and the Norwegian Sea, which open up the shortest route to targets which are in the depth of our country, and are for that reason least acceasible to the enemy's main carrier of nuclearircraft (hence the most important strategic significance of combat with missile-carrying submarines, especially in the Northern Arctic Zone). This-is fully confirmedtudy of the operations of United States atomic submarines mainly in the Northern Arctic Zone. At the same time, the possibility of operations by missile-carrying submarines from other important directions is not excluded.
According to the system adopted in $he United States for the distribution of targets among the different types of armed forces, targets for the Navy are situatedepth of upms from the coast. Taking the maximum range of fire of submarines with ballistic missiles of the "Polaris" typems, the main efforts against submarines in the Initial periodar must be concentrated on the lines from which they would launch theiristancems and0 miles) from the coast.
The main forces that will be involved in accomplishing the mission of destroying submarines ln distant areas will be submarines,aircraft, and antisubmarine vessels. As positional means of detecting and destroying submarines cannot be set up In peacetime in neutral waters, reliance should not be placed on their wids use in tha initial periodar.
antisubmarine forces could be concentrated without hindrance before the beginning of combat operations on tho lines of operations of missile-carrying submarines and after detecting the submarines they could maintain hydroacoustic contact with them until an order for using weapons is received or until they make their first attempt to launch missiles.
Accomplishing the mission of detecting submarines In the extensive areas of seas and oceans demands an excessively large expenditure of existing forces and weapons, which calls for the creation of new means permitting the surveillance of extensive water areas In short periods of time. In this respect, the greatest capabilities are possessed by long-range seaplanes making use of small sonar buoys, and also by antisubmarine vessels carrying antisubmarine helicopters. Armed with antiaircraft missiles, surface antisubmarine vessels could considerably extend their zone of operations.
Combat against missile-carrying submarines can be conducted most successfully by antisubmarine submarines in all conditions, especially in areaa of pack and drifting ice. In areas of clear water and broken ice, use can be made to some extent of antisubmarine aircraft and helicopters. An automated system of lines of radlo-hydroacoustlc stations and cable-hydrophone lines ast up on the ice can significantly facilitate the detection of submarines in conditions of lea.
The destruction In the ocean of mobile supply bases for missile-carrying aubmarlnes should be carried out by our submarines operating against tha mobile supply detaobments of carrier .strike .largo-units or by specially allocated submarines, if the areas of operations of tha missile-carrying aubmarlnes and the AU3 of the enemy do not coincide.
The destruction of tha stationary bases of submarines, aa well aa of the bases of carrier strike large units, must be accomplished by the missile troops of strategic designation.
Submarines have now become the principal striking force at sea. In accordance with this, combat against them must inevitably change fromype of defensebasic offensive mission of tbe Wavy in destroying the eneny's forces at sea. Combat at sea" Is going under water, forces operating against submarines will eventually become the basic strike forces of the Navy.
The existing antisubmarine forcea and weapons of the Navy, with the exception of submarines, can in fact carry on combat with enemy submarines only in tbe coastal zone. This Is far -from adequate. forces, aa the basic means of combat against the future main strike forces of the enemy Navy,reat future, and special attention must be paid to their development.
Combat against missile-carrying submarinesew problem. Ways of solving it are still under investigation. It is possible that in the future they will turn to some extent into combat between "twoind" (between submarines) under water.
The probable enemy, intending to carry on an aggressive war against the countries of the Socialist Camp across the ocean and not relying on holding the bridgeheads now occupied by him on tha Eurasian continent, will Inevitably attempt to make major landings In order to seize new bridgeheads or to reestablish the situation on them, and also to undertake sea shipping in order to supply the groupings established in these areas. In this connection the question arises: where, how. and with what forces can combat with landing forces(and also with convoys on communication lines) of tho enemy be conductod most effectively?
Tho view is expressed that: "Enemy landing operations, while en route at sea, do not merit expensive and cumbersome operations against them by the Navy and long-range aviation. The basis of their annihilation can be by missile strikes
r
mm
embarkation and debarkation areas; while enroute at sea, it is again more expedient to annihilate landing forces by strikes with missiles having nuclear charges of several megatons".1
There are, of course, many ways in which any mission can be accomplished. In selecting them, the aim should be to accomplish each mission as quickly as possible, using the minimum forces and suffering the smallest losses. ore detailed examination of the questions of combat against enemy landing forces, we come up against the following circumstances which militate against accomplishing the mission in the way outlined above.
