CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
21
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
"The Paths of Further Development of the Tank
Troops of the Soviety Marshal of Armored Troops P. Rotmlstrov
Enclosederbatim translation of an article entitled "The Paths of Further Development of the Tank Troops of the Soviety Marshal of Armored Troops P. Rotmlstrov which appearedpecial TOP SECRET issue of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought).
This article vas acquiredoviet official who has provided reliable information ln the past.
FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:
RICHARD HELMS
APPROVED FOR w
Military Assistant to the President
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Director for Intelligence The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Headquarters, U. S. Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy
Director, National Security Agency
The Director of Intelligence and Research Department of State
Director, Division of Intelligence Atomic Energy Commission
National Indications Center
Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant Director formations! Estimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
SUBJECT
,,Paths of Further Development of the Tank Troops of the Soviety Marshal of Armored Troops P. Rotmlstrov
OF INFO: 1
Documentary
SOURCE: Reliable Soviet source (B) who hae access to this type of document.
Followingerbatim translation of"The Paths of Further Development of the Tank Troops of the Sovietritten by Marshal of Armored Troops Pavel A. Rotmlstrov, SSf ofthe Military Academy of Armoredtalin.
article appeared inirst Edition of The Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Voyennaya Myal" (Militarynstitutedhich is classified TOP SECRET and is published irregularly. According to toehis edition contains articles never before published and some speeches which have been delivered prior to being published ln this form. It la distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.
Many pointstmlstrov's article are challenged in an article by General of the Army.A.hadov inl Second edition of thlB Special Collection. atedU)
The Paths of Further Development of the
Tank Troops of the Soviet Army
by
Marshal of Armored Troops P. Rotmistrov
There have been pronouncements of late on many questionswith the development of tank technology and tbetank troops. One can hear the opinion that it is pointlessstrong armor plating on tanks in view of tbe appearance ofeffective antitank means (above all of guided-nd also because of difficulties related toand use of heavy, tracked combat
In connection with the probable re-arming of tanks with guided missiles (upravlyayemyy reaktlvnyy snaryad) Instead of tube artillery armament, lt is also said that it is necessary totbe design of tanks. In particular, proposals are advanced that tbe production of heavy tanks and the development of prototypes be stopped. In this case there will be only two types of tanks with which our tank troops can be equipped: medium (the basic type) and lightnstead of the three that now exist.
It Is impossible not to admit tbat the pronouncements and proposals cited touch upon fundamental questions of the further development of armored technology, organizational structure, end of the combat use of tank troops.
A proposal that is no less important, which is also widely discussed and vhlch has its-supporters, is the elimination of .tank armies and divisions and conversion to mixed organization of an armynified division.
We do not share the views of theince they are not scientifically founded and are not supported by the experience of the last war. Inasmuch as there are no official decisionsthese questions as yet, we shall permit ourselves to express our viewpoint.
Conditions that determine the directions of the furtherof tanks. ankracked ccobat vehicle of high crosa-country ability Incorporating three basic combat qualities: firepower, armor protection, and mobility. During the existence of the tank these qualities have constantly been improved as regards achievements in the development of armament, armor protection, power transmission, and running gear, as well as by changes in operational-tactical views on the employment of tank troops.
The choice of the directions of development of the basic combat qualities of our modern tanks was made on the basis of the experience of tbe last war. During recent years further development has been mainly concerned with Increasing the accuracy of fire when in motionabf broadening the scope of combat utilization (firing at night and under conditions of poor visibility, the surmounting of water obstacles by floating or by moving along the bottom of thend of increasing the reliability of operation of separate assemblies and of the vehiclehole.
The correct determination of basic combat characteristics ensured the superiority of our tanks over the comparable types of tanks of the capitalist countries during the last war and in the postwar period.
At the present time the development of new types of weapons, and above all of the means of masa destruction, makes it necessary to determine the paths for the further Improvement of the combat qualities of tanka. which are applicable to the newly arising conditionsessibis war.
The present period of tank development is characterized by the fact that the decisive factor for further improvement is not so much past combat experience, with all its value,cientific forecast of the natureuture war, the role of tank troops in'it, and the methods of their combat employment. In other words, the basic trends in the development of armor technology should be determined now, above all, by the presence of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities, and by the development of tank technology and of the means of defense against tanks.
