THE CONSEQUENCES OF ALGERIAN PARTITION

Created: 1/24/1962

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

THE CONSEQUENCES OF ALGERIAN PARTITION

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THE CONSEQUENCES OF ALGERIAN PARTITION

THE PROBLEM

To evaluate the consequencesartition of Algeria.

SCOPE

This estimate was prepared in responsepecial request, to deal with theand limited problem given. It does not consider the consequences that would ensue if the entire area of Algeria were to become independent through negotiations.

CONCLUSIONS

of Algeria would lead to further conflict between the French and the Moslems and France would stilleavy military burden. The newGovernment would seek military and Large-scale economic assistance from both East and West. The Bloc would be anxious to exploit such an invitingby providing financial, technical, and military assistance. Conditionsapid expansion of Bloc influence in the independent partartitionedwould appear extremely favorable. (Paras.)

Partition would almost certainly create serious strains between France and the US. If the US failed to respond rapidly to Moslem remiests for assistance, it "'fflPVraViiT certainly lose any chance of countering strong Bloc Influence in Algeria. On the other hand, the French would probably regard any substantial US support for the Algerian regime as callingasic reconsideration of their foreign policies. France's reaction would bestrong in the unlikely event that the US were joined by its other major NATO partners. Although France would hesitate to give up its leverage on the US and to jeopardize its close ties to theRepublic of Germany by actually leaving NATO, it is possible that it would renounce its NATO obligations. Weit more likely, however, that France would not leave the alliance, but would become an even more difficult partner than It is today. }

DISCUSSION

In recent months there has been increasing discussion in France on the partition ofAlthough no firm plan has as yet been officially advanced, speculation has generallyoastal European zone which would include Algiers and its hinterland and would run westward through Oran to the Moroccan border. The depth of this zone might vary considerably, but it would probably extendat least one hundred miles so as tomost of the principal agricultural areas and the water supplies of the cities. The remainder ofthe rest of the agricultural land and the least industrially developedbe left to theWe believe that the French wouldto keep control over much of the Sahara, although the principal existing oil pipelines would run directly across the territory of the Moslem state.

References by de Gaulle to partition have been ambiguous. He has used threatseans of putting pressure on the Algerian rebels to compromise, and he might do so again. If he actually carried through partition, he would probably do soeans of gaining time in the desperate hope that the Provisional Algerian Government (PAG) could eventually be led to accept theor confederation of the European zone into an independent Algerian State on terms that would be more satisfactory than are now possible. De Gaulle probably feels that. In the event such an agreement could not be made, he would still have the option ofthe European zone more or lessor of eventually abandoning it to the Moslems and repatriating those who chose to leave.

1 See tne enclosed maps for geographicalof population, agriculture, and industry InAn overlayypotheticaldistribution of theseAlgeria.

purpose in this paper is not todifficulties ofartition ofbut to explore the consequences ofpartition. Although de Gaulleofolicy as representingof the search for aa decision to partitionalmost certainly not bring theterms, but would arouse their bitterto what they would consider anrob them of the richest part of theirThe policy of partition would bestrenuous efforts by the rebels to reversemilitary, political, and subversivecannot be excluded that the rebelsaccept Incorporation of thezoneederal arrangement.we believe it far more likely thatwould lead to indefinite conflict oran ultimate French withdrawal fromzone either by negotiation or

Consequences of Partition for France and Algeria

The partition of Algeria would of necessity Involve the migrations of hundreds ofof people in and out of both zones. This movement, which would have originated In an atmosphere of political tension and racial animosity, would present both the French and the PAG with continuing problems ofviolence, but would probably notthe eventual establishment of publicin both zones. -

A European zone would represent anartificial appendage of France, at least during the period of adjustment, substantially dependent on metropolitan France forsupport. Moreover, withuropean zone hostilities In one form or another would continue betweenand Europeans and France would stilleavy military burden in Algeria. Since more than halfillion people who would probably end up inone would be Moslem, distrusted by the colons and

subject to agitation and propaganda bynationalists, de Gaulle would be under constant pressure from the Right to protect and sustain the European community. At the same time he would be subject todomestic political dissatisfaction for falling to eliminate France's Algerian problem.

The new state of Moslem Algeria created by partition would face grave adriunistrative and economic problems. Its one political force of any consequence, the FAG, has had noInivilian state and would have to take over authority on short notice with little or no cooperation on the part of the withdrawing French officials. It Is possible that the PAG's distrust of the small Algerian Communist Party would decline sufficiently soumber of Communists, including Europeans, might be utilized in the new state for their baaTy needed skills. In any event, the new government would be sorely taxed to establish and maintain basic control of the country, to say nothing of providing anoperating administrative apparatus throughout Its territory.