A landing force at embarkation ports cannot as yet. be an:.objective for missiles with nuclear and, even less; with conventional warheads. As experience in the Second World War has shown, landing detachments are formed at many ports which are not even situated on the same continents (Sicilian and Normandy landing operations, landings in northwest Africa, etc.). At present the enemy is workingystem of operational and combat training of embarking landing troops where there are no ports, and he is building ships adapted for this. Consequently, the embarkation of a'l landing force will most probably take placeery wide front on an undeveloped coast. The simplest calculations show that an enormous expenditure of ballistic missiles will be required to achieve even some effect in strikesanding force while lt is boarding its ships.
1, "The Theory of Military Art Needsy Colonel-General A. Gastllovlch, Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Militaryirstage 12
It is most probablearge enemy landing forco will proceed in the form of many small detachments from various directions in dispersed combat formations and orders. Therefore, one can hardly consideranding force at sea willuitable target for missiles with nuclear warheads of several megatons.
To deliberately roly la all casea on destroying enemy landing forces on our coast after their disembarkation or vhlle they are disembarking,would mean to make it possible for the enemy to accomplish the preliminary mission of bis operation unhindered and to put our defenseery unfavorable situation. Landings have always been made, and apparently will bo made, when there is great superiority in forces over tha defenders. It must be surmised that in the first place the enemy will aim at ensuring his superiority ln nuclear weapons in the landing area. Moreover, anding will be precededreliminary and direct neutralization ln the full depth of our defensive forces. It is, therefore, ln our view, manifestly disadvantageous to deliberately postpone combat with the landing forces until this period.
Moreover, another fundamentally Important circumstance is Involved. Would it be right to transfer the zone of nuclear combat to our territory? Ve believe not. The course of turning one's own territoryesolate wilderness can obviously be followed only in certain directions, and then only in the most exceptional cases.
Consequently, it'is clearly inexpedient and dangerous to accept the schema outlined above for our operations ln combat with enemy landing forces.
An entirely different situation is created when the Navy operates against the landing force at sea.
Calculations and experience during combat training of recent years show that even one atomic submarine armed with torpedoes can dostroy more thanhips with troops and supplies (approximately one division of the landing force) . One atomic suboarlne is also capable of destroying one or two large surface vessels of the screening forces, Including strike carriers, which carryuclear warheads. Is this "expensive" compared with the price we shall pay if the enemy uses the indicated nuclear power against objectives
on our territory, end after thatanding? Other calculations could also be put forward to show that destruction of the enemy forces at sea will always bo cheaper and more simple than combat with blm when be is already on our territory.
Thus, until missiles attain the capabilitymobile sea targets at long ranges,no reasons for abandoning action against aat sea, and oven less for transferringwith it to our
Figures were given above regarding dry cargo-carrying and tanker tonnage which could be loaded by the beginningar. If stocks of atrateglc raw materials are laid down in advance, this transport fleet can be used In the first instance for shipping having military significance. It la known that up to three-quarters of the probable enemy's resources in materiel and personnel are across tha ocean. Calculations show thatransports must arrive dally in European ports alone. If one estimates ten days for crossing the North Atlantic and returning in ballast, it can be surmised that on this communication line,hips, excluding escort vessels, will ba at sea at the same time.
By stopping, holding up, or reducing to the minimum this flow of troops and supplies to the main theater of war, evenhort time,during decisive periods of combat, we would put the enemyifficult situation and create the most favorable conditions for our own armed forces. This determines the strategic significance of the mission of destroying the enemy's sea communication lines. For the accomplishment of this task the Navy baa far greater operational-combat capabilities in comparison with other types of armed forces.
Study of the experience of the operational training of NATO navies, as well as elementary calculations, show that the problem of giving security to such strained
t.
lines cannot be fully solved by the probable enemy, owing both toshortage of existing forces and means as well as to the impossibility of replenishing and restoring them under conditions of the disorganization of the shipbuilding Industry.
It is known that besides the system of ordinary convoys, tbe probable enemy Is looking for new ways of accomplishing the mission of protecting communication linos. Thus, he has studied the question ofhichesser ratio between theforces and the escorted transports. It is possible to accomplish the mission of securing tho most crowded communication lines by tbe method of "patrolledith ships moving in them without escorts, which provides not only economy of escort forces but, what Is especiallyuicker turnaround-on the part, of the transports. This method springs directly from the zonal system of defense In sea theaters adopted by NATO. Single use (without escort) may also be made of fast liners on communication lines, mainly for the transportation of troops (some of them can carry uphousandounded, radio-eleotronlc, medical, and other equipment and other materiel in short supply.
The striving for mora reliable security of sea transport can be seen from tha pro pee ed new line of development In the building of transports by the aaln capitalist countries. It finds its expreealoh in the building of container (konteynernoye) and trailer (traylernoye) ships which can be unloaded and loaded quickly, In the building of ships with their own means of loading and unloading ftwo or three words missing? capability of loadingnloading without tying up,ndonsiderable increase of the speeds of all transport vessela. The use of submarine transport vessels, especially tankers with atomic propulsion, la contemplated in the future. Aa in the paat, great attention is given to the development of transport-landing and debarking moans.
The probable enemy's great dependence on sea and ocean communication lines and the Impossibility of securing them reliablyar give rise not only to the necessity of taking action against his sea and ocean communication lines, but also create favorable conditions for the accomplishment of this mission by the forces of tha Navy.
The disruption of sea and ocean communication lines cannot,ln our view'i be an urgent task immediately on the outbreakar, for the enemy apparently counts on ensuring accomplishment of the missions of the initial stagear by laying in supplies in advance at the planned brldgoheads. Some time Is also required for the organization of communication lines. The forming of convoys and their movement from ports in the United States to Western-European ports will take two to three weeks. There is Information that the Anglo-American command is going into the question of sending "monster-convoys" from ports on the eastern coast of the United States to Western-Kuropean ports one month after the beginningar. It la most probable that the enemy will be faced with the problem of securing communication lines in their entirety during the concluding period of the combat for attaining the objectives of tbe initial stage of tha war, ln particular for restoring the situation in important areas, for establishing new bridgeheads, and supplying the appropriate groupings of armed forces there.
In order to fulfil the task of disrupting the enemy's sea and ocean communication lines, lt will be necessary to redeploy-our submarines, which raises the most important problem of resupplylng submarines ln the ocean, aa one cannot count on doing this at shore bases which have been subjected to destruction, not to mention the fact that there will be no time for this.
In previous wars, operations on communication linos continued throughout the whole war. Thohere loading and unloading took place wore not subjected to significant destruction; the shipbuilding industry succeeded not only in restoring tho losses of tonnage, but in Increasing It, while the use of conventional weapons against ships at sea did not give decisive results either in economic or military respects.
Present-day conditions have created opportunities for achieving decisive results in combat on communication lines. Any ports where loading and unloading take place, and communication line centers on land,can now be subjected to destruction by missile/nuclear weapons which will often produce far greater results than those attained by tho protracted combat on communication lines in previous wars. For instance, the puttlng-out of action of the Panama Canal would lengthen the sea route from eastern United States ports to western ports from five thousand to thirteen thousand miles, or, ln other words, would at once reduce transport possibilities on this communication line threefold. The puttlng-out of operation of the Suez Canal during the attempted armed intervention in Egypt by the British and French, evenomparatively short period of time, when oil from the Near East had to be transported partly around Africa, forced the Vest European countries to ration fuel.
Under conditions of missile/nuclear war, theindustry will be thef intensive activities. 1 Being based on extensive cooperation among many branches ofis particularly vulnerable to disorganization. Consequently, there can be no question of restoring tonnagearge scalear. At the same time, the operational-combat capabilities of the forces of tho Navy, and especially of submarines, in disrupting soa and ocean communication lines, have, as we have already pointed out, increased considerably. All this points to the fact that effective results ln the accomplishment of this mission can now be attained more quickly than before.
Operations for the disruption of soa and ocean communication linos should, under modern conditions, bo built, not on the principle of protracted, so-callod "systematic operations"onstant exertion of forces, as was the case heretofore, but on the principle of maximum concentration of forces on decisive axesimited time. An Interruption In communication lines, evenonth, where the enemy has large-scale personnel and materiel losses In the main theaters of tbe war, will create favorable conditions for the successful execution of combat by our armed forces on the major axes.