Proceedinghorough analysis of the natureuture war, it must be considered that tho decisive force
In the ground troops will be tank troops, ln cooperation with
13HN
missile troops and aviation. The basic assignment of tanks in modern combat operations will obviously be: combat with the tanks of the enemy, destruction of missile launchers on the launch sites, suppression and destruction of the various other firing means,-the means of control, reconnaissance, and Bupply, as well as the personnel of the enemy, including those in armored carriers and in shelters. Proceeding from this, it is essential to lay special stress on the multi-purpose assignments of tanks and their armament not only at the present stage, but also in the near future. From the conditions of highly mobile troop operations and of great Independence in the employment of tank unitsub-unitsnd individual tanks, dictated by the use of weapons of mass destructionattle and an engagement, arises the need to Include in the armament of our troops tanks with high resistance to all the(porazhayushchiy) factorsuclear explosion, with great cruising range, and which are also powerfully armed andignificant supply of ammunition for various missions, above all of shells (snaryad) effective against the tanks of the enemy.
The amor protection of tanks. As vas mentioned before, one hears nowadays the opinion that, owing to the appearance of new sntltank combat weapons, there is noequirement for tanks with thick armor. Amongroponent of thisis Colonel-General A. I. Gastilovlch, who writes literally in hishe Theory of Military Art Requirespetslalnyy sbornik atatcy zhurnala Voyennaya My si, First) that the ground troopshole should be made air-transportable with lightly armored (oblegchennyy) tanks, as any armor can be penetrated anyway.
In this article we do not have the opportunity to examine other questions raised by General Gastilovlch. At the same time, it le impossible to bypass the question cited without drawing the attention of the author to the fact -that not only are- light tanks incapable -of engaging Independently in battles with tanks of tbe enemy (General Gastilovlch, it should be said, calls upon our tank divisions to do this, on pagef the Specialut they will also suffer heavy losses from nuclear strikes by the enemy, and thus our tanks and tank troopshole will only lose by theseonsequently, it is impossible to reject, so rashly, reliable armor protection of modern tanks.
The complexity of creating proper armor protection for tanks under modern conditions, in relation to the development of powerful means of destruction, is further conditioned by the fact that,thls
protection must behat it is called upon to protect personnel against destruction by various types of weapons that operate on different principles.
Thus, the armor-piercing shell with high muzzle velocity which Is used against tanks presents one requirement to the armor material.
Nuclear weapons have introduced other requiremente, namely, the need to protect tanks against the shock waveuclear explosion and against penetrating radiation (gonna rays and neutron flux).
this connection, it must be kept In mind that while steel armor offers good protection against the shock waveuclear explosion (here we take into consideration the strength of the hull and turret)nd successfully resists gamma-radiation, which is connected with the heavy specific gravity of steel. It affords slight resistance to tbe flow of fast neutrons. In regard to radiation of light waves it should be said that the existing armor of tanks eliminates this danger to the crew.
Finally, the use of shaped-charge (kumulyativnyy) shells, as Is known, is basedifferent principle of destruction, which is most effective against steel armor. We recall that the first attempts to use shaped charges in combat occurred during tbe period of the Spanish Civil During World War II shaped-charge antitank means were greatly improved (panzerfaust, bazooka, and others) and were quite widely used.
In the postwar period the sphere of employment of shaped chargeseans of combating tanka baa widened even more; this is evidenced by the further Improvement of shaped-charge shells In conventional tube artillery, the creation of recoHless weapons with shaped-charge shells, and, finally, the appearance of guided missiles with shaped charges.
The highly effective action of shaped charges against steel armor, tho widespread possibilities of their use, and also the appearance during the last few years, in many countries, for example, France, England, the USA, West Germany and Switzerland, of various models of antitank guided missiles (PTURS) (Seeave introduced the problem of providing protection for tanks from destruction by shaped charges, which should be gone into in more detail.
Some foreign military experta think that the appearance of PTURS with shaped chargesew era in combat with tanks and leadsundamental change in the equipment (tekhnlka) and tactics of armored troops.