Even an Intact Algeria would haveIn staying economically solventontinuation of the substantial subsidies and preferential marketing arrangements nowby theartitioned Moslem state, cut off from most of its traditionalfood supplies, burdenedeavy Influx of refugees and with one of the world's highest population growth rates would have staggering economic requirements of great urgency. Moreover, the government oftate would almost certainly regardof the war against France as the highest priority of the new nation. It would wish to obtain modern equipment for its military establishment as rapidly as possible.

the new Algerian governmentsurvive unaidedery lowlevel, it would almost certainly askand West for substantialsinceovernment wouldreceiving substantial militarythe West we believe that it wouldneighbors and toikestates, andEgypt, would be anxious 'to buildpecial position with respect to the Algerian leadership. However, since the resources of the Arab states are inadequate they might offer to serve as intermediaries for the trans-shipment of Bloc assistance.

Despite their need for aid, the PAG leaders are not eager to falltate of dependency on the Bloc. However, therolonged partition wouldtheir need and narrow theirin this respect. The Bloc for its part would be anxious to exploit such an inviting situation by providing financial, technical, and military assistance. Simultaneously, the Bloc countries would almost certainly provide the new state strong diplomatic and political support.

In summary, the conditionsapidof Bloc influence in the independent partartitioned Algeria, Inflamed by anti-French sentiments and under the control of the more extreme leaders of the PAG, appear extremelyubstantialne-party authoritarian regime which would bear-footing and in severe economic difficulties, would be likely toconditions in which the government would rapidly become stridently anti-Western.

The Consequences of Partition for Morocco and Tunisia

Partition of Algeria and the continuing hostility between the new Moslem state and France would perpetuate the serious political difficulties which the Algerian rebellionposes for the governments of Bourguiba in Tunisia and King Hassan in Morocco. Both fear that the delicate relationships they currently maintain withwhich they depend for preferential marketingand other forms of indirectbe jeopardized by anof Franco-Algerian conflict.

Domestically both governments would come under the pressure of radical nationalists in their own countries to grant the Algerians full assistance even to the point of declaring war on France. This pressure would weigh

more heavily on Morocco than on Tunisiathe European zone would probably(if it were not contiguous to) Morocco's eastern border. Bourguiba, known as the principal exponent of Franco-Algerianmight find himself and his regime under heavy political fire immediatelythe failure of negotiationsrench announcement to proceed with partition.

the least the relations of bothTunisia with France would becomedistant and strained. Bothwould be under strong internalto expel all Frenchmen living InIn the last analysis therelittle either Hassan or Bourguiba couldavoid entanglement in the Algerianor to prevent an increase of Blocthe Mahgreb without risking theirby radical nationalists.two leaders would probably soon findpresently limited capacity toin Algeria would decline as thetook over control In the new state.

Partition and the UN

attempts could be made tothe UN in the Algerian problem.states would urge theMoslem Algeria to the organization. Inthey might alsoreakdownorder necessitating the interventionUN force; or call for UN administrative,or economic aid to the Moslem state;the latter was getting the worst ofwith the French, callNresolution; or attempt to secure acalling upon France to desist fromor to withdraw from the rest of theIn any or all of these actions themight provide its support. Francethe adoption of such measures aswould ignore any resolutions not towould refuse to cooperate withUN decisions; and would activelyany intervention. If effortsarcl aIler Frenchnot welcome, weFrance would boycott and possibly even leave the UN.

Consequence* of Partition for tho US and NATO

The partition of Algeria would confront themany of France's other NATOcruel policy dilemmas. USof the new state would almost certainly create serious strains with France, especially if the French and the Moslems were engaged in open and activear more critical problem would be posed for the US, however, when it was approached by thestate for assistance and possibly forsupport against France. If the US failed to respond rapidly to such requests, it would almost certainly lose any chance ofstrong Bloc influence in Algeria. If the US did respond favorably, however, the French would see our action asloc-supported group with which they were at war on NATO-covered territory.

The French President has in the past shown little receptivity to US and otheropinions on how to prevent Algeria from coming under Bloc influence. In theof continuing Franco-Algerianhe would be likely to feel that the only means left to France by which its Influence in North Africa could be restored and theinduced to reopen negotiations would be by opposing any assistance to the Moslem state. Even Soviet aid to the Moslem state would probably not dissuade de Gaulle.

All of France's allies would face the same dilemmas as the US, but the French would attach particular importance to the attitudes of the UK. West Germany, and Italy. Most of the NATO countries would probably not risk French hostility by recognizing orassisting the PAG. even if the US did so. However, their support for France might well dwindle as time passed, andItaly andfind it difficult to resist establishing contacts with the new regime.

he French would probably regard any substantial US assistance to the Algerian regime, especially in the unlikely event that the US were joined by its major NATOas callingasic reconsideration of their foreign policies. Although France would hesitate to give up its leverage on the

US and to jeopardize Its close ties to theRepublic of Germany by actually leaving NATO, it is possible that it would renounce its NATO obligations. We believe it more likely, however, that France would not leave the alliance, but would become an even more difficult partner than It Is today.

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