CABLE TO OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON INFO OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE BANGKOK SA

Created: 3/7/1962

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

f

Ilimi

(C)

Eoims

(C)

IC)

eo ima

SAIhlMWVrra (CI

It)

PLEASE PASS DEPARTMENT; SAIOON I

A S3 ASSXSTAIfT SI F.

HARRIMAN REFERENCE:

L AS PHOUMI WAS AN HOUR LATE ARRIVING MORNING 7BANGKOK. | D AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALKPRINCE BO UN OUM AT THE AIRPORT.THAT

HE HAD TRIED IN VAIN TO SEE BOUN OUMARCH WHENRETURNED FROM BANGKOK WHERE THEY HAD

SEEN PHOUMI. AS THEY WANTED TO BRIEF BOUN OUM ON THEIR TALKS.

3. BOUN OUM WAS TOLD THAT WE HAD HEARD THROUGH RADIO BROADCAST THAT SOUVANNA PHOUMA AND SOUPHANOUVONG HAD REJECTED THE IDEA OF GOVERNMENT BY KING'S COUNCIL ANDIT SEEMED THAT THE ONLY POSSIBLE SOLUTIONOALITION GOVERNMENT HEADED BY SOUVANNA PHOUMA WITH THE MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE AND INTERIOR IN THE CENTER. WE HAD STRONGLY URGED PHOUMI TO ENTER THIS GOVERNMENT IN ASOSITION AS HE COULD SO THAT HE COULD CONTINUE TO LEAD ANTI-COMMUNIST

WENT ON TO

rs IS)

ELEMENTS AND TO PROTECT HIS SUPPORTERS.

EXPLAIN THAT HE REALIZED THAT THISERY DIFFICULT DECISION FOR BOTH BOUN OUM AND PHOUMI TO TAKE; BUT IT APPEARS CLEAR THAT THE U. S. POSITION AS WELL AS WCR LD OPINIONEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE LAO CRISIS IN ASIME AS POSSIBLE. IN THIS CASE BOTH BOUN OUM AND PHOUMI COULD PLAY MAJOR ROLES IN BRINGINGEACEFUL SOLUTION.

I. BOUN OUM WAS TOLD THAT THE U.OLICY IS VERY CLEAR. PHOUMI HAD BEEN TOLD IN THE PAST THAT THE U. 8. WOULD NOT SUPPORT HIM IN ANY MILITARY OFFENSIVE. NOW THE U. S. WILL NOT SUPPORT THE FAR IF THE SOVIETS ARE UNABLE TO CONTROL THE PL AND VM AND THE LATTER IN FACT ATTACK THE FAR.

4. BOUN OUM WAS TOLD THAT HE. AS THE LEADING PERSONALITY IN LAOS.EADING ROLE TO PLAY AND WE WANTED HIM TO CONTINUE. NOW HIS ASSISTANCE WAS REQUIRED TO HELP PHOUMI CONVINCE OTHER CABINET MEMBERS THAT THE RIGHT COURSE OF ACTIONOMPROMISEELEGATION HEADED BY PHOUMI ENTER THE COALITION GOVERNMENT OF SOUVANNA PHOUMA. BOUN OUM WAS ALSO TOLD THAT WE FELT SO STRONGLY ABOUT THIS, AND OF HIS CAPABILITY OF FULFILLING THIS MISSION THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO CONTINUE SUPPORTING HIM IN HIS WORK THROUGHOUT

-a-

Yrs

(SI

rS

IS)

rS

IS)

BOUN OUM LISTENED VERY INTENTLY THROUGHOUT. HE SAID HE WANTED TO THINK IT OVER AND ASKED | |f" CALL AT HIS RESIDENCEARCH. BOUN OUM WAS TOLD THAT THISRIVATE MATTER FOR THE TIME BEING AND SHOULD ONLY BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN US. IF HE WISHED WE COULD GO INTO MORE DETAILS LATER ON THIS AFTERNOON. BOUN OUM AGREED AND SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO TALK MORE ABOUT IT.