Tactical-Technicai Data of Antitank Guided Missiles of Foreign Countries:
o
o
u
b
ih
(Type) System
ia
Is?
radio
by wire
Ot)
control by wire
mm
Length of Missile, mm
ij m
Weight, kg
t
of Warhead, kg*
lowanks.
meters/sec*
j
of Guided Flight, m
c
Ability, mm
as. els
Collection of Articles "Artillery Journal"0.
Note: The date on missilesU,nd "Cobra.U" are from the book, "Missile Weapons and Their Combatart I,. Data on "Entac" and "Ltrfcin"rom the collection of articles, "Artillery- On Red Eye, from the collection of articles of the Journal
With all tha diversity of knownhey can bebasically by the type of rocket enginer liquid) and by the system of guidance (navedenlye) to the target. Guidance (upravlenlye) is by wire, radio, or by means of an infrared honing head.
The firing of antitank guided missiles is done from ground launching mounts (puskovaya ustanovks) installed on vehicles, armored carriers, and other mobile means.
In comparison with other antitank means, these missilesumber of advantages. They are easy to handle and, being guided in trajectory, display great accuracy In tests. Unlike conventional antitank weapons, the operator does not have to determine distance to the target and its rate of movement whenuided missile. And finally, the main thing, which allowed some experts to speak of the onsetew era in combat against tanks, is tho great depth of penetration of steel armor, equalO ma or moreormal hit.
These positive qualities of antitank guided missilestheir widespread use in battle. But one must not go to extremes and draw hasty conclusions, which often happens when technical achievements are evaluated from only one standpoint.
Our creation of antitank guided missiles, of which the tactical-technical characteristics areevel with foreign models, apparently served as one of the main grounds for the pronouncements on the inexpediency of using heavy armor on tanka. Inasmuch as it mi allegedly practically Impossible to install armor protection of tanka that could withstand the modern neano for their destruction.
The mistake ln such reasoning lies in Its one-sldednees, and arises from an Inadequate appraisal of many factors connected with the conditions of employment of these means, and also from forgetting the powerful combat characteristics of tanks.
The launching mounts of antitank guided missiles aremeans of defense; they cannot be usedank meetinghave absolutely no protection from the effects of
weapons, which seriously limits the possibilities for their Even in the defense these launching mounts areby tactical nuclear weapons. Besides, they will bemove over contaminated terrain rightucleartanks will operate without delay, exploiting the successuseuclear weapon against the
Firing by tanks at guided missile launching mounts, the laying of smoke screens, and also the utilization by tanks of folds in the ground, features and structures, trees, and bushes when approaching the enemy will leadonsiderable reduction in the effectiveness of guided missiles used against tanks.
The analysis of the qualities, possibilities, and conditions of combat use of recently developed models of antitank guided missiles with shaped charges, possessing high armor-piercing capability, allows us to state with full responsibility that their appearance inresence of meanB of mass destruction and tanka does not giveufficient basis to conclude that it is inexpedient totrong armor protection on the basic types of Soviet tanks. Besides, it should not be forgottenank with strong armor, moving rapidly over the battlefield and firing simultaneously, has always had superiority over antitank weapons. Of course, it Is necessary to consider the possibility that the antitank weapons mentioned may be Improved or that new, more effective ones will appear. However, tanks will not remain at their present stage of development either.
In examining the question of the necessary armor protection of the basic types of tanks, we consider that it must beapable of giving the tank great resistance, protecting the crew from weapons of mass destruction and enemy tanks, and also from various modern antitank weapons.
Therefore, we must not slacken our efforts to perfect the strong armor protection of the basic types of tanks, which must be strengthened eupplementarily for the biological protection of the tank crew from penetrating radiation by the use of special "linings" (podboy) which inhibit the flow of neutrons. But, again, it must be remembered that the "lining" will be of use only in conjunction with dependable armor.
Improvement of the armor protection of tanka from all types of shaped-charge weapons (and not only from PTURS) must be carried out by using large angles of inclination of the armor details, the differential distribution of armor in relation to the probability of damage to the tank on the battlefield, the use of shields of various designs to induce activation of the fuse of the missile before it reaches the main armor, and, finally, byombined armor consisting of armor steel and glass plastic (etekloplastlk) which resists the shaped-charge effect well.
Nor should it be forgotten that the presence of weaker armor protection on tanks on one belligerent side puts the tank troops of that sideisadvantage In advance, especially In carryingeeting battle and engagement. But this type of combat action will be basic, as we know, especially in the initial periodar.
