71
LBJ LIBRARY Mandiiory Reviewocument * **
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER
POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN KATANGA
SabmJUmtUii.ii OTiniuFMi
Prcpc7afton of feuTh* Cmtraltpotae-ti er
Itmie,-1 uu imi. UWuu *t>f ru MIMf
* tke
UKITKD ST4TK3 OerUJlGEKCS BOARD
H/.o wee* Deparlne-IIUU. TIM'MelhfeiieeUU utilnl CBleJ <rf Meffmef
Natal Oveiaw trtffflwf ret. Dtfel-eu<Mitmiu Cut er JtcflMP.eio> A" MMPMK Voouke Ourctcr of Uurmey rae atom* <aef| CommumnMe USIt aad Iht AutiMnt fHreetor. reeeeel Hu'eau o! i'ruifitijafian. aotlalnerf lAe niMecfn
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DISSEMINATION NOTICE
ru* aiUinu in rtltaemmatcd oy lOegency. Thai copy is lor the uslormsUan and use of Use recipient and ol persons under his jurisdictionerd to know basks.ssential rthn*relpatlop may be authorised by Uw (allowing officials wiUiln their respective departments.
a Dime tor of Intelligence and Heicaicli, (or Uw Dependent of Stateirector, Deierue Intelligence Agency
c. Aniitwit Cliiet of SlsXT lor Intelligence. Department of tlie Army
tl. Assistant Oiidval operations lor Intelligence, lor the Department ol Um
^
e. Directorclllgence. USAF, lor the Department o( the AtrUectoi lot Intelligence, Joint Stan. lot "lTie Joint Stall g. DUectc* ol IntdUgance, ABC. lor UM Atomic Energy Ccanrniasloo b. Assistant Director, FBI, lor trie Federal Bureau ofUaclor ol NSA. lor the National Security Agency
I AasUUri: Director lor Central ReJrrence. CIA. lor tui) other Departrneni or Agency.
7 Tha copy may be retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security rrgulallorn. or returned to tbe CcotraJ Intelligence Agency by arrangement with Uw OOce or Central Reference. CIA
1 When aalisseminatcd overseas. Uw overseas recipients may retain tteriod not in escess of one year. At the end of uua period, the estimate mould ei'-rie: Be de-Jroyed. returned UJgency, or penala-ilonvf the torwardlng agency to retainccorduxe with2.
4 Tbeo.*eaUmateused separately from UM text, mould be classified! forilr
washing
mi natcnal contains loKmoaUoothe KeUMial Detente ot use Uniud OUuatht meaDlnc Ot thelam. Title ii USC.nd IM.ru nuuloo ei leirlauontUeb In anr ciumrr to an unauUioruedrohibited
DISTRIBUTION: White House
National Secant* Counul
twin rimenl ot lint
Drpelmetii ol Detroae Aioeo* toero Cntnnanlw. rrOertl kiev ot Ic'nUseUco
THE PROBLEM
To assess (a)ssifailities for negotiation between the Central Government and Katanga; <b) the exsris^wnces of TShombe's departure or ouster from Katanea (c) the conwquencesontinued impasse between the Central Government and Katanga.'
THE ESTIMATE
INTRODUCTION
he integration of Katanga province Into the Congo Republic is now becomingritical issue as to Uneaten theof Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula. At the moment, negotiations between Adoula and Katanga President Molse Tsnombe areby the Inabpity of either to bong ef-feetiee pressure to bear on the other. The essential issue is the form of political organi-taUon for the Congo: confederation asby Tshotnbeairly strong centralas held by Adoula and theHowever, the flnct limitations on their bargainingby conditions bc-yoad theireach reluctant and iMeed unable to offer concessions to the other. Moreover, the fighting which has broken out during ihe past several days in the eusabcthvuie area probably wm affect the possibility of initialing systematic discussions ofssue. Exactly how. it ts as yet too early to tell.
Tfatt estimateprepared in Ule early days el renewed fl (tiling between UN and Ka'.anion forces. Accotainely. ii is possible thaind (el mar be cnertakrn by events.
II. SOURCES Of TSItCNWiVi'S STRENGTH
TMrombe receives strong backing through, out much of the province from hu own Lunda tribal groups, and. in association with his chief Ueu tenants. Interior Minister Munongo and Foreign Minister Kimba, enjoys tribal support throughout southern and eastern Ka-tanrra among Che predominant rton-Baluba peoples. TShombe also obtains important financial resources from Katanga's mineral properties, which account lorf the Congo's budgetary mcorne and which axe still largely owned and operated by Belgian mtereau. Katangaillion annually in taxand dividends from the Union Minifrc and related companies. These eonuibuirons are paid lo Katanga, via Brussels, and are used for Tsh on he's nuiilary and otherTshombe also receives consider, able advice and guidance from the Union Minlereatanga; ihey. in turn, arc to some extent dependent upon him lor protection and for the right to continue to operate
White settlers in Northern Rhodesia and Angola fear an eMcnsion of the Congo'sinto their areas. To prevent this, they are willing to give some political support and
I
countenance Use passage ol somesupplies, mercenaries, and advisers In Tshombe. They are also willing lo grant Katanga continued access to the sea for Ita exports'. In Katanga. Ihe remaining Belgianollo the comparatively healthy economy and provide raadly-needed technical and administrativeMoreover,elgian colon "mlnutemen"an Europeanforce consliUite an effective core ot military strength and In addition provide readership to Katangan troops. Theup to the present at least, have proved superior to the Central Government's unruly army.
III. ISMOMBFS ATTITUDE TOWARD NEGOTIATION
harbors grave doubts aboutof negotiating with Adoula. InLeopold vUle lack* sufficientand administrative ability toHe is afraid that theimportant positions In the present
jUstratlon will so-ji prevail overftese circumstances, and recallinga's fate and his own earlier mistreat-mer' at the hands of Congolese poUUclans. Tshombe fears for his personal safety should he go to Leopoldville. He (ears for hisfuture should he accept any offer tor high oKVce In the present Central Government He is also suspicious thai any arrangement he might make with the Central Govemtnenl concerning Katanga's revenues would (ail to survive (or very long once he gave up his
EHaabeihviiie. Tshombe la theleader, but he is dependent upon thesupport ol his aides It would befor him to go (ar lo meet Adoulaswithout incurring strongMunongo. Kimba. andribes, and theMunongo nor Kimba. Ihe moreot the Katanga separatists, wouldto the strong radical element*Central Government on whomdepend, even if he personally couldTshombe.
n these circumstances, it ia unlikely thai Tshombe will undertake serious negotiation with the Central Government unlessnew pressures can be brought to bear on him. We explore below the variouswhich might be employed, including diplomatic and economic measures, moves by the Central Government, and actions by the UN.
IV. KATANGAN VUlNEtUolllTY IO PRESSURE
iplomatic pressure on Tshombe has been notably unsuccessful. The BelgianItself can exercise only limitedover the many private Belgians andInterests involved. There is probably little more that Premier Spaak canIn view of his own political problems In Belgium. Because large sectors of public opinion in Europe are favorable to Tshombe. and because some moderates within African colonial and ex-colonial areas led likewise, moot ol the European colonial and ex-colonlal powers are unenthustastic about applying pressure on him. In any case, we do notthat mere persuasion. In the absence of strong militaryconomic pressure, will have any decisive effect upon Tsbombe's
B Presumably, economic pressure on Tshombe could be exercised through attempts to force the Union Miniere. (or example, to pay taxes to the Central Government instead of to Katanga, and to permit the Central Government lo acquire dividends paid by commercial interests operating in Katanga However, we believe these measures would lake many months to prepare, and theirwould depend heavily on theot the Belgian Government and other European commercial interests to cooperate fully in their execution While theseeffectivelyreduce the financial resources available to Tshombe. they probably would not in themselves force him to accept Adoula 'a
Moreover. Tshombe could take coun-lermeasures inic IT which might blunt their effect
9eak in the northern half of Katanga, largely populated by thi Baluba tribe* The Central Governmentaluba state there, and has succeeded ln stirring up some sentiment to thai end It has been assisted byOXp troops from Stanleyville, whose entry into the region has been facilitated by the UN.ever, if such efforts shouldsome success, they would not gwt at thesources of Tshombe's strength, would perhaps strengthen Glsetigist Influence in Katanga, and would open up the prospect of uneoo-troUabie tribal wnrfare.
