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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
"The Organizational Structure of Field
Commandy Colonel K. Pashuk
Enclosederbatim translation of an article titled "The Organizational Structure of Field Commandy Colonel K. Pashuk, which appearedpecial TOP SECRET Issue, of the Soviet military Journal Voyennaya My si (Military Thought).
Requests for extra copies of this report or forof any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.
FOR THS DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:
Aw*-*
RICHARD HELMS
for release
02
cct Military Assistant to the President
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Director for Intelligence The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Headquarters, U.ir Force
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy
Director, National Security Agency
The Director of Intelligence and Research Department of State
Director, Division of Intelligence Atomic Energy Commission
Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee
Deputy Director for Intelligence Assistant Director for National Estimates Assistant Director for Current Intelligence Assistant Director for Research and Reports Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
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"Thetructure of Yield Commandy Colonel K. Pan huk
DATS OF IHFO: 1 (Prior to May)
OF CONTSNT
Documentary
SOUBCB: eliable aource
Followingerbatim) translation of an article titled "The Organizational Structure of Field Commandritten by Colonel K. Pan huk, Chief of tha Operational Directorate of tha Headquarterailitary District.
Thla article appeared in1 Second Editionpecial vereion of YOTlh^TAMTSL (Military Thought) which la olaaalriad TOP SXCRXT by the Borleta and ia iaauad irregularly. 1 Third Edition want to press IB July
Thetructure of
Field Commandront
Colonel K. Pashuk, Chief of the Operational Directorate of the Headquartersilitary District
The very great changes which have been taking place in the postwar period in the means and methods of armed conflict and, under the influence of these, la the organizational structure of troops have not, la fact, affected command elements (organ upravleuiya). The organization of field command of an army andront has remained essentially the same ad it was la the years of World War XX. Certain additions and changes which have taken place ia recent years have brought nothing basically new to the organization of field commands.
Ths organizational structure and equipmentperational staffs (shtab) which exist at the present time have resultedertain contradictionodern requirements. They limit ths combat capabilities Of troops, and they are larake oa thsby the troops of high speeds in the conduct of operations. This is evident if only from the following.
The presence of nuclear-missile weaponsront permits the fulfillment of operational tasks, not to mentioa tactical tasks,atter of minutes. Yet to collect and collate the facts of ths situation in tbe headquarters of the front takes several hours, and is even thsa an excessive strain on its officers.
At tha present time, combined-arms large units (soyedineniye) are at constant combat readiness, determined by the tine necessary for tho assemblyarge unit when ths alert Is received and for its movement out from its permanentdislokatsiya) points. Army headquarters (sbtab) however do not possessegree of readiness and, in general, are insufficiently adapted to work under field conditions, which, naturally. Holts the combat capabilities of army formations (obyedineniye) .
Tha most important conditions for ensuringontrol of troops are high mobility, ths maneuverability of headquartersnd their effective anti-atomic protection. But how can there be talk of anti-atonic protection, of mobility, or of the maneuverability of ths headquarters (shtab)ront and an army if they are billettsdent camp on exercise? This situation is considered normal, for during critiques Af exercises one can hear observations and objections only to the fact that there are very many tents and that they are not in the right order.
A broad discussion of the questions of organization and equipping of the elements for the control of troops and of the organization and equipping of control points (punkty upravleniya) is necessary. It seems to us that without ths correct solution of these questions it is Impossible toignificant increase of the combat readiness of troops.
In our article we deal with several questions of ths organizational structureieldront, first of all, we will attempt to defins the basic principles upon which this structure must be based, w
In our view, the organizational structureield commandront must proceed from tho release of the commander of troopsront, to thenuw extent, from the decision of questions which are not directly connected with the combat activity of the troops.
The commander must have sufficient time for studyor ths choice of the best methods of docidlng the basic currant and future (perspektivnyy) tasks of tha operation.
With ths existing organization, this requirement is not mat. In the front field command there arendependent directorates, staffsnd (otdal) subordinated directly to ths troop commander. Under such an organization, tha troop commander is compelled to cut himself off systematically from the immediate direction of operations and toass of questions of secondary importance. It is completely understandable that ha is notosition to listen to all those making reports and to give them exhaustive and concrete instructions. Besidss this, with the existence ofuantity of departments in ths front field command, tha solution of any question by one of tha departments requires its coordination with numerous other departments, which leadsreat waste of time and effort. In consequence, ths front field command worksonsiderable time not for the troops but for itself, which doea not help tha operational efficiency of the direction in any way.
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In order to onsure stable and continuousf troops, given the present means and methods of combat, ths front field command must be streamlined to ths maximum. The large and unwieldy headquartersith the complements ws use at present, would ba unequal to the tasks of firm control of troops ln tba first serious test. Clumsy and Immobile, thsyystem of no mors than superficial and seeming control of troops, to say nothing of their vulnerability, and of their consequent short tenure of lifs. How can one talk of the operational efficiency and mobility of the front field command, if its composition, not counting servicing personnel, considerably0 men? In our view, tha strength of the commandront should ba reduced by atimes. However, this will be possible only if the maximum use is made in tha
front field command of tho various means of automation. Without this, under present conditions, it is, in general, difficult to achieve real operational efficiency in tho work of headquarters and to eliminate multiplicity in the control of troops.
In speaking of the means of automation, we have in view, first of all, those means whose introduction is already entirely possible at the present time; selector communications (selektornayaortable recording equipment, facsimile telegraphy, television communications, speech secrecy apparatus, duplicating apparatus, the simplest computing apparatus, etc.
Let us take one of tbe duties of the headquartershe collection and collation of factsvituation. How many channels do one and ths same set of facts pass through before they reach the troop commander of the front, and how much effort does ths gathering of these facts cost? The troop commander of the front hears the reports of the army commanders (komandarm) or of the commanding officers of large units by high-frequency (VCh) telephone or other communications means. The chief of staff of ths front hears the reports of the respective chiefs of staff by telephone (normally also by VCh)or, more rarely, by radio. The operational department (otdel) collects the facts of ths situation through chiefs of directions (nacbalnlk naprnvlenlya) and their assistants by telephone, radio, and telegraph, with ths help of the communications officers. Commanders and officers of troop arms are engaged in ths collection of the facts of the situation through their channels of coaaiualcatloB. All these people receive ths data at various times, in varying completeness, and with varylag authenticity; ths obtaining of ths complete facts wastes too much time. It goes without saying that such methods of operation do not correspond to present-day requirements. The facts of ths situation should pass from the troops to the front headquarters by the shortest possible route, and all work on collection and collation of these facts shouldinimum of time.
The organizational structureront field command should reflect the specific nature of the functions of this control link (zvano) . As is known, the front troop commander, tha army commander, and the corps commander decide questions which ars essentially different from ons another.
Tha corps commander is intsrsstad in ths progress f combat operations directly on tha field of battle; he is concerned primarily with changes is ths progress of these operations. Ths army commander Is interested in tha ways ln which combat operations ars likely to develop over several days, using ths resources of operational intelligencea follows tha movement of the enemy's rsssrvas and means for nuclear attack and thus comes to understand the situation mora deeply.
The front troop commander has available intelligence resources which allow hint to follow tha situation in tho entire depthtrategic direction orheater of military operations. His fundamental efforts are directed to tha solution of long-term questions which will ensure the successful development of tho whols operation. In conjunction with this, in tha command of the front, the questions of the use of nuclear-missile weapons and of rear support of tha operation are decided ln their full scope, demanding of the staff and command of tba front,hole, long-term planning, foresight, and, consequently, workompletely dlffsrant scope and content from that of an army headquarters.
At tho sameront headquarters cannot limit itselfurely general knowledge of the operational situation. It should ensure that ths front troop commander is constantly provided with facts about tha entire current situation ln thaf the front, because the front commander has at his disposal nuclear-missile resources which enable him to influence vigorously tho successful decision not
only of operational but also of tactical problems at any time.
the organizational structureront field command must reflect completely the decisive role of nuclear-missile weapons in the achievement of the aim of an operation. the front troop commander should have an element which concerns itself both with the solution of questions of the use of missile troops in an operation and with the assurance of direct control or command of units and large units of these troops.
besides this, since nuclear warheads (boyepripas) are at present delivered to the target not only by missiles but also by aircraft and by other means, and also in view of the fact that the radiation situation willonsiderable influence on ths progress of combat operations, the front field command should include an element which is concerned with ths general and specific planning of the use ofuclear weapons, with careful study of the radiation situation in the area of the front and of its influence on the progress of the operation.
in the interests of stability of control of troops, the organizational structure of the front field commandhould ensure its division into several echelonshe real independence of each echelon in the control of troops, rear units, and establishments, and the ability of the second echelon if necessary to take upon itself ths control of the troops of the front and to exercise this control, even if onlyhort time.
the front field command should be able tosmall operational group of officers with meanswhich could ensure control for the
commander during his movement to an advanced or auxiliary control point. this operational group should be constantly welding itself together even while performing its district (okrug) command functions,
and should have special field headquarters equlp-nent and corresponding means of communication.