As regards the position taken on the need to increase the armor protection of tbe basic types of tanks, one must not conclude that It is inevitable that their weight will be Increased thereby. Even now we should strive to reduce the weight of tracked combat vehicles, but not at the expense of their combat qualities, because weight still adds to their great resistanceuclear explosion, vhlch leads to the broadening of tho Bphere of their combat utilization.
When we speak of resistance, we mean not only resistance to
overturning, but also the ability to withstand all tho other factorsuclear explosion.
The possibility of increasing the armor and still retaining the same weightank can be illustrated by an example of Soviet tank construction.
Thus,- tank, which was the best tank of its day, has been replaced by5 medium tank, which has armor and armament more than twice as powerful, with2 percent increase In the weight of the vehicle.
Even now there are certain opportunities to Increase further the combat qualities of tanks under conditions of their usear employing nuclear weapons without*Increasing their weight. At tbe same time, however we strive to reduce the weight of tanks, we should not do so under any circumstances at the cost of weakening the hullank.
The heavy tank: Up to the present some comrades have expressed the thought that It Is pointless to produce heavy tanks. Weifferent opinion Indeed.
First of all it should bo noted that the conceptheavy tank" is quite relative. 0ankseight ofons are called heavy, while the American tack MtSo that weighs U7 tons Is medium. Theton "Centurion" tanks are also considered medium. The latest models of American and British heavy
mm
tanka weighona andons, respectively, and the well-known heavy "Tlgcr-B" tank of the former German-Fascist army weighedons.
Therefore, it seems to us that it isuestion of the name, but of whether weype of combat vehicle such asank, or not!
When this question is examined it Is helpful to recall the relationship between our tank types during the last war. Statistics show that during World War II we bad aboutercent medium tanks and assault gunsp toercent light tanks and SAU, and aboutercent heavy tanks and SAU. Of course,ighof light tanks existed because of the well-known conditions, and, in particular, because it was possible to build them in ordinary automobile plants.
So far as the production of heavy tanks Is concerned, they were produced only out of necessity, because of tbe harsh deoands of war. They were produced despite all wartime difficulties and, as the experience of the last war ahowed, their production was fully Justified.
In our opinion, it is lmpoaaible to go only on economic considerations in evaluating the significance of heavy tanks under tho new conditions. It is really hard to produce heavy tanks; theyot of metal, but for defeating an enemy one cannot skimp with metal. Apparently, In this case, when examining the question of heavy tank production, it is necessary to approach It not only, and not mainly,urely economic standpoint, but above all by evaluating military necessity and expediency.
Let us note here that-art-the ^present time the -percentile relationship of heavy tanks to medium ones (if wo .consider only0anks) is in all onlyercent. In other words, ve actually havo only one type of tracked combat vehicle. Since the light, reconnaissance amphibious tank is not suitable, it seems to us, for conducting tank battles, and In reality we have so few heavy tanks that any restrictions on their production will reduce their significance in our troops to zero.
The question arises: Do we actually have to Halt ourselves to one type of tank and to considerormal phenomenon in the development of armored technology?
In our opinion, this muBt not ho done, not only fromof ensuring qualitative superiority over the enemy, hut also on tho grounds that it is essential to broaden the development of designs of tracked combat vehicles.
It is known that. Army, our probable enemy, has acceptedank into its armament, and it not only concedes nothing to our medium tank in most respects, but Is even superior to the latter in some. For example, the armor protection of the frontal (lobovaya) armor of5 tank hullm, and/of theank, ISO mm. Our tank is armeda gun, and theirsm gun. The muzzle velocity of an armor-piercing shell from our gunec, and fromoc. Our unit of fireounds, and The engine power of5 tanknd. The capacity of our main fuel tanksiters, anditers.
5 tank has an advantage overank, for example, in the dimensions and weight of the vehicle. This, however, does not give us the right to disregard the definite progress attained by the USA in tbe construction of medium tanks.
At the same timeeavy tank is superior to the latest models of foreign medium tanks, including,umber of basic combat features, especially in firepower and armor, and is equal to them in maneuverability.
Consequently, if we rejectank ot the present time it can lead to the loss of our qualitative superiority over the tanks oj the enemy. Therefore, we should not reject heavy tanks at the present time, particularlyank, but on the contrary, it Is necessary to arriveecision that would again ensure our superiority over the tank-technology-of-the enemy, especially-in tank battles and engagements.
It follows that an Incorrect selection of the necessary types of tanks will do serious damage to the army. This problem assumes special significance at certain stages in the development of tanks, as the result of general technical progress and the appearance of new methods of conducting combat operations.
We^con^^eiythat tho main purpose and meaning of the existence of heavyTsHKsin our army consists of the fact that, having stronger combat characteristics than medium tanks, especially In
4
firepower and amor protection, they ensure our qualitative superiority over the tanks of the enemy, vhlch is impossible to achieve with medium tanks alone.
ank that. Army haa adopted is called tho "basic combatt the same time, despite its extremely powerfuland armor, the Americans,einforcing measure, hove created numerous tracked assault guns of large caliberso 2U0ith armor giving full protection from bullets andpecial system of anti-atomic defense.
The armament of the newest models of these assault guns is Installed in revolving turrets; it has mechanized loadingairly large unit of fire. Some of them are so adapted that they con cross water obstacles afloat.
Consequently the American "basic combat tanks" have various and powerful means of reinforcement which have great nobility andability, adapted for crossing terrain that is contaminated with radioactive substances. Hovever, the weak armor of the assault guns limits their use In certain types of combat.
Under prevailing conditions our baalc (medium) tanks also need means of reinforcement that would be capable of destroying the enemy's tanks at great distances, firing by direct laying and without reducing the maneuverability of the tank troops.
These methods for the qualitative reinforcement of medium tanks can be:
heavy tacks, greatly superior to medium tanks In firepower and armor;
assault guns, created both on special chassis and on the chassisedium tank, which would have more powerful armament than the latter.
first way is preferable. The presence of strong armor protection on the heavy tanks Increases the possibilities for their combat utilization, compared to tbe SAU mounted on the chassis of medium tanks, not to mention the assault guns with onlyarmor, especiallyeeting engagement.
Besides, If the final designeavy tank exists, new combat vehicles for various purposes can be created on this basiselatively short time if the need arises (missile carriers, powerful assault guns. Including those using nuclear weapons and others).
Thus, bearing ln mind that the enemy has theHfiO tank and various reinforcing means, we come to the conclusion that ln order to ensure superiority over the tanks of the enemy and to strengthen our medium tanks qualitatively, it is necessary for us to have heavy tanka or some other vehicles which have firepower superior to that Of the basic tank of the enemy.
The aspiration to reject heavy tanka and to reduce the weight of tanks by reducing the thickness of the armor, will lead inevitablyharp decrease In the combat capabilities of tanks and win place our tank personnel In an unequal pes itlon in the conductattle with the tanks of the enemy- As has already been pointed out, the weakening of tank armor does not conform with tbe requirements for antl-atoalc protection.
In consequence. If we examine the heavy tank queetlonit is essential to study many conditions. Therefore, the decision which le adoptod has to be deeply founded to eliminate any possibility ofistake in this important question.
fioira questions Of the organization of tank troops: Lately, as we have already mentioned, there have been statements on the necessity of reviewing the organizational structure of tbe tank troops. More than that, there are even suggestions that we should reject tbe concept of "tank troops".
The supporters of the views indicated consider that theof modern ground troops and their saturation with tanksled to the fact that there is little difference In the ground troops between motorized rifle divisions and tank divisions, with the result that tank troops nowadays lose their independent significance. For this reason there are proposals to abolish tank divisions, tank armies and the concept of "tank formations".
In stating the concept of creating unified divisions as the basic tactical large unit (ooyedlneniye) of the ground troops, itshave foremost in mind the rejection of tank divisions.
In examining this question the experience of the last war and the economy of the country oust be taken into consideration. It appears to us that unified divisions, saturated with tanks, will not be needed everywhere. In many coses, in some theaters of military operations, and In many areas of tbe West European theater. It will also be possible to have standard motorized rifle divisionsimited number of tanks, or even without them. If all the divisions ore thoroughly saturated with tanks, the economy of the country will be unable to supportuge tank park. Moreover, the opportunity to mass tanks where it is deemed to be operationally expedient always remains, without their organizational disintegration.