The effective accomplishment by the Navy of the basic tasks examined above demands the carrying out of appropriate measures both in the makeup of the Navy and in the organisation of Its comprehensive support. What are these measures?
tha flrat place, the forces which will takeaccomplishing the main taakaar shouldIn every possible way:
atoaio submarines, armed with missile/nuclear weapons and long-range torpedoes;
naval strike missile aircraft, not wheeledwhich are entirely dependent on airfields, but seaplanes;
long-range antisubmarine strike forces -submarines, seaplanes, helicopters, andsurface vessels.
Increasing autonomy, units of fire of weapons, and radius of operation,must be the main requirement in the development of these foroos.
as tho operations of our forces,submarines far away from their bases, involveto base after using up their units ofreat reduction in their coefficient of combat
'Utilization, the main problem for ensuring that the.forces can operate offectlvoly is in supplying them with.
missile/nuclear weapons and torpedoes and in rosupplying them at sea with material-technical resources.
It vould be most expedient to follov the course ol creating transport seaplanes capable of operating from bases located on internal waterways ln the depth of the country and of delivering the necessary types of ammunition and supplies quickly to any areas of the ocean. The accomplishment of this mission vill be made much easier if efforts are made at the same time to reduce the dimensions and weight of missile/nuclear weapons, vhlch. vould considerably simplify resupply work at sea.
The first reloading of submarines at sea ln the initial periodar could be carried but to some extent by using modified transports and merchant ships sent ln advance to designated areas of the ocean which are poorly watched.
Ve should also follow the course of creating secret depots, especially under vater, in specially selected areas situated close to the areas of combat operations of our submarines.
The question of creating new, or reconstructing existing, dlesel-battery subnarlnes for service as supply bases also merits attention.
The creation of special floating supply bases, especially for missile/nuclear weapons and torpedoes, which have maneuverability and are less vulnerable than depots located on land, is absolutely essential for supplying our forces away from permanent naval bases vhlch could be subjected to destruction at the very beginningar.
3. In viev of the vulnerability of the main economic Installations and naval bases to missile/nuclear strikes from the very beginningar, one cannot count on being able to carry out regular and lengthy repairs to the forces of the Navy. Only the unit method (agregatnyy metod) of repair (replacement of entire mechanisms, assemblies, subassembliea-mokhanlzm, uzel, blok)can solve this problem. Repairs by the unit method can be carried out by the crew itself in any conditions, including at
sea, provided that the appropriate units are delivered there.
It is the task of Industry, and not of shipbuilding yards and naval workshops, to support tho unit aiethod of carrying outtoorking stock (oborotnyy fond) of mechanisms and assemblies In advance.
Be have lagged behind in methods of repairingnd If these archaic methods are also followed in wartime then lt la doubtful if any of our vessels will be able to put to sea again once their technical norms of maintenance of mechanisms and weapons have run out or they have been damaged in combat.
It la mainly ths working stock of units' that calls for repairs, and not the vessels themselves. It is necessary to provide the vessels only with the necessary assemblies for replacement. utureessel under repairaseasualty vessel.
4. In view of the possibility of destroying basic economic installations at tbe beginningar, ona. cannot count on being able to produce means of combat on large scales during the course of the wax. This applies particularly to the Navy, aa the production of Ita forcea and weapons during hostilities la most In comparison with other types of armed forces, in the construction of submarines and surface vessels we observe tha most extensive collaboration between the many branches of Industry, and parallel with thla, small-series production. The production of each vessel takes very much longer than the production of an airplane, missile, tank, or other types of weapons.
Consequently, for the Navy, the problem of creating and maintainingigh state of readiness both the forces themselves and all types of supplies arises in an especially acute form. Under present-day conditions it would be rash and dangerous to rely on "amblingn accumulating reserves in the course of the wax and making use of them during pauses of some sort.
The preparation of forces and accumulation of supplies
in advance willuccessful solution to the problem, both in the casas well asomparatively short, war. The necessity of accomplishing the main tasksar In the shortest possible time must be one of tbe most important starting points in the reexamination of the operational art of the Navy (and, incidentally, as Is obvious, of all the othor types of armed forces).
Original document.
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