It is clear to everyone that the existing structure of the front field command does not fully meet the requirements enumerated above and needs considerable improvement, which are the main changes which need to be introduced into this structure?
First of all, the organizationront headquarters as the basic nucleus of field command must be changed. The new organization of theshould ensure anew the solution of such problems as the collection, collation, and recording of all data on the operational situation. In ourpecial element should be set up for this, which would be free from all other commitments. This can be the operational center of the operational directorate or the front headquarters. Only this center must be concerned with collection and collation of all the facta on the situation and with their uninterrupted transmission to the commander, to the chief of staff of the front and also to other interested persons and establishments, about which we will apeak later. All remaining directorates, departments, and services are freed from carrying out this function and concern themselves with their particular questions. The operational center should be equipped with modern means of communication, with radio speech-secrecy apparatus, facsimile telegraphy sets, receiving and transmitting setsound-recording apparatus, and selector communications. In the future it must have electronic computing machines which would automate such processes as:
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the collection and storage of facts on the position, state, and actions of enemy troops, and about the enemy's nuclear resources and their capabilities;
the collection and storage of facts on the position and state of friendly troops;
th* aystemization and collation of Information on the operational situation for reports to tha command and tha higher staff;
tha processing of data on the radiation situation, tha determination of areas contaminated by radiation, and of tha levels of radiationiven tins.
Ths facts racsivsd by ths operational cantor about the position of ths troops (friendly and enemy) should bo disseminated continuously by television sets or by telephones with visual presentation (videotelefonnaya svyaz) to tha troop commander, chief of staff, and tha department of operational planning. Zf necessary, tha front troop commander or tha front chief of staff can ba at tha operational center personally for tha detailed solution of tha most important questions of control of tha troops.
Bagular information about tha poaltlon of ths troops in tha detail noceasary for tha solution of questions by ths arms of troops must ba passedpecial relay network for ths remaining directorates (departments) .
Tha operational center must have at its disposal several shifts (smena) of trained officar-operators. Each shift should also include an officer of engineer troops, one from the chemical troops, one from ths hydrometeorologlcal service, and representatives of ths VYS and PVO control points. Tha shift should ba
headedesponsible officer-operator (chief of the operational department) who can make an evaluation of tha operational situation and pass it on at tha proper time to tha chief of staff or to ths commander soaclaion can ba mads. Vith threw working shifts and one reserve (for ths forward command post-PKP, or auxiliary control point-VPU>there may ba no more thanfficers on tha staff of tha operational center.
Tho operational center cannot concern Itself with questions of planning an operation; forpecial element lan operational planning department. Receiving systematic data about tbe current position of the troops iron tha operational center, tha operational planning department analyzes and checks the fulfillment of tasks by the troops of ths front, prepares suggestions for tha command on the conduct of combat operations, and pasaas on ths nscessary operational tasks to tha troops. In ths future, the department of operational planning should also ba equipped with an electronic computer, which would lighten the performance of such tasks as:
tha production of estimates related to dstsrmlnlng ths rslatlvs balance of forces and the regrouping of troops;
the determination of the requirements for combat means eitheromplete operation or for part of ons and ths distribution of these means to directions;
ths distribution of nuclear means by targets, ths determination of ths best alternatives for destroying enemy targets with ths means available, and others.
When sodsrn means of control are available, tha execution of tba functions entrusted to the department does not callarge number of officer-operators. The staff of tha department can be within tha limitsan.
Tha operational center and tha department of operational planning should be unitedinglehe operational directorate, which would ensure unity in ths work of these two bodies.
The Intelligence directorate does not loas its significance, butomponent part of tha headquarters of tha front. Butart of its functions (the collection, collation, recording, and storage of data about ths enemy which comes from tho troops) is carried out by the operational cantor,
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the complement of tbe Intelligence directorate may be reduced and its structure changed. At the same time it is necessary to bear in mind that data about the enemy reaches ths front headquarters not only from the troops but also from other sources: from the Chief Intelligence Directorate, from ths intelligence directorates of neighboring fronts, from agent Intelligence, from special dlversloaary-reconnalssance groups, from front radio and radio-technical intelligence, etc. This data should be checked, compared, and evaluated by the intelligence directorate before being passed on to the operational center, and for this lt la expedient topecialontrol point for operational intelligence.
This control point, like the operational center, should work round the clock, and should therefore have three duty shifts and one reserve shift. Eachshift should include two operational intelligence officers, concerned with the collation and analysis of all Intelligence data, one officer from agent intelligence, one officer of radiotechnlcal Intelligence, one aerial-reconnaissance officer, and one special communications officer.
To direct combined-arms reconnalsaance and the planning and control of all typos of intelligence activity in the intelligence directorate, besides the control point for operational intelligence, it is necessary to have another department for planning and control,taff of officers of combined-arms and operational intelligence, agent-Intelligence officers, and radiotechnlcal intelligence officers.
We see no need for baslo changes in the structure of tbe other departmentsront headquarters (replacement, communications, or topographical). the strength of each can be reduced considerably in connection with tho possibility of automating and mechanizing their work. Tbe role of the cipher department obviously will decrease wltb the introduction
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of apparatus for ensuring the secrecy of radio, telephone, and telegraph conversations and, consequently, its strength, too, can bo reduced.
The questions of the control of artilleryront should be decided anew. The trend ofof combat means shows that the role of artillery in the solution of operational tasks is decreasing. Clearly, artillery will perform only tactical tasks.onsequence, the noed for tbe presence in ths front field command of an element which would concern itself specially with the operational use of artillery is disappearing. Questions of the combat use of artillery can be settled successfully at the tactical level (zveno) . Clearly these questions will be decided in exceptional cases in the front command.
At the same time, the ever-increasing role of missile troops in the resolution of operational tasks requires the presence in the front field commandpecial element, which would concern itself with their direct command, not only operational, but also tactical control. Furthermore, we believe that this element must concern Itself with the direct command of missile large units and units. Such an element can be tho control point of the missile troops of the front-It should have direct radio, telephone, and telegraph" communications with all missile large units and units of the front, and also selector and visual telephonic communication with the operational center and the operational intelligence control point.
The personnel of the control point of missile troops must ensure its unbroken work round the clock and also the detachment, when necessary,mall but harmonious group of officers for the control of the missile troops during trips by the chief (nachalnik) of the missile troops to tho PKP or VPU with the front troop commander. Hence, the control point of ths missile troops can consist of three duty and one reserve operational shift. Each shift would consist of two
operators for the preparation of data and two control offlcera. The work of each shift can be headed either almultaneously or ln turn by the chief of missile troops, tha chief of ataff of ths missile troops, and by tha deputy chief of ataff of tha mlsslls troops (hs Is ths chief of ths control point and chief of the operational department).
The operational department of the staff of the piaails troops haa the functions of planning the utilization of the mlsslls troops, of supporting them, of organizing reconnaissance, and of overseeing their combat activity. In view of thla, besides ths chief of the department, the operational departmenteputy chief of department (ha Is tha chief ofhree senior planning and control officers, two senior intelligence offlcera, the chief of communications, aod his deputy.
It is clear that no one will doubt ths naad for the preser.ee ln ths front field command of an olement which is concsrnad with questions of antiaircraft defense. However, its organizational structure must also be changed somewhat. Ths development in ths capabllltlsa of antiaircraft missiles and of radio-technical troops and the use of nuclear weapons to combat means of air attack, call for still more centralization of tho control of the forcea and means of PVO at front level. The need is growing continuously for their direct command by the front PVO commander. Hence, we consider it expedient toVO control point in ths front field command, equipped with modern means of control, which performs all tasks, beginning with ths planning of air defense and ending with tha direct control of PVO troops in battle. This point must ba commanded by the chief of PVO troops of the front or by bis deputy and should be sat up on tha principle of continuous operation by three shifts and shouldaaarva shift for the control of PVO troops during trips to tho PKP or VPD.
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The controlling bodies of the engineer end chemical troops must. In our view, remain in the front field command. Their numerical strength can be reduced considerablyart of tbe functions which previously belonged to these departments will be performed by the operational center, and also because of the possibility of equipping these departments with means of automation. However, thore is no need to have these departments In direct subordination to ths front troop commander. They decide questions of support of the combat operations of tbe troops, and their work should be more closely linked with tbat of ths operational and Intelligence directorates of the front headquarters. The operational center will concern Itself with tbe collection, collation, and recording of data on the position, bringing up to strength, and condition of the engineer and chemical troops and of engineering and chemical squlpment, and the front headquarters will also deal with the preparation and delivery to the troops of orders concerned with the combat use of engineer and chemical troops. All this points to the expediency of including engineer and chemical departments in ths make-up of the front headquarters.
It is expedient that the unificationingls directorate of the elements dealing with questions of automotive servicing and of tank armament which has now taken place in the commandistrict (okrug) should also be retained in the front flold command with direct subordination to the troop commander.
It Is expedient to concentrate all questions of the organization and structure of ths rear, and of tbe material and medical support of the combat operations of ths troops in onehe directorate of the front rear aervicee, headed by the deputy commander of troops for the rear services. The organizational structure and numerical composition of the directorate of ths rear services should be examinediew to cutting them down considerably. The nucleus of the directorate of the front rear servlcos should be the rear-services operational center organized in
A Manner similar to the operational center of ths front headquarters. Tha rear operational centerdecide all questions of collection, collation, and recording of data on tha position and stats of rear units andupplies of equipment, support to the troops, the structure of tha operational and troop rear areas, and othero.
It should ba constantly roady to pass this data to tha chief of tha rear aervlces and also to ths operational center and to the chief of staff of tha front. Tha chief of the front rear servlcea la tha peraon vho reports to tha front troop commander on queatlons about tba rear aervlces. In ths future ths rear-asrvlces operational canter should be equipped with means of automation, which would facilitate th* solution of such questions as:
rscordlng the availability and movement of material-technical means and tha compilation of estimates of the requirements of the troops for thass;
planning supply and evacuation of all types, using the various types of transport present in tha front, armies, and large unita;
recording medical loaaaa, tha degree of fullneaa of ths medical establishments, the movements of wounded and sick, and others.
Ths strength of tha political directorateront, whose subordination should remain as before, can ba reduced because of tha transfer of tha functions of supply to the chief of ths front rear services and of the functions of recording, appointing, and moving Party-political worker cadres to ths chief of ths directorate of cadres of the front. The strength of the directorate of cadres can also be reduced considerably bocauseavailarJlTTty of computers which allow ths automation of work on ths registration of tha cadraa by ths officer complement.
Such, In our opinion, are the changes which it is necessary to introduce into the organizational structure of the front field command.
Proceeding from this structure, It Is by now already possible to define in Its general outlines the composition of the command postront. It, obvloualy, will consist of two basic groups and one reserve group.
The first group: the commander of troops and the chief ot atari of the front, the operational center, the department of operational planning of ths operational directorate, the operational Intelligence control point, tbe department of planning and control of intelligence, and tbe 8th department.
The second group): the headquarters of the missile troops, the control point of the PVO, ths department of engineer troops, the chemical department, and tbe signals department.
The roserye group of the command post Includes -the reserve shift from the operational cantor, the reserve shift from the control point of missile troops, tho reserve shift fron the intelligence control point, and ths reserve shift from tha PVO control point.
The reserve group serves to man tho PKP or VPU. It can serve aa the nucleusow front field command, if the command post goes out of action as the resultuclear strike by the enemy.
Ia conclusion, we shall dwell briefly on the organisation and movement of the control points.
Tho organization, disposition, and movement of the control points must meet the requirements for stable and uninterrupted control of the troops under any enemy coercion. However, the present material bane of our operational headquarters does not allow these requirements to be met. Tbe experience of
exercise* shows that even if the control of troops is maintainedufficiently high level in the period of preparation of an operation, it very often breaks down during the course of ths operation. Aa soon as ths troops of tho front ars sot la notion, control over them becomes insufficiently stable and tho control points become helpless.
Ths relief of control points la carried out by old methods, by tha dispatch forward of operational groups to organize control pointsew placo, because, since they ars oa the move, operational headquarters ar* notosition to control the troop*. Consequently, when an operation ia moving at high speed, headquarters fall behind the troop* already by the second day.
Ia modern operations, the headquarteraront should assure the commander reliable control of the troops irrespective of whether it is stationary or on tho move. The control resourcesront headquarters must ensure reliable communications and the conditions necessary for th* work of officers on ths move, and its staff and material base should ensure the rapidclosing down, and aovement of control points.
Unfortunately, questions of working convenience aad of rest for the officers of the operational headquarters nave not yet been solved by us. Even the experimental models of radio trucks which are being developed for operational headquartera at present do not allow officers to work la themap. In consequence, there can be no talk of any control on the move orhort halt. V* have not on* acceptable production modeltaff vehicle for operational headquarters. Attempts by the headquarters of districts and armies to get out of thi* situation by their own efforts and resources lead to the unreasonable waste of considerable sums and to the weakening of other links of the military aachias.
our opinion it is advisable to perform the teak oftaff vehicleentralized say. The design bureau of any automobile plant could do thla successfullyow months. The establishment of normal conditions for the work of officers of operational headquarters will ralss tha quality and operational sfflcisncy of thsir work and, consequently, will improve tha control of troopshole.
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Original document.
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