These concepts oblige us to have at least two types of divisions.
It is well known that nuclear weapons have brought about many corrections, not only In combat tactics, but also in military arthole. Under conditions of the use of weapons of mass destruction, war will be more mobile with higher rates of advance thsn formerly, and operations willarge scale. All this will call for more frequent and more intensive troop movements than before.
Proceeding from this, some comrades consider that tank divisions do not fully meet specified requirements, and that they are inferior to the motorized rifle divisions in mobility except on the In particular, they assert tbat the motorized rifle division is superior to the tank division on the march, because lt is necessary to have strong bridges, heavy ferries, and pontoon bridges for tanks toater barrier, and tanks are supposedly slower than wheeled vehicles and armored carriers, etc. Therefore, in their opinion, all the advantages remain with the motorized rifle division,iven case.
It la entirely obvious that none of these conclusions is sound. On the march the motorized rifle division has no advantages, andhave any, over the tank division, because lt has tanks of its own and moves at the speed of the tanks. Because of the presence of tanks in the motorized rifle division lt needs bridges Just like the tank division, so even in this sphere the motorized rifle division has no advantages of any kind.
Indeed, in battle, as soon as the motorized Infantry (motopekhota) leavee tho armored carriers, the motorized rifle division will be forced to advance at the speed of Infantry (thla will sharply curtail its maneuverability and rate ofhile tank units and sub-units
will have to operate without Infantry, because on the battlefield lt Is impossible to combine the speed of tanks0 km/hrwith tho speed of infantrym/hrnd the powerrotectedpwith the strengthan without any protection.
AH combat experience of World War II points to the fact that it was not rifle divisions reinforced with tanks that determined the success of operations, aa, for example, French militarybelieved, but tank divisions, tank corps, and tank armies.
All those who maintain that the organizationnified division is more progressive than the organization of our tank divisions, are, ln our opinion, bearers of old-fashioned ideas.
The tank division fully Justified itself in the last war, and it will Justify itself even more under the conditionsar conducted with the use of nuclear weapons. In examining current problems, one should proceed first of all from the effects of the employment of nuclear weapons. This must be taken as the basis of the organization of the troops. If this is so, and if lt seems that no one takes issue with this thesis, then we have to create an organization that will meet all the modern requirements -
Upon thorough examination of this question, one may assert that the inadequacy of the proposed organizationnified division will be proven by every nuclear explosion. uclear explosion will put everything that is on tbe battlefield out of cemission, except the tank crews, who are covered by thick armor. It might be asked, why build illusions and create an organization of troops that is known beforehand not to meet the requirements of modern warfare}
More than once, the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet union R. Ya. Malinovskly, pointed out that In the next war, as never before, there will be an increase in the number of tank meeting engagements and battles. He did not forget to remind us of this during this year's critique of exercises, by pointing out that "meeting battles and engagements will be the most commonhis is understandable. These battles and engagements will have to be carried out, above all, by our tank troops against the tank troops of the enemy; this Is borne out by the fact that they are best adapted for the conduct of battles under nuclear warfare conditions, and that they con engage, most successfully, the enemy tanks. This thesis is upheld by the entire course of World War II, and especially during the engagement at Prokborovka on
During this meeting engagement the blows of the German tank troopa were sustained only by our tank troops. Iteet that tbe fresh, battle-tested 5th Guards Combined Arms Army under the ccssnsnd of such an experienced warrior as Lieutenant Generalhadov, not only did not fulfill the order of the Commander of the Voronezh Front, General of the Army H. F. Vatutin, and member of the Military Council N. S. Khrushchev to carryoint counter attack with the 5th Guards Tank Army, but did not even hold the lines being occupied. Its corps on the left flank, unable to sustain the onslaught of the German tanks, withdrewistance to the east, and exposed the right flank of the 5th Guards Tank Army, which was alreadyifficult oituatlon without this. Despite the conditions that arose, the 5th Guards Tank Army not only closed the right flank with ita own tank units, but also detached one brigade to the assistance of the 5th Guards Combined Arms Army. How con we forget these lessons of history now, and propose without foundation or dueew universal division whose combat value appears highly dubious, and reject the tank division which proved itself throughout all of World War II and has not compromised itself yetI
It is perfectly apparent that the conversionniversal division will lead to the rejection, not only of the tank division, but also of the tank army, and this will lead inevitably to the extensive dispersal of tanks and to the loss of all the advantages which they possess when they are organizationally massed.
respect, we consider lt quite properot of atten-tlonito directed to the questionew organization of the troops.