here wouldtrong Incentive for Tshombe to accomrroiate to the Centralerms if real strength and ordern the areas now only norruriaHj under Central Goremmcnl control. If Tshombe ever came to realise that he was occcinirig isolated because the Central Oov-ernmenl had effective armed forces, aeeoocoy, and strong international support, then he would find lt very difficult to hold out against negotiating sxana kind of arrange ment satisfactory to the Centra: Oow-frnrrsent However, the problems confront. ing the Central Qovernmenl are so enormous that II would be many months before It could project to strong an image
he greatest threat to the Katangais that posed by UN militarynowon in the provincemay have been Use immediate cause for the eOliapse of the cease-fire tbe UN now appears to be attemptinghow of military force to convince Trhorabe and his lieutenants that the die is east and that he Had best come to terms while he can stuiGiven their present strength andUN fortes will probably have great difficulty tn accomplishing this, and may be able to do DtOe more than maintain their present positions Withretnforcrrnenl. which now seems to be taking place from within the Congo, they may be able tolimited conertain areas.the withdrawal of forces from other parts of the Congo is leaving those areasexpoied to new disorders arising from army indiscipline, tribal enmities and political to Ungues.
V, THC CONSCQUCNCeS Of TSIrOMBtS OfPABIUtiF Off OUSUI
t appears that pressure upon thtGoremmenlsegotiatcelwith UopoldriUe wUI be very eufTicult to apply eHeclivety. It la, of course,that Tshombe and has lieutenants might be re mo red by more forceful and directaccident, or full-scale UN Intervention. In such an event, there wouldirtually complete politicalin the areaous local leader who would be generally acceptable throughout Katanga. There would befor leadership, including some In the present Katanga Government,umber of tribalight be established
he rrrost serious problem which would be posed by the desi ruction of the Katangawould be tha danger of large-scalefere. eitheratural consequence ol contusion in the wake of Tshombe's removal, or at the result of an attempt by theGovernment lo impose an aumiiinuauon unacceptable, on tribal or other grounds, in ccesssdeiwbie portions of Katanga If It were lo avoid complete chaos, the UN would al-rnosi certainly be forced lo exercise extensive, it not virtually complete, governing authority in Katanga tor an indefinite pmoA
la In the event thai Tshombe should be eliminated through assassination or anwhich Mil his principal lieutenants un-harmad. the latter would atiempl to continue the Katanga regime and to carry out eaten-Ually the aarne policies which Tshombe has pursued However, they would be moteand extreme, and would probably be confronted with more interna! dtewenrjori and conflict, partly of their own making
VI. CONSEQUENCESONTINUED IMPASSE
doula has tern under great procure lo solve the Katanga problem ere* sincebe-caaic prime Minuter Hi has always been vulnerable because he lacks strong polllKal or tribal suppott In his own nghl, and he has been dependantarietyxtremlrt. moderate, and tribal, whose support might be withdrawn at any Una. II be tails to reintegrate Kaunra soon he may be ousted by Use extremists, mote-over, heimilar tick should h* lower his sight* and coma to an accommodation with Tshombe on eiaenttally theerms. Ills political position would obviously be greatly tuefigthaned. not onlyhis potitacal encores In theGovern-ment but agsinst Tshombe as well. If he could demonstrate tn.it he had access tofunds, military supplies, and foreign
assistance not available to other Congolese politicians
It At the moment. Adoula is probably hoping that the UN anil rescue turn from his dun-cullies. If the UN should tail to resolve Use Katanga problem In Ihe present context, he himsell may feel compelled to undertakeoperaiiwis against Katanga, and tomilitary assistance from non-UN sources in order to do SO. If he cannot get Uus from the West, he will probably accept ottersmade by the Soviet Bloc Ironically, even If Use Katanga problem wen aeUled on Adoulaterms, rut peJJliea] future would Mill be In jeoperdy Oppeaitiori to Tshombe hasnifying force; tt has broughtand extremists alike together under Adoula. Once thisemoved thewould be disposed lo try to overturn Adoula
hatever may bt done to resolveseparatism. Ihe Congohole seems likely to remain In turmoil for many months lo come, with ON presence required lor an Indefiniteinimum degree of order as lo be maintained Aasda from the problems of Katanga and the Gracngiats. Use Congo Beams likely to remain plagued with the problem* of lack of army discipline,nemployment, lack of national con-aevousneaa. tribal rivalries and Lack of trad-tramp and training at all levels ofand in the economyhole.
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: