Highlights of Reports Processed Thus Far
3. The value of the reports so far translated has equalled or exceeded previous expectations basedreliminary scanning of the documents.
The documents haverolific source of army order of battle and represent an OB acquisition unmatched since Korean War days. The documents
have yielded identifications ofajor military units by true designation andthers by cover designation throughout China. Their subject matter covers virtually the entire gamut of ACSI'sresponsibilities for China. Illustrative of the rangeyi* nature of their intelligence are the following nuggets extracted from reports thus far translated:
. The Chinese have no nuclear weapons and their military leadership recognizes that it will have to "fight any war within theears with the weapons we now have on hand".
I'D. The total strength of the Chinese armed forcesen; the total vehicle inventory of the Chinese Army0 trucks.
c. The militia, which the Chinese have claimed to numberillion men, Is largely an empty shell. Inilitia inspection team checking Ho nan Province's claimedillion militiamen, found that entire units existed only on paper and that several militia battalions, supposedly composed ofen, badozen or so militiamen who did not even know who their platoon leader was supposed to be. 5. An unexpected bonus in the translation of these documents was the discovery of our first firm indication of the retrenchment China's economic troubles have forced on her military establishment. The statistics contained in these documents reveal the startling dimensions of this retrenchment. They show that bank deposits maintained by the armed forces were frozen at the end0 and all spending from them was temporarily stopped. The national defense budget was pared
byillion in the category of "expenditureby military social organizations" alone. Barracks construction programs were cut%0 and the Rear Services Department ordered that "all military construction which can be halted must be halted and all that can be stretched out or reduced, must be". In tho drat six monthshina's industries delivered to the military lessf the truck parts scheduled for delivery, lessf tires, and lessf weapons and related items;f the steel allotted to the armed forces was actually delivered during this period and the Rear Services Department estimated that China's industry could deliver during all1 only one-third lo one-half of the goods planned for allocation to the military. Since the Chinese have never released military production figures and have released no significant production figures of any kind for almost two years, this has been uniquely valuable intelligence.
6. The documents have also provided. Government's first firm intelligence on the impact of China's recent poor harvests on her privileged armed forces. They show that the Rear Services Department declared the problem of providing adequate food to soldiers "the very core" of their logistics problem. According to admittedly incomplete statistics,0 members of the armed forces suffered from gross nutritional deficiencies between
0 and% of tbe troops of tbe Foochow and Nanking Military Districts were incapacitated by edema and investigations showed that troops in several units who neededalories per person per day were actually receiving as littlealories. After intensive diversion of military personnel to food-gathering and food-substitute campaigns (one army employedenf its effectives in this way) the Rear Services Department declared the situation ingreatlyut admitted that most military regions had stopped issuing meat rations,f soldiers were still getting inadequate rations, andurther reduction in rations was likely.
7. Less easily summarised but almost as valuable aredetailing military strategy and tactics, militaryallowances and extension of services provisions,within the ranks of the military leadership, etc. of all the documents is completed, we confidently expect
this acquisition tovaluableOriginal document.