In modern conditions military art does not at allniversal organization of the basic large units of the ground troops, for it would be hard to combine the combat qualities of the various new types of weapons and combat equipment.'contrary, -it'is necessary to create an organizational structure which will provide the most effective ulltlzation of combat equipment.
Thus, it seems advisable to us to nave not one universal type of diviaion, but three types of divisions:
ank division to conduct combat operations under conditions when nuclear weapons are uaed, to conduct meeting battles with enemy tanks, and as the basic means for carrying out deep strikes on the offensive and repelling enemy strikes on tbe defensive. Its
organizational development must tend tovard the further reduction of personnel not protected by armor and saturation with heavily armored tanks.
otorized rifle division which should bo more or leBs the same as lt is now, maybe even with some reduction in the number of tanka, or else in wartime we may not be able to maintain all motorized rifle divisions at TOE strength in tanks. Besides its general missions that were pointed out ln the order of the Minister of DefenseI, it can be used to secure general success ln tbe main f. direction, for performing basic missions ln minor directions, ond forirm defense.
ight motorized rifle division without tanks. In ourivision of this type could carry out fast marches in armored carriers over light bridges and crossings, cross contaminated zones without engagement, move by air into the enemy rear or into an area of our strong tank formations to consolidate their successes, conduct stubborn defense of terrain that tanks cannot reach easily, etc. ivision of this type is armed with modern antitank weapons, under favorable conditions, it will be able to hold on area or line securely and repel enemy tank attacks. In casesivision of thiss thrown into an area where we have strong tank formations it can be reinforced with tanka if tbe necessity arises.
It seems to us that tbe presence of three types of divisions in the organization of the ground troopa will fulfill the requirements presented by modern warfare better than one unified division.
The pronouncements of some of our military leaders that the tank array has outlived itself, and that tbe time haa come to shift to an army of unified organization, are not new. Such conclusionsirect consequence of the rejection .of Ihe .tank division -and -the creationingle, unified division.
In this connection, it is pertinent to remember that ln the history of the development of armored troops theread day when the tank and mechanized corps found themselves disbanded. Everyone knows what consequences this led to.
At the root of such views on the modern tank army la tbe assertion that it does not differ in any way now from the combined arms amy, that In operations, exercise experience shows. It cannot break away from the other forcesront, and Its existence is, therefore.
supposedly not Justified in say way.
Such pronouncements are, to say the least, unfounded. The experience of World War II testifies to the fact that all of the moot successful operations, not only offensive but also defensive, were won by our troops largely with the participation of tank armies. Tank armies provided the front with wide mobility, power, and depth of strike, developing operations at high tempo.
It is permissible to pose this question to all comrades who espouse the concept of abolishing tank armies: Do they now reject the concept of massed strikes, or Is this method of defeating the enemy also obsolete!
If wo consider that oven now, in tho age of nuclear weapons, it is necesBary to fight with the fist, then how can we come out against the tank army if its organization already incorporates the principle of massing tanks. We do not wish to go into this question further and introduce other arguments of the superiority of the tank array over the combined arms army in offensive operations, but lt seems to us that, to any person capable of objective evaluation, it must be clear that if tank armieseading role in tbe success of operations carried out during the last war, then their roleuture war, more mobile than the last, will increase more and more. The tank army was and will remain the most menacing force to the enemy, especiallyeeting engagement against his tank formationa.
The experience of World War II teaches that theat ion of tank troope differed, and will continue to differ, from the use of rifle troops reinforced with tanks. Therefore, the various proposals directed, in actuality, toward abolishing tank troops In their present organization, do not strengthen the ground troops in any way, but push us towards the French tactics which Tailed -completely -in"the last war. Wo need powerful endorganized tankll the experience of the last war speaks eloquently of this, and it is demanded by modern conditions of carrying out combat operationo arisingesult of the appearance and development of missile troops and nuclear weapons.
Original document.
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