fl. 0 HOURS | ^CALLED ON PRINCE BOUN OUM AT HIS RESIDENCE. BOUN OUM SAID THAT HE HAD TALKED BRIEFLY WITH PHOUMI WHO HAD ONLY REPORTED ON HIS CONVERSATION WITH THAI OFFICIALS. BOUN OUM DID NOT ELABORATE ON PHOUMl'S REPORT. HE ADDED THAT PHOUMI DID NOT MENTION THE CONVERSATION HE HAD HAD IN BANGKOK WTTh|

7. AT THIS POINT AIN EXPLAINED TO BOUN OUM THE U. S. POSITION AS DESCRIBED INBOVE. BOUN OUM WAS TOLD AGAIN THAT HEEADING PERSONALITY COULDEADING ROLE IN BRINGINGEACEFUL SOLUTION

AND ALSO HELP TO MAINTAINTI-COMMUNIST ELS MB NTS. BOUN OUM SAID THAT SOUVANNA PHOUMA WAS AN EXTREMELY WEAK PERSON WHO WAS EASILY INFLUENCED. FOR EXACTLY THIS REASON, BOUN OUM WAS TOLD, PHOUMI ANDNSISIENOMAY, BOUN OUM'S BROTHER-IN-LAW, SHOULD BEOALITION GOVERNMENT.

S. BOUN OUM WAS AGAIN TOLD THAT Wfi KNEW HE WAS CARRYING ON CERTAIN ANTI-COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES, LIKE BUILDING PRIVATE HOSPITAL IN PAKSE ANDTI-COMMUNIST INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT LAOS SHOULD BE MAINTAINED. BOUN OUM WAS URGED TO PERSUADE PHOUMI TOOALITION GOVERNMENT. I

9. BOUN OUM SAID HE HAD GIVEN CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT TO WHAT HE HAD HEARD THIS MORNING AT THE AIRPORT AND THAT HEOLUTION MUST BE FOUND IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME. AT THIS POINT BOUN OUM WAS TOLD THAT THE ALTERNATIVEOALITION GOVERNMENT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES AND AS THE FAR WAS WEAKER THAN THE ENEMY ONLY DISASTROUS RESULTS COULD BE ANTICIPATED. BOUN OUM SAID THAT THE MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCK FOR PHOUMI WOULD BE THE MILITARY

WHO WERE GENUINELY FEARFUL NOT ONLY FOR THEIRALSO FOR THEIR SAFETY UNDER SOUVANNA WHO COULDHE WANTED AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF AND BOUN OUM WAS TOLD THAT LOGICALLY THESTRUCTURE SHOULD REMAIN INTACT UNTILPLACE; HOWEVER, THIS HAD TO BE MADE CLEAR TO bUUN OUM ASKKDfl HwHAT HE HONESTLY THOUGHT.

MtMiptim

PLIED THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS THE ONLY POSSIBLE PEACEFUL SOLUTION AND THEREFORE HONESTLY URGED THAT BOUN OUM SHOULD ENCOURAGE PHOUMI TOOUVANNA GOVERNMENT.

U. BOUN OUM SAID THAT HE APPRECIATED THE OFFER OF PERSONAL SUPPORT AND THAT HE WOULD TRY TO PERSUADE PHOUMI. BOUN OUM WAS ASKED TO USE HIS INFLUENCE WITH OTHER CABINET MEMBERS BECAUSE THISERY MFFICULT DECISION FOR PHOUMI AND IT WOULD NEED ALL OF THE SUPPORT THAT BOUN OUM COULD MUSTER.

U. AVINg| AIN ASKED BOUN OUM IF HKxrTn| |ln EFFORT PERSUADE PHOUMI TO MAKE THISOUM AGAINCOUNT ON HIS ENTIRE

COLLABORATION.

AMBASSADOR BROWN HAS SEEN THIS MESSAGE.

END OF MESSAGE

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA